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
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
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
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from the path he had chosen, or fail in fulfilling the promises held out, instead of meriting immortal glory, he would become odious to all Italy, as well as to the rest of Europe, since even those who professed Protestantism now applauded him. dedication was approved by all to whom I read it, except De Lamennais and Mamiani in Paris, and Bozzelli, to whom I sent it, in Naples: I yielded to the weight of these authorities, and suppressed my dedication. Seeing that Charles Albert was disposed to ameliorate his government, I softened my expressions on his conduct in 1821, and thus my Memoirs went to press: in England, in France, and above all, in Naples, they met with a favourable reception, which I could hardly have expected. In Naples, where they penetrated with difficulty and by stealth, they sold for ten times their price; even the ministers, who were the first to read them, acknowledged that I had told the truth without any exaggeration.

In 1847, the political news from Italy was such, that my friends said and wrote to me that I should have to write other volumes: they were not deceived.

The volumes I am about to publish will not, like their predecessors, contain the adventures of a youth, who for his love of liberty was driven into exile at seventeen years of age; who afterwards, for persevering in the same love, without a moment's repose, passed his days alternately in chains, or in camps; who, in his thirty-eighth year, having attained the highest military rank, at the head of 50,000 men, succeeded in giving liberty to his country.

As, in consequence of the late events, the Italians now honour me with more than their former confidence, so my desire and my duty become more stringent to set forth the facts, to point out the errors committed, and the means of avoiding them, whenever the sacred struggle for our independence shall be renewed.

It would be unpardonable not to avail ourselves of the advantages we have gained in our late misfortunes; first by the experience of our strength and valour, and next, by the certainty we have obtained, that, from the Alps to Trapani, all desire to drive out the Austrians and be independent.

The inhabitants of Reggio, the capital of southern Calabria, and of Messina, were the first to grow impatient to throw off the heavy yoke, and to shed their blood in the holy cause.

Mamiani and Massari wrote to advise me to ask permission from the King of Sardinia to go to Genoa, Though Piedmont i٧

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quarters were at Sinigaglia; he often visited my family;" he then added, "You may tell him that I highly esteem his merit as a General, and his patriotism, and that I will invite him to come to Rome, as soon as I am in harmony with the King of Naples, who at this moment would be much annoyed to know that General Pepe was in Rome, and so near his territories."

This hope which Pius IX. entertained of being reconciled to the King of Naples, did not prevent the latter from speaking of him as il pazzo, rather than as Pope.


Ferdinand II., both in his words and actions, seemed more than averse to making any concessions on either side the Straits, when the Palermitans gave the first shock to his absolute power. The reverses which the royal troops suffered, commanded by Marshal Desauget, produced the most beneficial results in Naples, and contributed towards obtaining a constitution.

The Pope, who was the first cause of all

the popular demonstrations, both in Rome, Tuscany, and Piedmont, conceded but little; still less was granted by the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the King of Sardinia; and every concession was, as it were, forced from them. Therefore these Princes met with but little gratitude either for the institutions promised, or for the constitutions which were at last given, because they were evidently forced to confer these gifts by the example of the King of Naples, who by character was the most despotic of all the Italian Princes, and yet the first who was compelled in Italy to grant a constitution. The tenacity of Ferdinand to preserve his absolute power entire was such, that Louis Philippe said to the Count of Syracuse-"I have given good advice to your brother the King, but if he does not profit by it, I must abandon him to his fate." The King of the French showed that he understood the political position of others better than his own.

But if the Sardinian king was slow to make concessions, both he, his ministers, and the persons in place about his court, showed their aversion to the Austrians without disguise. This circumstance, which was most useful in Italian affairs, appeared to me no longer doubtful after I had conversed with the Commandant Ferretti, who arrived in Paris, and related to me, that on going to Turin from Milan, in the quality of a Major on the Austrian retired list, he presented himself to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, accompanied by the minister of Austria. Both were received very coldly; and the Austrian minister said to Ferretti, "This coldness is for me, and not for you." In fact, Ferretti found an invitation to dinner at his house. from the Sardinian minister, who said to him, when he saw him, "How could you think of coming to me accompanied by the Austrian minister?"

Many other anecdotes were told me by



conspiring against despotism, and the first words of Pius IX. ripened in that people, and above all in the ardent Calabrese, the desire of liberty. Some letters written by the secret and revolutionary committee established at Naples, to the patriots in Reggio, hastened a movement. The head of this committee was Dominico Romeo, a native of the district of Reggio, a man of talent and high-toned mind. In August, 1847, he went into Calabria, passing through Messina, where he communicated his intentions to many warm liberals; he thence proceeded to Reggio, and there, on the 2nd September, he made the revolution break out; it was to be seconded by the three Calabrian provinces and by Messina. On that day all the people in Reggio rose, and those among the government functionaries who did not fly, concealed themselves ignominiously.

The small military garrison, comprehending officers of artillery and engineers,




"Reggio to the Provinces of Naples and Sicily.

"Faithful to our promises, we have hoisted the tricoloured flag of Italian independence, amid overpowering shouts of 'Viva the constitutional King Ferdinand II.! Viva liberty!' The constitution of 1820, so happily obtained, so spontaneously sworn to, was afterwards violated, betrayed, and destroyed by foreigners. How many citizens during the past twenty-seven years, in vainly attempting to restore it, have with their blood purchased that martyrdom which their memory has made sacred to us.

"Brothers, to arms! Let us remember the blood of our Martyrs! Strong in numbers, union, and will, faithful to former contracts, we will hasten towards the capital of the kingdom, where we are confidently expected.

"Like other civilised nations, we desire a constitutional, representative govern-



entrance of the Straits against any expedition from Naples, and to give confidence to the Messenians, whose insurrection (commenced the 1st of September), though vigorously sustained in repeated encounters between the citizens and the troops, was nevertheless repressed by the multitude of the royal forces. The insurgent masses at Messina had been repulsed, according to the current accounts, because they had not succeeded in getting into their power General Landi, the Commandant of the citadel, and at least a part of the officers of the garrison.

King Ferdinand, receiving intelligence by telegraph of the revolution in Reggio, instantly dispatched a corps of troops under the orders of De Corne, with precise commands to bombard every place which resisted.

The government of Reggio not having succeeded in time in getting possession of the forts which guard the Straits, a steam frigate entered without opposition, with the troops on board, who arrived before the city of Reggio and began to bombard it.

Unhappily, the counsel to save the city from the evils of a bombardment prevailed, and the armed bands were therefore ordered to retire towards the mountains, and defend themselves there. At the same time they expected news of the masses in the contiguous provinces, where the population, terrified by the hostile preparations of the government, remained immovable, and thus failing in their promises, they became responsible for all the misfortunes to which their fellow-countrymen who had first taken up arms were exposed. These found themselves alone, exposed at once to the assaults of the soldiers, the gendarmerie, and, what was worse, of the Urban guard (a numerous corps, acquainted with the localities, and composed of men devoted to Del Carretto), and these corps formed altogether a numerous body. The bands of Reggio, at the sight of so much adversity, were disheartened, and thus this revolutionary movement, instead of advancing, receded.

True it is, that some of the populations in the countries watered by the Gonio had responded to Reggio, but they were immediately opposed by General Nunziante, who, disembarking at Palma, crossed the mountains with the troops he commanded.

And here begin the days of struggle and of terror. The denunciation of a police agent, or a gendarme, was sufficient to cause hundreds of respectable citizens to be dragged to prison. Every kind of torture and atrocity was employed against them. An order from the agents of government placed eighteen citizens of the best families out of the pale of the law; and to excite the zeal of their persecutors, 1000 ducats were promised to whomsoever should arrest one of these alive, and 500 to whomsoever should take them dead. This

iniquitous and brutal ordinance was signed by Prince Aci Catina, who commanded in Upper Calabria. Nor was the persecution limited to the eighteen comprised in the list, for a youth of seventeen years of age, named Fati, who had no other fault than having been born in the community of St. Stefano, the country of Romeo, without any form of trial, was shot. Three other individuals suffered the same fate, Favaro, Giuffre, and Ferruzano, all three perfectly innocent. More than a hundred other victims would have experienced the same death, if a Calabrese lady, named Caterina di Lieto, born at Cavassa, had not hastened to Naples, and presented herself to the Bourbon, to obtain a suspension of the execution of the sentence of death, which the military commission had pronounced against her husband. This occasioned the suspension of all the other capital condemnations as well. But such was the thirst for blood in the satellites of the King, VOL L

that the decreed suspension could not save Bello, Mazzoni, Ruffo, Salvatori, or Verduci, all five in the flower of their age; of noble and generous natures, and belonging to five of the best families in the district of Geraci.

The end of Dominico Romeo was extremely tragical; finding himself seriously ill, he concealed himself in a cottage with his nephew Pietro. The Urban guards of Pedavoli had notice given them of this, and eighty of them went to arrest him. In the midst of a desperate defence, Dominico received a mortal stroke in his breast which was amply avenged by his nephew Pietro, who with his musket brought his uncle's murderer to the ground. Urban guards seeing that it would not be possible to take Dominico alive to the judges, for he was dying, cut off his head, which they placed upon a pole, and carried it in triumph through the streets of Reggio. Forty among those who were condemned

for political offences were mingled with many convicted malefactors, and sent to Naples, where they were chained in couples and placed in the Darseno, under the eyes of the King.

Thus ended the first peninsular movement, which was followed by much bloodshed. Its sole aim was Italian independence.

The Calabrese who first took it up showed great vigour and a contempt of life which was worthy of better fortune. So much courage only added to the ignominious barbarity with which they were treated by their victors, the prince and his satellites.

In 1799 Cardinal Ruffo, armed with a cross and a sword, came from Calabria to drive out of the kingdom the French who had arrived with promises of liberty. Their promises were uncertain, but there is no doubt that they were strangers who wished to give us laws. From Calabria, in 1808, that Carbonaro sect first issued, which was afterwards established in France, and in

the Spanish peninsula even before 1820, when in conjunction with the army and the civic militia, they aided me in over-throwing absolute power. So in these last circumstances, so unfortunate for Italy, the Calabrese were the first to shed their blood, that the stranger might be driven beyond the Isonzo.

May it still be their fate, and with better fortune, a fourth time to send forth a shout which may resound from Calabria to the Alps, of "Italian independence!"

CHAPTER II.

Succinct account of the first Insurrection in the two Sicilies, especially in Naples, where the King is compelled to grant a Constitution.*

As soon as Pius IX. was elevated to the chair of St. Peter, he commenced his career by an amnesty, and then proceeded by degrees to other reforms. This liberal policy, on the part of the Pontiff, moved the minds of the Italians, and it became clearly impossible that the old institutions in the peninsula should long remain unchanged. Leopold Duke of Tuscany, and then Charles Albert, were the first to follow the Pope's example, and to concede some reforms.

Ferdinand II. of Naples alone remained unmoved in his despotism, and he repeated

^{*} This chapter has been dictated by a Neapolitan citizen of

to his intimates that he should follow the policy of his ancestors; adding, that in the kingdom of Naples, these institutions which were so much wanted, had long been established by his predecessors, who called themselves reformers. Certainly in the kingdom of Naples, there were provincial and district councils; there was a council of state, and good laws both civil and criminal. But these institutions were corrupted and spoilt by the bad faith of an absolute government, which in the choice of its magistrates and public functionaries, constantly inclined to the dishonest, the servile, and the ignorant; so that in defining the government of Naples it might truly be said, that there was a constant contradiction between law and facts.

It is incontestable that good institutions perish in the hands of a corrupt and ignorant administration, while even bad ones may fructify when administered by able and honest functionaries. Thus, justice, in Naples, was a vain word; innocence was no defence, and faults were often unpunished.

By the side of a criminal law which prescribes the greatest consideration for the accused, and an unlimited liberty of defence, were found commissaries of police, who subjected even those accused of common misdemeanors to the greatest violence and intolerable tortures; much worse than were prescribed by the ancient criminal laws; these were at least regulated by certain conditions, while those depended entirely on the arbitrary ferocity of a single man.

Pius IX.'s reforms, contrasted with the Vandal government of Naples, rendered the people, who are by nature fervent lovers of liberty, most impatient. In southern Calabria, which has Reggio for its capital, the absolute government of Ferdinand was abolished, and a constitutional one proclaimed.

The city of Messina responded to this

movement, but both were repressed by brute force, and with the odious circumstances related in the last chapter.

These cruelties and enormities rather excited than frightened the Neapolitans. Frequent tumultuous demonstrations took place in the capital; they were not diminished either by frequent imprisonments, or by the deaths and wounds which occurred in collisions between the liberals and the armed force and police.

The 12th of January, which was the King's birthday, was at hand. The Sicilians, and especially the Palermitans, had already sent to the King to say that they should have recourse to arms, if liberal institutions were not granted them before that day. They were true to their word; seeing on the 12th that all their hopes were vain, the Palermitans commenced the conflict. The King of Naples immediately despatched two steam frigates, and about five thousand men under the com-

mand of General Desauget to Palermo. The column which formed the expedition was ill commanded; the Sicilians fought with unanimity and valour, and compelled the royal troops to re-embark. The news of the Sicilian movement greatly excited the Neapolitans, who considered it a sacred duty to assist their Sicilian brothers, which they did in the following manner.

The flag of liberty was hoisted in the province of Salerno at Lilento, and nearly 10,000 men armed themselves under different chiefs, with an understanding that they were to go on augmenting their force, and then march on the capital and force the King to grant a constitution.

But neither the revolution in Sicily, which gained strength by the advantage gained over the royal troops, nor the insurrection in the province of Salerno, had yet moved the mind of the King; he still hoped to conquer and repress the revolt.

But events followed in Naples, which

decided the King to grant the constitution. The liberals of the city, seeing that the different movements, so happily begun, had hitherto produced no results, met together, and after alarming the government with various demonstrations, they assembled to the number of 20,000 men on the 27th of January, in order to overthrow the absolute power.

On the morning of the 27th, at eleven o'clock a.m. in the piazza before the Royal Palace, and in the Toledo as far as the piazza Mercatello, were assembled about 20,000 liberals of the capital. Near the church of St. Ferdinando, close to the palace, were heard the first cries of Viva la costituzione! which with the rapidity of lightning were repeated through the immense multitude, which then proceeded with measured step and tricoloured banners flying, while the ladies from the windows and balconies received them with joyous acclamations.

After this triumphal procession had lasted about an hour, the cavalry were ordered out, commanded by Marshal Statella. At the sight of this armed force, these generous youths, who were unarmed, stood firm. They even went up to the cavalry, and surrounding Marshal Statella, invited him to cry Viva la costituzione! Neither Statella nor the cavalry repressed these joyous shouts, and their countenances showed that the King would not refuse the ardent wishes of the Neapolitans. The Marshal went with the procession to the Royal Palace, and the joyful people retired.

In this interval, the ministers had assembled in council: in consequence of this popular movement, they saw the impossibility of pursuing a despotic course, and they became as humble and yielding, as they had previously been proud and untractable.

The general opinion was, that they must yield to the haughty attitude of the people; and the King himself, hitherto immoveable, saw the necessity of political concessions. The ministers all gave in their resignation, which was accepted; and in the course of the night, Serra Capriola was entrusted with the task of forming a constitutional ministry. On the evening of the 27th, the streets were thronged with groups of young men, discussing the position of the country, and they determined on going armed to the piazza and forcing the government to resign.

Some days before this, the Minister of Police, Carretto, had been banished the kingdom; by his severe and tyrannical measures he had made enemies of the people, and had hastened the political revolution.

Early on the 28th, the determination of the government to yield began to be known. The resignation of the ministry was placarded on the walls, with the formation of a new one, consisting of Serra

Capriola, Buonomni, the Prince of Torella. Dentice, Ciarciulli, and the consultatore Scavazzi, a Sicilian. Ciarciulli not having accepted, Francesco Paulo Bozzelli was substituted in his place. The choice of Bozzelli excited universal applause, and seemed in itself more than a constitution. The confidence felt in him could not be misplaced, the acts of his whole life were highly honourable. A liberal since 1820, when he went into banishment, after the nine months' duration and the fall of the constitution became a signal for tyranny, he was imprisoned and exiled, and lived poor and without reproach in a foreign land. On being restored to his country, he lived surrounded by the esteem of his fellow citizens, and followed his profession of an advocate in order to give himself the means of existence. To this may be added the fame he acquired by many works on literature and constitutional law and his constant attach-

ment, even after the sorrows of exile, to the liberal party; so much so, that he awakened the suspicions of despotism, and was imprisoned again in 1844, together with Carlo Poërio, Aspareti Graziosi, Primicerio, De Agostini and others, and was detained in prison many months. And yet this man, who gave such promise, and on whom so much hope was founded, was one of the chief causes of the misfortunes of Italy; united to the illiberal government, he became at once a courtier and a hostage;-he prepared and matured the reaction against the great idea of Italian nationality; he destroyed the constitution, and caused the war of independence to fail, by blindly and vilely seconding the views of King Ferdinand, in whom the Jesuit and the Austrian were combined.

It was no fault in the Neapolitans to have confided in him, for their trust seemed well founded; it was wholly the fault of Bozzelli, who thus belied himself, by denying every principle of his past life.

On the morning of the 29th, the promise of the constitution and its outline were published. In a few days the constitution itself, drawn up by Bozzelli, appeared. It was, with few variations, an exact copy of the French constitution, within the narrow bounds of which he had received his political education. Though the form of the government was changed, the substance remained the same; the public functionaries were unaltered, with this difference, that, before the constitution, they were, if not revered, at least respected; after the constitution they were despised and vituperated. Besides the many causes which produced our ruin, there was one which was most fatal in its effects. By his constitution, Bozzelli had invested the nation with political rights, but he had not foreseen, that other laws were necessary to guard the exercise of those rights.

For example, the censorship of the press was abolished, without any provision being made to guard against its delinquencies, which were sure to abound after this sudden emancipation. No committee was instituted with powers to act until the constitution was adapted to the country, and to prevent the evils likely to result from too rapid a passage from absolutism to liberty.

Yet this constitution of the 29th of January 1848, changed the political position, not only of Sicily, but of the whole peninsula. Naples, which gave to Italy the first example of a constitutional government, might also have decided the expulsion of the Austrians, which was more essential than constitutions or republics, if the unhappy events of the 15th May, as we shall hereafter see, had not given the King and his iniquitous ministers courage to recall the army from the right bank of the Po.

CHAPTER III.

The Author not included in the Amnesty at Naples.—Extension of the Amnesty, which finally permits him to return to his country.—French Republic foreseen by no one,—Opinion of Lamartine on the assistance to be given to Italy.—

The Author leaves Paris.—Arrival in Genoa.—News on arriving there.

Scarcely was the promised constitution in Naples made known, when my friends, my acquaintances, and even myself, did not doubt that I should return there. Mrs. Gilchrist and her sister, English ladies who had known me twenty-seven years, that is, since my first arrival in London, and who had been my constant friends, came to me, and, moved even to tears, exclaimed, "You are then no longer proscribed!" To celebrate my new position, they gave a banquet, to which they invited almost all the Italians in Paris. A few hours before I went to the entertainment,

I received from Naples a printed copy of the constitution, from which my name was excluded; and in order that it might be so, the King had punished only the state criminals of the revolution in 1820; that is to say, he remembered the old and forgot the more recent culprits. Not to disturb the joy of the banquet, I concealed the royal decree which confirmed my exile. I afterwards heard from Naples, that the patriots, with Carlo Poërio at their head, raised such clamours on account of this scandal, as to bring about an extension of the constitution, and when it was definitively promulgated, all political delinquents were included.

I was thus once more free to return to my country about the time at which the kingdom of France was transformed into a republic.

If either kings or people were capable of profiting by what they see and read, the former would be persuaded, that in spite of the force which sustains their authority they are liable to fall; and the latter would know that it is more difficult to uphold a revolution, than to make one.

For the moment let me forget Italy, where I may soon return, and speak of France, or rather of Paris, which represents it, and where I have been domiciled eighteen years. During that time I had kept away from festal assemblies, from drawing-rooms, and even from theatres, for my heart, ever riveted to my unhappy country, sought no such diversion. I saw but a few chosen acquaintances and friends, whose conversation sometimes consoled my afflicted mind. Several of these were no longer alive, as La Fayette, Haxo, Valasé, Lamarque, I had been intimate with the aged Sièves of the convention, Barrère, Benjamin Constant, Carelli, and James Lafitte. Among the living there remained Lamennais, Thibeaudau the conventionalist, Arago, Béranger, Mignet, Odillon Barrot, Lamartine, the Duke d'Harcourt. I remember the political opinions of all on their own country, and there were few who thought alike. I believe there is no nation in Europe, in which men of superior intellect vary so much in their political sentiments as in France. I always recollect a sentence of Arago, the astronomer, spoken about three years ago, when he did me the favour of dining with me in company with the elder Thibeaudau, Lamennais, and Mamiani. Speaking of the wretched government of Louis Philippe, and the sad condition of France since that king had ascended the throne, Arago said, "Unhappily he is supported by the powerful aristocracy of the bourgeoisie and the shopkeepers, who by their numbers are more powerful than the aristocracy of the nobles;" and all echoed this opinion.

In the mean time February arrived, with a revolution which was foreseen neither by those who deprecated, nor by those who desired a change, and still less by the King himself. A few days before, Louis Philippe had said to the President of the Chamber, "Rather than extend the electoral franchise, I will change ministers twenty times, and will place my veto on the twenty-first."

A short time before the 24th of February, Lamartine said to me, "Count Molé came to see me yesterday; we talked of a change of ministry which he was to make." The same day, I found Béranger at Lamennais' house, talking over the events of the moment. Lamennais was firmly convinced that, after Louis Philippe, no other government than a republic would be possible; he added, that though events were marching rapidly, he could not foresee the final crisis with certainty, that is, whether it would precede or follow the death of the King. Revolutions being prepared by a certain invisible process in the secret depths of men's minds, their execution depends on an instantaneous concord of divers causes, and a spontaneous combination of will and power, the production of which is ever determined by unforeseen circumstances, and escapes all forecast respecting the precise moment in which it will be effected.

It is known to all, that if the Duchess of Orleans had mounted her horse on the morning of the 24th of February, accompanied by Odillon Barrot, or if, on the same morning, she had gone to the Chamber of Deputies only an hour earlier than she presented herself there, she would have been proclaimed Regent; two instances of the accidents on which our social destinies depend.

In the evening of the 24th, I went to see Odillon Barrot, who had always a small circle round him. I found him wearied with the fatigues of the day. He said to me, "I am punished for my victory." In truth, every one was surprised to see him excluded from the new government, while the most decisive impulsion given to the revolution was certainly given by him. Two or three days later he said to me, "I shall go and ask you for an asylum in Naples."

I visited Lamartine at the ministry of foreign affairs. On seeing me he said, " Embrassons-nous," and I embraced him, assuring him that he was the first great poet of our times, who had given such unequivocal proofs of courage; and I added, "You did not throw away your sword in Philip's camp." A few days later, Lamartine, before going to the council of ministers, said to me, in the presence of two veteran generals, "France is disposed to send 100,000 men to Italy, to favour her independence." I answered that 30,000 would be sufficient, in order to connect the Sardinian forces with the Neapolitan, and with the few troops to be found in the Tuscan and Roman States.

In the mean time, in one of the articles

of the enlarged Neapolitan constitution, drawn up by Bozzelli, and sworn to by the King, as I have before pointed out, it is clearly said, that a veil was to be thrown over all past political events. Wherefore, my brother Florestano wrote to me that I was expected with impatience by all; at the same time he counselled me not to give up my house in Paris, or to sell my furniture. What cold precaution! Was this the same brother who twenty-seven years before, uncertain whether I should be able to reach constitutional Spain, and seeing me in danger of falling into the hands of the Austrians, wrote to bid me remember that I had a pair of pistols with me? But now, who could foresee that fortune would thus scoff at Italian liberty? Placing my faith more in the French Republic than in the oaths of our princes, I prepared to depart, leaving my house and furniture to be disposed of.

I saw the excellent Arago, Minister of

Marine, who was also well disposed to assist Italy. But, for some time past, I had renewed my acquaintance with the Duke d'Harcourt, whom I had formerly met at the house of my dear friend General Haxo. D'Harcourt was distinguished at once for his patriotism and for his love of Italy. In the conviction that he would not now be left idle, I begged him to give the preference to the Roman embassy, from whence he would have the means of aiding the good cause. I repeated the same wish to Lamartine, who told me that he desired to send d'Harcourt to London. I instantly repaired to the latter, and begged him to give the preference to Rome. He was, in fact, named ambassador to the Pontiff, and from Rome he wrote to me in Venice.

It never came into my mind, that, in the council of ministers at Naples, Savaresi would be directed by the King to send a steam-frigate to Marseilles, in order to convey me to Naples.

On the 16th of March, I quitted Paris, grieved at parting from a few excellent and affectionate friends, and before the end of the month. I embarked on a steamer which transported me to Genoa. The only previous occasion on which I had seen those shores, was at the early age of sixteen, when I was driven into exile, and my property confiscated. This happened in 1799. We were three hundred proscripts in all, in two vessels. After landing at Marseilles, I had then walked to Dijon, and crossed the Great St. Bernard with the glorious Italian legion, which distinguished itself so much at Marengo. At that early age the beauty of the country made but little impression on my mind, but now, after forty-nine years, I admired it exceedingly. In the midst of this admiration, my thoughts wandered alternately between the past and the present. But I had scarcely set foot in Genoa, when news was brought me which made the new social

scenes much more marvellous than the past. In Berlin, in Vienna, liberty had been proclaimed: the people of those vast states had risen, and overthrown their despotic governments. To these strange events was added the revolution in Milan, in which a people almost entirely unarmed, had driven out 22,000 Austrians, commanded by their General-in-chief in person, and supported by a citadel. Finally, I heard of the revolution in Venice, and the expulsion of the Austrians from the Lagoon.

It seemed like a dream to hear of these marvellous acts of vigour, which, for the third time, were exclusively performed by Italians. The population of Naples alone, in the time of Massaniello, drove out the Spaniards from the capital; and the Genoese did the same by the Austrians just a century ago. Venice, and afterwards Brescia, also drove the enemy from their cities. Did the cities of Spain, France, England,

Germany, Poland, or Russia ever dare as much? Madrid rose against Murat, but was subdued by that valorous leader.

These unexpected events in France, Germany, and Italy, seemed to me favourable to Italian independence, which now, I thought, we should have but small merit in acquiring. The revolt of Palermo and Naples had been brought about by natives against natives, though the royal troops were supported by Swiss mercenaries. Of the two revolutions beyond the Po, that of Milan was the most vigorous, the most manly, the most gigantic; that of Venice was the most extraordinary.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIVE DAYS' REVOLUTION IN MILAN.

"No; even tyranny has its limits! When the oppressed no longer find justice on the earth, when their yoke is become insupportable, let them, full of faith, stretch their hands towards heaven, and draw down from thence those eternal rights, which there remain unalienable, indestructible as the stars! Let them return to that primitive state of nature in which man encounters man; when no other means avail, that supreme resource remains, and the sweet becomes lawful." Schiller.—William Tell.

Austria, which during so many years had governed by political and religious hypocrisy, finally threw off the mask. In Ferrara, the imperial soldiers brutally outraged the Pontifical flag; Pius IX. was punished for having blessed Italy, and cursed its tyrants. The Lombardo-Venetian provinces, condemned to ignorance and progressive impoverishment, daily saw the source of all public and private prosperity withered and weakened.

In the space of a few years, two thousand millions (a fabulous sum, when the size of our territory, not more than an eighth of the monarchy, is considered)two thousand millions had been buried in the imperial treasury, to our great misfortune, and without real advantage for the finances of the empire; such is the ignorance and corruption which in Austria rule public affairs! Everywhere commerce languished, hampered as it was by the fetters of prohibitive laws, and enormous taxes; while, on the other hand, smuggling increased excessively, and was one, though not the only cause, of the universal immorality. There were no longer any cannon founderies; nor manufactories of arms, or of linen cloth. Native industry was ever sacrificed to that of its rivals, Austria, Moravia, and Bohemia. No encouragement was given to agriculture, the principal source of municipal wealth. The delays of the administration were incredible, and lawsuits eternal. The conscription was intolerable Every year the flower of our youths were transported into Hungary, Moravia, Bohemia, and latterly into Gallicia. Talent was either bought by the police, shackled by the censorship laws, or left to die in chains. Information, that social disgrace, owed its growth to Austria, and this horrid pest had penetrated into the very heart, and corrupted the very marrow, of society. There were spies in the piazze, spies in the cafés, in the theatres, in the churches, in the most intimate family privacy. Many honoured citizens, because they were suspected by the government, without other reason, were imprisoned; many were, from the same motive, torn from the sanctuary of their homes, and sent as exiles into a foreign land. Nor did Austrian oppression stop here. Marshal Radetsky was superior to the police. Despised by us for his ridiculous airs, he revenged himself for our contempt by hating us mortally. The soldiers knew this, and the excesses of military insolence towards the peaceful citizens in Milan had attained their highest pitch, when the bloody scenes of January, 1848, took place.

It was then that Austria, throwing off all decency, inaugurated in Lombardy the giudiccio statario, which authorised the government to assassinate in the space of two hours; and, for the prudent delays of the law, substituted the blind impetus of brute force.

Lombardy was in this miserable condition in March 1848. On one side, the cup of Austrian cruelties was full to overflowing! on the other, incessant injuries had tried forbearance too severely, and provoked vengeance. The Lombard people raged like a wounded lion—and this rage broke forth like the noise of an approaching tempest.

H. Fiquelmont had said, and history will take note of his words, "I have in my hands an infallible means of making the good Milanese forget their idol Pius IX., and their wishes for national independence, which they have lately manifested in their puerile demonstrations; the Carnival is approaching, and I will then give a grand entertainment in the Theatre della Scala."

Marshal Radetzky on his side published the following order of the day:-

1310

"H. M. the Emperor, being determined to defend the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, as well as every other part of his dominions, from all attacks of the enemy, whether internal or external, according to his rights and his duty, has permitted me, through the means of Marshal di Corte, charged with this message, to make known to all the troops of the Imperial army who are now in Italy, this determination, persuaded that his high will must meet with the most efficacious support in the valour and fidelity of the army. Soldiers!

you hear the words of the Emperor, which I am proud to make known to you: the evil counsels of fanatics, and the faithless spirit of innovation, will be broken by your valour and fidelity, like fragile glass against a rock.

"Soldiers! the sword which for sixtyfive years I have wielded with honour in so many battles, is still ready for action, and I shall know how to use this sword to defend the tranquillity of a country lately so happy, and now menaced with misery by a fanatic faction. Soldiers! your Emperor esteems you, your old leader trusts in you, and this suffices! May the Heavens not compel us to unfurl the banner of the two-headed Eagle! The strength of its claws is not weakened. Let this be our motto: Peace and protection to faithful subjects; Death to those who dare with a traitorous hand to disturb order, and endanger the prosperity of the people."

On the 17th of March the terrified Viceroy moved precipitately towards Verona.
The avaricious Archduke collected all his
movables, and turned his back on us.
His magnificent palaces at Milan and
Monza were stripped of their furniture.
He fled, carrying our spoils along with
him! The governor, Spucer, and the minister, Fiquelmont, had preceded him in his
flight, having departed some days before
towards Vienna.

On the 17th of March, intelligence had arrived at Milan of an insurrection in Vienna. This news was like a spark applied to a powder-magazine; the popular effervescence in a moment assumed gigantic proportions! On this account, on the morning of Sunday, the ice being broken, the following proclamation was placarded on the walls:—

"The President of H. I. M. government thinks it his duty to publish the following news, contained in a telegraphic despatch dated Vienna, 13th inst., which arrived the same day at Cilli, and at Milan yesterday evening.

"H. M. the Emperor has determined to abolish the censorship, and to publish without delay a law on the press, as well as to convoke the States of the kingdom, both German and Slavonic, and also the central Congregations of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The meeting will be held on the 3rd of next July at latest.

"CONTE O'DONNELL.

" MILAN, 18th March, 1848."

" Vice President."

These words, "The meeting will be held on the 3rd of next July at latest," seemed an insult to the just impatience of the generous city, which only saw in these illadvised words an artifice to conjure away present difficulties, and not a promise of future concessions. The perturbation of men's minds was therefore universal; large

crowds assembled in the piazza of the Cathedral, in that of Mercanti, and at the Corsie de' Servi; their attitude was menacing, though they were unarmed.

Towards midday the crowd of citizens precipitated themselves towards the municipal palace, shouting, "Arms and a civic guard."

The Conte Casati, Podestà of Milan, endeavoured to govern the multitude, counselling moderation and respect for the laws: they demanded a leader, and the Podestà put himself at their head, and, accompanied by the municipal and provincial corps, he conducted them to the Governor's palace.

But what human force can arrest the torrent which has burst its banks? Behind the Podestà came the furious masses. The first victims of the Lombard revolution were the two Hungarian grenadiers, who were on guard at the Governor's palace; they were killed with daggers, their com-

rades disarmed, and the palace invaded by the multitude, who religiously respected private property; but all public property, as recalling an abhorred government, was destroyed.

The timid councillors had saved themselves by flight, but Conte O'Donnell, the head of the government in the absence of the Governor, had not been able to fly like the rest; finding himself in a dangerous predicament, his gestures expressed humility, and this time the vocabulary of the courtier found words to address the people directly. "I will do what you wish! what you wish!"

"Down with the police! a civic guard," cried the multitude. "Yes, you are right, down with the police; yes, the civic guard;" the magistrate replied tremblingly. "We will have it written," replied the people, and the poor Conte, in an agony of fear, signed the following decree, which a few hours later was published at the municipality:—

" MILAN, 18th March, 1848.

"The Vice-president, seeing the necessity of maintaining order, authorises the municipality to arm the civic guard.

"CONTE O'DONNELL."

"The guard of the police will give up their arms to the municipality immediately. "Conte O'Donnell."

"The direction of the police is abandoned; and the security of the city is confided to the municipality.

"CONTE O'DONNELL." *

The volcano had broken forth, and the burning lava of insurrection spread into every quarter of the heroic city. Everywhere the popular cry rose up to Heaven, "Long live Pius IX. Long live independence and Italy!"

^{*} See the Last Five Days of the Austrians in Milan : relation and reminiscences of citizen Ignazio Cantù.

Delicate women and tender children were seen tearing up the stones in the roads, and carrying them into their houses, to throw on the heads of their assailants. Some prepared oil, some boiling water; some sharpened their knives, or got ready their fowling-pieces, some a simple stick with an iron point. Hundreds of barricades arose in the city, while at the windows of the citizens waved, as on a day of rejoicing, the tri-coloured banner.

The fire of musketry commenced; the cannon roared from the castle; the bells of the city responded by sounding a peal.

Besides the castle and the gates of the town, Radetzky occupied some strong positions in the heart of the city. Suddenly a detachment of Bohemian infantry surrounded the Broletto, where a great concourse of people were demanding arms from the municipal magistrate. The populace was dispersed, and many honourable citizens taken prisoners on this occasion, and the

following night they were conducted to the castle, and retained there as hostages.*

The dawn of the 19th was rainy; as yet the people had neither arms nor ammunition, but nothing could damp the impetuosity of their rage. The enemy occupied the Duomo and the contiguous piazza. From time to time the Austrians discharged their muskets, but fortunately with small havoc. But frequent shots were fired from the top of the Marine Cathedral, where many of the Tyrolese infantry were placed. These were expert marksmen, whose shots told. But this did not intimidate the courage of the people, who persevered, and the third day they were masters of the Duomo, the piazza, and the Viceregal palace, in spite of the artillery which defended them.

The office of the police was taken by

^{*} The two brothers Porro, pupils of Silvio Pellico; their cousin Carlo Porro; Alberto de Herra; Ercole Durini; the delegate Bellati; Giani, secretary of the municipality; Manzoni, son of Alexander; Dr. Peluso; Ignazio Cantù; a Brambilla; an Ubicini; a Viscenti; a Belgiojoso; Fortis; Crippa; Appiani, &c. &c.

assault. Search was made for Toresani the director, but he had disappeared: Conte Bosso, the most hated of the police-staff, had also escaped. It was said that both one and the other had fled from Milan the preceding night.

The Piazza de' Mercanti was well guarded by cannon and troops: after a fierce contest it was taken, as well as the Criminal Court. By a decree of the municipality the political prisons were opened, and amidst the applause of the multitude came forth the Marchese Villani, young Camperio, the Abbate Brambilla, the student Amorra, with Salvioni, Bergazzi, Mavezza, and many others.

Some barracks were taken, as well as the station of the engineers. There a bold populace, careless of the Austrian balls, ventured up to the doors and set fire to them; an heroic deed for which the name of *Pasquale Sottocorni* will long be remembered in Milan.

There was a fierce combat at the barracks of St. Celso, an imperial college of cadets. A cannon planted there made terrible havoc among the citizens, and in the surrounding edifices. For two days the neighbouring houses, struck by the guns, were in a tottering state. An assault was determined on, and thanks to a movable parapet, composed of faggots and other yielding materials, the assailants triumphed without great loss. In this encounter the Marchese Trivulzio was wounded in the leg.

A voice cried out, "To St. Antonio!" and the third police district, and the prefecture of the city, fell into the hands of the people. From thence they rushed to St. Simone, and then to the general barracks of the police. The gate was partly fortified, and the defenders amounted to eight hundred men. They fought the whole of that day and the following night. The gate was taken and burnt. The multitude broke into

the barracks, whence the police had fled by a secret door. Some of these rascals, who had concealed themselves in the cellars, were discovered, and confined with the other prisoners.

On the 20th, at one o'clock p.m., the municipality, preserving its ancient name, constituted itself into a provisional government, and on the same day it issued a series of revolutionary decrees; and several subaltern committees were named to watch over personal security, the supplies of the city, finances, war, and the public defence. At the same time the desired decree was issued for the organisation of the civic guard in the several parishes.

The citizens from twenty to sixty years of age enrolled themselves with emulation on the parochial lists. Arms, though insufficient for their wants, were furnished from the soldiers that had been captured, and from the conquered barracks; and here in honour of truth it must be said,

that in the ranks of our combatants were seen some gendarmes, the fine corps of firemen, and all the finance guard, besides the Italian soldiers who, as they went out of the castle, came over to us singly.

In spite of the heroism of the citizens, the city became a field of battle, where balls, shells, and missiles of every calibre fell on all sides, and rendered our condition desperate. The necessity of foreign assistance was urgent, and a proclamation was thrown from the wall, drawn up in the following terms:—

"To the Cities and Communes of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom.

"Milan for two days victorious, but almost without arms, is surrounded by humbled, but still formidable soldiers.

"We throw this page from the walls to call on all the cities and communes to arm, and immediately to form a civic guard, meeting in the parishes, as has been done in Milan, and organised in companies of fifty men each, from whom a captain and a purveyor should be elected, to hasten wherever the necessity of defence demands."

Other proclamations were spread about by means of balloons, launched by the war committee. One of these was as follows:—

"Brothers! Fortune smiles on us. Austria vanquished, still maintains her footing only in the castle and from the bastions. Hasten hither! Let a gate of the city be taken between two fires; united we shall conquer."

The Croats who guarded the bastions, seeing with wonder these flying messengers, directed a useless fire of musketry against them. Some of these balloons fell beyond the Swiss confines, others on the

Sardinian territories, and in those of Piacenza. The people were everywhere aroused, and thousands of citizens, headed by students in medicine, by ecclesiastics. by financiers, hastily advanced towards Milan. From the tops of the steeples might be seen, here and there, troops passing the fields and rice grounds, while other bodies were thrown out on the roads, and attacked the Austrian cavaliers who were wandering in the fields, with the fire of their fowling-pieces. Five hundred men came to us from Italian Switzerland: joined to the mountaineers of the Lake of Como and to the youths of Comasia, they made 1200 Croats prisoners. Spreading revolt on their road, and fighting again at Monza, they reached our walls on the north side, where they encountered two other columns; one of these had taken thirty prisoners at Varese, the other came from the shores of Lake Maggiore. Another column was moving from the banks of

the Po. One of their leaders, Signor Gui, was killed under the bastions, and Trabuchi, the father of a family, a poor but honourable man, was taken on this occasion, and basely shot at Lodi. committee of war, constituted at Lecco, established a military organisation in the Valteline, the Valsassine, and in Brianza. Bergamo sent some hundreds of its citizens and its mountaineers. Girolamo Borgazzi, inspector of the railroad of Monza, came with 2000 men the following day; he penetrated into Milan to ask instructions from the war committee, and it was concerted that on the 4th day, a double assault should be made against the bastions of the gate Tosa, near the railroad to Venice, at ten in the evening. But this valiant man, having got out of the city, and put himself at the head of his column, to carry the orders he had received into effect, was mortally wounded by a bullet.

While a brave people were thus fighting

for their franchises and their independence, the more intelligent part were labouring to find means to finish the unequal conflict happily. The astronomers made observations on the steeple tops, and with their telescopes spied the movements of the enemy, and every hour rendered an account of them to the war committee. Ingenious artifices were used to make cannon of wood, strengthened with hoops of iron, and capable of withstanding a certain number of discharges. The chemists prepared gunpowder and gun cotton. Others melted lead for balls, and others were employed in preparing cartridges. Nor did they fail to pick up the projectiles which the enemy had sent them, among which were found many large medals, with the effigy of Pius IX. on them, this time an emblem of sacrilegious irony.*

During this time, an inn-keeper from

See the Insurrection of Milan in 1848, by Chas. Cattaneo.
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Corsica, twice got over the walls in the midst of the Austrian balls, to bring news to the municipality. Antonio L-, whom we wished to dissuade from too perilous enterprises, answered with a bold heart, " Balls do not touch those who carry on their foreheads the name of Pius IX." One of our ladies disarmed three police agents; another killed as many Croats; nor was she the only one who distinguished herself by firing off a gun or a carbine. Beardless boys wrenched their bayonets from more than one soldier! Such was the cowardice of the barbarians, who resisted the insurrection. At the Carrobbio. a citizen, who had lost his right hand in the combat, was seen to discharge his gun with the left hand: one of his companions charged it for him, and he fired it repeatedly with wonderful perseverance. young man who was the first to enter the Vice-regal palace, shouting "Viva l'Italia!" was struck by fifteen balls: when almost cold, this heroic youth still murmured, "Viva l'Italia." A dying man wrote on the walls with his own blood, "Courage, brothers!"—and expired.

Ability and valour were not the only ornaments of our people. The charity shown in Milan during these days was universal. In many houses, the wounded were collected, and expert doctors and surgeons gave them every sort of succour and assistance. Ladies of all ages prepared lint and bandages. The rich distributed bread and wine gratuitously to the poor. The denominations of patricians and people, so senseless in modern times, disappeared, and with them the pride of the one, and the envy of the other. During five days, Milan presented a spectacle which was worthy of the angels, and too beautiful for men! It was truly a city of friends and brothers! And the good Milanese, after beating the Austrians and the Croats, saluted them too with the appellation of brothers: if naked they clothed them, if hungry they fed them, if wounded they were placed under the loving care of the sublime city. Their hostages were guests. Among the numerous examples of humanity and moderation which we might cite, we will limit ourselves to one.

The family of Baron Torresani Lanzenfeld, head of the police, remained in our power. This family was treated with the most delicate consideration. Conte Bolza, a noted tool of the police, had not succeeded in escaping: he hid himself in a hay-loft, like a wolf pursued by hunters. He was dragged from thence by another of these bailiffs, who had discovered the secret of his concealment. The crowd wanted to tear him to pieces. A bravehearted man said to them, "If in these circumstances you kill him, you will perform a just act; if you do not kill him, you will have performed a holy action;"

and this magnanimous people touched not a hair of the head of this wretch, who deserved the severest treatment. It was an incontestable fact that our people were as generous as they were terrible in combat, —only too generous in victory!

On the 22nd March, the municipality published the following proclamation:—

"The armistice offered by the enemy has been refused by us, at the instance of the people, who wish to continue the combat. Let us then fight on with the same courage that has made you conquerors in the struggle these last four days, and will still enable you to conquer."

"Citizens! meet this last assault of your oppressors with steady firmness, and with that confidence which results from the certainty of triumph.

"The country responds festively to the uproar of bombs and cannons; the enemy

sees that we can combat joyfully, and cheerfully die.

"The country adopts the children of those who are killed in battle, and secures to the wounded gratitude and subsistence.

"Citizens! this announcement is made by the undersigned, who form a provisional government, which was rendered necessary by imperative circumstances, and by the vote of the combatants. They are thus proclaimed: Casati (President), Vitaliano Borromeo, Giuseppe Durini, Pompeo Litta, Gaetano Strigelli, Cesare Giulini, Antonio Beretta, Marco Greppi, Alessandro Porro. "Cesare Correnti,

" Secretary General."

Some points of the city were still not taken. The palace of Radetzky was attacked and taken. The soldiers who defended it were disarmed, but their lives were spared. The plate and precious furniture were handed over to the provisional government, in order to be sold for the profit of the poor. The military uniform of the Marshal was fastened on a pole, and hoisted in the Piazza Borromeo; his sword, —that famous sword which was to break the insurrection like fragile glass,—was sent to the war committee, while the more massive furniture was employed to form barricades, together with the sumptuous carriages of the imperial court, dragged for this purpose from the church of St. Giovanni, in Como, where they were kept, and transported to the magazines.

On the morning of the 22nd, the principal military post surrendered, though the cannon balls fired from thence committed great havoc on the houses in the street of Biera and Orso, and some even reached as far as the corner of St. Giovanni and the Case Rotte.

One after another, the barracks of St. Fiamesco and St. Vittor Grande were furiously assaulted and taken, after being defended with desperate valour. The

military hospital of St. Ambrogio also fell into the hands of the victorious people, who were prodigal of care and pity to the 541 sick and wounded there assembled. By the paternal solicitude of the Marshal, these poor soldiers had remained four days without a drop of broth or a morsel of bread.

Austria, expelled from the heart of the city, now only defended the castle and the bastions. It was necessary to drive them from the bastions and make ourselves masters of one of the gates, and thus open a communication between the town and the country. A band of valorous youths, led by Luciano Manare, succeeded in getting possession of the gate Tosa, which was defended by 2000 men and seven guns.

Not long after, our country peasants, seconded by the citizens, forced the gate Camasine. It was then that the Marshal (to whom the hostile intentions of Charles Albert, and the fury of the Piedmontese of the citizens, the imperial army, precipitating their movements, fled through the bastion road; but the Milanese rifles were on the watch, and this time there was no need to spare their fire, for 48,000 pounds of powder had been found in the barracks of the Incoronata. With the aid of the country people, no respite was given to the fugitives; only from time to time, when the enemy pressed on them too closely, the Austrians stopped for an instant, and responded by a discharge: a cordon of innumerable muskets formed a semicircle of fire round the city, where the bells of seventy belfries did not cease to ring.

The flying army dragged along with it its artillery, the wounded, two hundred families of the officers, both civil and military, several hostages, who were exposed to most barbarous treatment, and some thousand Italian soldiers. Symptoms of wavering and hesitation appeared among these unfortunate men, till the cannons

were pointed against them and their officers, and the word was given-"Germans! forward, or death!" The fugitives had every species of obstacle to overcome, and it took them more than eight hours to get out of the burning circle which enveloped them. At last Radetzky was gone. These five days had cost him not fewer than 5000 men. For the service of seventy guns scarcely five artillery-men remained. So low was the proud old man fallen, who in the beginning of the insurhad behaved with a violence worthy of an Attila, and who, four days before, had threatened to break the spirit of revolt with bombs and bullets!*

A volume would not be space enough to register all the atrocities committed by the enraged Austrians, during those five days: let a few examples suffice.

A group of eight children were found who had been crushed against the walls,

^{*} See Cattaneo.

thrown on the ground, and trodden underfoot; two were found shut up in a chest; two burnt with aquafortis; another, spiked on a bayonet, was fastened to a tree, where the poor child struggled in vain agonies before the eyes of its mother! A sucking babe (by a jest worthy of a cannibal) was thrown on the breasts of its mother's corpse; another was cut in two, and the halves tied together with its own bowels. Five heads, cut from their tender trunks, were placed under the eyes of the innocent parents. An unborn child was torn from the maternal womb by these vile wretches. In the pocket of a Croat prisoner were found two female hands, loaded with rings; and many women were deprived of their eyes, tongues, hands, and feet. The monsters first violated, and then killed them with their bayonets. Some were burnt alive; others buried alive in ditches and wells; others covered with pitch and tortured with fire. Eight

bodies were found burnt in an inn at the Porte Tosa; as many in another inn at the Porte Vercellina; ten were seen in a small room at the Porte Ticinese, horribly mutilated and mangled: the great efforts made by one poor woman to save herself through the chimney, still appeared. I pass over the assassinations in houses, in beds, in hiding places. One man was compelled to kneel on the bloody corpse of his brother, and there stabbed. Two unfortunate men, father and son, were spiked together to a tree on the ramparts; a child of Mario Belloni was burnt; a son and a brother of Giovanni Piotti were killed. But let us throw a veil over the abominable deeds of the flying enemy; the mind can ill endure the atrocious spectacle of such wicked carnage !*

On the 23rd of March the war committee published the following edict:—

[·] See Cantù.

"Five days are past, and Milan has no longer an enemy within her walls. Combatants arrive with eagerness from all sides, and it has become necessary to organize, and form them into legions. Henceforward courage alone will not suffice. We must with art pursue in open campaign an enemy who possesses all the advantages to be drawn from cavalry, artillery, and the facility of moving his forces. Let us, therefore, organize ourselves in two divisions; let one remain to defend the city with barricades and every sort of arms; let the other, provided with fire-arms, supported by cavalry if possible, and flying artillery, go boldly without the walls, and, adding valour to activity and precision, pursue the flying enemy from place to place, restrain their rapine, retard their flight, and prevent their deliverance.

"As the object of this division must be, as soon as possible, to reach the summits of the Alps and the frontiers, which the finger of God has pointed out from the beginning of all ages as the boundary of Italy, we will name them: First Legion, Army of the Frontier, Army of the Alps.

"The defenders of the city we will call the Second Legion, and, that we may conform to the example of our brothers, and complete a great Italian institution, we will call them also the Civic Guard.

"Brave men, who from neighbouring or distant lands have run to our aid, join yourselves either to the army or to the guard, according as our imperfect position may require, but unite and organize, and obey fraternal commands. Your commanders shall be elected by yourselves. Let us then cry, 'Viva the Army of the Alps! Viva the Guard of the City!'

"The War Committee:

- "GIORGIO CLERICI.
- " CATANEO CARNEVALI.
 - " ___ TERRETTI.
- " POMPEO LITTA.
- "GIULIO TERZAGLII.
- "CERNUSELIE LISSONE."

Many of the dispersed soldiers of the routed army were taken prisoners. The main body was followed by the volunteers of Milan, of Como, of Lecca, and of Italian Switzerland. After dispersing the country people who defended the bridge of Marignano, it passed the Lambro, and moved towards Lodi.

Things being in this state, all felt the necessity of securing the city against a surprise from any quarter; a body of the citizens was appointed to keep guard night and day on the circuit of the bastions, and to send out patrols on all the roads. A corps of 100 Brescians, a fine valiant people, offered themselves as scouts; a third corps was expedited towards Melzo, in consequence of information that many Croat were wandering dispersed about the fields, and that there was some artillery sunk in the rice grounds. A band of engineers was appointed to fortify the moat at convenient points of the Milanese Agao, avoiding as

much as possible all unnecessary injury, either to private property or public thoroughfares.

On this same 23rd of March, the citizens were summoned to enter into the civic guard, reserved for the defence of the city, or to enrol themselves in the movable column, destined to follow the Barbarians to the Alps. All the horses which had been taken from the enemy were got together, with all those which had been offered by the patriotism of the citizens, in order to create, as speedily as possible, a regiment of cavalry. Signor C-, a mathematician, and formerly a soldier under Napoleon, opened a special enrolment for the artillery and waggon trains, undertaking to teach all that belonged to those two branches of the army. Signor Montemerli instructed our infantry; and for this purpose he had the French military regulations printed in Milan. The manufacture of powder was organised on a

wider scale. All the objects of military armament and equipment, which had fallen into private hands, were placed in public magazines.

On the 25th of March, the provisional government elected, as Captain-General of our military force, General Teodoro Lecchi. To Manare and Arcioni, who were at Trovoglio, with their columns, burning with impatience, orders were sent to march against the enemy. On the morning of the 28th, the rear-guard of Radetzky went out of Crema. Manare and Arcioni entered it, and were the first to pass the Serio, the Oglio, and the Chiave. A few days sufficed for these brave men to reach Salo, and surprise the Austrians, who having arrived there at night were supping joyfully, after having levied a war contribution on the town. Having embarked in boats called piroscafi, on the Lake of Garda, they disembarked at Desenzano. Thence, in a few days, they passed the lake, threw

themselves between Leschiera and Verona, and made themselves masters of 500 barrels of powder, under the cannon of the enemy.*

The Lake of Garda is the boundary of Lombardy. The Lombards were free! †

• See Cattaneo.

⁺ This chapter was written by an illustrious martyr of Italian independence, a native of Milan, who combated during those five memorable days.

CHAPTER V.*

REVOLUTION IN VENICE, MARCH 22ND, 1848.

The result of the celebrated battle of Austerlitz, gained by Napoleon over the Austrians, was to place all the ancient possessions of the Venetian republic in his power.

The conqueror not only made himself be pardoned for the base bargain he made of the Venetian people in the treaty of Campo Formio; he even gained their hearts, by giving them new institutions, which applied alike to all classes, and excluding the privileges of caste, opened the way to merit alone. Protection was accorded to the arts. New roads were opened for the extension of commerce, which received

This chapter has been written by a Venetian Colonel on my staff.

fresh stimulus by means of liberal regulations and freedom from the chains which had hitherto fettered it. By the prestige of so many victories, fortune seemed to be for ever bound to the car of the victor. Finally, by his powerful voice, he roused the aspirations after glory, never quite extinguished in Italian breasts, and in the campaigns in Spain and Russia, the Italian arms reaped no perishable glory.

After being long accustomed to a humiliating thraldom, the Venetian people, roused as it were to new life, felt all the grandeur which fate was preparing for them. Proud of their own dignity, they saw in the foundation of the new kingdom of Italy, in their very name, in their army, in their navy, in their tribunals and administrations, and in their ministry, if not yet perfect independence, because they were ruled by the same hand which guided so many other nations, yet a future certainty of acquiring it.

Thus during eight years Venice was nourished with something more than the mere bread of life.

When the colossal power which had redeemed it fell, the potentates who sincerely desired peace, and who had proclaimed the statu quo ante bellum, found that perfect quiet was not to be hoped for, so long as the people who had formed a part of the kingdom of Italy, and who in the division of the spoils fell to the share of Austria, were governed neither constitutionally nor independently.

The kings in their congress had definitively ceded to Austria the Venetian and Lombard provinces which her armies already occupied; but this new government was to be established on an independent and constitutional basis.

The Austrian government, faithful to the letter, but not to the spirit of its promise, promulgated on the 7th April, 1815, the Imperial *Patent* which consti-

tuted the new Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, with a communal administration in every commune, a provincial congregation for every province, and two central congregations sitting, one at Milan for the Lombard provinces, the other in Venice for the Venetian, with viceroys residing in Milan and Venice, and depending only on the Imperial court. The electoral system was set on foot by the choice of members for the communal, as well as for the provincial and central deputation. The special office of the congregations was to represent to the Sovereign the wants, the desires, the petitions of the nation, in all the branches of public administration.

Literary works, not proscribed, were referred to the censorship. Such were Inquiries into State affairs in general, and in all their branches; Discovery of errors or defects; Proposals for ameliorations, &c., even if the opinions of the author were not those of the government.

By these regulations, his Imperial Majesty desired that the government of the kingdom should be truly Italian, and conformable to the characters and disposition of the Italian people.

How were these Imperial words and promises fulfilled?

The first and most lucrative offices in the kingdom were in the beginning conferred on strangers, under the pretext of initiating the Italians into the new methods of government, and ever after continued in their hands, without any scruple or pretext whatever. A little later, the posts of secondary importance were also given to foreigners, and gradually all, even to the lowest, were filled by Germans.

This system filled the Italians who belonged to the administration with despair. They saw by degrees every door to advancement shut on themselves and on their sons, both in the administrative and judicial line.

The examples were not few of German judges, who, being ignorant of the language, were accompanied by an interpreter. Thus property, which so often depends on the right meaning of a single word, was abandoned to the discretion of the ignorant.

In the military line, matters were still worse; the remains of the valorous Italian army were dispersed among regiments of which the superior officers were Germans, and the Italians mingled with German troops. Thus Italy saw the remnants of her recent glory dissolved, and extinguished in Germany. True it was, that the Italian levies formed separate regiments: but as it is also true that almost all the officers were Germans, and that the Italian officers were transferred to German regiments, and by degrees placed on the retired list, it was very rarely that any Italian attained the rank of general, or having attained it, kept it long.

Even the navy was infested by foreigners, and places in the naval colleges were given in preference to foreigners. These institutions were Italian, but were remodelled according to the Austrian system, and the naval officers were chosen from it.

Thus the career of arms, so brilliant in past ages, became closed to the sons of Italy.

The funded tax was preserved in the same proportion as at the fall of Napoleon, that is to say, as in a time of active war, when double sacrifices were demanded. The resources of property were consumed to the detriment of agricultural industry; the due end of legislation was frustrated by the minute subdivision of all large properties, which was the consequence of the changes made in the laws of inheritance, and of the prohibition of entails.

Less of the national wealth was consumed in the kingdom than was taken out of it to pay the Austrian authorities, and to heal, in part, the wounds of that country.

The unequal perception of the taxes, arising from the want of a regular census, which want continued to the end, after augmenting the number of small proprietors, reduced them to misery.

Public credit was diminished by the sale of the properties which were the guarantees of the State Bank, by an additional charge made on the bank, and by an unlimited issue of new paper money.

The traders from the German provinces were protected and favoured, especially those of Trieste, which lies opposite Venice, and whither a number of Hungarians resorted.

Liberty of speech and liberty of the press were illusory; they were fettered by secret machinations. Personal safety, consequently, was not more secure. The discretional power of the police was ever ready to inculpate individuals for any act or word.

The secret criminal inquisition proceeded by way of accusations without defence, conducted by the same judge who pronounced either condemnation or acquittal.

The determinations of the communal councils on the management of their own funds were almost always rendered vain by the *veto* of the tutelary government, which, under pretence of taking care of it, poured their treasure into the money-chest of the State, and never restored it. Loans were made to the poor communes for expenses which they were unable to defray, but they were bound to repay them faithfully at the appointed time. All were loaded with obligations which had previously been met by the State.

The provincial and central congregations, by dint of restrictions, were reduced to mere forms.

Though the Viceroy was ultimately

dependent on Vienna, he never rendered an account of the expenditure of the public monies, such as Napoleon required while the kingdom of Italy lasted.

Thus were fulfilled the promises contained in the Patent of the 7th of April, 1815; and thus by degrees did the constitutional Lombardo-Venetian kingdom become dependent on the pleasure of Austria.

This unhappy condition, which ever progressed from bad to worse, lasted nevertheless thirty-two years, putting the people to double trials.

The acute French nation were well aware of this state of things, but it suited their views to let matters go on as they were, well knowing that hatred always destroys its own instruments.

Finally, G. Batt. Mazzari, a central deputy of Lombardy, first gave the alarm, by inciting the central congregation in his report of the 9th of December, 1847, to

apply itself to allaying the open discontent of the population, by nominating a commission from its body which should inquire into the means of establishing a good understanding between the administrators and the governed, and thus remove the peril of a fatal collision. The Viceroy approved this commission.

In Venice, in imitation of Lombardy, the advocate Dancile Manin made a similar motion in the central congregation on the 21st of December, specially demanding public trials, oaths, and other reforms, particularly in criminal cases; and on the 28th, the provincial deputy Giambatt^a Morosini made an exhortation to the people of the province to which he belonged, and succeeded in carrying a resolution, that it would be disgraceful that a demand for reform should emanate from any other body than that of the representatives of the provinces.

On the following day, the 29th, several

individuals, all belonging to the higher classes of the nobility with one only exception, went to solicit the municipality of Venice to persuade the central committee of Venice to unite and agree with Lombardy in its labours; and on the 30th of December, the municipality addressed to the central committee a prayer to the desired effect.

On the same day, Nicolo Tomaseo read a discourse to the Athenæum of Venice, on the abuses of the censorship, which were in contravention of the Patent; and he invited the individuals present to sign a petition for the restriction of the censorship, at the same time inviting other citizens to petition against other abuses, in the same manner as the literati had done in the cause of letters. Not satisfied with this, he sent his discourse and the petition to the minister Kübek.

On the 14th of January, the advocate Avesani presented to the central congre-

gation a paper, in which he stimulated it to demand from the Sovereign the concessions granted by the Patent, and those which the times required.

All these acts were legally performed, and the petitioners were within the strict limits of the sovereign Patent.

Finally, also, the Venetian central committee, after secretly ascertaining the wish of the government, named a commission to collect and transmit the complaints of the people.

When all these demands for reform became public, there arose a deep fermentation. The police thought to put a stop to it by terror. In the night of the 18th January, 1848, they arrested Manin and Tomaseo. They found in Manin's house a circular to the bishops, which he was copying.

During the night, writings were put up on the walls saluting Pius IX. as the saviour of Italy. In vain the police effaced them the following day; the same inscriptions were repeated the succeeding nights, and always longer and more varied.

Even in the theatres liberal demonstrations were made. Meetings were held in the public piazza, amid shouts and vociferations.

The arrests which took place from time to time did not quell the excitement. Then recourse was had to arms, and the lower people were driven away, at first with the bayonet, and on the following day were fired on from a short distance. Venetian people were unarmed. pulled up stones, and breaking them, attacked in their turn, and then ran on the soldiers and seized the bayonets from their Children of ten or twelve years old were conspicuous in these encounters; they beat a waltz under the very fire. wounded bound up their wounds, and returned to the attack. There were some both wounded and killed, an earnest of what they were capable of doing, and of what they afterwards effected, and a lasting example of magnanimity and devotion to the cause of emancipation. From the piazza the people ran towards the streets, knocking at the doors, which were opened to let them mount to the roofs, in order to crush in the narrow and tortuous streets any soldiers who should venture there.

In the mean time a system of defence sprang up as if it had been organised. Bridges were designated to be cut through, so as to divide and weaken the troops.

These events changed the counsels of the government: they tried blandishments to let the popular fury pass, and prevent its spreading.

For some days news had reached the merchants that a constitution was published at Trieste.

On the same evening, two hours after sunset, a steam-boat of Lloyd's landed with

despatches for the government, and good nercs was announced to the people assembled in the piazza. At this notice, all ran under the balcony of the governor, calling loudly for the news. The Governor Palffy appeared at the balcony, and said that he had received advice from the Governor of Trieste, that the constitution had been proclaimed there, and he added that he hoped it would soon come to Venice. people gave themselves up to rejoicing, On the following day the portrait of the Pontiff, crowned with a garland, was taken to the piazza, and the passers-by were compelled to uncover their heads before it; the theatre, hitherto deserted, was filled that evening, and a tricoloured flag was hoisted from the balcony, which government with the aid of the troops forced down.

The arrival of the desired constitution was retarded, and this delay might be attributed to its having been, according to the usual course, transmitted in the first place to the Viceroy at Milan. Thus things went on till the 17th of March, when the people, unable to contain themselves any longer, decided on liberating Manin and Tomaseo.

The Governor, intimidated, sent orders to the police; but already the people had reached the prison. They forced the doors, and bore their champions on their shoulders to the piazza.

Manin made a long discourse under the windows of the Governor, who, partly alarmed and partly irritated, made him signs to go away; but he persisted, and so long that he fainted, and was conducted by the people to his own house.

From day to day the attitude of the people became more serious. On the morning of the 22nd of March, the municipality invited some of the most esteemed among the citizens to join with them in the difficult circumstances of the moment.

An Assembly being thus formed, and while they were discussing the events, news was brought that Colonel Marinovik had been killed at the arsenal. The workmen revenged themselves by his death for all the anguish and persecutions he had inflicted on them.

This Assembly hastened to name out of their body a commission to repair to the government, and explain to it the wishes of the people, in order to spare the effusion of blood.

This commission was composed of the Podestà, Correr; the two municipal assessors, Medies and Michiel; the advocate, Avesani; the merchant, Pericherle; the central deputy, Fabris; and the advocate, Mengaldo, named Commandant of the Civic Guard, which was instituted to calm the popular effervescence and provide against disturbances.

The deputation intimated to the Governor that the Austrian government

must give up its power, and the civil governor resign his functions to the military governor, Zichy, who must sign a convention, by virtue of which Venice should be evacuated by the Austrian troops, ceding the command, which, in expectation of a provisional government about to be instituted, was secured to the members of the deputation sent.

While these events were passing in the Palace, the arsenal was strongly occupied by a portion of the civic guard, and Manin, taking from thence a standard with the ancient emblem of St. Mark, was conducted along in triumph, proclaiming the Venetian republic to the people, who, half astonished, had just been reading the printed proclamation of the institution of a provisional government.

The same night the members of the deputation resigned, and the following day, the 23rd of March, the Commandant of the Civic Guard, Mengaldo, drew out

two of his battalions on the piazza, and after obtaining from the Patriarch the benediction of their banners, he proposed a provisional government, composed of Manin, President and Foreign Affairs; Tomaseo, Religious Worship and Instruction; Castelli, Justice; Camerata, Finance; Solera, War; Paulucci, Marine; Paleoropa, Internal Affairs and Constructions; Pinibrerle, Commerce; and Toffoli, Arts, without a portfolio.

All the magistrates, both civil and judicial, gave in their adhesion to this government, as did also the Venetian provinces, as soon as they were evacuated by the Austrian troops, who were concentrated in Verona.

CHAPTER VI.

The Author's intention of going to Milan.—The Sardinian troops pass the Ticino.—The Author's conviction that Venice should be assisted by the Neapolitans.—The Genoese send succours to Milan.—The Genoese Civic Guard.—Sensations produced by the sight of the Gulf of Naples on the Author.

My first idea on arriving at Genoa was to go to Milan, where there was not a single General who had ever taken the field with that grade, and to lead the troops while my years and strength would permit.

I had my carriage brought on shore, out of the steamer, but when I was on the point of starting, news arrived that the Sardinian troops, commanded by the Duke of Genoa, the King's son, had passed the Ticino. I therefore thought my presence might be more useful in Naples, where, among other circumstances, I was flattered by hearing that I might be influential

in determining an expedition of land and sea forces to succour Venice. I had long known the importance that classical and glorious lagoon was destined by nature to have in a war of Italian independence. I was so convinced of this, that I had written a few pages on the subject in my "Italia Militare," published in Paris, and afterwards reprinted in Venice.

The day preceding that on which I arrived in Genoa, the inhabitants had sent off a number of volunteers to Milan, among whom were many young men of historical and illustrious families, and they promised to despatch greater forces in favour of Italian independence.

The day I landed in Genoa the whole National Guard of the city was assembled for a general review. The Commander, together with all the superior officers, came to salute me; and to tell me, that they would all defile with their battalions before the balcony of my hotel, which was done, and I saw with pleasure about 5000 men of this National Guard, well dressed, with a military appearance, and seeming full of patriotism. Every thing appeared favourable to the destinies of Italy, and, under these happy auspices, the steam-boat, in which I was embarked, continued her voyage towards Naples.

The dawn of the 29th of March, when we discovered the Gulf of Naples, was to me a moment of overpowering emotion. Not only had my long sojourn in the north made its beauty more striking, but other recollections rushed to my mind, already agitated with tender feelings. There was Castellamare before me, where, twenty-seven years ago, in this same month of March, I had gone, not without great danger, in order to embark in a Spanish vessel for Barcelona, esteeming myself fortunate to be sent on a long exile, instead of leaving my head under the axe of princes who thirsted for my

blood. Turning my eyes to the tremendous and poetical Vesuvius, I perceived the mountains which concealed Avellino, from whence, in 1820, I had passed them with an army, which I conducted to the capital, not to punish the cruel King, who, in 1799, had sent to the scaffold the flower of my contemporaries to the number of three hundred, all the honour of Italy and of humanity, but respectfully to impose on him a liberal constitution. Viglieno next caught my view, recalling the flag of those Calabrian heroes, who, faithful to their magnanimous view of dying free, set fire to the powder magazine, and were followed by their conquerors into eternity. I invoked them to rise from their tombs, and admire how, at last, their sacrifice was becoming fruitful.

The condition in which Germany, France, all Italy, then was, made me, again and again, repeat, "This time, at least, the invader shall surely be driven beyond the

mountains, and for ever." But fickle and wicked fortune laughed at my hopes, which all thought reasonable, and which seemed no longer hopes but certainties.

In the midst of these moving reminiscences, I found myself in the harbour, and the first person who ascended the vessel to greet me was Count Pietro Ferretti, who, although a cousin of the Pope's, and a brother of the Cardinal Ferretti, has since been obliged to escape from Naples in order to save his life, or at least his liberty. Along with Ferretti came Captain Corrado, who commanded a company of grenadiers in my favourite regiment, the 2nd of the line, in 1815. Both accompanied me on my way to my brother, who was greatly esteemed and loved by them.

CHAPTER VII.

Arrival at Naples.—Reception.—The King's conduct.—Conversation.—Proposals to the Author to form a Ministry.— Endless altercations.—Final rejection.—The Command of the Forces against Austria offered him.

I FOUND my brother Florestano confined to his bed by severe sufferings. These were the results of wounds which he had received in his early and northern campaigns. It was a great grief to me to find him thus; and his house was so filled to overflowing, with old and new friends, that it was impossible for me to converse with him alone. It was expected I should present myself to the King, not later than mid-day. I wished to defer my visit till the following morning; but my brother said, that, ill as he was, on being called for by his Majesty, the preceding day, he had instantly obeyed the summons, and had

promised, for me, that I should go to the Royal Palace as soon as possible after I landed. "What love! what benevolence!" I exclaimed; but to avoid making my brother uneasy, I determined to comply.

Florestano was in a singular position: he had always remained a Lieutenant-General on active service, without ever having accepted any favour from the King, who, nevertheless, had not ceased to overwhelm him with civilities ever since his accession to the throne in 1830. Moreover, he was the only person whom the King never spoke of with derision, according to his usual practice with regard to all others when conversing with his courtiers. Gratitude, which is ever warmest in elevated minds, prompted Florestano on all occasions to excuse and defend the King.

I was obliged to make a hasty collation, surrounded by a multitude of persons, many of whom were about my own age, and they asked me if I recollected them. A few only I recognised; and these, after an absence of twenty-seven years, seemed to me like the caricatures of pictures I had once seen. Gaetano Cappola, the companion of my first exile, was an exception: though five years older than myself, he had preserved, through the changes of years, the fine features of his youthful physiognomy. I embraced him with heartfelt cordiality. I already knew that he had inherited the wealth and title of Duca di Campo Chiaro, by the death of his nephew in Paris.

Before my interview with the King, it was very essential for me to learn as much as possible of the prevailing opinions of the people; above all, it was necessary that I should know what progress the republican party had made. I begged the moderate, as well as the ultra, liberals to tell me frankly what they desired. They replied, "We desire to retain the King with a constitution on a broad basis:" and

among those who gave me this answer, were many who had formerly been condemned to decapitation for political offences, and who had afterwards had their sentence commuted to severe imprisonment in chains, &c.: among these were Salicetti and Romeo.

I replied not a word; but I mentally exclaimed, "How simple of you to suppose that such things can be easily obtained!"

I must now suspend my narration, in order to explain to my Italian countrymen what my own opinions then were regarding our political conduct and position, and what they are at present. I must request my readers to bear in mind that the desire and aim of my life have ever been Italian independence: to attain this, I have gone straight to the point, putting aside even my republican sympathies.

But before I state my thoughts on our past and present position, I must observe to the Italians that, since 1799, I have been personally acquainted with almost all the proscribed in Europe; that I have found my own countrymen, who for ages have been so separated by territorial demarcation, less disunited in sympathies than those of other lands.

At this moment, the exiles are principally amongst the highest intellects of the Peninsula. I do not fear to exhort them to bear in mind the faults which have been committed, and not to fall again into those errors which have deprived us of the good fortune and glory of obtaining our so reasonably and earnestly desired independence.

Let us not foster fatal discord by throwing blame on the conduct now of one, then of another,—often on that of the purest patriots.

I will now return to the point I wish to develope.

It is a serious error, when you have

deprived a king of a portion of his power, to expect that he will use what you have left him, to consolidate the liberal system which you have imposed upon him. This is possible only when a prince, who has never known absolute power, ascends a constitutional throne, as was the case with William of Orange; or when a prince entertains hopes of greatly forwarding the interests of his dynasty by these means, as was recently exemplified in Charles Albert.

But these are rare exceptions, while instances to the contrary are numerous.

The English barons had repeated examples of this in their obstinate King John.

Charles X. of France, by his attempts to regain not only his own lost power, but the absolute authority which his beheaded brother had possessed, was deservedly driven into exile.

Ferdinand I., Bourbon, first in Sicily in

1815, afterwards in Naples in 1821, infamously perjured himself.

Francis I. did the same, and recently the humane and most christian Ferdinand II. followed their example.

We Italians were not ignorant of these truths; but the state of Italy prevented us from changing the persons of our Italian princes at the same time that we lessened their power, or from doing altogether without them.

We had to drive away the foreign usurpers before we could establish liberty at home. We were compelled to stipulate, not with one alone, but with five sovereign princes. Among these, Charles Albert united bravery with political prudence, and gratitude claimed for him more extended dominion.

Pius IX., who was both Pope and Prince, in the first days of Italian resurrection was not only beloved, but adored. The difficulties which impeded our way to the full attainment of liberal institutions were innumerable. Nevertheless, they might have been obtained, if in the months of March and April of 1848, we had, after the manner of Odillon Barrot, dismissed Ferdinand II., and set up his son with a regency in his place. Italy might thus have obtained independence and liberty. This not having been done, the Italians should all have turned their thoughts on Charles Albert, and have determined to succour him in his arduous enterprise. They should have abstained from throwing any impediments in his way by demanding new concessions, and still more from calumniating and injuring him. Unhappily, Italy did the very opposite to what she ought to have done; she disgusted Charles Albert instead of caressing him, and she caressed Ferdinand of Naples instead of sending him to the right-about, and giving the crown to his son, who as a minor could have done no harm.

In the course of these memoirs I shall have frequent occasion to confute the unworthy accusations brought against Charles Albert, who in his last acts may have appeared often wavering and incapable, but ever a generous and loyal cavalier.

As to the future, it is impossible to foresee whither political events may conduct us. In every case, our first object must ever be to drive away the foreigner, embracing every means which may lead to so holy an end, be they mild or vigorous. This alone I recommend, that all should unite in this thought, and labour in concord to attain the same end; and no sacrifice or abnegation will be more noble than that which shall win the independence of our common country.

I resume the narrative of my adventures. Mid-day was not passed, when the King sent Major Nunziante in one of the royal carriages to convey me to his palace.

The patriots by whom I was surrounded, both young and old, urged my speedy departure, saying I was surely come for the public good, and they attributed the King's eagerness to see me, to a determination to listen no longer to his courtiers: yet these same patriots besought me not to drive in the King's carriage with Nunziante by my side, as he was especially obnoxious to all' the liberal party. I was obliged, therefore, to take another officer with me, and to request Nunziante to follow us in Florestano's carriage. Yet, as we passed along the streets, there were those who cried, "Yesterday condemned to decapitation, to-day invited and courted."

Since I had quitted Naples, many improvements had been made in the royal habitation. On entering the room appropriated to the officers on duty, I was saluted as a person of high position, and immediately introduced to the King. He retained no trace of the boy of ten years

old, whose beauty I had then admired; with added years he had become colossal, and his countenance did not indicate tenderness of heart. Yet his manner to me was only too gracious: he invited me to sit down on a magnificent sofa, while he took a light cane chair for himself. "Sire," I said, "this is my place, the other belongs to your Majesty." He began by inquiring after Florestano's health, and this inquiry he never failed to repeat in all my subsequent visits; after asking whether my voyage had been prosperous, he talked of I told him that when first the French republic was proclaimed no one believed it, but soon after I had convinced myself, and I remained convinced, that a throne would not speedily be re-established in France. We discoursed of the embarrassment in which the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and other German princes found themselves placed. I said, "Sire, an example is offered to princes, as

useful as it is agreeable to follow, in the person of the King of the Belgians, who has conducted himself in such a manner that his people unanimously entreated him not to abandon them."

Having conversed some time on the political condition of other states, without saying a word of his own, he pressed me to return again the following day.

On leaving him, I turned my eyes towards that chamber, temporarily converted into a chapel, where Ferdinand's worthy ancestor, in 1820, in presence of his ministers, myself, and other notabilities, swore on the Evangelists, and said to me, weeping, "This time, General, I assure you I swore from my heart;" on which he placed his hand; and I, admiring in this gesture a grey-headed old man seeming to repent his perjury, wept at his tears, and incurred the reproaches of not a few of my contemporaries, who were not present at the scene which excited and excused my emotion.

In that palace, too, I called to mind the feigned reasonings of the Regent, afterwards Francis I., and the father of Ferdinand II. This prince, the most dissembling of men, pretended to be a warm partisan of constitutional government, and in order to make himself believed, he studiously advanced arguments in favour of that system.

On my return to my brother, I found it impossible to converse with him alone, and the day passed in greeting a multitude of visitors, and in talking especially with those who could best inform me of the predominant leaning of the public mind: all desired a liberal constitution; all mistrusted the King; no one spoke of getting rid of him.

Observing this inconsistency, or want of decision, even in those who were called on to lead the public mind in Southern Italy, I determined with myself that I would use all my influence to obtain, at least for

the moment, some amelioration in the constitution already given. But to succeed in this endeavour was not sufficient; the greatest difficulty would be to give it stability, and this would depend entirely on the organisation of the National Guard of the kingdom, and, above all, of that of Naples. The traditions regarding the regulations I had made in 1820 for the said Guard, the remembrance of my impartiality, of my affection, and my severity, placed me in a position to obtain speedy results; on the other hand, without a well-disciplined national militia, it would be impossible to bridle either the liberticide tendencies of the King, or the exaltation of the patriots, stimulated partly by folly, and partly by personal ambition.

It was my constant conviction of the necessity of a well-regulated national militia, which induced me in 1835 to publish "L'Italia Militare."

The following day I was again sum-

moned to the King, and the most singular conversation ensued. I said to him, "Sire, my maxim has ever been, that a man's first duty is to his country, and that it supersedes all other duties. It results from this conviction, that I feel myself obliged to say nothing to the King, of which I am not thoroughly persuaded myself."—He answered, "I am perfectly convinced that whatever you say either to me or to others is your real opinion, and that you may more firmly believe what I say, I will add that I have read your Memoirs."

I was not prepared for this; nevertheless I replied, "I will tell you then, Sire, that the wishes of the most exalted and patriotic are, that you should reign with a constitution on a broad basis, and that my own opinion accords with this. In the commencement of the current year, if your Majesty had only granted liberal institutions, I myself, though I should not have returned to my beloved country unless

it had been free, should have warmly applauded such political ameliorations, and have prayed that they might continue. But now that France is a republic, that all the European States are responding by a revolutionary movement, neither simple institutions, nor even the constitution already given, will satisfy. The people are like their princes—the more they obtain, the more they desire. In effect, it is easier to restrain the wishes of a people by granting them at once all they ask, than by granting them little by little with a bad grace."

The King added nothing to my observations, and, to say the truth, he did not add fresh reasons to my arguments, to prove the profound conviction of his mind, as his father was in the habit of doing. I talked much of the National Guard, both in Naples and in the rest of the kingdom, endeavour ing to demonstrate that the strength of th country, the security of the government and the internal tranquillity of the state, in great measure depended on them. The King partly remembered the manner in which I had disciplined the civic militia in 1820.

On returning to my brother, he thought I had spoken too strongly to the King, and he added, "Perhaps your frank discourse will have the effect of leaving you in peace, and you will not again be called to Court."

But the following day he found he was mistaken; for, before mid-day, Bozzelli, Minister of the Interior, came to me from the King, to inform me that the ministry was dissolved, and to propose that I should form a Cabinet, offering me the presidency of the council, and the double posts of Minister of War and Marine. Nor was he unwilling to charge me with the organisation of the National Guard of the whole kingdom, remembering the manner in which I had succeeded in 1820 and 1821, when I not only maintained internal peace,

but also sent eighty battalions to the frontiers. That I accepted such an arduous task united to a double ministry and the presidency of the council, must prove my profound love of my country and the public weal. But in truth, supported in all vigorous measures by public opinion, and having formerly accomplished the same organisation, I thought myself the only person who could succeed, especially since the national militia, called Civic, which had been organised in the preceding years, was such as would have corrupted any society.

I replied through Bozzelli, that I accepted the charge, and would speedily present my programme to the King, with a list of the ministers.

"PROGRAMME OF THE NEW MINISTRY.

"I. Entire and sovereign power for the Chamber of Deputies to legislate on a broader basis. Consequently the suspension of the Chamber of Peers. "II. Reform of the electoral franchise. Deputies to be named by the electors; electors by the citizens; whoever is in the enjoyment of civil rights may be an elector and eligible.

"III. Organising commissioners to be sent into the provinces with the special mission of dissolving the actual communal commission. The provisional commission being dissolved, a new nomination of the national assembly, which under the ancient monarchy was called the Parliament, to be proceeded with.

"IV. Three delegates shall be despatched to the Italian confederation.

"V. Reform in the personnel, civil, judicial, and military.

"VI. Speedy departure of troops of the line for Lombardy. The forts in the hands of the National Guard.

"LIST OF THE MINISTRY.

- "GUGLIELMO PEPE, President, War & Marine.
 - "SALICETTI, Interior.
 - "CONFERTIG, Justice, Public Worship.
 - "DRAGONETTI, Agriculture and Commerce.
 - "Poërio, Public Instruction.
- "UBERTI, Public Works.
- "SAVARESE, Finance.
- "CARIATI, Foreign Affairs.
- "LIETO, Police."

In giving me so highly coveted a charge, after my frank discourse, the King did not consult his wishes, but his fear of losing his throne. My proposals were not new to him, nor did he oppose them when they were presented to him; but some hours later the following note was sent me from the Court:—

"His Majesty cannot alter the constitution sworn to by himself and by all. It belongs to the lawful authorities, *i.e.*, the King and the Chambers, to develope and fecundate the constitution given on the 29th January, without changing its essence. Therefore the programme proposed cannot be accepted.

"The advice which his Majesty receives from all quarters, confirms the idea that he would fail in his duty towards his country by altering the constitution already granted."

I replied to the King, that having sworn to a constitution ten degrees wide, if to satisfy public opinion he should grant another doubly liberal, he would perjure himself in the same manner as a man would do, who, having promised to pay 100,000 francs, should afterwards pay 200,000.

In the midst of these altercations Lord Napier came to see me: he was then acting in the place of the English minister at Naples. He said to me, "Without being aware of it, your Excellency is seriously injuring your country."

I answered, "Pray omit the Excellency

and point out my errors, that I may know how to correct them."

I perceived that he was misinformed, and I explained to him all my proceedings from first to last. Lord Napier then said I could not have done better; and he proposed to go immediately to the King. Being engaged to dine with a lady, he sent his excuses, in order to have time to converse with the King; but the result of his conversation proved that his Majesty was less favourably disposed, and more obstinate, than Lord Napier had believed.

The advices which reached the government from all quarters were so numerous, and so warmly patriotic, that I was more than ever persuaded that a decisive contest must soon take place, the result of which no sensible person could foresee. These convictions gained additional force from the fact that as many as three ministerial combinations were formed daily, and that not only the liberal, but the Court

party, came each in turn to offer me the Presidency of the Council, and the Ministries of War and Marine. I replied to both, that, having lived twenty-seven years under constitutional governments, I had had opportunities of understanding them; that my programme and ministry being rejected, I ought not to be tempted by the honours offered to myself, to rule the State with the opinions of others, and in conjunction with men not chosen by me to second my views.

There is no doubt that the King, to avoid greater calamities, had determined to trust himself entirely to me, and that he was dissuaded from this by his courtiers, and by Bozzelli. This Bozzelli, in 1821, was sent to my head quarters as chief administrative director. After the battle of Rieti he was among the few who did not despair of the salvation of the country; he followed me to Salerno, to tempt fortune once more, and was rewarded with long

imprisonment, and still longer exile—during which his conduct was ever dignified—and hecontented himself with the modest means of existence which his family sent him.

On returning to his country, far from renouncing his former opinions, he did all in his power to promote liberal institutions, and was again rewarded with chains and imprisonment in the Castle of St. Elmo for many months. Scarcely had the King been compelled in 1848 to concede a constitution, than Bozzelli was named minister with universal approbation. after seeing the King, as if struck by a fatal malediction, he entered on a course of conduct in which my pen refuses to follow him. I leave the task to others who are not allied to him by long years of friendship, strengthened by partaking together of the bread of exile, and by mutual love for the same unhappy country, a love which her misfortunes have only fortified and increased.

The absurd intrigues for the formation of a ministry being terminated, and while Florestano was congratulating me on being left to enjoy a little repose, the Minister of War, General del Giudice, arrived. He informed me that the King had desired him to offer me the command of the army, which was destined to cross the Po. Without hesitating an instant, I replied, "I accept with the greatest pleasure."

My brother was astonished at my prompt determination. I answered that there were circumstances in life in which hesitation is not wisdom. The troops destined for this expedition were to consist of 40,000 men, including the corps of reserve. The 10th of the line, which afterwards distinguished itself so much under Charles Albert, was to form a part of it.

But in the composition of this army two wills, and both equally obstinate, were constantly in direct opposition to each other. I was bent on its being speedily organised, and in a manner that should decide the safety of Italy; the King was resolved that it should be numerically feeble, deficient in all the material requisites, incapable in fine of aiding the Italian cause effectively.

It would be long, tedious, and beyond the scope of these Memoirs, to detail the base subterfuges employed by the King and his courtiers, by superior officers and generals, to oppose the preparations for entering on the campaign, and, above all, in making choice of military men who had most distinguished themselves by baseness of mind.

Before I proceed with the narrative of the events which were fatal to the independence of the Peninsula, it is necessary that I should say a few words of the Neapolitan army. It was highly disciplined, and the officers and subaltern officers were generally of wealthy families; the advancement of corporals and privates was

determined by virtue of seniority and examination. The generals, and many of the superior officers, were grown old in ignorance. In fine, the army might well be called devoted to the King, for he was ever in the midst of the troops, so as to know the names of the common cavalry soldiers, and even those of their horses. He interfered frequently in the marriages of the officers and subaltern officers, and gave civil posts to their relatives and Thus the army, which from interested motives was devoted to the King, began by degrees to find itself compromised against the national cause, combating on either side the straits, sometimes in small. sometimes in more serious insurrections.

The King was desirous that I should admire the qualifications of his soldiers, as well as his own ability in commanding them. I was scarcely arrived in Naples, and not yet in possession of a military uniform, when he requested me to accom-

pany him in my civilian dress. Accordingly I repaired to the palace in my morning costume, and was conducted by the King to a very small cabinet, where I was seated opposite him, without knowing the motive. I felt we were descending, and I then perceived that we were in a machine constructed to descend and ascend, in order to avoid the fatigue of mounting the lofty stairs.

When we arrived beyond the Maddelena Bridge, we mounted our horses, and the King made two regiments of dragoons and lancers manœuvre. He commanded remarkably well, and his commands were executed with the greatest exactitude. I paid him most well-merited compliments; but I perceived that he considered this elementary part of the science of war as its most sublime point. In the moments of repose there was but little dignity in the conduct of the King towards the soldiers, who dunned him with petitions. Hence

there was a want of discipline, and of that noble dignity which rules the multitude on all great occasions.

On re-entering the carriage, we drove through a new and beautiful street, which leads to the Studj. On the way, I observed to the King the multitude of mendicants, who, naked even to indecency, persistingly demanded alms. He replied to my observation, that it was the fault of the Minister of the Interior. In the same carriage were the Conte de Trapani, the King's brother, and the Prince d'Ischitella, the aide-decamp on duty.

A conversation took place regarding Sicily. Both the King, his brother, and Ischitella affirmed that the English government had assisted the Sicilian rebels, and, among other acts, had sent them arms. I replied that this might have been done by private merchants, but not by the English government. Finding them obstinate in their opinion, I said, with a

frankness which astonished myself, that before the King had promised the constitution, I had written to London to three of my friends there, who were members of Parliament, to obtain information from the government as to what assistance I could hope to receive from them, if I landed in Sicily, in order to assist the revolution there. The answer was, that I might expect much sympathy, but not the smallest aid in arms, men, or money.

We soon arrived at the quarters of the 12th of the line in the Santo Petito, the greater number of whom were Sicilians. Scarcely had the drums beat, when, in an instant, the soldiers, while running, took their knapsacks and placed themselves in order of battle. The King commanded the manœuvre, and everything was performed to perfection. There was no flattery in my warm congratulations, nor in telling him that I had never seen troops move better on the drilling-ground, and that,

though the English might excel them in precision, they were certainly inferior in agility. This exercise was scarcely terminated, when a crowd of soldiers, subaltern officers, and women, presented themselves to the King, each loudly supplicating for some favour; and he appeared pleased with this. That my readers may understand the nature of these petitions, I will repeat one of them. A woman presented herself, saying, "Majesty, I am the wife of Sergeant — . We have two children. maidens, but real maidens; you have promised to give them husbands; I beseech you not to forget the promise, to avoid the sin to which they are exposed, the virtuous young girls!" The King replied, "I will not forget my promise." This regiment, the 12th of the line, towards the end of May, gave the first example of rebellion on the coast of Ferrara.

On returning to the Royal Palace, the King would not permit me to alight, but

desired Prince d'Ischitella to accompany me home.

In the midst of so much gracious affability, the King, through the medium of his Minister of War, and the head of his military staff, continued to refuse all that was most necessary for the equipment of the troops under my charge, and to retard their departure. He employed the latter officer, as in the time of his absolute power, nor could I ever convince him, that his orders should be communicated through the responsible Minister of War. I did not fail to tell him, that I should only obey the orders of the King when thus conveyed to me.

The next day I went to the King, with the intention of trying if it were possible to move that heart which Heaven seemed to have created in a moment of anger with mankind.

I said to him, "Sire, having married an Austrian princess, it is to be expected that you should be averse to making war against that power;" and he replied, without hesitation, "You are mistaken; I have always detested Austria."

"In that case," I continued, "I am rejoiced to hear your Majesty's sentiments, and shall propose, with greater confidence, what would be most useful to your Majesty, to the kingdom, and to all Italy. Instead of confiding to me the command of the army, which amounts to 70,000 picked men, let your Majesty in person take the command of them. I will be the head of your staff. The liberation of Italy from a foreign yoke will then be chiefly your act: you will be the idol of all the Italians, especially of the Neapolitans. The Sicilians will return to your allegiance; and if that should not be the case, following the example of my brother in 1820, I will go there myself, and I feel certain of compelling them to return to their allegiance without spilling a drop of blood.

regard to the extension of your territory, you will obtain whatever you may desire."

I added many other arguments. I counselled generosity, and the evacuation of the citadel of Messina. "The Sicilians are grateful, Sire; you are not ignorant of the attachment they have ever retained for Florestano, for a simple general, who, because he did them service, was much annoyed by the Parliament and the Government." I added, "You, Sire, who have the military profession so much at heart, who from your earliest years have occupied yourself with the training of your troops, do not let the opportunity escape of gathering the fruits of your labours. You may, from the Isonzo, or even from Vienna itself, dictate to Austria the surrender of all the strongholds in which her troops have taken refuge. You will decide the destiny of the Pope, of the King of Sardinia: your glory will live as long as Italy."

In Naples, field-marshals are generals of a division; brigades are commanded by brigadiers: and lieutenant-generals, as in Spain, correspond to generals in Piedmont.

The Conte Statella, a field-marshal, had remained twenty-two years in that rank, and could never obtain advancement. He was recommended to me by Florestano, and moreover, on the day on which the constitution was wrung from the King, Statella had conducted himself so as to have received a sword of honour from the This circumstance induced me patriots. to propose him for lieutenant-general; and the King, to oblige me, acceded to my proposal. Statella was accustomed to have frequent disputes with his superior officers, and even with the King. belie himself, he wrote me a strange letter, affixing many conditions to his I sent for him, and told him departure. that if in an hour's time he did not withdraw his letter, I should dismiss him from the army. My warm exhortations induced him to comply, and he made no more observations.

The generals appointed by the King to accompany me in the expedition, took the Prince's part, and declared that bad health and the advanced season would not permit them to commence the campaign. The following month, when the war with Sicily was in question, they all asked to be employed.

The King was so obliging as to send me one of his own riding horses, with a complete caparison both for parade and common service.

With me, to succour Venice, to be masters of the Adriatic, to enrich ourselves with the treasures of Trieste and to leave that avaricious city without even a fishing-boat, were settled ideas. I therefore demanded that seven battalions should be embarked in six magnificent steam frigates, and that with these troops I should

disembark in the Lagoon. The King opposed this plan, saying that I would thus place myself in a cul-de-sac. I persevered; the minister was on my side, and what I demanded was decided on. Unhappily, in consequence of the agitated life I was leading, never having a minute's repose, I was attacked with a violent fever, which lasted six days. The King took advantage of this accident to oppose the embarkation of the troops; but being afraid of public opinion, he made the council meet in my house, and wished Florestano to preside. He added to the council Brigadier Carascosa and Major Cianciulli. It would be tedious to detail all the arguments used against the expedition by sea. confined to my bed, I should perhaps have been more successful in inducing them to follow my opinion, if I had employed intimidation rather than argument; but I was apprehensive, in the first place, that the brigade which was to follow me by

land, being without me, would never pass the Po; and I shall presently show that I was not mistaken. Secondly, the Vice-Admiral Cosa assured me, that with seven battalions on board the frigates would be unable to work, and that consequently the Austrian vessels might engage with positive advantage. Thus it was decided that the troops under my charge should go by land; and even in this I was thwarted by the Pontifical government, who demanded that they should proceed by single battalions, and only one squadron a day. They would thus have reached the Po with a delay which would have been ludicrous to the population on the road.

At last the brigade, composed of 17,000 men of all arms, started; they were to be followed by 24,000 more, and it was determined that I should embark at Ancona on board the steam corvette "The Stromboli." Before my departure I re-

ceived the following letter from the Minister of War, in which he tells me, on the part of His Majesty, that when I reach the Po, I must wait for further orders before crossing it. I placed the letter in my private portfolio, with the firm intention of considering it as not received. It must be evident to every one, that the intention of the King was not to satisfy the noble desire of the nation in sending an army into Lombardy, but that he studied the means of preventing it from joining the campaign. What general, trained to warfare, would have been so chicken-hearted as to consent to remain on the right bank of the Po-to say to the Sardinians, to the Venetians, "Expose your lives for the national cause, for its honour, for its independence; I will remain here, and read your feats in the newspapers, until I receive orders to pass the great river, orders which will never arrive?"

If I had made known the contents of this letter to the public, or even to the ministry, and it had got public, the King would inevitably have been assassinated. What happened eleven days later proves that I do not exaggerate.

" NAPLES, 3rd May, 1848.

"EXCELLENCY,

"I must beg your Excellency, on the arrival of the troops which the State has so worthily committed to your Excellency's charge, to confine yourself to concentrating them on the right bank of the Po, and there wait for instructions from the Regal government as to the active part they are to take in the present war, for the liberation of Italy from a foreign yoke.

"The most energetic measures are being taken in order to establish a convention among the Italian Princes, to determine the part which our troops are to take in the said contest, whereupon your Excellency will receive instructions, perhaps before the troops are reunited; and you may rest assured that not an instant will be lost in informing you of the part assigned to them.

"Your Excellency will be pleased to inform the Regal government, as often as possible, of all the movements made, whether partially or collectively, by the troops confided to your Excellency.

"For this purpose, your Excellency is authorised to expedite couriers or officers in employment, either as far as Guglielmo, where we have a telegraph, or here, according to the importance of what you may have to communicate.

"The Minister Secretary of State for War and Marine.

(Signed) "RAFAELE DEL GIUDICE.

"To his Excellency Lieut.-Gen. Baron Guglielmo Pepe, Commander in Chief of the Army of Expedition for Northern Italy." Thus, after twenty-seven years of exile, I revisited my native land, only for thirty-four days, comforted, indeed, by the hope of contributing to the salvation of Italy; with a mind agitated, yet determined to leave nothing untried which could contribute to the success of so noble a cause.

On the 4th of May I quitted my good and affectionate brother, surrounded by numerous political friends; uncertain when I might again behold this much loved country, which has been the cause of all my suffering, but which I shall love till my last breath.

CHAPTER VIII.

Arrival in Ancona.—Part of the troops reviewed.—Staff.—Arrival in Bologna.—Letter from the Venetian government.—
Correspondence with Charles Albert.—Orders received from Naples either to conduct the troops back to Naples, or send them under the command of Lieutenant-General Statella.—
Perilous situation.—Demonstration of the National Guard and population at Bologna in favour of the Author; he decides on reuniting the troops on the right bank of the Po to combat the Austrians.

The war steam corvette on which I embarked, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Statella and part of my staff, had been built in England, and the King had given orders that I should be luxuriously treated. When I arrived in the Straits, on the left, near Scylla, I beheld the camp in which I had passed about five months with King Joachim, when, in 1810, he threatened to invade Sicily; and, on the side of Charybdis, I saw the coast on which batteries were raised, from which the missiles passed

beyond the tents of the intrepid Murat. The corvette then approached the citadel of Messina, from whence I was to receive on board Picenna, Lieutenant-Colonel of the artillery, who was to be the head of my staff. The coast of Calabria, of Puglia, and Manfredonia, the mountains of Gargano, and then the shores of Abruzzi, awakened in my mind the reminiscences of a youth, ever warmly devoted to my unhappy country.

Arrived at Ancona, I was quartered in the palace which belonged to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy; and where also King Joachim was lodged. To find myself in his *salons*, in his very bed-room, revived very painful recollections.

In the meantime the first detachments began to arrive, especially those which had embarked at Pescara. I assembled them, and spoke to all the officers, subaltern officers, and soldiers, one by one. I inquired into their wants, promised them that advancement should be always given to merit; I told them that we should combat in a noble cause, and the soldiers often added, "and for our King." Not to allow that these troops were devoted to the King, would be to deny an evident fact. I endeavoured to turn their interested attachment to a more noble object—to Italy and its independence. I therefore published the following order of the day:—

"General Orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Neapolitan Army in Northern Italy.

" 10th May, 1848.

" SOLDIERS.

"Having, in my early youth, attained the rank of superior officer, my subordinates, to reward my care of their welfare, saluted me by the title of Father. I received this appellation from our troops in Calabria, then commanded by Massena;

and afterwards from our valorous soldiers in the plains of Castiglione and of Italy, when I commanded the advanced guard of the brave Joachim; and when you have experienced my warm interest in your welfare, I feel confident of receiving the same name from you. Above all, I shall watch over your dignity; you shall no longer be subjected to humiliating stripes, since you are citizens of a free country. But this will not satisfy my mind; I will not suffer your immediate superiors to use improper expressions towards soldiers, who, by good conduct, will have a right to attain the highest ranks in the army. I shall study, at the same time, not only to advance you according to your deserts, but to obtain for you the esteem of your contemporaries. By means of the public journals, your parents, sisters, wives, all who are most dear to you, will learn your deeds of honour; and when you return to your country, you will hear it said as you pass, 'Behold one of the brave soldiers in the sacred Italian war.'

"Soldiers! these advantages can only be obtained by strict discipline; by this alone can you obtain the esteem of your own government, and of all Italy, with the rewards which the King has promised to those who merit them. If, in other periods of my career, I have loved my soldiers as my children, I have never allowed a crime, a fault, or even the slightest negligence, to remain unpunished. My severity will ever be the same, but it will be the rigour of reason and affection.

"It only remains for me to express my entire satisfaction at your conduct, as reported to me, on your march through populations united to you by a common language and common hopes. The cordial reception you met with must have been most grateful to you, and they must have gathered from your order and discipline a certain pledge of your active obedience to

your commanders in the day of battle, which alone can obtain for your valour a right direction and prosperous results.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE,

"Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief "of the Neapolitan Army."

Will it be believed, that while I was thus taking upon myself the responsibility of abolishing flogging, the soldiers, excited by their officers, said that all this was in opposition to the will of the King?

At this time I received a visit from Bonaparte, Prince of Canino, who came from the neighbourhood of Padua, where General Ferrari then was in command of the Pontifical brigade. Canino spoke to me of Charles Albert as being of dubious fidelity, and rather favourable to the Austrians than averse to them. I was astonished at this conversation, and I told Canino that I was grieved to see an influential man, attached to Italy, holding such opinions. I demonstrated to him, that it would be greatly

prejudicial to Italian independence, to distrust a king who had hastened with his troops and his sons to support the daring insurrection of the Milanese, and who had it in his power to save the peninsula. Canino was so sincere in his opinions, that, being convinced by my reasons, he offered to repair to the King of Sardinia with a letter from me. I accepted this offer with pleasure, but I addressed the letter to himself, and not to the King. I told him in that letter, that every Italian should feel attached to the Sardinian King, and consider him as the first and best prop of Italian independence. Canino was well received by Charles Albert, who wished to keep my letters, though addressed to Canino and not to himself.

Distrust seemed the order of the day in Italy, to such an extent that, even in Ancona, sensible people feared that the Neapolitans proposed to occupy, along with that place, all the Marshes. I complained to these persons, that they should fear King Ferdinand could make use of me to satisfy his own ambition, instead of leading the troops against the common enemy—and their suspicions ceased.

In the port of Ancona, I found the Neapolitan squadron, composed of six fine steam frigates and some other sailing vessels. The Vice-Admiral Cosa, who commanded them, was a man devoted to the Italian cause; but his mind was more patriotic than resolute. He proceeded towards Venice, where he was received with the greatest affection; and after remaining a short time off the Lagoon, he presented himself before Trieste.

In the meantime, after leaving the instructions necessary for the troops who were expected from the Abruzzi to pursue their march, I proceeded with my staff toward Bologna. Passing through Pesaro, I no longer found there my dear friends Perticari and Cassi; the latter had died recently; the former many years before. I stopped a short time in his ancient dwelling, now inhabited by his brother Gordiano, who offered me a collation in the very room in which I had parted for ever from Giulio Perticari and from his wife, who was a daughter of Monti, to mount my horse, and drive the Austrian cavalry from Pesaro in the campaign of 1815. As in life our days of sorrow far outnumber those of enjoyment, in the same proportion are our sad reminiscences, compared with the pleasant ones.

I was soon in Bologna, a city I have ever loved, and this affection was repaid me with usurious interest by its truly Italian population. I found there the following letter from Manin, President of the Provisional Government of Venice:—

"EXCELLENCY,

"The state of our Venetian provinces becomes daily more disastrous. The Papal troops have suffered serious losses in several encounters. Not only the whole of Friuli, but Trevignano, and part of Vicentino, are invaded by the German troops, who are advancing round Venice, and evidently threaten a blockade by land, while that by sea is already declared.

"Excellency, in this serious and perilous extremity, we fervently invoke the assistance of the generous Neapolitans, moved and guided by you. Hasten to our succour with your land and sea forces, if you would obtain the great glory of saving us, together with the cause of Italian independence.

"From the President of the Provisional Venetian Government.

"MANIN."

Every one will readily understand that I could have wished my troops to fly instead of march. I again reviewed those who had arrived in Bologna, and published throughout the whole corps the following proclamation:—

"Soldiers of every Rank in the Neapolitan Army combating in Northern Italy,

"The war we have undertaken is sacred; its aim is great, and incomparably glorious. We do not aspire to Italy's becoming again 'donna di provincie,' but to her being no longer enslaved.

"Our rivals will be the valorous warriors of the house of Savoy, rich in traditional glory, and the sons of Milan, who
without arms, yet with their hearts and
hands, defeated and drove out the veteran
Austrian bands from their walls. Our
past misfortunes oblige us to be foremost
in the midst of so much bravery in the
peninsular camp.

"In vain have upwards of thirty writers celebrated the valour of Masaniello's com-

patriots. In Velletri, in vain, we vanquished the Austrian bands. To few is it known that in the fort of Vigliena our valour was on a par with that of Leonidas. Championet and Massena in their relations point out in vain the indomitable bravery of the people of Naples and Calabria. Finally, in vain does history relate, that in 1815 the Neapolitans were the first in Italy who contended alone with the Austrian troops superior in numbers; that they were the conquerors in every encounter, and only abandoned the field of battle in Macerata on the arrival of the Anglo-Sicilians in the kingdom. What has it availed to have conquered for ourselves liberty in 1820, which was destroyed by all Europe combined against us?

"But now that Italy is struggling alone against Austria, now that the military deeds of Italy will be for the public cause, you will compel the world to admire your valour, you will refute past calumnies, and fully justify the reasonable confidence, which the General who has the honour to command you has ever felt in you.

" BOLOGNA, 20th May, 1848."

I had found in Bologna a letter of the 15th May, in the name of the King of Sardinia, and I hastened to reply to it, sending Captain Ulloa to the King's head-quarters. I produce this letter, because it explains in part the situation of Upper Italy at that moment.

" Bologna, 22nd May, 1848.

"To his Excellency the Minister of War.

"SIGNORE,

"Though scarcely arrived here, I hasten to reply to the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me, on the part of His Majesty, on the 15th instant.

"The instructions which I have received from my government are, to reunite the entire brigade under my command on the right of the Po, and there await new orders. But as the independence of Italy, and the honour of the Neapolitan arms, demand that I should march promptly against the enemy, I shall, without hesitation, hasten to cross the great river, and I shall have the honour to place myself under the command of H. M. Charles Albert.

"I desire to know with precision where, according to the King's decision, I ought to go with my troops; whether between the Mincio and the Adige, or whether towards Treviso. In the first case, I should be under the direct orders of H. M. In the second, I request that His Majesty would direct that the two Field-Marshals of the Pontifical troops, Durando and Ferrari, should be under my orders, that the operations of war and discipline may not suffer under any pretext, and that we may act together.

"In this second case, we shall not be

long before we encounter the enemy. But if, instead of marching on Treviso, I should have the honour of placing myself directly under the command of the King, I would ask as a favour of H. M. not to employ me in sieges or blockades, but rather in open campaign. I am more than ever desirous to refute completely the calumnies which malevolence, in former epochs, cast on the valour of the Neapolitan troops.

"I request your Excellency to direct, that the Neapolitan 10th of the line may join the 1st division of my brigade, as soon as it has crossed the Po.

"The captain of artillery who will deliver this letter, and whom I have charged to present my respects to the King, will inform the Colonel of the 10th that he must explain to the Commissary Darelli what the regiment under his charge is in want of. Captain Ulloa will return speedily with the instructions I am waiting for from H. M.

"To-morrow, the first company of the 1st division will start for Ferrara, with an excellent battery of eight pieces. Two days later, the 2nd company of the same division will follow. On the 22nd inst. the 1st regiment of dragoons will arrive in Bologna, and will be followed by the 2nd, and a regiment of lancers.

"I have the honour, &c. &c.,

"G. PEPE."

But while I was dying with impatience to cross the Po, and fancied that I held the liberty of the peninsula in my hand, an incident as unexpected as it was fatal took place.

When I awoke, on the morning of the 22nd May, Lieutenant-General Statella and Brigadier Scala were introduced, the latter arriving from Naples with a letter and information of great importance. A copy of this letter, which announced the new

and terrible misfortunes of all Italy, here follows:—

" NAPLES, May 18th.

" EXCELLENCY,

"The serious disturbances which took place in the capital on the 15th inst., as well as in some of the provinces, and which are threatened in others, impose on the government the duty of recalling, as soon as possible, the troops which are on their march for Upper Italy.

"In consequence of this, your Excellency will make arrangements that part of the infantry may embark at Rimini, to be disembarked at Manfredonia; while the remaining divisions, including the cavalry, artillery, and ambulance, shall fall back on Ancona, from whence the artillery and cavalry shall, in the first place, be ordered to proceed; and when they are nearly arrived in the kingdom, the remaining divisions of infantry shall be embarked,

and landed at Pescara. This being executed, the squadron shall proceed to Naples.

"These movements must be varied and combined according to circumstances, and the position of the troops and the country.

"For the 10th of the line, which is now at Gorto, near Casalmaggiore, your Excellency will direct that it may, by the Modena road, join our other troops in the Bolognese territory, and follow the same movement.

"The Neapolitan volunteers may, if they desire it, continue their march and join Durando's troops.

"Your Excellency will be pleased, without retarding the movement of the troops, to communicate the present orders at the head-quarters of H. M. Charles Albert.

"In fine, I am to add, in the name of the Royal government, that if your Excellency does not think proper to take the command of the troops in their retreat, it should be assumed by Lieutenant-General Statella.

"The Minister-Secretary of State for War and Marine,

"PRINCE OF ISCHITELLA."

The two generals could not conceal their joy on the receipt of this letter; I told them to return to me at mid-day. I sent to beg Count Carlo Pepoli to come to me quickly: he is a Bolognese, but had been absent from that city sixteen years. I told him that I commanded troops, who, in consequence of my twenty-seven years of exile, now saw me for the first time; and that the soldiers, superior officers, generals, all were devoted to the King; that, notwithstanding, I should have attempted to oppose the Royal orders if the population of Bologna had supported me in arms, and, above all, the National Guard. Pepoli, and other liberals, told me not to count entirely on the population against regular troops, who might arrest and conduct me out of the town. Rather than expose, not only myself, but the Bolognese, to a fratricidal war, and to a political scandal, which would have rejoiced the Austrians beyond measure, I decided on offering myself to Charles Albert as a simple volunteer on his staff; and, with a heart oppressed with anguish, with sufferings more acute than if my last moment of life had arrived, I gave Lieutenant-General Statella orders to take the command of the brigade, and follow the directions of the Government. Without losing a moment, Statella expedited couriers in every direction to the chiefs of the different corps, to commence the retrograde march; and thinking to be agreeable to me, they said that, as I proposed to go on, they offered to give orders to the paymaster to give me whatever sum I might require. I smiled at such an offer and thanked them.

In the meantime, the news of the orders from Naples spread along the Italian shore, and it was said that my life was in great peril. When a multitude of officers came running to defend me, I asked them if they would also have assisted me in preventing the troops from returning, which not only diminished the numbers of the defenders of Italy, but sent fresh aid to despotism in Naples against the liberals who had risen in favour of Neapolitan liberty.

The brave among the National Guard put their hands on their swords, saying, "This is for you, Italian General!" and I, grasping my own sword, added, "This is for Italy as long as I live!"

While the Bolognese had my safety thus at heart, a Neapolitan general, who was most disposed to flatter the great, exclaimed to King Ferdinand, "Is it possible that not one of your officers will put an end to Pepe with a pistol shot?"

Without losing an instant, I wrote and

declared to Lieutenant-General Statella, that he must regard the letter I sent him, ceding to him the command of the troops, as not received,—that I had resolved to resume the command. Statella not only resigned the command-in-chief, which I had conferred on him, but, in the letter which follows, he declares that it did not suit him to serve any longer. I publish the letter, to give an idea of the spirit which animated almost all the generals of the Two Sicilies.

"Bologna, 22nd May, Evening, 1848. "EXCELLENCY,

"This morning, the ministerial order was scarcely arrived for the retreat of the army of operation to the kingdom of Naples, leaving to your Excellency the choice, either of retaining the command, or ceding it to me, in case you would not conduct the retrograde march, when your Excellency judged it expedient to determine

that I should command in your place: and, according to the ministerial announcement, I assumed the charge and commenced to give instructions for the troops to defile towards our territories. Now, your Excellency, in orders of the same date, but at a later hour, resumes the command of the troops with the intention of continuing the forward march.

"After the demonstrations which have taken place in this city, I find it impossible to oppose,—and, therefore, in spite of my-self, I am obliged to accede to,—your Excellency's directions.

"But, in the present position of things, though as warmly interested as your Excellency in the Italian cause, I nevertheless feel it to be incompatible with my principles to take part with an army which is about to act against the will of our Government, as manifested in the abovenamed dispatch of the Minister of War.

"I must therefore entreat your Excel-

lency to permit me to resign the command of the 1st division, which no longer suits me, and allow me to return to Naples.

"LIEUT.-GEN. GIOVANNI STATELLA."

The Lieutenant-General Giovanni Statella was definitively resolved to depart. I did all in my power to shield him from the dangers which menaced him. He reached Tuscany safely, but ran a great risk there of being killed by the populace, who burnt his carriage from rage. The Vice-Admiral Cosa, who commanded the Neapolitan naval division in the Adriatic, and who had received so much applause from the Venetians, received orders to return to Naples. He obeyed with grief; but he obeyed.

Without loss of time, I despatched a courier to Ferrara and its vicinity, in order that the troops there might remain. I sent another courier towards Ancona, directing the commanders of these corps, under their

responsibility, to hasten their march towards Bologna. I was implicitly obeyed, in spite of a vivâ voce order, given by Brigadier Scala, for a countermarch. This proves that the devotion of the troops to the King proceeded from interest and not from any more elevated sentiment: my commands to continue their march towards the Po were obeyed with enthusiasm as well as promptitude.

The evening of the 22nd of May deserves to be described by the pen of a poet rather than of a soldier. Neither before nor since have I ever seen patriotic enthusiasm manifested more energetically, or more universally. The street, in which my hotel was situated, was filled with all the population of Bologna. Many bands of music played in succession. The windows were illuminated with lamps, and the street with torches. Extemporary discourses in prose and verse were spoken, and it was impossible for me not to answer, however laconically, those which were addressed to myself. The object of all these rejoicings was to thank me in the name of all Italy for not having obeyed the King's orders.

I sent the same Brigadier Scala to Naples, accompanied by Cirello, an officer of my staff, to whom I gave two letters, one for the King, the other for the Minister of War. In both these I declared my firm determination, neither to send, much less to reconduct, the troops into the kingdom: since such a retrograde movement would be fatal to Italian independence, and would redound moreover to the eternal dishonour of the Neapolitan army. I terminated my letter with the following sentence:-"In the mind of every citizen, the duty which should supersede every other is that which redounds to the welfare and glory of his country."

Will it be believed, that, for a long time, neither the King nor the minister answered my letters, though they blamed my con-

duct, and repeated to those around them the orders which had been sent to me. But, on the other hand, the ministers exhorted all the officers' wives to write to their husbands, that they and their children would be deprived of all their pensions, and must die of hunger. Many officers, especially those on my staff, who had the honour of Italy and of the Neapolitan name most at heart, referred me to these discouraging letters which were received daily. I continued to oppose with perseverance the increasing difficulties; I reviewed the corps as they arrived; I studied to profit by the impression produced on the minds of the soldiers by the popular demonstrations of the cities through which they had passed, and I perceived that the soldiers were more readily moved than the officers to favour the Italian cause.

On the 23rd of May, two letters of the same date reached me from Franzini, Minister of War to Charles Albert, and in

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his name. I produce them here, to show, not his military capacity, but his loyal character, and his desire to save Italy.

> 4 From Head Quarters in open Campaign, 21st May, 1848.

"ILLUSTRIOUS GENERAL,

"His Majesty, not being able to answer directly the letter which you sent him by General Ferrari, by reason of his being obliged to depart for Peschiera, has charged me to write to you for the purpose of begging you to direct the march of your forces towards that part of the Venetian States where Nugent now is, with the remainder of the troops which are not gone towards Verona. H. M. recommends, as of the greatest importance, that your Excellency should afterwards unite your troops with the right of his army.

"At the same time H. M. desires me to advertise your Excellency of the orders he has expedited to General Durando, to join the Sardinian army with the greater part of his troops as soon as possible, in order to compensate for the reinforcements which the enemy has received, leaving the rest to General Ferrari, under the orders of your Excellency. On the arrival of General Durando's troops, H. M. intends that the 10th regiment of Neapolitan troops shall be directed to join the Neapolitan corps.

"In announcing to your Excellency my Sovereign's directions, I hope, at the same time, to have the earliest notice of the favourable progress of the Neapolitan troops, and I have the honour to assure you of my highest consideration,

"Most illustrious General,

"Your devoted servant,

"FRANZINI,

44 Minister of War of H. Sardinian Majesty."

" May 21st, 1848.

"EXCELLENCY,

"Although I this morning communicated the orders of H. M., that you should reach the Venetian territory, to watch and beat the corps of Nugent, who, with only 5000 men, was endeavouring to join Marshal Radetzky, having now learnt by the official reports that this junction has been effected, H. M. desires that your Excellency will immediately join the right of his army, since there is every appearance to lead him to expect an attack on our line somewhere between Mantua and Peschiera. In the expectation of a speedy and certain encounter, I sign myself,

"Your Excellency's devoted servant, "Franzini, &c., &c."

While I was receiving these letters from Charles Albert, Manin, the President of the Venetian Republic, and the Chargé d'Affaires of the Provisional Government of Lombardy, wrote me the two following letters, which I insert, to show the situation of Venice, and the patriotic enthusiasm of Lombardy. Imagine, reader, the state of my mind. Grant me only life, adverse fortune, I inwardly ejaculated, till I reach the other side of the Isonzo, and I will no more complain of your injustice! Between my troops and the Roman troops, under the Brigadier-Generals Durando and Ferrari, we should have united near Padua 36,000 men; and the King of Sardinia, aided by this body of troops, would without doubt have liberated Italy from the Austrians.

"GENERAL.

"The regular militia, led by General Durando, are retiring from Trivigiano to keep in the rear of the Austrians, who appear to be moving towards Verona; they leave this part of the country in trust, I may say, to the valour and loyalty of the troops commanded by you, General. On your arrival the popular enthusiasm will be rekindled, which has been chilled

by circumstances which I will not now detail, but leave them to be judged by public opinion and by history. Time presses. We are weak, and are not ashamed to confess it; and there is joy in thinking that this new chain will more firmly join the different Italian races. Excellent is the unity which is produced from the most spontaneous and generous affections! To you, General, who, during an exile of more than a quarter of a century, have loved Italy with a watchful affection, to you no excitement is necessary. Your nation is with you. The wishes of all the noblest countries in Europe are for us. The Quirinal, the camp of Verona, and Venice are the three centres round which the fate of Italy is agitated. From the harmony of the three movements will issue salvation and honour.

"From the President of the Provisional Venetian Republic,

"MANIN."

" BOLOGNA, 26 May, 1848.

"EXCELLENCY,

"Your presence, your dignified authority, prevented me, General, from expressing to you the sentiments of veneration and admiration with which I am penetrated, on learning the sublime abandonment with which you have offered yourself to the Italian cause. History has already registered your name among her heroes; and now the universe will place you among the great. Italy will acknowledge her salvation to come from you; from you will date the commencement of truly national warfare and policy; from you the victory over ancient servile opinions. I am devoted to you, for you are devoted to the country. All the powers which the Government here have conceded to me, I am prepared to use, in order to second you in your magnanimous enterprise. And if that be not sufficient, I will joyfully give you my life. In the meantime I desire also to ascertain the sentiments of his Eminence Cardinal Amat, to whom I shall do myself the honour of presenting my credentials. I request your Excellency to return them, or an official copy. Your Excellency's devoted and admiring,

"CESARE CORRENTI,
"Secretary, &c."

While these hopes were throwing a ray of pleasure on my existence, disastrous intelligence reached me from Ferrara; it was reported that the 1st division quartered there, composed of ten battalions, an excellent campaign battery, and a company of sappers, had revolted, to obey, as these rebels expressed themselves, the orders of their beloved and beneficent King. Among the regiments composing this division was the 12th of the line, which was chiefly formed of Sicilians taken from the galleys, and of pardoned

highwaymen, who, knowing themselves to be invidious to their contemporaries, had placed all their hopes on the King's kindness. The other corps had followed the example of the 12th of the line. A committee was formed, composed of noncommissioned, and a few of the subaltern officers, which directed the whole mass of the division. They closely guarded the artillery and superior officers, but these they called their chiefs, to impose on the multitude. This revolt was excited, under hand, by officers, who had received letters from their wives imploring them to please the Government, and not to expose themselves to perpetual exile. The Cardinal Legate of Ferrara and his dependents aided the rebels to consummate their crime, even by giving them the means of transport and large quantities of provisions, on pretext that they might have joined the Austrian garrison of the citadel, and, being irritated, might have made use of the field battery they possessed, against the towns on the road between Ferrara and the Isonzo.

It was not prudent for me to send troops which had not yet broken discipline, against such a numerous rebellion. Along the line of march towards Ancona, the excellent patriot Odinot, a Bolognese, endeavoured to persuade the populous cities on the great road to let their National Guard attack the revolted troops on their march during the night; but their artillery inspired too much fear in the chiefs of these communities. The Brigadier Latralle, who was compelled, in spite of himself, to follow the rebels, irritated by the idea that he might be regarded as their accomplice, put an end to his life with a pistol. Colonel Testa, humiliated by the situation in which he was placed, was struck by apoplexy. Many officers, subaltern officers, and soldiers of honourable sentiments, who were able to escape the vigilance of the committee, came to Bologna.

If, even before this calamitous desertion, discipline was unsteady, and the wills of many wavered between obedience to the Royal orders, or to their Commander-inchief, the effect of such fatal example, which moreover remained unpunished, increased the vacillation to such a degree, that it became necessary to hope against all hope; and I did still hope.

Among so many sorrows, I was particularly afflicted by what was published in the journals, and reported in Italy, against the Neapolitans. All the nation shared the blame attached to one regiment, which the King had employed twenty years to seduce and pervert from their nationality. Some months later, the King of Sardinia was compelled, by the vicissitudes of the war, to recal three battalions which he had sent to form part of the garrison of Venice, and not one of these

would remain to combat the enemy in Italy.

Latterly a French republican army obeyed the orders it had received to attack the Roman republic. In every epoch, citizens who have spent some time as soldiers in the ranks, have incurred the stain of anti-nationality.

The three regiments of cavalry belonging to my brigade arrived in Bologna. They were admired for their discipline, instruction, and dress. I reviewed them, and published the following order of the day:—

"General Orders for the Neapolitan Cavalry.

"Three Neapolitan cavalry regiments, which combated in Lombardy, in 1796, have acquired historic fame. You too are three regiments called on to fight in the plains of Lombardy. Then the contest was for the Royal cause—now, at the same

time, for royalty and liberty. It is therefore your duty, not only to equal, but to surpass, their valorous deeds; not only to emulate their glory, but to conquer.

"G. PEPE."

While, on the one hand, I studied to infuse Italian sentiments into the minds of my soldiers, and, on the other, I kept them divided, to avoid a repetition of the catastrophe of Ferrara, I received another letter from Manin, which follows:—

" VENICE, 23rd May, 1848.

"GENERAL,

"You have already been informed, through General Ferrari, of the precise movements performed hitherto in the united provinces of our republic; of their occupation, in great part, by the enemy's forces; of the resistance in some cities, and, it is useless to conceal it, the weakness of many corps among our absent troops.

These notices must have made you aware. most valiant General, of the expediency of hastening the movement of your brave soldiers in order to succour us, as well for the moral, as for the material advantage of our population and of our troops. But Ferrari could not have advertised you of the injury we have received through the supineness of General Durando's troops, in consequence of which, the troops of General Nugent have effected a junction with those of Marshal Radetzky, between Vicenza and Verona. I will add a precise notice of the Austrian forces, which are descending into Italy to form a second corps, and which are already arrived in Friuli and Trivigiano. This notice will confirm you in the resolution, that we do not doubt you will take, to hasten to our relief, in defence of the principle which ever directs all the glorious actions of your life, and which we have proclaimed to all the Venetian people.

"We have been eye-witnesses of the valour of our Neapolitan brethren in the encounters at Treviso and Vicenza. If we were forced to admire the ardour and indomitable courage of that small free corps, what may we not expect from the greater number and discipline of those under your command, inspired with fresh energy and confidence in such a captain?

Permit me, General, to renew the assurance of our highest consideration.

" MANIN,

" President of the Venetian Republican Government."

Besides Manin's letter, I received another from Franzini, Minister of War, in the name of his Sardinian Majesty, which I transcribe:—

" 23rd May, 1848.

" EXCELLENCY,

"The Neapolitan Chargé d'Affaires to my master the King, having expressed to me, that it would be desirable that General Durando should be at the disposition of your Excellency, to act in concert against the Austrian forces in the Venetian territory, his Majesty desires me to inform you, that, whenever you think this measure indispensable, he will expedite an order relative to General Durando. As to the instructions which your Excellency, through the medium of the said Chargé d'Affaires, expresses a desire to receive with regard to the operations of your brigade, the distance which separates us will only permit me to point out a general plan,—that of operating in such a manner as will repulse the Austrian corps with the greatest vigour, endeavouring, at the same time, to cut them off again from Verona. Your Excellency should also place yourself in a position to effect a junction with the right of His Majesty's attack on Verona army, in case an should render a momentary reinforcement desirable.

"In case Durando's corps remains under your Excellency's orders, the 10th of the line may remain with the Sardinian army.

"I have the honour, &c.,

"FRANZINI,
"Minister of War."

I wanted neither the spurs of Charles Albert, nor of the Venetians, to make me cross the Po with the troops remained with me: these were, a division of infantry, another of cavalry, and an excellent battery with sappers. But I was assured by my officers who were the most devoted to the Italian cause, that the troops, who were with difficulty retained in their ranks, would desert me when I commanded them to pass the Po. Now by waiting a few days before giving this order, that which the King promised Major Cirello to send me, in accordance with my wishes, might Nor did I hope for this, from any repentance in the King, but from the fear

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which the Calabrian insurrection would inspire if it continued.

In the meantime, the progress of the enemy in the Venetian territory, and the dangers to which Venice was exposed, were such, that I thought the moment was arrived to risk the attempt. I therefore transferred my head-quarters from Bologna to Ferrara, and decided on issuing the following order of the day.

If I have not had the good fortune to decide the salvation of Italy, I have succeeded in defending Venice during a long period, and in giving its people occasion to show themselves worthy of the glorious liberty which their forefathers enjoyed for thirteen centuries; I showed the Ultramontanes to what a pitch the desperate valour of the Italian youth, though unused to arms, could attain; and lastly, I showed a king, that the love of country can make the bread of exile sweeter than his highest favours.

Order of the day.

"HEAD-QUARTERS AT ROVIGO, June 10th.

- "To-morrow at day-break, Major Ritucci will pass the Po, and repair to these head-quarters.
- "To-morrow at ten a.m., Colonel Cotrufiano with the 1st dragoons will march to Ferrara, where he will pass the night The day following, at nine o'clock a.m., he will pass the Po at Francolino, and continue his march on the same day to these head-quarters.
- "To-morrow at dawn of day, Colonel Colonna, with the 2nd dragoons, will reach Bondeno. At ten o'clock a.m., the following day, he will commence his march in order to pass the Po at Palantone, and the night at Occhiobello. On the morning of the 13th he will quit Occhiobello, and arrive at these head-quarters before evening.
- "Major Giosue Guida, with the 2nd division of the 11th of the line, will quit

Cento to-morrow at ten o'clock a.m., and march to Pontelagoscuro. At dawn on the 12th, he will pass the Po at Francolino, and continue his march to Rovigo.

"Colonel Caracciolo, with the 1st lancers, and 2nd battalion of the 2nd, at seven in the evening to-morrow, will proceed to Cento for the night, and the following morning will continue his route to Pontelagoscuro viá Mizzana. The next morning, he will pass the Po early at Francolino to arrive at these head-quarters the same evening.

"Brigadier Klein, with the 9th of the line, and the 1st battalion of the 8th, to-morrow, at seven in the evening, will proceed to Bondeno for the night. At ten a.m. the next morning he will pass the Po at Palantone and pursue his march to Occhiobello. On the 14th he will resume his march, and arrive that evening at Rovigo.

"The 2nd and 3rd battalions of volunteers, the 2nd battery of artillery, and the

6th company of sappers, have already passed the Po, and are at head-quarters since yesterday.

"It would be difficult to say whether the prompt enthusiasm of these troops in their advance, or the fraternal exultation with which they were received by the inhabitants and the militia of Milan and Bologna, was the most fervent.

"The military of every rank are strictly bound to obey their general under pain of being declared in a state of revolt.

"A general-in-chief has the right of modifying, on his responsibility, the orders he receives from his Government; above all, when these modifications have in view the national honour and the King's interest.

"I therefore hold all the subaltern officers, officers of every class, and partiticularly the heads of corps, responsible for the exact execution of these orders of the day, in default of which they will endanger both their life and honour.

"Beyond the Po, provisions of every sort will abound, and the military chest will be supplied both by our government and by those of Lombardy and Venice, who have sent me commissaries for this purpose.

"The recent victories of the King of Sardinia over the Austrians, the praises which our 10th of the line and the 1st battalion of volunteers have deserved for their valour, must make every Neapolitan soldier desirous of finding himself in presence of the enemy, before the campaign is terminated by the undoubted success of Italy.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE,
"Commander-in-Chief of the Neapolitan Army."

I shall conclude this chapter by a letter from the provisional government of Lombardy to their secretary, General Correnti, whom they sent to me, and one from Terenzio Mamiani. " MILAN, May 24th, 1848.

"To Signor Cesare Correnti, Secretary-General of the Provisional Government of Lombardy.

"You are desired to repair with all speed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Neapolitan army, General Guglielmo Pepe, in order to guarantee to him, and to all the officers and soldiers in his brigade, that, in every eventuality, their rank and pay will be assured to them as forming an essential part of the army of Lombardy; in case, an hypothesis which we hope is impossible, they were deprived of their rights by the Neapolitan government, for having passed the Po and taken part in the war for Italian independence.

"You will take care to give as much weight as possible to these assurances; and, for this purpose, you will act in concert with his Majesty the King of Sardinia and the Provisional Government of the Venetian republic, in whatever may occur. "The Provisional Government of Lombardy gives you full authority to take every measure needful, and to impart, in its name, all these arrangements, that they may avail for the accomplishment of the great end which is trusted to the vigorous energy of its mind, and the fervent patriotism of its heart.

"CASSATI, President.

DURINI.

GUERRIANI."

"Rone, May 20th, 1848.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"You must already be aware of the ill-will with which the King of Naples sends here the troops which are under your command. But, in case you should not have received distinct notice on this point, on account of their desiring to conceal it from your exalted patriotism, you may be sure of the truth of what I now tell you. This day, a despatch from Naples reached me, in which the Nunzio relates a conversation with the Prince Cariati, who came in order to foretel that, possibly, the troops would be recalled. This may serve you for advice and rule of conduct. It appears that King Ferdinand is jealous of Charles Albert, and does not fancy expending money and blood without some increase of territory. These, dear General, are old monarchical maxims; they neither suit the times nor the welfare of Italy.

"Let us think of saving the country, and if Piedmont becomes formidable, I confess it will not disturb my peace. On the other hand, I constantly grieve to think that your excellent troops may perhaps not participate in the great work of independence. I and my colleagues confide in you alone. Take all the authority you can on yourself, and even, to provide against these events, proceed forwards with all speed.

"Excuse my frankness: you have known

me for so many years, that you can neither NARRATIVE OF doubt my sincerity nor be offended with my plain dealing. Adieu, dear General: recommend me to our Bozzelli, and let us Your most affectionate, " Terenzio Mamiani." save Italy. " Again adieu.

CHAPTER IX.

Insurrection of the City of Naples, 15th of May, 1848, with its fatal consequences.

AFTER my departure from Naples, Troja, and the minister who preceded him, tried every means calculated to procure the welfare of the kingdom and of all Italy; but their endeavours were in vain with a prince whose mind clung to absolute power as to a second nature. This minister could, therefore, come to no useful decision respecting the affairs of Sicily. The many thousands of the reserve which the King had promised he would send to the Po, to increase the companies of my battalions, never moved. No one was sent to Rome to urge forward the treaty of the Italian league. Unless under the influence of fear, the King was never inclined to

any good deeds. He perceived that all the ardent young men in the kingdom, and especially in the capital, who were of liberal opinions, had no leader; and, on the other hand, the army were devoted to him, above all the Swiss mercenaries. these circumstances, which were against the cause of liberty, may be added the celebrated Enciclica, in which Pius IX. began to show a retrograde tendency. the lovers of Italian independence were not discouraged, yet the opposite party began to hope; and for the first time the star of peninsular fortune grew pale. that time it was said (and the report reached me through the camp of Charles Albert), that the Sicilian King already thought of betraying us, and recalling the troops entrusted to me. At that moment I did not believe this, nor do I now think it could then be true, since the fatal recal could not have taken place without the victory which the Royal troops obtained on the 15th of May over the patriots of the capital, who were few in number, and without a chief. The fault of the Neapolitan youths, who took up arms on the 15th of May, was not that they combated a prince who was radically averse to the constitution which he had sworn to maintain before God and men -their fault was, that they had not well calculated their own, and the enemy's forces; that they did not choose among themselves a good leader, or, in default of a good one, a mediocre one; for it is well known that in all deeds of arms it is better to have a faithful and ardent chief, even though inexperienced, than to be without any.

Having read with attention the narrative of Massari on the events of the 15th of May, and that of a celebrated Neapolitan advocate, who was in the midst of them, and being assured that the facts are related with great exactitude, I shall here transcribe them in great part, omitting

the reflections, which do not satisfy me, and adding my own.

On the approach of the 15th of May, the deputies elected in the provinces arrived in Naples, and they ascertained with their own eyes the fearful crisis which was hanging over the country. Yet no one foresaw that it would be as terrible and as near at hand as was the case. The mine was loaded with gunpowder—the spark, which was to set it on fire, was alone wanting to make it explode, and this was the question of the oath.

The minister published the programme of the solemn ceremony by which the parliamentary labours were to be inaugurated. In an official article it was said that the deputies were to swear fidelity to the King, and to the *Statuto*,—nothing more. No mention was made of the express clause in the manifests of the 3rd of April, which conferred on the Elective

Assembly the right to expound and modify the constitution.

The elected deputies met in a private conference, in order to come to an understanding together, and, by a preparatory deliberation, to hasten the verification of their powers, which would necessarily be the first subject of discussion submitted to a legislative body. One of these reunions met by invitation at the house of the exminister Ruggiero; but, as many were of opinion that he ought not to be admitted, because the election was made during the time that he sat in the councils of the Crown, the meetings were transferred from his house to a saloon of the Communal Palazzo of Monteoliveto.

The form of the oath was naturally the theme on which all the discussion turned. The silence regarding the powers solemnly promised on the 3rd of April by the executive power offended the deputies. Hence, a great diversity of opinions on the formula to be adopted, and much irritating discussion. The deputies had little or no confidence in the minister. The programme which he had signed increased their distrust and dis-

content,—an unjust distrust, a fatal discontent, which hastened the catastrophe,

The deputies assembled at the Palace and ruined everything.

Monteoliveto. In a preparatory meeting, they had chosen for their president in age the venerable Archdeacon Lucado Samuele Cagnazzi, a profound and learned econo-

mist, and for vice-president Dr. Vincenzo Lanza, a celebrated professor of pathology in the University of Naples, and one of

the most respectable physicians of the capital. The discussions were violent and agitated: every one wished to give his

opinion. The formula inscribed by the minister in the official programme wa rejected: it was moved that a conferen should be opened with him, to obtain

consent to a better formula. The deputation repaired to the minister, who, it may readily be understood, had no other object in view than to put an end to dissensions, and to reconcile the demands of the deputies with those of the Prince.

The news of these differences flew with the rapidity of lightning round the city; the minds of all were moved and alarmed beyond all belief; suspicions and distrust, hitherto concealed, now burst forth in open anger; deep and hidden wrath was stirred in every breast. Still the question between the executive power and the chamber remained untouched, when suddenly it became known that some barricades had been erected in the Strada di Toledo. These barricades were the first preparations for the funeral of liberty. Positive data are wanting as to their first authors, which proves that they could not have been persons of note. By this fault the expulsion of the foreigner was delayed, and will be, Heaven knows for how long. Those who committed it were misled by ignorance of their means of action, and by not knowing how to use those which they were able to furnish. The conduct of the King was not merely a fault, but a serious crime,—the crime of having brought such severe calamities on his country.

It is impossible to say the number of deputies who shared in these discussions. If they erred by uselessly raising an irritating question, they erred at least with the greatest good faith, and it certainly was not their intention to push matters to such terrible extremities. Many ran to entreat the people to pull down the barricades, but they were not listened to. The minister, justly alarmed at these menacing events, and placed, as the Italian proverb says, between the anvil and the hammer, did not neglect any means of arranging the fatal dissension: he did all in his

power to persuade the King to consent to the wishes of the national representatives.

The honourable Minister of the Interior, Raffaele Conforti, on the evening of the 14th of May, repaired to the hall where the deputies were assembled, and, almost with tears in his eyes, he conjured them to think of Italy, and to let irritating discussions yield to the thought of co-operating with alacrity in the war of national independence, which was now being carried on in the plains of Lombardy. To these patriotic and judicious words of the good minister, the provisional vice-president of the chamber, Vincenzo Lanza, answered—"The chamber will provide for the war better than the minister does."

To meet the exigencies of the moment, the deputies named a committee of public safety, composed of five of their number; and this the partial imagination of Bozzelli afterwards called a "Provisional Government." This committee was most innocent, and never entertained the notion which was attributed to it, of concentrating the supreme power in its own hands, and proclaiming the fall of the Bourbon dynasty.

After many reiterated endeavours, the deputy, Camillo Cacace, supported by the minister, obtained from the King, that, to avoid disagreement, and calm the public agitation, the opening of the Parliament should take place directly, and no form of oath whatever should be prescribed. On this notice, hope revived; disheartening suspicions were dissipated; doubts ceased. The soldiers of the National Guard, rejoiced at this act, returned tranquilly to their homes in the middle of the night, very few of them remaining under arms. The following morning many of the deputies repaired to the Palazzo di Monteoliveto in black coats and white cravats, certain of assisting at the imposing ceremony which was to inaugurate their parliamentary

labours, and consecrate the first real act of a representative government. But Heaven in its high and stern resolve had disposed otherwise, and this day of expected joy became a day of sorrow and slaughter. The sun which rose bright and splendid in that azure and placid sky shed its parting rays on the last hour of Italian liberty!

At half-past eleven, a.m., the firing commenced—on which side is unknown—in the neighbourhood of the barrier of St. Ferdinand, close to the Royal Palace. After the first shot, conciliation was at an end; the die was cast. The few National Guards who were under arms, and the other soldiers, who at the beat of the drum hastened to the spot, sustained the battle heroically. The encounter was murderous, and for some time the result was doubtful. The soldiers of the Royal Guard turned their backs; the sinking fortunes of the royal army were retrieved by the Swiss mercenaries. They, pretending themselves

friends to the Neapolitans, had been listened to fraternally. Some of their superior officers were admitted to visit the barricades, and they swore on their cross of honour that they would not fight against the citizens. The lying promise was a sly artifice to get within the barricades, in order to estimate their real power of resistance. As soon as they saw that they were fragile and ill-constructed, they turned back, and kept their promises by fighting with a fury and ferocity which baffles description. Platoon fire, incessant musket shots, did not suffice; artillery was used, and the castles cannonaded the innocent city. That of St. Elmo alone did no damage, because the guns were only loaded with powder. The loyal commander of that fortress, General Michelangelo Roberti, a man and a citizen before he was a soldier, would not obey the orders given him, and preferred losing his post to committing an infamous fratricide. On the

towers of the castle floated the red banner—the abhorred symbol of murder and blood!

But in the Royal Palace they trembled; the fate of the war was still uncertain, and its final result doubtful.

The diplomatic corps all repaired to the King's Palace, even including Lord Napier, who on the 29th of January had shown himself so favourable to the cause of liberty. Not one of these diplomatists said a syllable to persuade the King to put a stop to the inhuman slaughter, and give orders for the troops to return to their quarters. Unhappy Naples, in the middle of the most civilised nineteenth century, was coldly abandoned to all the horrors of war; and the civil functionaries of the nation had not courage enough, in the name of humanity, to plead its cause.

The behaviour of the deputies on the 15th of May was truly admirable. The sword of reactionary power was suspended

over their heads; the palace in which they were deliberating was surrounded by soldiers; imminent danger of death threatened them every moment; but their courage did not forsake them; and, with a few exceptions, all remained at their post. The president by seniority, Archdeacon Cagnazzi, though almost an octogenarian, gave the first example of firmness and courage. An officer presented himself, and, in the name of the King, desired the assembly to dissolve itself. The venerable old man refused to obey this verbal order, and demanded that it should be written. Before they submitted, a noble and dignified protest was written, and signed by seventyseven of the deputies. Pietro Leopardi, Girolamo Ulloa, and Giuseppe Masari, who, on account of their employments elsewhere, were absent from the kingdom, and could not participate in their colleagues' glorious peril, publicly gave their adhesion to the protest, which with great moderation of

language, and energetic laconism, attested to the country the sentiments of their representatives, and courageously pronounced their solemn reprobation of the arbitrary acts of a government, which attacked the chosen deputies of the nation with the arguments of the sword and cannon balls, thus suffocating liberty, trampling on just rights, and destroying the constitution.

In that terrible and memorable emergency, the Neapolitan deputies proved themselves the worthy descendants of those immortal martyrs, who in 1799 met death on the scaffold with the serenity and deliberation of Stoics, with the manly resignation and confidence of Christians.

The deputies were driven from the hall in which they were assembled, because alone and unarmed they could not resist the soldiers sent to eject them; but, while departing, they protested against the brute force which trampled triumphantly on their outraged rights, in the language of authority and offended justice. Nor are these praises either exaggerated or undeserved; for the Neapolitan deputies heroically defended their prerogatives to the last, and in the face of death, from which they were miraculously delivered, they did not swerve from the sacred principle they represented, nor betray their high national mandate.

Nor did the combatants give fewer proofs of courage. The struggle lasted from half-past eleven in the morning till the evening, and was most bloody. The soldiers of the National Guard, who were for the most part young, unskilful, and novices in the art of fighting, performed prodigies of valour. The fragile barricades were feeble ramparts against the onset of the royal troops, especially the Swiss, who declared that they fought for their bread.

The strongest barriers, and the last to be overcome, were the breasts of those generous youths. Unfortunate and heroic young men! who from the smallness of their numbers, and the want of a leader, were as innocent victims to the butcher. What, then, was the cause of all this bloodshed? Those traitors to their country, who, greedy for place, were impatient to consummate the sacrifice, and again to erect, over the dead bodies of so many magnanimous patriots, the tottering edifice of despotism.

In the midst of the grief occasioned by such dreadful calamities, it is at least a comfort to reflect that the Italians, and especially the Neapolitans, have borne testimony with their blood against the false and ignominious calumny cast on them by foreigners, that "the Italians do not fight."

The soldiery abused their victory by an excess of inhumanity almost incredible: they revelled in barbarity; and in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the most flourishing and civilised city in Italy,

Neronian horrors were committed; and Europe, from her fleets, impassible and tearless, contemplated the sanguinary spectacle! Pillage, slaughter; children and old men murdered; women slain; all that in spite of humanity can take place in a city taken by storm, and after a long resistance, was experienced by most unhappy Naples. The days of Cardinal Ruffo, of infamous memory, seemed restored. The dregs of the populace crowned the work, and vied with the soldiers in vile cupidity and unbridled rapine. The houses of the liberals were pointed out, and selected for pillage and violence. Three times in the course of the day the lazzaroni and soldiers went to Salicetti's dwelling, and three times, fortunately, they failed in finding him. On being asked why they were so enraged against a man who had never done them wrong, they answered, "We have promised his head to the King!" An excellent young man named Santillo, who had the

reputation of being an ardent liberal, and a thorough Italian, seeing the soldiers ascending his stairs, to appease their anger put himself in bed and feigned illness; but in his bed they inexorably murdered him. All the soldiers of the National Guard, taken with arms in their hands, were shot in the ditches of Castelnuovo. Not a few fathers, before joining their beloved sons in the tomb, were compelled to look on while they were murdered!

On the evening of the 15th May, the most beautiful city in Italy presented a horrid spectacle, which my pen shrinks from describing. Palaces burnt; the Via di Toledo and the adjacent streets strewed with the bodies of the wounded, and with bloody corpses; the groans of the dying drowned by the obscene cries of the soldiery and the populace; all around the smoking vestiges of the artillery; every where squalid contention; in every family agitation and grief; in every breast dread

and terror; liberty extinguished; reaction triumphant and inebriated with joy.

This is an explicit account of the catastrophe which happened in Naples on the 15th May, 1848. The reactionary party, which had been vanquished on the 29th January, panted for its revenge; the anarchy which prevailed during the ministry of Bozzelli was the arsenal whence they took and furbished their arms; the agitation caused by the dissensions between the deputies and the King relative to the oath, made the young men run to arms; and in the unequal combat liberty fell.

To clear itself in the eyes of Europe from the blood which had been shed, to avert the execration of Italy and of all civilised nations from the head of the Prince, the Government alleged that they had used the right of legitimate defence, and had fought against republicans. But the deputies, the soldiers of the National Guard, the patriots of every class, did not contend

for a republic, but to maintain the constitution sworn to by the King. If the Government, as they wished it to be believed, had truly acted for their lawful defence, towards what party would they have leaned after the victory? Doubtless they would have continued to co-operate efficaciously in the war, and they would have preserved the constitutional franchise in its purity. But on the contrary, the government hastened to recal their subsidies from Piedmont, to revoke the greater part of the concessions made, and, above all, they hastened to call back the troops commanded by Pepe, whose co-operation during all the month of June would infallibly have decided the liberation of Italy from foreign yoke.

The ministerial portfolios had fallen into blood. The antecedents of the members of the ministry were not such as to conciliate the esteem and confidence of the nation. Nevertheless, before judging them,

NARRATIVE OF their acts should be seen; no one can be brought to believe that men, reputed

honourable, if not capable, should in a moment sully their reputations by making

themselves the pliant instruments of If the vile subterfuges employed by the reaction.

ministry of the 16th May, to persuade

the troops on their road to the Po not to follow their General-in-Chief, were minutely known, when, against every rule of dis-

cipline, they made themselves judges of the difficulties which arose between the said general and the government, more

than ever would all Italy applaud those Neapolitan soldiers who passed the Po, and followed Pepe.

With regard to internal operations, the first was a manifesto, signed by the King. containing expressions of anger and menace

but it mentioned that the Statuto would upheld, and by this means reassured minds of the citizens. The facts plain

showed the signification to be given to these words. The National Guard of Naples was dissolved, the city was placed in a state of siege, and all arms were ordered with severe threats to be given up: and, as if these measures were not enough, the Chamber was also dissolved. At the same time the electoral franchise, conceded by the King on the 3rd of April, was declared subversive and anarchical, and therefore annulled. A new electoral law was promulged, differing little from that which Bozzelli had framed. The electoral colleges were convoked for the 13th of June, and the opening of the Parliament fixed for the beginning of July. At the same time incarcerations and trials began; the soldiers who had pillaged and stolen were rewarded with premiums and honorary distinctions; domiciliary visits were renewed; flourished anew; and the ancient police revived as by enchantment. Michelangiolo Roberti for not cannonading

the city from the Castle of St. Elmo, was dismissed; and the head of the ministry which dismissed him was Bozzelli, who, a prisoner himself in that castle in 1844, had received from the loyal old soldier every sort of courtesy and kindness.

In the mean time the sad news of the fiery state of the capital spread over the provinces, and generated in the minds of all immense irritation and cruel apprehensions; suspicions became stronger, and the fermentation indescribable. The whole kingdom was in agitation; in Calabria they proceeded to action, and in many of the communes took up arms. But these provinces were unprepared for a general rising; nor did a single citizen of note, or sufficiently esteemed to inspire the confidence necessary to direct such a movement, present himself. Therefore, on the side of the liberals, no experienced head inspiring universal confidence; with the remembrance of recent misfortunes

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from want of arms: on the side of the ferocious government, a sufficient number of troops; recent victory in the capital; with numberless examples of cruelties rarely heard of: in fine, telegraphs and steam-boats, thanks to which, losses and reverses (for there was a moment in which the royalists between Nicastro and Pizzo found themselves in rather critical circumstances) were easily repaired: such were the causes which occasioned the discomfiture of the liberals in Calabria; which rendered the government more proud, more averse to liberty, more powerful; and which place the nation in the sad necessity of again conquering their lost institutions.

CHAPTER X.

Passage of the Po.—Troops which follow Pepe.—First operations. Fall of Vicenza.—Small remaining corps concentrated in Venice—Advantages to Italy from its defence.—Description Venice.—Advantages to Italy from its defence.—Description of the Lagoon.—Command of all the Italian troops in Venice. of the Lagoon.—Command of MI the Human tecops in Venice conferred on the Author.—State of the fortifications, and of

ALTHOUGH my order of the day of the 10th of June* was dated from Rovigo, I published it in Ferrara, where I remained in order to superintend the passage over the Po, of two battalions of Neapolitan volunteers, another of Milanese volunteers, which had been conducted to me by the fervent patriot, Cesare Correnti (whose two younger brothers were in this corps), and a battalion of Bolognese volunteers, with an excellent field-battery and a company The passage was performed The Marquis Costabile, colonel of my staff, and Anau, two wealthy of sappers. at Francolino. · See chap, viii., p. 195.

proprietors, and both warm patriots, provided all the expenses and requisites.

On arriving on the right bank of the river, we were received by a multitude of citizens from the neighbouring communes, who were devoted to the national cause: also by several companies of the civic guard, with bands of music; and lastly, by the young ladies of a neighbouring seminary, with their directress, who declaimed a patriotic poem. We all waited the two following days for the passage of my troops with the fine cavalry. When I arrived in Rovigo, my anxiety seemed to be doubled; I was ignorant how many would follow me, and I trusted but in few; while, on the other side, I saw with pain that the Roman forces, commanded by Durando, general of brigade in the pontifical service, were in serious danger in Vicenza. I know not by whose orders Durando occupied Vicenza, but certain it is, that if, instead of that city, the forces of Pius IX. had occupied Padua, which is not only a walled city, but also in great part surrounded by water, they might either have defended themselves there, or have fallen back on Venice or Mestre. At the same time, the enemy by advancing towards Padua would have removed to a greater distance from their forts, and the movement of the Sardinian troops would have rendered retreat more difficult; but Vicenza fell about the 11th of June, at the very moment when I was placed in the unfortunate position of finding myself followed by none, or very, few of those I had left on the other side the Po. Notwithstanding this, and without hesitation, I ordered two battalions of artillery from Padua to enter the Lagoon, and with the rest I prepared to go to Cavazere from Rovigo on the 12th. if my troops should execute my orders to cross the Po. A sorrow which we apprehend is still greatly increased by the certainty of its realisation. I was filled with the most lively grief when I knew, that of the troops I had left behind me, only one battalion of the 2nd Rifles, commanded by Major Ritucci, who had been my subaltern

officer in 1815, had passed the river; and that the other battalions and squadrons had chosen to obey the King's orders by repassing the Tronto. I leave to other pens to narrate the particulars of this event, so fatal to Italy; mine is more willing to be employed in praising my contemporaries. All hope of being able to support the operations of Charles Albert being lost, I turned my mind to the best method of preventing the fall of Venice; therefore on the 13th of June, via Padua and Cavazere, I entered the Lagoon with the forces before-mentioned, to which were added the 2nd battalion of Neapolitan Rifles. These might well be called a model battalion; and there is no doubt, that had we not arrived in Venice with the above-named auxiliaries. Venice must have fallen before the end of June, from want of defenders, and still more of commanders.

I embarked at Chioggia, on a steamvessel, for the city of Venice, on the same day, the 13th, and I arrived there after sunset. I knew not that I was expected, but on stepping on shore, I found myself surrounded by the affectionate Venetian population, whom I was destined afterwards to admire so much for their love of liberty, which made them heedless of all personal or family interests, and even of life itself.

The crowd which accompanied me to the Palazzo Soranzo, which had been chosen for my dwelling, pressed on me so much, that it was with difficulty I could breathe. They proclaimed me their deliverer, and truly I felt that I would willingly give my life to deserve the name.

Among the advantages which redound to Italy from the long defence of Venice, two are pre-eminent. The first is, to have shown the utter contempt of worldly goods and life, which the love of liberty excited in this people;—the second is, to have demonstrated to the youth of Italy, in how short a time, from absolute inexperience in warfare, they may become capable of contending with advantage

against disciplined troops. I say, the youth of *Italy*; for the defenders of Venice were composed of Neapolitans, Romans, Venetians, Lombards, and even Piedmontese, since Charles Albert sent two battalions there for some time.

My readers must not expect from me a minute description of the Lagoon, which, in fact, is not easily described; still I must mention some particulars, remembering that in a journal which was published in Milan, in the summer of 1848, by some fervent literary patriots, it is said that Venice being entirely surrounded and defended by waters, its whole garrison might encamp on terra firma.

The entire lake, which is called Venetian, and the estuary, are nearly nine miles in circumference; but there are no fewer than fifty-four small and large forts to garrison. Those of Malghera, Brondolo, and Treporti are on terra firma, and could not be abandoned with impunity. Large ships of war cannot enter the Lagoon on account of the shallowness of the water

in many places, and of the internal canals, which are partly artificial, and partly natural. Of its defence I must write at length, but I shall not say a word of my own ideas regarding the system to be followed in besieging it, since Venice is now occupied by the Austrians. It has been my singular fortune to pass my days alternately in camps, in chains, and in royal palaces; and recently I was whirled from Paris to the command of an army of Ferdinand the Second's, and then to that of the Italian troops in the Venetian republic. It may be my fate, at no distant day, to bear arms against the Ultramontanes who now contaminate Venice with their presence; but the unparalleled glory of so many centuries' duration is not destroyed by a few years of misfortune.

The first visit I received on the evening of my arrival in Venice, was from Manin, the President of the Republic. He described to me the situation of Venice, and proposed that I should take the command in chief of all its land troops. I accepted the offer, and he issued the following decree:-

"To his Excellency Lieutenant-General Baron Guglielmo Pepe, &c. &c.

"The Provisional Government of the Venetian Republic nominates your Excellence, General-in-Chief of the land forces which are now in Venice.

"Your name is already great and revered in Italy, and the present title will add nothing to its lustre; but your name will be a favourable omen for the liberation of these provinces—a liberation which will soon render it more glorious.

"From the President of the Provisional Government, &c. "Manin."

" VENICE, 15th June, 1848.

I accepted this command, for I had ever considered Venice the most important military position to preserve in Italy, since it is from thence that the Austrian empire must be attacked. The fortifications in the lake were almost abandoned, and the excellent Neapolitan officers of the engineer-corps who had followed me were most useful. The militia whom I found in Venice, when joined by those I had brought with me, amounted to 22,000 men, including a fine battalion of marines, and one of gendarmes, all old soldiers, but who could rarely be occupied in the defence, as they were employed in preserving internal order. The rest of the militia were divided into different regiments, into battalions, and into many subdivisions, and were chiefly commanded by adventurers. Each corps had rules of discipline, and ordinances, peculiar to itself, and, what is more extraordinary, they were paid and armed in different ways. Often in one company might be seen four different kinds of muskets. Garrison-service was wholly unknown. Among others, the garrison of Malghera, the key of Venice, was composed of 3000 of the civic garde mobile, who not finding sufficient room to lodge themselves in the two barracks which were there, lay on the ground in the open air, or within the barrack which they were beginning to construct.

To give an exact idea of the state in which I found the military population in the Lagoon on my arrival, and to remove all suspicion of exaggeration, I will transscribe the letter written to me by Tomaseo, the Minister of the Interior: he is one of the warmest patriots, and most eminent of the Italian literati, and could not persuade himself that I should succeed in so short a space of time in converting a set of men, so utterly deficient in discipline, into a valiant militia.

" VENICE, 17th June.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"This troop of idle undisciplined men is more dangerous than useful to Venice. We beseech you to send them away as soon as possible. Form a camp, which is earnestly demanded by every one. To you is confided our destiny, and perhaps that of all Italy. It is superfluous to recommend ourselves to you. Adieu, with affection.

"Tomaseo."

I produce this letter for the honour of Italy, when it appears that a vagabond set of youths, unused to arms, in a short time became disciplined troops, who assaulted with success a warlike enemy, not once or twice, but repeatedly.

But if among so many thousand militia many deserved the appellation of vagabonds, many others, perhaps a good half of the entire garrison, had left their families, who were more or less in easy circumstances, through love of Italy. Oftener than would be believed, I found in the ranks young volunteers of high families, either from the city or the provinces. I was particularly grieved to find that advancement was given, not to merit, but to satisfy the demands of the patriotic club.

When in presence of the enemy, promo-

tion should be gained with the point of the sword. In some of the battalions, especially among the Lombards, there was not a single soldier deficient in education. In Venice, in Chioggia, and in some of the most populous islands, I endeavoured to prevent them from lodging in the inns, and spending there the money they had received from their parents. But I was rewarded by knowing that they read there with great attention my orders of the day, from which they often repeated different sentences. These orders were my warhorse. I generally met with so much kindness of feeling in these enthusiastic young men, that when I questioned them, first one and then another, concerning their wants, they concealed from me the privations they suffered, to avoid giving me pain; for not one of them was ignorant that I loved them as my sons. About three hundred young men of respectable families had formed themselves into a company to serve as artillery-men during the siege. They suffered privations with

such patriotism, and exposed their lives with so much valour, that you might have thought them the contemporaries of Lycurgus.

I will here transcribe the order of the day which I addressed to the Neapolitans who had followed me to this side of the Po, and the manifesto to all the Italians, in which I justified, on public grounds, all that I had done since I embarked at Naples till my arrival in Venice.

Order of the Day.

"Officers, Subaltern-officers, and Soldiers of the Neapolitan corps which passed the Po, by following your General you have proved yourselves possessed of the first virtue of a soldier, which is obedience; by adhering to the Italian standard in this sacred war, in spite of servile habits, of threats and of seduction, you have deserved well of the whole nation. When that part of Italy to which you specially belong shall have regained those liberal institutions, of which fraud and violence have

deprived it, my voice will be raised to demand, that in your respective homes your names may be lastingly recorded.

"In the meantime, though your number is small, there is much to be done. You must at the least equal in valour our 10th of the line, and our 1st battalion of volunteers, who have obtained the applause of His Sardinian Majesty. You must show yourselves so prodigal of blood and life, that the world shall say that those who refused to follow you over the Po were seduced, for, being your contemporaries, their courage could not have failed.

"You will neither be exiles, nor banished, as the satellites of regal power have threatened. Every province which lies between the Tronto and the Alps is your country. I shall recommend all the Italian governments to treat you as their own troops, and give you the rewards you may deserve. Like a tender father, my endeavours for your welfare will never cease; your guarantee is the affection, increased and sanctified by misfortune, which I have

cherished all my life for our common country, and which will follow me to the grave.

"LIEUT-GEN. GUGLIELMO PEPE, "Commander in Chief.

"HEAD QUARTERS, VENICE, 15th June."

Order of the Day.

"Officers, subaltern Officers, and Soldiers of the Italian Militia, who, under various denominations, are now combating in the Venetian provinces, for the liberation of the entire Peninsula from the Austrian yoke; the Government of his Holiness, the Government of Venice, and the Commissioner of the Lombard Government. have desired that I should put myself at your head. I have accepted this great honour; and if any thing could give me consolation for having been followed by so few of the troops whom I had conducted to the banks of the Po, I should certainly have found it on assuming the command of the numerous troops belonging to different Italian provinces, which have

long been dear to me, and are now more so than ever, from the flattering reception given to me by their inhabitants in my recent misfortunes.

"The foundation and summit of all military excellence is discipline. Valour, love of country, kind sentiments, energy of will, and firmness of purpose, are all of them virtues which you possess; but these, which give you so much superiority over the troops you are to contend with, will be fruitless without unity of command and prompt obedience. It will be my earnest care to introduce and consolidate both these among you. Without these, in spite of courage, alacrity, and ardour, you will not obtain over the enemy the advantages which all Italy expects from you, supported, as we are, by Charles Albert, the great prop of Italian independence.

"In future no soldier must leave his banner without obtaining the permission of his superiors, and the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief. No corps can execute any movement without the orders of

their respective Generals, which must have been first confirmed by me. Reasoning and deliberation may be seem brothers, but cannot be allowed to warriors. By maintaining discipline with firmness, by punishing the smallest failings, which if passed over might lead to serious evils, I shall the most efficaciously promote your well being. I shall refer every act that deserves reward to your respective governments, nor shall I rest till I have obtained it: I shall take care that, through the medium of the official gazettes, those of your deeds which are worthy the rising destinies of Italy, our common country for which you have taken up arms, may be especially made known, to your contemporaries, to your parents. to all of whom you most desire the esteem and affection. I hope thus to convince you that just and rigorous discipline is the supreme necessity of war, and my mind will rejoice only when I can praise you with truth, and reward you according to your deserts.

"G. PEPE.

[&]quot; VENICE, 18th June, 1848."

Order of the Day.

To the Italians, and particularly the People of Bologna, as a mark of my gratitude towards them.

"AFTER twenty-seven years of an exile, which itself was not my first, I returned to my native country. The Presidency of a Ministry of my choice, with the portfolios of war and marine, were offered me; but the King not acceding to my programme, which tended to enlarge the constitution, I accepted the command-in-chief of the army destined to combat the Austrians.

"The independence of Italy, and the desire to see the valour of the Neapolitans, who had shed so much blood in the cause of liberty, shine on the field of battle, was ever the ardent wish of my life. I, therefore, used all my efforts to overcome the innumerable difficulties with which the expedition was sought to be retarded. Thus I had decided the Ministry on disembarking myself and a portion of the troops at Venice, when suddenly this salu-

tary design was impeded, and instructions were given me to wait for new orders between Bologna and Ferrara. Nevertheless, I had scarcely re-united the greater part of the forces, than I wrote to His Sardinian Majesty, that I should speedily continue my march to the Venetian provinces, without waiting for further orders from Naples. When I was on the eve of executing this project, the Neapolitan Ministry of the 15th May (a day of painful recollections) sent a General to me, with orders not to advance against the Austrians, but to conduct the army back into the kingdom, where it would have been employed in combating the defenders of the Chamber of Deputies. But as the Ministry were not ignorant of my sentiments, they ordered the same General to make the troops, who had not yet arrived in Bologna, turn back: to exhort the officers and subaltern officers of the entire corps, both by words and writings, not to follow their Commander-in-Chief if he should refuse to retreat, under pain of being considered

outlaws, and being banished their country; thus ruining their career, and abandoning their wives and children to misery. In spite of so much perfidy, I ordered the 1st division to pass the Po on the 26th of May; but seduction had already produced its sad effects, and you all know how the two brigades which had advanced to Ferrara, refusing obedience to their commanders, turned back towards Rimini, where they were led to expect that the Neapolitan fleet would take them up and convey them to Naples. Many officers, faithful to honour, did not follow the mutineers. Colonel Lahalle, who commanded the 2nd brigade, being compelled to accompany them, generously preferred death to dishonour, and with his own hand he put an end to a life which could no longer serve Italian independence. Colonel Testa, from the intensity of his anguish, was struck with apoplexy.

"These horrid examples did not vanquish my firm resolve of aiding the common cause, and I directed that on the 30th May the Colonel of the 1st Dragoons, followed 學學

by his regiment and three battalions, should cross the Po near Stellata, and the rest of the troops on the following day. Then the head officers of the regiments declared, that it being now known to all the officers and soldiers that I was acting against the King's will, this movement would expose them to a renewal of the sad scene offered by the 1st division at Ferrara. Yielding to necessity, and in the hope of aiding the Italian war, I waited for an answer from the Neapolitan government; but though many days had elapsed beyond the time needful for a speedy answer, with signal bad faith they maintained an artful silence. In the meantime events were ripening in Venice. The war commissioners of Venice, Rovigo, and Padua, invoked our assistance in the holy cause with the troops which remained to me. Ever an Italian, I determined to pass the Po, and I gave precise orders to this effect. In very many officers servile habits prevailed over sentiments of military honour; but an excellent battery of artillery, and a company of sappers, gave a noble example. All were most valuable, and, commanded by the good Major Moreno, they immediately passed in company with two battalions of volunteers. Then Major Ritucci, whom I rejoice to call of my school, as he was formerly my subordinate, having arrived on the banks of the river, pronounced these noble words, "Onwards is honour, on that side dishonour;" and the soldiers passed on. I was followed by all the officers on my staff, and joined by several officers and some detachments.

"The division of infantry and that of cavalry, so much applauded by the patriotic Bolognese, abandoned me. My hopes of aiding the Italian cause, and of placing Neapolitan military glory in relief, thus proving delusive, I thought of offering my services to Charles Albert as a simple volunteer. But called to the succour of Venice, with my few remaining troops, I was entrusted by its government with the command of the forces assembled here, and the Cardinal Legate of Ferrara, in the name of the Consulta, presided over by

him, desires I should assume that of the Pontifical forces on this side the Po.

"It would ill accord with my sentiments and with my life, to refuse to act in the service of Italian independence. I have, therefore, accepted the commands conferred on me. May success correspond with my zeal. May fortune prove favourable. It is not in her power to diminish my love for Italy. Wherever I have been she has been my pride, as well as my comfort in adversity.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE.

"VENICE, June 17th, 1848."

In the meantime, I hastened to write to his Sardinian Majesty, giving him notice of all that had happened to me, and of the command which I had accepted in Venice; and I added, that whenever he could place under my orders one of his brigades and the squadron commanded by the Vice-Admiral Albini, I would disembark at Trieste, not in order to occupy it, but to send all its riches to Venice, together with

their merchant and war vessels; and that, moreover, with these troops I would attack the enemy, or at least molest their forces between the Isonzo and Rovigo. But the Sardinian King, whose ardour in the Italian cause I admired, but never his military talents, nor, above all, his art in choosing good superior officers, instead of responding to my proposal, addressed to me the following letter through General Salasco, chief of his staff:—

"From Head Quarters,
"Valeggio, 19th June, 1848.

"General Ferrari has this moment arrived from Rome, sent to his Majesty from the Pontifical government. The King, considering that it would be both advantageous and reasonable that the different corps, either of the regular troops or of the militia and volunteers of the Pontifical state, now bearing arms in the Venetian territories, who were not, and cannot be, comprehended in the convention for the reduction of Vicenza on the

11th inst., should act in concert under one commander, has judged expedient to adhere to the demand of the above esteemed General Ferrari, charging him in the interests of the common cause to assume the command of such troops under the superior authority of your Excellency, to whose rank and position belongs the command of all the Venetian troops, without distinction, with the approbation and under the direction of H. M. the King of Sardinia, General-in-Chief of all the forces combating for the independence of Italy.

"H. M. trusts that these various troops, united under the direction of your Excellency, regularly distributed and well conducted, may not only defend Venice effectively, but, should the opportunity present itself, may act on the offensive on terra firma, and molest the enemy in the possession of the city they have recovered, or force them to keep strong garrisons drawn from their campaign forces.

"Signor Leopardi, minister of the Neapolitan government to his Majesty, will write more fully to your Excellency on these subjects. I confine myself to the brief orders already expressed, and beg your Excellency to be assured of my distinguished consideration.

"SALASCO,
"Lieut. Gen., Chief of the Staff."

The Pontifical government had conferred on me not only the command of the four legions which I found in Venice, but moreover the power to dismiss the officers of every grade whom I thought unfit for service, as well as to bestow rewards on the deserving. Ferrari, who, from a retired lieutenant-colonel in France, had been received in Rome with the rank of brigadier-general, at the end of May had been deprived of his command by the Roman government, which was not satisfied with his services. This circumstance was contrary to the orders of Charles Albert; but as I was very desirous of satisfying him, remembering that on him depended the expulsion of the Austrians, I did not fail

to confer the command of the four legions on General Ferrari, keeping watch over his conduct.

In the meantime, the energetic and most Italian government of Lombardy issued the following decree:—

"The Provisional Government of Lombardy decrees,—

"1st. All the Neapolitan officers, soldiers, and volunteers, of whatever rank and branch of the service, who have followed the Italian banner of General Guglielmo Pepe, shall remain officers and soldiers of the Italian army, and shall, whenever they demand it, be inscribed on the list of the Lombard army.

"They will retain their rank and pay, in accordance with these offers, and will enjoy the same rights as the officers and soldiers of the Lombardo-Milanese army.

"CASATI, President.

" 23rd June, 1848."

From the above decree, and other daily

occurrences, may be gathered the progress we had already made in Italian fraternity; and to show how earnestly I endeavoured to augment these feelings of union, to which, at the first favourable occasion, we must owe our salvation, I shall transcribe later my order of the day for the 23rd of August.

We were now near the end of June; and as the enemy only blockaded us, without entering the Lagoon for offensive operations, I profited by this state of comparative repose, to ameliorate the condition of the militia as to their clothing, providing them also with the best sleeping quarters I could obtain; and, more than all, I persevered in getting them bread of the best quality. I then superintended their instruction and discipline, which was no easy task, as they were dispersed in the numerous forts. I was unable to put in execution my dominant idea of exercising them in shooting at a mark, on account of the indispensable necessity of sparing our ammunition.

I was expecting some favourable news from the Sardinian camp, when I received the following letter from the King's headquarters at Roverbella:—

" 4th July

"This morning I received the courteous reply of the 30th of June, which your Excellency sent me from Venice.

"H. M., to whom I have communicated it, observed with much satisfaction your Excellency's plan for the defence of that unique city and, if necessary, the adjacent terra firma, when the organisation of the troops will allow this with greater success.

"Eighteen thousand five hundred men present some force; but discipline and homogeneity are still wanting, or at least not thoroughly infused. However, your Excellency's experience, with a good direction on one hand, and on the other a love of their country and a firm will, may overcome many obstacles.

"There is no doubt that the King will expedite some of his troops to Venice,

provided their march along the coast (the order being already given for three battalions) be not retarded in the Pontifical states, and in their embarkation on the Po for Venice.

"I beg your Excellency to accept my best wishes for the success of your operations, and at the same time the assurance, &c. &c.

"SALASCO."

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CHAPTER XI.

From the 1st of July till 13th August.—Changes of government.

—Fusion of Venice with Lombardy.—Fall of Lombardy.—
Reverses of Sardinia.—Opinion on the campaign of 1848.

It has ever been my system not to leave a single negligence unpunished, whether committed by a soldier or an officer, whether slight or serious. But at the same time, and in order that this severity should be, and should seem to be, really paternal, I tempered it by orders of the day, by constant reviews, and by a continual care of the soldier's well-being. These habits were more than usually needful in the Lagoon, where the troops were often in want even of straw; where they slept on the bare ground, and mattresses were very rare! The Government, which was well disposed, took much pains to supply these wants, but many months elapsed before they had accomplished it. I went about

all the islands in order to cheer the soldiers in their privations, to see that they did not miss their drill, and above all that discipline did not suffer. A General's most arduous task is to maintain the rigour of discipline in the midst of privations; and especially when the soldiers began to fall victims to the epidemic malady which visited the two camps, both besiegers and besieged.

When the Neapolitans who had followed me were reviewed on the Piazza of San Marco, being well clothed, and executing the military movements with precision, they were applauded with long clapping of hands by the multitude, and I fancied how the applause would have been doubled on this side the Po, if all had crossed it.

While on one side I was attending to the welfare, discipline, and instruction of my troops, it was necessary also to render them fit for war, by means of reconnoissances and sorties of an importance proportioned to the circumstances of the locality on which they were to act, and to the number of the enemy. This last knowledge it was

most difficult for me to obtain, for the Venetian government never had a well organised spy system. Even from Bologna, when I supposed we might have to combat in the varied fields of the Venetian provinces, I wrote to the Government to find me a good exploring company, and some spies; for I should have preferred an engagement with 10,000 men, and good information of the enemy's movements, to 20,000 men without it. A General without good spies is, as it were, blind.

I began with small sorties; little by little the soldiers became accustomed to face the Austrians. In divers encounters I had reason to be satisfied with my troops, who related with pleasure all the partial encounters, and pointed out those who had most distinguished themselves. By the press and the journals I always excited the patriotism which existed in the hearts of those valiant youths. Finally I decided on a bolder reconnoissance, which I made known by the following order of the day:—

" VENICE, 8th July, 1848.

"THE Commander-in-Chief, after organising the troops, was desirous to begin such operations as were possible in the present state of the blockade of Venice, by land. He resolved, therefore, to explore the Cavanella on the Adige, a place of some importance seven miles from Brondolo, and where he had reason to believe from intelligence received, that the Austrians would be found with a small garrison, and works not far advanced. General Ferrari was charged with the execution of the reconnoissance, regulating his movements according to circumstances, and avoiding exposure to serious loss. The forces confided to him departed for Chioggia, and arrived at Brondolo. They passed the canal in boats, and proceeded to Sta. Anna, from whence they marched in three columns upon Cavanella. The left column, composed of artillery, and the Lombard battalion under Major Novara, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Ulloa,

proceeded by the left bank of the Adige in order to pass that river at Portesine; the middle column, composed of the Bolognese battalion of Colonel Bignami, and the Neapolitan battalion of Major Materazzo, followed the road of Romea; the Trivigiano battalion of Colonel Amigo proceeded along the right bank of the canal of the Valle. The fire of the three columns of artillery compelled the enemy's detachments to withdraw within the fort. Our men, regardless of their fire, pushed on till within musket shot; the left column was within the same distance, in consequence of the narrowness of the river. Having thus occupied two small houses opposite the Cavanella, and beyond reach of the cannon, many of the riflemen, shooting from the heights, committed great havoc among the Austrians. It would be impossible to say which of the four battalions of volunteers showed the most courage. General Ferrari, with the intelligence and intrepidity which distinguish him, seeing the ardour of the brave youths under his command, prolonged the combat beyond what was needful in a military reconnoissance; so much the more that the Austrians, advertised of our movements, had received strong succours from Portalonga and Cavarzere, and the works already completed by them were much more considerable than had been reported, furnished with parapets fifteen feet above the ground, and surrounded by a ditch which was full of water.

"Our loss was about forty wounded, and ten killed; a loss, according to all probability, much inferior to the enemy's. Of the four battalions, that of Trivigiano, having been obliged to advance on disadvantageous ground, lost more than the others. There were no troops of the line engaged, except the Neapolitan artillery, who were efficaciously seconded by some Venetian soldiers employed in the train; they showed what Italy might have expected from that army which a vile Government was not ashamed to recal from the banks of the Po.

"On receiving orders to retreat, the Lombards manifested some repugnance; they were displeased at being obliged to withdraw the Italian banner which they had hoisted on one of the houses they had occupied. This was a sentiment honourable in itself, but which it was necessary for the preservation of discipline to repress; for that virtue is superior even to courage, since by that alone can impetuosity be changed into valour, and success be assured, by bridling impatience in attaining it. Let all the officers, then, insist upon discipline from their subordinates as the basis of all military ordinances, and the guarantee of final victory.

"The General-in-Chief will publish the names of the killed and wounded, and of those who, in the midst of so much valour, have succeeded in distinguishing themselves.

"GENERAL PEPE."

To preserve discipline and military ardour at the same time, I was compelled to state the incidents of that day not very exactly. General St. Fermo, who commanded the district of Chioggia, and who was charged to let me know precisely all the works which the enemy had executed for the defence of the small fort called Cavanella, on the Adige, was illinformed, and I did not find it easy to supersede him. But in spite of the works and the fortifications which had been erected, General Ferrari might have made himself master of the fort, thanks to the enthusiasm of the four battalions under his command, since from above the trees, our troops obliged the enemy to abandon the offensive. As to Ferrari, if in my order of the day I had not said that I had desired to limit myself to a reconnoissance, I must have summoned him before a council of war. The confidence of the soldiers in themselves would thereby have been greatly diminished, and Ferrari, at the least, would have been dismissed. The Lombard soldiers wished to kill him, and the people of Chioggia wanted to make an

assault on his house, which obliged him to escape in the night. I arranged some expressions in my order of the day in time to save him.

The Venetian assembly met on the 6th of July, in the Ducal palace, and the fusion of Venice with the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, as it was called, and the ancient Piedmontese provinces, was agreed on. By these means Italy was to see a new state arise, with nearly eleven millions of inhabitants; among whom would be numbered the most ancient republics of Italy, which had been so illustrious in the middle ages, the Genoese and the Venetian.

The President of the Provisional Government was Castelli, a Venetian advocate. My heart rejoiced to see the basis of such a kingdom formed in Italy, which, to a numerous population, added the advantage of commanding the Adriatic; and on its opposite shores, had the powerful Genoa, Spezzia, and the Alps. Will it be believed, that, though few, still there were some who disapproved of such a fortunate combination,

and who marvelled to see me in favour of Charles Albert, who would thus become a powerful prince. They had forgotten the vicissitudes of my life, and my conduct towards the five last kings of Naples, whose personal kindness, and the high rank I held in the army, had never induced me to take their interests to heart, in preference to those of my country: true, they did not accuse me of feeble patriotism, but of error in my views. He who has no other aim or interest than his country's welfare, is rarely mistaken in the choice of means to attain it.

Let me return to my soldiers, for whose improvement in order, discipline, and every other quality, I published the following order of the day:—

"ALL the Forts of the Estuary continue to be divided into four circondarii, or districts:—

"1st. Malghera, commanded by General Rizzardi;

NARRATIVE OF

d. The shores of Palestrina, commanded by Colonel Raffaeli;

'3rd. Chioggia, commanded by General Sanfermo;

"4th. Mazzerbo, comanded by Major Belli.

"The Commanders of the Forts will correspond with the niefs of their districts, and the latter directly with the General-in-Chief, without whose permission no movement can be executed, either in the personnel or the materiel.

"If a movement is performed, the Commander of the district shall give information of it to the Committee of War.

"The General of the Engineers and Artillery, whenever he desires to add to, or diminish, the number of fire-arms, or to transfer them from one fort to another, must obtain the permission of the Commander-in-Chief.

"No Commander of the forts, or Chief of district, can admit any parley from the enemy without the permission of the General-in-Chief. "The Chief of a district, in writing to the General-in-Chief, must address to Lieut.-Colonel Avesani, head of the staff for the forts, to be transmitted to the General-in-Chief.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE,

" Commander-in-Chief.

" VENICE, 10th July, 1848."

The division of the militia among the numerous forts, was a calamity which was greatly increased by the privations to which I have before alluded. I was accustomed to assemble first one and then another battalion, in order to ascertain the spirit by which they were animated, and the progress they had made in military knowledge. Having received the Lombard battalion and that of Bologna on the 4th of July, I wrote the following letter to the Lombard government, which becoming public in Venice, inspired emulation, and demonstrated the confidence I placed in them:—

"SIGNOR PRESIDENTE,

"On the 4th instant, I reviewed two battalions of volunteers, one from Milan, the other from Bologna. The entire population ran to behold the admirable appearance of these young men, and admired their martial deportment, which might compare with that of soldiers long used to camps. Compelled by our local position to subject them to the arduous trials of war, I have had the satisfaction to find my hopes not only fulfilled, but surpassed; and the confidence I reposed in them has been fully justified.

"It will be evident, from the annexed order of the day, that these volunteers neither resemble those of whom Washington complained so much, and still less can they be compared to those whom Dumouriez turned out of his army.

"I rejoice, not only as their Commanderin-Chief, but for all Italy, whose cause is sure to triumph, since young men, so unused to arms, possess such military qualifications. "I take this opportunity of thanking the Lombard government for their generosity in allowing my few followers to fraternise with their soldiers.

"While valuing with due gratitude this mark of warm benevolence, I trust that the entire Neapolitan nation may soon worthily respond to such a noble proof of fraternal feeling, by sending a fresh army to combat for Italian independence, which may cancel the shame of that, which being confounded and seduced in a thousand unworthy ways, alike odious and destructive of all discipline, was made to deviate from the path of honour.

"This may be expected from the brave efforts which are now being made in Southern Italy, especially in Calabria, where the inhabitants were ever renowned for tenacity of purpose and indomitable valour. By their magnanimous efforts, will certainly fall that blinded and malevolent Government which has suppressed all rights, violated every duty, and loosened the bonds of wickedness in such a manner,

that men can no longer tolerate, and Providence cannot fail to punish it.

"GENERAL G. PEPE.

" VENICE, 10th July, 1848."

From administrative cares and discipline, we must now come to facts, and in the next order of the day will be seen the particulars of the sortie which was made on the 13th July, and followed by another at Malghera, and several more in different parts of the lake.

" VENICE, 13th July, 1848.

"Colonel Belluzzi, Commandant of the fort of Malghera, perceived on the 9th, that the Austrians had augmented their advanced posts, and were preparing to construct a battery from the lunette, No. 12. He commanded 200 Neapolitans, partly of the line and partly volunteers, 200 Roman volunteers, and as many Swiss, under the command of Colonel Pianciani, having for chief of his staff Captain Paschetta, to attack these works. This order was exe-

cuted by the troops with promptitude and alacrity, and the Italian flag was seen waving among the works which a moment before the enemy had been preparing. The impetuosity of the assailants was great; the Neapolitans, with a few Romans mixed with them, advanced with their bayonets fixed, and were efficaciously seconded by a sharp fire from the remaining Romans and Swiss. The enemy tried with their cavalry to seize one of our colours, but a shell thrown from a howitzer of the fort, (as was continually done), was directed against them so as to cause great havoc, and a precipitate retreat. The result of this sortie was to drive out the enemy from three houses they had occupied, with the intention of making them a basis for permanent offensive operations. They were driven back on the woods of Mestre, and the intentions of the sortie being accomplished, the Commandant ordered the retreat, and had much difficulty in preventing the other volunteers from joining the combat without orders. This impatient ardour, though springing from noble feelings, was nevertheless an infraction of discipline which must be religiously observed, and a repetition of similar acts would compel the Commander-in-Chief, though with great grief, to use just severity.

"In the next order of the day he will publish the names of the killed and wounded, and of those who particularly distinguished themselves at Cavanella on the 7th, and at Malghera on the 9th inst.

"In the meantime he is happy to announce that according to the reports received in the affair of Cavanella, the enemy lost not fewer than eighty-five men, among whom was the Commander of the fort, and had one hundred and seven wounded.

"On visiting the hospital of the wounded in Venice, a grenadier, a native of Calabria, who had had his right arm amputated, said to the General, "I would give my remaining arm for Italy;" and after a moment's pause he added, "but how can I gain my livelihood without my right arm?" The General replied, "I will be to you a father, and I have already begged my good brother to secure you an easy existence, when he and I shall be no more." At these words a smile of content appeared on the lips of this brave man, who was so gloriously mutilated.

"It is gratifying to know, that while some brave Calabrese are shedding their blood in defence of the classical Lagoon (an example of fraternal feeling which unites one extremity of Italy with the other); the Calabrian population are rising in great force in their native mountains to put down a miserable government, which, to conceal all its other evil deeds, had been a traitor to the Italian cause. When it is overthrown, the first effect of victorious liberty in those countries would be to make them participate in the sacred cause of common independence by sending numerous armies to their aid.

"GENERAL G. PEPE."

After the sortic alluded to in the above order of the day, another was made on the 21st of the same month, in which our Neapolitans exhibited eminent ability and valour.

The Provisional Government of Venice.

BULLETIN OF WAR.

" VENICE, 21st July, 1848.

"It being judged expedient for the better defence of the fortress of Malghera, to pull down the guard-house on the railroad, opposite the Orlando road, and to disperse the materials, a sortic from the fort for this purpose was ordered yesterday.

"A company of the second battalion of Neapolitan Chasseurs were led by Major Ferdinando Rittuci: the Neapolitan sappers, with a good number of workmen from the peasantry, followed Lieutenant Leopoldo Castellani; Vladimiro Chiavacci, Major of the Engineers, commanded the expedition.

"They met with such vigorous resistance

on the part of the enemy, as to require the assistance of a second company of Neapolitan Chasseurs, who were already posted on the covered way, and who were supported by a third company when they moved. The enemy had some field pieces; but from the lunette, No. 12, from other bastions, and from the fort of Rizzardi, our artillery supported our operations with much skill, and played on the enemy whenever they were assembled in close column, or whenever the fire of their artillery became troublesome. The contest continued till mid-day, when the house was knocked down, the materials removed, and the enemy considerably worsted.

"Major Chiavacci, whose talents have hitherto been so useful in improving the fortifications, exhibited on this occasion distinguished abilities and intrepidity; he unhappily received a wound in his right arm. Lieutenant Leopoldo Castellani, and Major Ferdinando Rittuci also deserve special mention for their military valour and excellent command.

"The Neapolitan miner, Biagio Veneroso, was equally courageous in this brilliant encounter of arms. He dared spontaneously to enter the mined house after two mines had been sprung, in order to kindle a third, which delayed lighting, and having taken the burning rope from the house, he placed it in such a manner as to obtain directly the desired effect. Besides Major Chiavacci, three more Neapolitan soldiers were wounded, as also the Milanese engineer Carlo del Vitto (who bravely seconded the operations under Major Chiavacci), and the labourer Giovanni Battista Favaretto.

"In spite of the enemy's strength, these are our only losses; while on their side the loss was much more considerable.

" ZENNARI,

" Secretary-General to the Provisional Government."

At this time the Sardo-Venetian squadron which had been sent to blockade Trieste, returned to the Venetian shores, on account of the protest of France, of England, and of the Germanic Confederation. Three

Sardinian battalions disembarked on the Lagoon: these belonged to the corps de reserve.

In reviewing them I found not only that they belonged to the reserve, but that they had all been fathers of families for twelve years or more.

This is certainly a bad method, to leave men so long in their homes; for after long habits of domestic life men lose their vigour, and are unfit to be called into the camp, and lead the life of soldiers.

According to my opinion, a soldier who enters the reserve should not remain in it more than five years at the utmost.

Besides the arrival of three battalions, which was considered a pledge of further assistance, the multitude were rejoiced by the news which arrived of the blockade of Mantua. On the contrary, the few who understood military matters, were grieved to find that the King persisted in remaining in line of battle before Verona, Mantua, and Lignana, occupying a long line, and instead of executing decisive movements

forward, only changing the order of his encampments.

This system, moreover, was not at all suited to the temperament of the Italian soldier, who requires as much as possible to be kept in constant activity.

Before passing the Po I regarded this manner of proceeding as most prejudicial.

I had written to the Lombard government to request them to send what was necessary for the troops under my orders: the fusion of the two countries had given me the right to make this demand. They answered me as follows:—

" MILAN, 20th July, 1848.

"EXCELLENCY,

"The picture which your Excellency, in your letter of the 13th inst., has drawn of the state of the troops in the Venetian territory, and which you have organised, has greatly moved this government, and principally because at this moment it is unable to satisfy your demands as it would wish. "Our finances are exhausted by the many expenses we have had to bear during this war, nor for the moment can we count on the generosity of the citizens who are daily subjected to new and heavy calls. Still we hope that our position will improve with time, and that by September we may be able to provide your troops with the most indispensable of the objects which your Excellency points out.

"In the meantime this government confides in the authority of your Excellency's name and mind to maintain the discipline of these troops, and induce that generous abnegation which the present circumstances of our country demand of all her sons.

"I assure your Excellency, &c. &c.

"BORROMEA."

In the meantime Carlo Alberto suffered such reverses, that he was forced to retire, and abandon even Milan. I shall revert to this fatal misfortune at the end of this chapter; I must here continue to narrate the military and political events of Venice.

I received from the Lombard government the two following letters, which I think will be interesting:—

4 MILAN, July 31st, 1848.

"THE Austrians, elated by the late events, have obliged the Piedmontese army to abandon the line of the Mincio, and retire on the Oglio; and they seem to intend to fall suddenly on Milan with all their concentrated troops. Carlo Alberto has already made known his intention of abandoning the line of the Oglio, in order to cover Milan, and taking that of the Adda. The Germans, with their accustomed perfidious arts, will not fail to make it believed that the Piedmontese army is in a state of dissolution. This is not at all the case. The army may be said to be entire. Their formidable artillery has sustained no loss, the cavalry too is complete. The dispersion of some corps, composed almost entirely of recruits and soldiers of the reserve, was the cause of the alarm into which the population was thrown. This desertion was the effect of the moral depression occasioned by the retreat.

"The Piedmontese army was then obliged to retire, not on account of any overthrow in the field, but from the circumstance of having been three days without provisions. The unexpected concentration of more than 45,000 men, in a country which for many months had been devastated by war, the incursions made by the German cavalry in all the surrounding country, scaring away all the purveyors of provisions for the Italian army, had so completely weakened the strength of the soldiers, that they were unable to fight, and weeping with rage, they were obliged to retire before an enemy whom they had vanquished in every encounter. But now the Piedmontese army is recovering its pristine energy; and if ever the enemy, rendered audacious by success, and by the last reinforcements received from the Tyrol, should attempt to fall upon Milan, we doubt not that they will meet with a resistance equal to that which inaugurated this war four months ago.

"Other Lombard cities are also disposed to resist most vigorously. Here, at Milan, in order to concentrate every means of defence, a committee of public safety, with extraordinary powers, has been instituted. The spirit of the population is most satisfactory. All, indiscriminately, are disposed to be martyrs in the holy cause of Italian independence, rather than fall again under a foreign yoke. Under the direction of expert military engineers, marvellous entrenchments are being prepared, in which thousands of persons are employed. A part of our National Guard, amidst the applause of the entire population, departed yesterday to join the line on the Adda, which a commission of engineers and other military men are intending to fortify strongly, even before the arrival of the

Piedmontese army, whose head-quarters are now at Cremona. The defence of Brescia is confided to our valiant General. Griffini, and the Lombard column of General Perrone is also gone in that direc-Garibaldi, with some thousand volunteers, full of enthusiasm for their chief, is advancing on Bergamo, to revolutionise that country and join Griffini at Brescia. The adventures of the Italian army, instead of discouraging Piedmont and Genoa, have revived the revolutionary enthusiasm, and the ardour is inexpressible. All the National Guard rise en masse to rush into Lombardy. The priests preach the holy war, and encourage the population rather to gain the crown of martyrdom than expose Italy to the infamy of seeing a revolution, commenced under such noble auspices, again vilely subdued.

"In order that the entire forces of the Italian nation may complete the total destruction of the invader, even before the arrival of French succour, it is necessary that the insurrection should spread to every point of upper Italy, or, at least, that a more powerful diversion should take place in the rear of the enemy.

"For this purpose, e Provisional Lombard government, we the concurrence of the Committee of Defence, invites you, General, to make every endeavour again to take the offensive against the Austrians who are blockading Venice, in order to advance towards, and, if possible to revolutionise, the Venetian territory. You may, in case of necessity, put yourself in communication with the Commander of the Pontifical troops on the other side the Po, in order that he may join his forces to yours.

"For this purpose the Lombard government is writing, this day, to the Lombard Commissary of War in Bologna, in order that the troops there, and the valiant population, may hasten to the succour of Lombardy.

"STRIGELLI.
A. ANELLI.
GIULINI."

"MILAN, 1st August, 1848.

"We have received official notice that her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Turin has arrived at his Sardinian Majesty's camp, from whence he has repaired to the Austrian camp, to propose a suspension of arms. It is added, but not officially, that the non-acceptation of this suspension would provoke an intervention on the part of England and France.

"We give your Excellency this early notice in order that you may deliberate on the movement of your troops with the intention of occupying as large a portion of the Italian territory as possible. It is needless that we should demonstrate to your Excellency more fully, of what importance such a movement would be in ulterior treaties.

"GIULINI.
AL. ANELLI.
A. CARBONERA.
P. LITTA."

While the vicissitudes of the war were proceeding thus inauspiciously in Lombardy, the internal affairs of Rome did not present a more favourable aspect; as will be seen in the following Letter from Count Mamiani:—

" MY DEAR GENERAL,

"The reasons which you give me for not letting the Roman volunteers quit Venice are quite convincing, and I see that we have small hope of succour from your side. I have also written to the Pro-legate of Bologna, to require an explanation of the demand which the Senator of that place has made to this Government for the Roman troops. Such an abuse of authority is really excessive and intolerable. But I shall not witness its amendment, for to-morrow I cease to sign, and shall completely quit the Ministry, never to return to it. The Pope is ill-advised, and things are going on from bad to worse. With respect to the muskets which you ask for, I hope that 800 will be sent you for the present, but I beg you to reiterate your demand to Count Campello, Minister

of War, who succeeded to Doria four days ago; that is, after I thought I had settled this matter.

"Adieu, yours, &c.,

" Mamiani.

"THE QUIBINAL, 2nd August, 1848."

That the political and military events which succeeded one another with such rapidity may be more completely understood, I will insert a letter written to me by the President Castelli, which regards the politics of that moment.

"EXCELLENCY,

"It being settled that, to-morrow morning, 7th instant, at nine o'clock, the possession of the city and provinces of Venice shall be solemnly made over to the Royal Commissioner of his Majesty the King of Sardinia, the Government has the honour to invite your Excellency to assist at this ceremony.

"From the Provisional Government, &c.,

" J. CASTELLI, President.

" VENICE, 6th August."

VOL. I.

This possession of the provinces and city, of which Castelli wrote, was of short duration. Castelli quitted the Presidency, and the Sardinian General, Colli, was appointed in his place, who contributed not a little to make me lose a part of the Neapolitan troops, who had followed me on this side the Po. The Neapolitan government wrote to desire its Consul in Venice to employ every means to make the Neapolitan soldiers return into the kingdom. The Consul assured them that they would be well received; and they received, at the same time, pressing letters from their families, who were in fear of dying in misery. The officers who desired to return presented themselves to General Colli, who conceived that he had no right to retain, against their will, military men who were claimed by their King. After long discussions between me and the President, they were allowed to depart. I was of opinion that the officers alone, who desired to go, should join the brave 10th of the line, then fighting with so much

bravery for Charles Albert, and that they should afterwards return to their country.

The Neapolitan forces remaining in Venice were—eight pieces, with their respective ammunition-carriages; two battalions of volunteers; nearly three hundred soldiers of all arms; and twenty officers of the engineer corps. The service which the few remaining Neapolitans were of in the defence of Venice will appear hereafter. The admiration which their valour and discipline excited in the inhabitants of Venice, even to the last hour before it surrendered, was unbounded.

On the 12th of August, from Vigevano, Charles Albert published a proclamation which had far more merit than his operations of strategy and organisation. An armistice was agreed to, to the hard conditions of which the vanquished were obliged to submit. The fortresses of Peschiera, Rocca, Anfo, and Osapo, were to be evacuated by the Sardinians. All that had been ceded to them of the Austrian possessions was to be restored.

The land and sea forces of the King of Sardinia were to abandon Venice, its port, and territory.

The consternation of the brave people of the Lagoon at this news may be imagined. The government established in Venice in the name of the Sardinian King departed immediately. Soon after sunset the people assembled under my windows, loudly declaring that they trusted their safety to me alone. They proclaimed me Dictator, and insisted on accompanying me to the government palace. Without hesitation, I went into the midst of the assembled multitude, who crowded round me so as to endanger my life. On arriving at the place where the government was held, the governing commissioners, Colli, Castelli, and Cibrario, were not to be seen: from fear of the popular frenzy, they had taken refuge elsewhere.

I waited till the popular acclamations proclaiming me Dictator were calmed, and then, turning to an impromptu deputation which had accompanied me, and to other popular notabilities, I said to them, "For our Italy and for Venice, which I love as dearly as all her contemporaries, I would willingly submit to any sacrifice, however painful; but as Dictator, I should not be more serviceable to you than I hope to be as Commander-in-chief. If you will consent to follow my counsel, give extensive power to Manin for two days. In that short space, call the parliament together, which will name a stable government." This was done. The deputies nominated a triumvirate, composed of Manin, formerly an advocate; Graziani, vice-admiral; and Cavedalis, who had the reputation of being an excellent patriot and a clever engineer, but who had never performed any military achievements. This triumvirate was elected on the 13th of August by the Assembly, who gave the Presidency of it to Manin.

NARRATIVE OF

CHAPTI XII.

CHARLES ALBERT'S CA 'AIGN IN 1848.

THE military and p tical condition of Italy and of the Sardinian kingdom are such, that if the latter were ruled by a prince of truly Italian sentiments, possessing at the same time the talent of organising and leading his army, he might in a very short time free Italy from a foreign yoke. If a similar king at the same time governed the Two Sicilies, not only might Italy be independent, but the Austrian empire might also be menaced with 100,000 well-organised troops; and, thanks to their navy, the Italian sovereigns would be masters of the Adriatic, and in a position to invade any of the Austrian provinces which are washed by that sea.

But I must now write of Sardinia. The Italians had immense difficulties to over-

come, in order to overthrow the absolute power of six princes, one of whom was both Pope and King; while the Emperor of Austria was established in the heart of our Peninsula with a large army, which might at any moment be reinforced, and was master of Venice, Peschiera, Verona, and Mantua. To conceive the difficulties which Italy had to encounter merely to overthrow the absolute power of six princes, we must recollect all the efforts made by England and France to obtain liberty. The former had a Parliament, and the latter its States-General, with each only one king and one court, and neither were under the dominion of priests or of a foreign power.

In the midst of these almost insurmountable obstacles, scarcely had fortune smiled on the Italians, who are supposed to be unripe for liberty by nations which never knew real liberty, when behold them seizing on the first hope of better fortune. At the first sound which came from the lips of Pius IX., all the Italian provinces

re-echoed "Liberty!" Not satisfied with meagre institutions, the Calabrese and the Messinese demand a constitution: they combat with the royal troops and are subdued; but Palermo and Naples have better fortune. King Ferdinand is forced to swear to a constitution, the Pope and the other princes are compelled to imitate him, and all the states of Italy are constitutional. A grave question now arises: Will these princes be faithful to their oaths? Not a whit. They will not at once perjure themselves; but gradually they will incense the people by failing, now in one, and then in another of their promises, until a struggle ensues. If the nation conquers, the cry will be of Exaggeration and Mobocracy; if it is conquered. woe betide it, as happened in Naples, in Rome, in Tuscany. The princes will scarcely have resumed their absolute authority, when they will prove that their oaths were but perjuries in their hearts. Examples of this turpitude have already been given by Ferdinand I. and Francis I.

in Naples, in 1820 and 1821. The first, after taking his oath in the royal chapel, turned to me and said "This time, I assure you, I have sworn from my heart;" and he placed his hand on his heart, while his face was bathed in tears, and I wept at his tears!

But for this once, fortune seemed to protect Italy, by a royal exception in her favour. The only one of her princes of real Italian dynasty, and able to dispose of an army of almost 100,000 valiant men, warmly embraced the national cause. This circumstance would have been sufficient to insure the success of Italy, if the valorous prince, who had the generosity to hasten to the aid of the intrepid Lombards, had not been perpetually thwarted by a proud and poor aristocracy, by his Jesuit clergy, and by no small number of patriots, some of whom through ignorance, others through self-interest, acted to the prejudice of Italy, by giving themselves up to the most senseless anachronisms, since they were more impatient to obtain liberal institutions than to drive away the

foreigner, whose presence signified slavery. Why did they not remember those magnanimous words of Charles Albert, "L'Italia farà da se?" Had it not been for these misfortunes, this prince would have redeemed Italy; thanks to his own valour and that of his troops, and in spite of the want of a mind to organise an army, and lead it to the enemy.

Truth, according to Polybius, is as necessary to history, as sight to animals; and in writing this I feel bound, though in sorrow, to remember the precepts of that excellent writer. Yes, the brave, the most gallant, the most Italian Charles Albert, was deficient in the qualities of a captain.

Cæsar said he had defeated Pompey, because he encountered a captain without an army. True it is, that the duty of a good captain is to organise the troops he commands: but the Senate and the Roman aristocracy fomented insubordination among the republican troops, and thereby incapacitated a general from

organising them, and meeting the enemy according to his views.

In the Sardinian kingdom there was want of skilfulness in the leader, and defective organisation in the troops. In the most arduous moments Charles Albert's army was in need sometimes of provisions, sometimes of artillery. The infantry, who are the nerves of war, remained but a very short time under arms, and much too long inactive in their families. Some of the soldiers of the Piedmontese battalions who came to Venice, told me they had spent twelve years away from their banners. Promotion was given by favour, by connexion, and by weakness. A Romarino was lieutenant-general. With such an administration, such organisation in the personnel, an army composed of the bravest men in the world is not fit to meet the enemy. Thus the bravery which the Piedmontese troops displayed in more than one battle, and in several encounters, was almost prodigious; it did honour to Piedmont and to Italy, the more because

they were badly, wretchedly, commanded, against all the most obvious principles of the science of war, as I will soon demonstrate.

Though in Italy the fever of independence, which broke out in the cities, was not equally violent in the country, yet it is undeniable that the Milanese insurrection spread, without any interruption, like a flame, to the limits of the Isonzo and the Alps. A battalion which garrisoned Monza was certainly made captive. The garrison of Como surrendered, and that of Pavia was compelled to follow the retreat of Radetzky. At the same time the Brescians. after having imprisoned two generals and many officers, forced the garrison to surrender. Three Italian battalions, which were at Cremona and at Pizzighettone, embraced the national cause. Finally, Venice drove the Austrians from the city and from all the Estuary, as well as from almost all the other cities of the ancient Venetian provinces. In Milan, without losing an instant, a government was organised, which

made every effort to assist Charles Albert, whose assistance they had invoked in the first moments. This prince had the high merit of not having hesitated an instant to declare himself in favour of the Italian cause; and if the movements of his columns had only been a few days more rapid, the Austrian army must have been obliged to surrender in a short time.

General Teodoro Lecchi, who was called to the command of the Lombard troops, if he could immediately have disposed of a Sardinian column, by embarking in boats which they had shut up in Pavia, and ascending the Po, might have surprised Mantua, while the rest of the army marching rapidly forwards, would have broken through the line of the Mincio, and thus prevented the other forts from providing themselves with stores of provisions.

The same general also proposed at the same time to send a Sardinian regiment in support of the movable columns expedited in the direction of the gorges of Italian Tyrol. Thus the countries on the side of

Bassano, which had been in complete insurrection, would have been placed in communication with the Venetian provinces, and with Venice itself. Supposing even that the probable capture of Mantua had not succeeded, the King, after reaching Bassano either by way of the Tyrol, or debouching between Mantua and the Po on Rovigo, might have established his forces in Padua, and thence have cut off all communication between the Austrian army and Austria; and by this means the salvation of the Peninsula would have been effected. Padua might have served Charles Albert as an entrenched camp, more useful to him than that of Verona to Radetzky. Imagine the King, with 50,000 of his troops in Padua, a walled city, rendered stronger by the water which surrounds it, in communication with Venice by a railroad, and let us examine what his military situation would have been there. Lombardy, the Venetian provinces, Tuscany, the Roman states, would have furnished 60,000 men. These troops, being under his eyes, would

have been better organised than were the 18,000 Romans, who found themselves separated from him. The King would have disposed of half the number in garrisons, and in the Tyrolese or Lombard insurrectional wars. The remaining 30,000, chosen by himself, he would have joined to his own 50,000 men, and formed a total of 80,000 men, having for the basis of their operations Padua and Venice. The Roman provinces on the Adriatic would have abundantly supplied the Sardinian camp with provisions. The Sardo-Venetian squadron, according to a statement drawn up for me by Vice-Admiral Graziani, might have embarked not fewer than 20,000 men. From thence Charles Albert might have landed at Trieste and all the other Austrian seaports, and after levying the same tribute which Austria raises in Italy, and destroying all the Austrian navy, he might have landed his 20,000 men on the left of the Isonzo, and thence, according to circumstances, have directed a large body on Padua. There is no manœuvre, no military movement, which the King might not have accomplished from Venice by sea, or from Padua by land; having always for his first object to oppose the arrival of all aid to the Austrians.

Let us now examine what Marshal Radetzky could have done. The choice of three operations was left to him. To invade Lombardy and Piedmont; to remain on the defensive between the Mincio and the Adige; or, in fine, to march against the Sardinian army.

In the first case the 40,000, or at least the 30,000 Sardinians left by the King in Piedmont, united with the National Guard mobilised, might always have retired into the many strong positions which are offered by the forts over against the Alps, and in the vicinity of Genoa, in order to be ready to combat the enemy at the right moment. In any case they would have executed the orders of their king, who would have had the choice either of keeping behind the enemy and combating him in his rear, or of waiting for him well

entrenched before Verona and Mantua. I do not descant on what the Lombard insurgents would have done; I only maintain that the Austrians would have lost the advantage of their highly prized forts.

Had the Austrian general chosen to shut himself up in his forts, every one must see that his total loss would have resulted.

In the third supposition, the parts would have been changed: not the King, but Radetzky, would have presented himself before the enemy, shut up between Padua and Venice; but the circumstances differ widely. Venice could neither be besieged nor blockaded by the enemy, who could not have prevented Charles Albert from bringing 20,000 men from the Lagoon, in order to land them wherever he found most useful, and then re-embark them at his pleasure. The superiority of Charles Albert's position is evident. He had the sea open to him; that of Marshal Radetzky was protected by Mantua and Verona. But Italy's evil fortune did not allow her leader to profit by such decisive

advantages. Towards the end of April, Charles Albert marched with his columns towards the Mincio, which he passed. had under his command 60,000 Piedmontese, 5000 Tuscans, 3000 men from Parma and Modena, 17,000 from the Roman states, 5000 Lombard volunteers,-in all, 90,000 men, without including large Lombard battalions, which were being formed with much celerity. The King committed the two great errors of not vigorously pursuing the enemy, and of not allowing the general insurrection, so well begun, to extend itself with energy from Lombardy to the Tyrol, which would have called to arms all the mountaineers of the ancient Venetian provinces. The prince committed a third error, by adopting a false system of combating the enemy, which was fatal to all Italy.

His plan of campaign was to place his forces in line from Mantua to Peschiera, and to begin the siege of the last of these places. Its reduction would certainly have been an advantage, if it had not had the

most fatal results. The first was that of remaining motionless, with shouldered arms, while his troops were warm with enthusiasm, and eager to try their hand at the bayonet, which, if an Italian soldier has had only two or three trials, he will always succeed in using well. But this repose was injurious to our troops, active by nature, and inebriated with patriotism; while it greatly rejoiced the Austrians, tired with continual marches, discouraged by so many losses, and such unexpected revolutions, not only in Italy, but in France, in Germany itself, and in their most conspicuous capitals - Vienna and Berlin.

On the other hand, this same repose, or rather this precious time lost in inaction, gave the enemy an opportunity of receiving aid, and reinforcing their army, as unhappily was the case; whereas they would not have added a single man to their ranks had the King passed the Adige, which might easily have been done if he had been established in the Venetian provinces. The utility of history, as influencing human acts, is conspicuous only when the events narrated coincide exactly with the present. Thus, in the position of Charles Albert, it was useless to remember that Bonaparte suspended his movements, in order to occupy himself with taking Mantua, because the great captain did not possess Venice, nor was he master of the Adriatic: he had not the Lombard insurrection in his favour. nor the Italians everywhere disposed to favour him. As I said in the eighth chapter, I had scarcely reached Bologna with the first corps of the Neapolitan army, when I was informed of the tendency of the King to remain stationary, facing the enemy, who were shut up in their forts; wherefore I wrote to him that I should soon have passed the Po, and only begged to be permitted to pass into the Venetian provinces.

This tendency on the King's part was so tenacious that not even the advantages gained over the enemy made him deviate from it. In fact, after having repulsed the Austrians at Pastrengo, and a month later at Goito (where the valour of the Piedmontese was so conspicuous, and the enemy so severely beaten), the King did not leave the positions he occupied; and on the arrival of Nugent with 20,000 men, the Austrians were repaid with usury for the momentary loss of Peschiera. The inaction of Charles Albert also gave Radetzky time to collect another 15,000 men, brought to him by General Welden, and at the same time to march on Vicenza to beat Durando, and oblige the Roman garrison in that city to promise not to enter the field again for three months. The addition of 35,000 men and the fall of Vicenza were sufficient to change the gloomy aspect which Austrian affairs had worn previous to those events.

To show the necessity of caution in reading the many pamphlets which have been written on our last misfortunes, I will mention that in two of these it is said, that while the combat was going on in Vicenza, General Pepe had passed the Po

with 8000 men, and that his vanguard was arrived at Monselice; that from Monselice he threw himself into Padua, and that the remainder of the 8000 men had time to do the same; that Pepe, either ill-informed of what had happened, or not trusting in his troops, instead of defending Padua, commanded his vanguard to retreat to Venice, where he entered himself by the coast road. In all this there is not a word of truth, as my own narrative will have proved. When I wanted to pass the Po, I was unhappily followed only by 2000 men, including two feeble battalions of volunteers, who, though new to arms, conducted themselves like brave soldiers in the defence of the Estuary.

The King thought it desirable to occupy Rivoli, and on the 10th of June, with two divisions, he executed his project, which tended still farther to prolong his line. On the return of the prince to Garda, he was informed of Radetzky's movement on Vicenza, and believing the garrison of Verona to be feeble, he concentrated his

troops on the evening of the 12th round Villa Franca, in order to make an assault on that city the following day; but he was afterwards obliged to give up this plan, as the Austrian Marshal from Vicenza had again entered Verona.

Throughout all Italy were vaunted the taking of Peschiera and of the positions of Rivoli, and the advantages obtained by the Italians in several encounters; but all mention was omitted of the fact, that Radetzky had received most powerful aid, that he was again master of the Venetian provinces, and, possessing unmolested communication with Austria, could obtain whatever succour he might need.

That the Italians may not in future fall into their past most destructive errors, I will mention that in Venice, and in Milan, and still more in Rome, the direction of the war was given to men of no weight, mere would-be generals, who desired to enter the army with superior rank; and many who were in the service asked only for promotion, and placed themselves in the

first ranks of the patriotic societies. In Venice this disorder was partly repaired; in Milan, but imperfectly; while in Rome the evil was so great, that alone it would have been sufficient to destroy all order and discipline.

In the first days of July, the King, including the reinforcements received from Lombardy, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, had united 80,000 men, without counting nearly 22,000 in Venice, who were daily, though in the midst of fever and sickness, acquiring discipline and Italian sentiments.

It seems scarcely credible that Charles, instead of perceiving the error of his system of inactivity, in presence of the enemy's strong fortresses, decided on besieging Mantua; that is to say, on extending his right line, and renouncing all idea of attacking the Austrians, of passing the Adige, and seizing the advantages offered by Venice and the Sardo-Venetian squadron.

Towards the end of July the King commanded 80,000 men including the sick, and Radetzky had nearly as many, but concentrated, and not spread out, as the Sardinians were, in a line extending from Mantua to Rivoli. Nevertheless, the Austrians, who wished to attack these positions, were repulsed with glory to the Piedmontese. The King understood the necessity of abandoning Rivoli, and found himself in a state to sustain the combat which took place in the open country.

This combat was followed by the battle of Custoza, which the Piedmontese lost, not from want of valour, for they showed much, but from want of leadership. The loss of this battle decided the sad issue of the campaign: not on account of the losses of the vanquished, but on account of the great moral suffering which weighed them down. All the elements of disorganisation which existed in the Sardinian army seemed to be brought to light; they discovered that all their valour, and all the blood that had been shed, was useless. Already provisions and ammunition failed. The King determined to retreat, and, in order to recross the Mincio, he thought

it indispensable to retake the position of Valta.

There, again, another combat proved adverse to the Piedmontese, and general discouragement was the result among the soldiers, officers, war commissaries, and their commissioners, so that the King, yielding to the counsels of his generals, demanded an armistice, the conditions of which were never accorded.

The King had nearly 50,000 men remaining, but the want of confidence which he saw in all around him made him lose all hope of reinstating his affairs in their former position. On the evening of the 25th of July, Charles Albert decided on retreating, viâ Cremona; but he desired, in the first place, to cover part of Lombardy and the city of Milan, where he arrived the 3rd of August.

I will say no more on the sad and fatal termination of this campaign, so unworthy of the valour and patriotism of which both the army and its chief had given such unequivocal and repeated proofs. I will limit myself to observing, that, with 25,000 men, Charles Albert might have defended Milan against 35,000 Austrians, if the inhabitants, mindful of their former five days' heroism, had assisted the Piedmontese, not only in defending their capital, but also in driving the enemy to a distance. This is the more certain as the Lombard population would, infallibly, have shown the courage which the heroic population of Brescia afterwards displayed.

CHAPTER XIII.

The French decide on sending 4000 men to Venice.—The Navy of Venice.—Progress of the fortifications in the Estuary.—Sickness.—Departure of the squadron of Charles Albert, and then of his three battalions.—The Venetian Militia organised into Legions.—Menaces of recalling the four Roman Legions.—Secret information to the government regarding the National Guards of Chioggia.—Order of the Day.—Hints to the Italian clubs for the assistance of abandoned Venice.—The Author gives up all his emoluments.—Sally of Cavellino. Affair of Mestre.

THE French republic had determined on sending 4000 men to Venice, as will appear from a letter of the Duke d'Harcourt, which I transcribe:—

"Rome, 9th September, 1848.

" DEAR GENERAL,

"I wrote to you two days ago; to-day I will tell you that we are very discontented with the bad faith of the Austrians in the negociations, and there is reason to believe that they are broken off.

"Several ships of war, and 4000 men,

are being sent from hence to be disembarked at Venice.

"Hold firm till their arrival; it is through you perhaps, at least I hope it, that the salvation of Italy will be effected.

"Your devoted

"HARCOURT."

The arrival of the above-named troops would have changed the aspect of affairs in all Italy, and consequently in all Germany, but fortune was not with us.

Foreseeing that we should be abandoned by the Sardinian navy, after providing for our wants on land, it was necessary to devote our endeavours exclusively to the sea. The *personnel* of the Venetian navy was indisputably better than that of Austria, but the number of our vessels was inferior; with a determined will, we might have purchased two steam-frigates; we might, at the same time, have introduced better discipline than that which existed, and thus the Adriatic would have remained open to Venice.

In all the Estuary, the fortifications were advancing; in my reports to the government, and my Orders of the Day, I was careful to point out to the army, and to the population, the names of the officers who had best co-operated in the defence. Malghera, Treporti, Lido, Brondolo, were doubly strong as compared with the state in which I found them in June.

The sickness, inevitable at the end of summer and the beginning of autumn, in almost all the islands of the Lagoon, harrowed my mind with anxiety. The Lombard battalion, of about 800 men, was at one moment reduced to 100 men capable of service. I was afraid of being left without men to mount guard. The Neapolitans, between Chioggia and the Brenda, had suffered severely. Nor did all recover from this fever; many were so invalided as to obtain leave of absence, and what was worse, many died. There was no scourge which we did not suffer during that long siege.

In the midst of the sickness which

deprived me of so many hands, we were abandoned by the Sardinian squadron, and then by the three battalions which had been sent us by Carlo Alberto; and, as if all these evils were not enough to overwhelm us, notice reached me that Pius IX. recalled his four legions. On repairing to the seat of government, I gave my hand to Manin, the president, saying to him, "Abandoned by men and by heaven, let us die without envying the living, but defending liberty and this classic Lagoon while life remains."

I had ordered a steam-boat to be ready one morning at eleven o'clock, to take me to Chioggia. The government sent for Colonel Ulloa, chief of my staff, and charged him to tell me not to go to Chioggia, a city of 30,000 inhabitants; for that the National Guard there, knowing I was authorised to take the command of them, and not being willing to submit to my orders of changing them into a military division, with regular service, had determined to fire on me. I replied to the

government, that I was not accustomed to attend to threats. On embarking, I found my hostess, Countess Sorango, and the Countess Papadapoli Aldobrandini, with her husband, on board; and I then remembered that they were to accompany me to Chioggia for their amusement. Not to alarm them, I did not tell them of the fears of the government. The population of Chioggia was believed, in Venice, to be inclined to disorder and opposition. found the National Guard drawn out in close order, and only a few of them in uniform. Traversing the front of their line, I spoke to each of them, and to the reasons they alleged, I answered in such a way as to make them promise to equip themselves, and they ended in being quite satisfied with me. It happened that to two or three among them, who were not luxuriously dressed, I said, "I read in your physiognomy that you are rich, and therefore the expense of a uniform will be a trifle to you." This excited the laughter of those near them, who marvelled moreover at my guesses being several times true. The National Guard were so satisfied with me that on defiling to military music they cheered me warmly, and sent their military bands to my house. To lead men, we must study the human heart.

I will here transcribe a letter from the old companion of my exile, Mamiani, who wrote to me from Rome, and whose letter shows at the same time his love of Italian independence, and the state of that truly sacerdotal government.

" MY GOOD GENERAL,

"I hope the ministers here will not recall the troops; and we have obtained for them clothing as you will see. We shall do all in our power to get what is most needed, i.e., some assistance in money. But, from fear of Austria, every thing must be done secretly to avoid the appearance of co-operating in the Italian cause. I am sorry to say that the instrument of this miserable policy is Count Fabbri, a good old civilian, worn by years, and little used

to affairs. I have not failed to fill the office of a friend to him, praying and conjuring him to quit the ministry.

"No one is surprised at your obstinate and invincible courage. You will not fail to conclude as you began; fortune may still overwhelm you with trials and adversities, but she cannot prevent them from being glorious and salutary to Italy. I cannot believe that Italy will not rise from this last stroke-for she has the conviction of being able to conquer, and she will do The terror which the Austrian arms inspired is for ever dissipated: the conspiracy of kings is ended. My mission to the Neapolitan parliament will be without effect, since Bozzelli only the day before yesterday stopped the entry into the kingdom. But to return to Venice; I feel myself bound to adopt every means in my power to force this government to send you assistance, and I shall do it with much zeal, if not with great success. Every thing moves me to this; the salvation of Italy, love of that unhappy capital,

affection for you, and gratitude moreover for the trust which this Provisional Government places in me, honouring me by writing to me ex-officio, and overwhelming my small merits with undue praise. But besides the insufficiency of my faculties, I am at this moment attacked by calumnies, and much out of favour with the Pontiff, because the retrograde, the egotists, and the fearful, run me down. At any rate I shall not cease to labour on to the end.

" Adieu, &c. &c.

" MAMIANI.

"Rome, 3rd September, 1848."

In the meantime, far from despairing, I directed the organisation of great part of the militia into legions, and though I met with considerable difficulties, yet I ended by succeeding.

Order of the Day.

"The Commander-in-Chief in the Venetian States orders that all the corps, whether regular or irregular, shall be divided into legions, composed of the individuals belonging to the Venetian provinces. These legions shall be formed as follows:—

"The 1st Legion, composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the present 1st legion of the guard mobile, shall be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Giuseppe Jehan.

"The 2nd Legion, composed of the 4th battalion of the present 1st legion, and of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 2nd legion of the guard mobile, shall be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eugenio Vandoni.

"The 3rd Legion, composed of the 3rd battalion of the present 2nd legion guard mobile, of the battalion from Vicenza (Zanellato), of the Paduan guard mobile (Stucchi), and of the Spangaro, Zerman, and Grondoni companies, shall be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Zanellato.

"The 4th Legion, composed of the Trivigiano battalion (Galateo), and of the Paduan crusaders (Cavalletto), will be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel San Martino.

"The 5th Legion, composed of the legion of Sile, and some portions of the Prato battalion, shall be commanded by Colonel Amigo.

"Major Ciro Foglia will command the 1st battalion of the 1st legion thus constituted, and Major Antonio Torriani the 2nd battalion.

"The 1st battalion of the 2nd legion shall be commanded by Rodolfo Dea; the 2nd battalion by Guiseppe Zambori, and provisionally by Captain Pietro Spangaro.

"The 1st battalion of the 3rd legion aforesaid shall be commanded by Major Antonio Sartori; and the 2nd battalion by Major Napoleone Stucchi; the 3rd battalion by Major Alessandro Jehan.

"The 1st battalion of the 4th legion shall be commanded by Major Guiseppe Galateo; the 2nd battalion by Major Cavalletto.

"The 1st battalion of the 5th legion

shall be commanded by Major Nicolo Radonich; the 2nd battalion by Major Guiseppe Francesconi.

"The officers in command of the legions and battalions will be responsible for the good and exact performance of the service.

"Subordination, the soul of military service, must be maintained by the adoption of more rigorous measures, and by inexorably enforcing the articles of war against all who are guilty. The abovenamed commanders will remain responsible for the adequate instruction of their subordinates of every grade.

"The Commander-in-Chief expects from the zeal and patriotism of the soldiers of all ranks, that they will assist, without fearing fatigues and sacrifices, in lightening the difficult mission of their chiefs.

"G. PEPE.

" Venice, 17th August, 1848."

Perceiving that the times were unpropitious, a few days before the three Sardinian battalions embarked, I published the following Order of the Day.

"Volunteers, Soldiers, Officers,

"I had scarcely completed my fifteenth year when, driven into exile, I fought in the ranks of the immortal Italian legion. After this legion had crossed the great St. Bernard, alone it vanquished the Austrians near Varallo; and this victory was the fortunate prelude to Marengo, which so highly raised the fame of the Italian Captain.

"This legion was composed of Neapolitans, Romans, Tuscans, Lombards, Venetians, and Piedmontese, all of them young and new to arms, but devoted to the love of Italy. That was an anticipated image of the corps which I have now the honour to lead, which seems to have received from Heaven the glorious charge of defending this ancient and classical asylum of peninsular liberty. If that legion bade defiance to snowy mountains, to long marches, and to so many other fatigues, you, with unparalleled patriotism, support sickness and privations of every kind: if they victoriously combated the ancient enemies of Italy,

you attack them with hearts worthy of equal good fortune. But now behold them advancing, divided between the shame of having been defeated by the unarmed populations of Venice, of Milan, and of Bologna, and the pride of the recent victory which they have gained on the banks of the Mincio!

"Officers, Soldiers, Volunteers, the eyes of Italy and of all Europe are on us. From these shores we may, perhaps, be so fortunate as to contribute greatly to Italian independence; from this country of heroes, who, having made themselves masters of the sea, were formerly a shield against the barbarians that menaced the civilisation of the west.

"The enemy, combating under the walls of our fortresses, will lose those advantages, which his long-taught and mechanical discipline has obtained for him in the field.

"Let us defend Venice, the bulwark of Italy, which in so many centuries has never fallen, though often attacked by enemies very superior to those who now oppose us. We will defend it till the promised aid arrives. Rather than abandon our Venetian brethren to slavery, we will meet death without repining. The protection which the Estuary offers us will enable us to fall not unavenged, and the true sons of Italy will envy the fate of the defenders of Venice.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE.

"VENICE, 23rd August, 1848."

But Venice was not only abandoned by its land and sea forces, not only menaced by the recall of the Roman soldiers, an evil still more serious was threatening her, which was poverty. The population of the Lagoon amounted at the utmost to 200,000, and they were expected to maintain all the land and sea forces, and moreover to furnish their clothing, household utensils, &c., &c. To supply so many wants, an appeal to Italian patriotism was made; on many arduous occasions the reply had proved heroic, but now it

was feeble. I published the following Circular, in order to exhort the Italians to be generous towards Venice, or rather towards the cause of Italian independence,—

"The Commander-in-Chief of the armed Corps in Venice, to the War Committees and National Circles of all the Italian Provinces.

"From this remaining rampart of Italian independence, from Venice so illustrious in arts, so splendid in history, whose resistance, in the unforeseen and precipitous decline of Italian fortune, is a sure pledge of reviving destiny, a cry is raised which will resound over the entire Peninsula. Here are met together Lombards, Subalpines, Romans, and Neapolitans, to assist the valorous inhabitants in the defence of the classical Lagoon. Here almost every province in Italy is represented in the last struggle of our country against our common oppressor. The garrison, though attenuated by sickness, is still sufficient for the defence, animated as it

is by a noble spirit, warm with patriotic love, ready for all dangers, patient in suffering, and assisted by the National Guard. We have still spirit, and strength, and an obstinate hope of fruitfully shedding our blood for Italy. But the treasury is exhausted by long and frequent calls; the occupation of the Venetian terra firma has deprived us of the means of replenishing it in proportion with our wants, and the many millions of lire lately given by the citizens are insufficient. Shall we leave Italy, which seems to have risen as one man to drive away the hated German, shall we leave her last defenders to perish for want of pecuniary assistance? If the governments, which should remain united, have been separated; if they, who should have manfully persevered in the well commenced enterprise, but who have been cast down by the first reverses, if they are less mindful of the nation, let her, at least, endeavour to prove herself worthy of a better fate. No government can forbid that the urgent necessities of Venice should

receive pecuniary succour. Let subscriptions be opened; let collections be made; every citizen will give the sacred obole to the city which is combating in the van of national independence. Since this city has miraculously escaped from the hands of Austria, and has once again been given by Heaven to Italy, it would be infamy and impiety to lose it again by avarice. While Venice is free, Italy is not lost: and a powerful neighbour may, in spite of dark diplomatic tergiversations, still succour it in time.

"War Committees of all the Italian provinces! what remains but to send pecuniary aid at least to Venice, which is still in arms? National circles! what other resource have you but in helping the last armed representative of the nation? May your assistance be ample, speedy, and efficacious, and we shall feel you to be brothers as much as if you were fighting beside us.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE.

[&]quot;VENICE, 23rd August, 1848."

As example is ever the best stimulant, I, who had already given up half the salary which had been awarded me, and which amounted to 70,000 francs a year, now resigned the whole sum, and the President Manin rewarded me with usury by the following letter:—

"GENERAL,

"The government is penetrated with profound gratitude for the gift you have made it of all the emoluments due to you, and it thanks you with heartfelt gratitude for this, as well as for your esteem for the people of Venice.

"Yes, General, they deserve this esteem. Their greatness of mind has overcome the greatness of their wants. Italy will aid them; it will respond to the example which you, who have grown grey in defending her independence, do not cease to hold out.

"Accept, General, the assurance of my high consideration. "Manin.

"President of the Provisional Government of Venice, 19th October, 1848."

A contemporary of mine in Naples, Ruiz, who as captain of artillery had valiantly combated under my orders at the battle of Rieti, and against the Austrians, had been made prisoner in 1823, while defending liberty in Spain, at the battle of Slado, and conducted into France, where he settled and was naturalised. He there became Prefect of the Nièvre, and he now published an address to the French, exhorting them to succour Venice. Among other things he told them that the fate of modern civilisation would be decided in Venice and on the plains of Lombardy, and at the same time Ruiz contributed 1000 francs to the proposed offering.

To increase the esteem felt for Venice, I thought it right to undertake somewhat bolder measures than at first, though I could not risk any hazardous sallies, for the government adduced a thousand reasons, all political, to exact the delay of all important movements till better times.

On the 22nd of October, I limited myself to sending out from Treporti a column

composed of chasseurs of the line, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel d'Amigo, to drive away the Austrians from a position on the Cavellino which their artillery occupied. My men were protected by a bragozzo and three pirogues armed for warfare, and these boats descended down the canal Pordilio. The whole expedition was under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Girolamo Ulloa, the head of my staff. chasseurs placed themselves at the head of the vanguard, and had scarcely come within musket shot, when they beat the charge, and threw themselves on the Austrians, with bayonets fixed, and with so much violence, as to force them not only to retreat precipitately, but also to abandon two pieces of artillery protected by campaign works. This feat of arms was highly lauded by the Venetians, as they all knew that the enemy's forces were superior to ours. I had the two captured guns transported into the Piazza of St. Mark.

The Triumvirs had hoped by moderation, and through the intervention of England and France, to obtain some considerable advantage for Venice, and for this reason they had recommended me to abstain from operations which might attract observation; but when they perceived that they had little or nothing to hope, and even saw themselves suspected of being unwilling to join the common cause of all Italy, then, in order to show by their acts that in Venice there were truly Italian sentiments, they let me know that I was free to act according to my own impulse. I therefore determined to send my volunteers against the enemy, and thus, by example, persuade the inhabitants of the Peninsula to take up arms again. On the 26th of October the government gave me this notice. The combat of Mestre took place on the 27th, the particulars of which will be found narrated in the ensuing Order of the Day. But before reading this order it is necessary to know that there were a thousand difficulties to prevent the defenders of the Lagoon from executing reconnoissances, sorties, or above all from taking any numerous column by surprise. The enemy's corps were at a distance from Venice, which they had hemmed in by a circle of detachments; and in case of assault they fell back between their entrenchments and the marshes. The only neighbouring position which contained a sufficient number of troops was the city of Mestre, half an hour's distance from Malghera. But it was well fortified, and protected by marshy lands. I could not spare many troops to attack it, because in case of a check I should have endangered the safety of Venice. Nevertheless, to rouse dormant Italian patriotism, I was obliged to risk much, and to assault the enemy in their fort of Mestre.

Order of the Day.

"VENICE, 29th October, 1848.

"On the morning of the 27th before dawn, the General-in-Chief, surrounded by his staff, from the lunette No. 12 in the fort of Malghera, observed the movemer of three columns, which contained in a about 2000 bayonets. That on the le consisted of 450 men of the fifth legion, commanded by its colonel D'Amigo, and embarked on a number of boats; it was preceded by five pirogues and two scouts, under the orders of Captain Basilesso of the navy. These boats, with their artillery, were intended to facilitate the landing of our men in Fuseria.

"The Colonel had instructions to occupy that post, and afterwards the part of Boaria which adjoins the city of Mestre, so as to form a reserve for the centre column. This column consisted of 900 men, commanded by Colonel Morandi, and composed of Lombard and Bolognese volunteers; its orders were to dislodge the enemy entrenched on the railroad, and then to occupy Mestre by force. The right column of 650 men, formed of the free Italian battalion, and the chasseurs of the Upper Reno, commanded by Colonel Zambeccari, had orders to take a barricade erected on the narrow banks of the canal of Mestre, and defended by two guns, and by considerable numbers of infantry posted in the neighbouring houses, which were fortified with loopholes.

"The dawn was appearing; the pirogues, not yet arrived at their posts on account of the unusual fog, had not commenced firing. The four field-pieces destined for the right column were not come from the island of Lido; but all further delay would have been injurious, and it became necessary, therefore, to begin the assault with the bayonet.

"The strength of the enemy was about 3000 men on the whole line, besides 2000 entrenched in Mestre, which was also defended by many field-pieces, and by chasseurs ready to fire from the houses.

"The centre column was stopped by the fire of the muskets, and by the artillery of the enemy. The General-in-Chief despatched Colonel Ulloa with one hundred gendarmes of the reserve, and with this reinforcement he rallied and urged on the column at the pas de charge; and they penetrated into the city. They were stopped a second time; but in spite of the obstinate resistance they encountered, and the great loss they sustained, they advanced onwards.

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"The enemy, after losing part of their artillery, defended themselves from the houses. Captain Sirtori, Major Rosaroll, and Captain Cattabene, bold even to temerity, undertook with a handful of brave Lombards to drive out the Austrians house by house, and thus opened the way to our troops, who occupied the city militarily.

"It was in this affair that Baron Alessandro Poërio, a volunteer on my staff, received a musket-shot in his leg; he continued to advance, and received a second in the right knee; and while lying on the ground, the enemy wounded him on the head with his own dagger. While his right thigh was being amputated, this brave Poërio conversed calmly of his beloved Italy—the heroes of Plutarch might have used the same language while speaking of Athens or Sparta.

"During these vicissitudes, the Zambeccari column, following the bank of the canal, encountered a strong barricade, defended by two seven-pounders, and made themselves masters of it with their bayonets. But the enemy, taking advantage of the inequalities in the sandy ground, and of some small cottages, greatly annoyed the rear of the column, so much so, that several among the volunteers hesitated; they were rallied again by Colonel Paolucci, and Major Assanti, under the eyes of the General-in-Chief: during the fray these two officers were generally by his side.

"As soon as the pirogues were in a position to fire, Colonel Amigo landed at Fusino, captured two twelve-pounders, abandoned by the Austrians, and made some prisoners; but he was not in time to facilitate the attack of Mestre, and was therefore unable to carry out the design of the Commander-in-Chief, by taking the enemy in the rear.

"Besides the results effected by the prodigious valour of the centre and right column, six hundred prisoners were taken, six bronze cannons, many horses, and a large quantity of ammunition.

"But what was still better, was to have proved that the Italian volunteers, who only a few months before had taken arms for the first time, commanded by officers for the most part new to the profession, had beaten the Austrians, who were superior in number, well entrenched, obstinately defended, and prepared overnight to receive us, and who made use of the loop-holed houses as a second line of defence.

"The General-in-Chief wishes that those who are accustomed to say that he places too much confidence in the volunteers, had seen the Lombards and the Bolognese fighting; they would have observed with astonishment, that these bold men employed in preference the bayonet and the dagger, and despised every obstacle, as if determined to give their lives for the glory of their country; they would have admired their calmness and order, which might have honoured the most expert veterans; they would also have heard those who were most seriously wounded hailing Italian liberty, from which death was so soon to separate them.

"When a nation has such sons, when

among its people there are men who run to the struggle as did those of Milan and Bologna, it will triumph over the most powerful enemies.

"GIMO PEPE."

This order of the day was followed by notices of the names of those who had most signalised themselves, with the number of our dead and wounded, amounting to above four hundred men; while the loss of the enemy was more than six hundred. In one house, where the resistance had been very obstinate, ninety dead bodies were found.

The day of Mestre was of great and durable advantage to Italy. Years ago, when I wrote my *Italia Militare*, and afterwards in my Memoirs, I wearied myself in endeavouring to demonstrate that the ancient valour of Italy is still alive; but few believed my words. But on the 27th October, 1848, I had the good fortune to place the worth of the Italian sword in evidence, and to prove that the youths of Italy, after passing only a few months under arms, combated success-

fully, not only in the open field, but also in the midst of the defences of a warlike enemy.

Some Sardinian military men, who happened to be in Venice, in order to pay court to their prince, spread the report and published that I had endeavoured to induce the three Sardinian battalions to remain in Venice. This was pure invention. Not that I should have thought the attempt unworthy, but I was quite convinced it would be unsuccessful. good of Italy, and her independence, have ever been supreme laws to me. The withdrawal of these three battalions from the Lagoon was of assistance, both militarily and morally, to the Austrians far more than to Charles Albert. He had sent these troops to Venice entirely of his own accord; but he recalled them only under compulsion,-forced by his disasters to obey the Austrian mandate.

END OF VOL. I.

NARRATIVE

07

SCENES AND EVENTS

ın

ITALY.

From 1847 to 1849.

INCLUDING

THE SIEGE OF VENICE.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEPE, COMMANDED-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF EXPEDITION OF NAPLES, AND OF THE FORCES OF THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC.

TRANSLATED FROM

THE UNPUBLISHED ITALIAN MANUSCRIPT.

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NARRATIVE OF

EVENTS IN ITALY.

From 1847 to 1849.

CHAPTER I.

A sortic on Caorle decided on.—Reasons against it.—The young men of Naples send a sword of honour to the Author.—Leonardo da Vinci.—Several corps organised into a Brigade.—
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I HAD sufficient experience and knowledge of history, to foresee the complaints of the superior officers who followed me to Mestre. Each believed himself to have co-operated in the victory more than his companions, and therefore desired to obtain the largest share of praise. After the battle of Marathon, all yielded the first place to Miltiades; but every one believed himself the second.

Remembering the proverb, that "we must vol. 11.

strike while the iron is hot," I planned a vigorous expedition against Caorle, which had a numerous Austrian garrison. I had combined all the movements with the Vice-Admiral Graziani, who had promised me light-armed boats, which were to land my troops on the small hill connecting Caorle with the terra firma. Colonel Ulloa was to take the isthmus at the point of the bayonet, and I intended to embark on a steam-boat, and command the expedition in person. embarkation was to take place at sun-set, when the sea suddenly became so tempestuous as to prevent it. Two days after, it was calm; but the triumvirs let me know, that political circumstances required that, at the present moment, I should confine myself to the defensive. They listened to the European diplomatists, who, now that they had no intention of assisting us, exhorted us to act with more prudence, and not to disturb the treaties which were then being negotiated. I was obliged, therefore, to limit myself to slight reconnoissances.

At this time, the young men of Naples, defying imprisonment, and the rigours of that miserable government, jointly subscribed to purchase a handsome sword of honour, which they sent me by an excellent young officer belonging to the National Guard. On arriving in Venice he was named Lieutenant of the republican army; and on all occasions he conducted himself with great valour. His name was Montuoro. I accepted the sword with great satisfaction, and it never quitted my side during the rest of the campaign. These patriotic youths accompanied the gift with the following inscription :-

> "AL BENEMERITO DELLA PATRIA CITADINO GUGLIELMO PEPE

COMMANDANTE IN CAPO LE ARME ITALIANE NEL VENETO IL QUALE, DI SPRONE AI VALOROSI CHE LO SEGUIVANO A TRAVERSO COTANTE LAGRIMEVOLI SCIAGURE SI NOBILMENTE SALVAVA L'ONOR NAPOLITANO ! I NAPOLITANI RICONOSCENTI QUESTO TRIBUTO DI OMAGGIO, E DI GRATITUDINE OFFRIVANO A DI 24 OTTOBRE 1848."*

* TO A CITIZEN DESERVING WELL OF HIS COUNTRY, WILLIAM PEPE,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ITALIAN FORCES IN THE VENETIAN TERRITORY.

WHO, URGING ON HIS BRAVE POLLOWERS, THROUGH SO MANY LAMENTABLE DISASTERS, SO NOBLY UPHELD THE HONOUR OF NAPLES, THE GRATEFUL NEAPOLITANS OFFERED THIS TRIBUTE OF HOMAGE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT,

тне 24тн ог остовек, 1848.

I answered as follows :-

"Young men of Naples! In 1820, I commanded the Neapolitan army, which had been chiefly trained to arms in the Russian, Italian, and Spanish campaigns, and they nobly seconded me in overthrowing the slavery under which our country groaned. The Regent, who was afterwards Francis I., offered me at that time the rank of Captain-General, as I have shown in my Memoirs. I refused to accept it, as being an insidious and inopportune honour. In my eyes it had not the merit of the sword, which you, with such touching kindness and so much moral courage, have sent me; exposing yourselves by this act to the rigours of an unreasonable government.

"Beloved fellow-countrymen! I thank you from the bottom of my heart for this act of patriotism, which I consider a happy omen of the future destinies of our country, on which the fate of the entire peninsula in great measure depends. In this peninsula, the love of independence, the firm will to obtain it at any price, are such, that it would already have been ours, had our Princes been guided

by Italian feelings, or had we been freed from their yoke.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE."

I had observed with pain that Italy had not been generous to Venice, on the resistance of which so much of the safety of the peninsula depended. I had, as I before explained, given up to the treasury all my emoluments; I determined on a further proof of my affection for Venice, by sending to the government a portrait of Cesar Borgia, Duke of Valentino, painted by Leonardo da Vinci, to have it sold for the public benefit. This picture was a gift from my good brother Florestano, which accompanied me everywhere. By means of a lottery they might have obtained 100,000 frs. for it; but they preferred retaining it as a remembrance, and the President, Manin, graciously sent me the following letter :-

"GENERAL,

"No magnanimous act comes unexpectedly from you. By nature, and by long habit, all noble sacrifices are dear and easy to you; and now, mindful of the wants of our country, you cede to us a famed work of art, the precious gift of fraternal affection, the constant companion of your honoured exile. Type of a citizen soldier, model of a perfect Italian, your name will ever be blessed and glorious.

"From the Provisional Government of Venice.

"MANIN, President."

" 12th Nov. 1848."

My gifts were insignificant compared with those which the magnanimous citizens made to the glorious and, for thirteen centuries, powerful Venice. In their breasts, her present misfortunes had weakened neither patriotic love, nor hatred of a foreign yoke. "Of what importance is it that for fifty years we have been unfortunate? Is this a tearful episode in the midst of the liberty we so long possessed, admired by the whole human race? What, if with change of times, we should also change the object of our ambition! That which now fills our breasts is more pure, more elevated, more honourable to human nature! We shall no longer com-

mand numerous provinces, but we shall be the bulwark of all Italy, whose sons will repair hither from the north and south, to shed their blood for the common safety." Thus saying, these truly liberal and Italian minds sent to the treasury all they could dispose of. The ladies excelled in generosity; and it was observed, that those who before had most indulged in luxuries, now repressed their desires, and adorned themselves with the more noble ornament of Italian independence.

The organisation of the troops in the Estuary necessarily differed from that of the other corps, who were not dispersed among the islands and the smaller and larger fortresses: therefore, instead of being divided into brigades and divisions, it was better they should remain in legions; so much the more, that experienced brigadiers were wanting. Even had this not been the case, still, surrounded as we were on all sides by a numerous enemy, it was unadvisable that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief should have to pass through brigadiers, colonels, and commanders of battalions, scattered about the Lagoon and its shores; yet, to satisfy the

self-love of some brigadiers, four brigades were organised. In truth, the reverses of Charles Albert had not made me lose all hope of entering on open campaign warfare, but in that case the whole organisation would have been changed.

Towards the end of November, my nomination to the national parliament of Naples reached me; the official information was dated November 25th, and sent by Signor Campitelli, president of the central commission for the elections of the district of Naples. The ministers, I was informed, had opposed my election with all their power, but in vain. The Government considered this election as a new scandal, confirming the first, the gift of a sword, which had become public. In my answer to the President Campitelli I accepted the honourable mission: I said that we must not aim at pleasing a despicable government; and I ended by expressing a hope that the war in Venice might be speedily terminated, in which event I would return to my post of deputy. This last sentence so frightened the Government that they hastened to decree, that if the deputy,

General Guglielmo Pepe, entered the kingdom, he should be arrested and brought to trial. I was thus proscribed for the third time.

The armistice obtained by the Sardinian King, the unjust suspicions which were thrown on his good faith, the threats of Austria, and the movement of her troops, alarmed the people of the Roman states with the dread of an invasion of the enemy. Both the Government and myself accordingly determined on sending back the four legions belonging to Rome. There remained in Venice, out of these legions, only one battalion of 1000 men, whom I proposed, after the first feat of arms, to salute by the appellation of "The Thousand Romans," in order to excite their valour. At the same time, there arrived daily out of the ancient Venetian provinces, many young men who were determined, at all risks, to escape from the Austrian conscription: many others deserted their banners to join the Italians in the defence of Venice. Colonel Cavedalis, one of the triumvirs, had the charge of uniting these youths, and forming with them a fine battalion. These young men came from the

surrounding provinces of Padua, Treviso, Undine, and Bellona. I formed them into legions.

I bade adieu to the four Roman legions who had fought so willingly for the Italian cause, and endured difficulties, privations, and sickness, in the following order of the day:—

"VENICE, 3rd Dec., 1848.

"The Government decreed yesterday that the Roman division, now fighting in the defence of the Estuary, shall return into their native provinces. The present condition of these provinces has induced the Venetian government to come to this determination; it has also been formed in consequence of the fevers which have been so prevalent during the past year, enfeebling the health of many of the volunteers, who will revive on breathing their natal air.

"The General-in-Chief will never forget a single one of the military virtues which have adorned the Roman volunteers whom he has had the honour to command during seven months. If they have defended Venice with so much ardour, they will not fail to maintain the liberty of their fellow countrymen against its internal enemies wherever they may arise, and against the attacks of the foreigner.

"The General is grieved at parting from so many warm defenders of this classic land; but he derives consolation from the thought that both they, and the other volunteers who remain in the Estuary, having the independence of the Peninsula for ever engraven on their hearts, will soon again be seen in the Venetian camp, in order to shake off entirely the humiliating yoke of Austria, who will surely be driven beyond the mountains by the bayonets which fought with such valour at Mestre.

"GLMO. PEPE,
"The General-in-Chief."

If in this order of the day no mention was made of General Ferrari, who was to lead back these legions of which Charles Albert had asked me to give him the command, it was his own fault. Eight months before, his Government, dissatisfied with his conduct, had recalled him through the medium of their commissioner, Count Carlo Pepoli.

In the affair of Cavanella on the Adige, I sinned on the side of indulgence, and not of severity, in regard to him. The triumvirs in a letter of the 18th September had urged me to send him back to Rome, yet I retained him in Venice. The Venetian government wrote on the 29th October to the Roman government, greatly blaming Ferrari. Notwithstanding this, he was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-General in Rome, where, as in Naples, this grade is on a par with that of General in Piedmont. In fact, the Minister of War in Rome wrote to inform me that that Government had established generals of brigade, generals of division, and lieutenantgenerals. Ferrari had arrived from France where he had the rank of a retired Lieutenant-Colonel.

I have explained this subject fully, to show that all the new Italian governments, from Sicily to Piedmont, had the fatal mania of conferring promotion without considering the evil it is of to discipline, and to the organisation of an army. I shall have further occasion to point out some serious inconveniences resulting from this practice, in order that Italy may not fall into the same error when she has regained her independence.

In the time of the first French Republic, if advancement was rapid, it was only given to officers who had signally distinguished themselves. The rapid careers of Massena and Murat do not belie my assertion; the grades they obtained were merited, one by one, on the field of battle. General Haxo, who united experience to great good sense, said that Napoleon, when Emperor, often showed that he had never been colonel of a regiment.

Many and various were the wiles employed by the enemy to subdue the persevering love of liberty which was shown in Venice both by the people, and by the valorous and patriotic garrison. Among other means, they endeavoured to inspire distrust of many superior officers and persons in civil employment, particularly of the commanders of the forts, such as that of Malghera. To destroy these baneful calumnies, I published the following order of the day:—

" VENICE, 16th Dec., 1848.

"Vague rumours of a speedy attack by the wily enemy not long ago gave the alert to the garrison of the Estuary. It was the artful act, either of the enemy, or of wicked malevolence, or rather of timid and ill-advised levity. Persons of conspicuous honour were made marks for blind and perfidious suspicions. The General-in-Chief takes this opportunity of again assuring the citizens and the military that both he and the government attentively watch over the punctual service of the garrison, as well as over the zeal and fidelity of the commanders. It is a matter of gratification to the General, who has so often rendered a just tribute of praise to the soldiers, now to offer one, not less deserved, to all the commanders without exception; for intelligence, for unblemished honour, for ardent love of their country, they all deserve the commendations of the garrison, and of the city which they defend. The General wishes especially to signalise Colonel Mattei for his indefatigable activity, his tried patriotism, his intelligent and zealous services in the defence of

Malghera. The officers of that fort, and the council of defence have given in writing a similar well-deserved testimony to this deserving Colonel.

"LIEUT.-GENERAL G. PEPE, "Commander-in-Chief."

When an honest man is calumniated, and is aware of the calumny, he has often the appearance of being guilty. As to myself, I confess that I had so often seen the valour of the Italians called in question in newspapers and pamphlets, in spite of the well-deserved praise they had earned in all the provinces of the Peninsula, as well as in the wars of the French empire, that I always abstained from going to the Italian Theatre in Paris, where all the applause showered on the performers seemed to me to mean, "You can always sing, but never fight." But, after the day of Mestre, I went to the finest theatre in Venice, where, if I mistake not, a performance was given for the benefit of the Treasury, and in one of the scenes nearly thirty young ladies sang in chorus. I said to myself, "If in Italy we are superior in all the fine arts, after

Mestre, we are ourselves at least convinced that we can fight with more valour than our enemies." This idea, and this train of reasoning made me, for the first time since many long years, take pleasure in an Italian theatre, and in seeing my countrymen sing and dance.

CHAPTER II.

Political and military situation of Italy in the beginning of 1849.

—Letter of Count Gherardo Freschi, of Turin.—General Olivaro and Deputy Correnti are sent by the King of Sardinia to Venice.—They return with a letter from the Author, and two projects for the approaching campaign.—The King's answer.—Instructions for Colonel Fabbrizi sent to Rome.—Demand that the Roman battalion of the Union should remain.—Letter of Manin,—Charles Albert decides on resuning hostilities.—Departure of the Author for Chioggia, where he concentrates a small corps.—Reconnoissance by the Lombards.—Letter from the Government to suspend all operations.—Return to Venice.

In the commencement of 1849, Italy was, both in a military and political point of view, in a wretched condition.

Sicily, though desirous of maintaining her newly acquired liberty, possessed neither an army nor a fleet to contend against the enemy, nor a general capable of organising troops, and then assuming the command of them.

The kingdom of Naples was groaning under the despotic yoke of a prince, who, to consolidate his power, shaken by recent

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commotions, and by the still unsubdued state of Sicily, employed corruption with both the people and the army, and again called the Jesuits to his assistance.

The Roman States were the focus of all the intrigues of the European courts, who rivalled one another in suggesting to Pius IX. the basest means of reducing that energetic people under the temporal power of the clergy; and the Pope, by calling in the aid of foreign bayonets, deservedly obliterated his former acts, which were worthy of the Vicar of Christ, and had filled the two hemispheres with his name.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany wanted only a cowl to become a complete Jesuit. From the right of the Po to Trapani not a bayonet could show itself in favour of Italian independence. From the left bank of the Po to the Alps there remained means sufficient to drive the Austrians beyond the mountains at the point of the bayonet, if Carlo Alberto had been as expert and energetic a general as he was a valiant Italian-minded soldier. I will examine in this chapter the difficulties by which this prince was surrounded, and the

vigour which he wanted to enable him to surmount them.

Several letters which I received from Turin, and especially from Signor Gherardo Freschi, deputed by the Venetian government to the Sardinian, filled my mind with more sorrow than ever.

Count Freschi, in a letter dated the 2nd of November 1848, told me, among other things, that the Lombard Consulta had declared that it would dissolve itself, if the insurrection was not assisted by the rest of Italy. He also said that the King, his sons, and his ministers, declared to Durini, to Prince Canino, and to Mamiani, that they would continue the war; that the enormous expenses incurred, the calling out of the reserve, the nomination of a number of officers, and, still more, the generous proclamation of the Duke of Savoy, confirmed these promises. But, at the same time, the Lombard insurrection was premature, and there were two opinions abroad: some believed that the army was not yet prepared for war; many others maintained that the Lombard brethren, who had compromised

themselves, must be assisted at any cost. Freschi added, that he was alarmed at the evil spirit which had shown itself in the army, and which was caused by the reactionary spirit of the aristocracy, who worked secretly, but not without the culpable assistance of the ministry. Hence the continual desertions in the army, and the incapacity of many generals. He also pointed out the sad example recently given by the Casale brigade, which almost entirely disbanded itself. He concluded by relating to me other circumstances, very disheartening to those who were devoted to Italian independence.

In another letter, dated the 2nd of January, 1849, Count Freschi writes as follows:

"ILLUSTRIOUS GENERAL,

"I must inform you, that although I have seen the King several times, and he has always asked me for an account of your proceedings, and spoken of you as a man whom he highly esteems, nevertheless, from my knowledge of the character of that

prince, the moment has never seemed propitious for communicating to him your ideas concerning the plan of campaign. But now that a new ministry, more in unison with the parliamentary majority, has liberated Carlo Alberto from the fetters which impeded his movements, and has electrified him in such a manner that he seems finally resolved to attempt every possible means of redressing the wrongs of Italy, and avenging the honour of her arms, the moment seemed to have come when your letter might be shown to him with profit; and therefore, a few days ago, I presented myself to him. He received me with his usual affability, and appeared only more joyful and better disposed than ever. He was the first to turn the conversation on you. I then directly laid before him the tenor of your letter,—that is to say, your idea of making Venice the basis of operations in the new war, and the certain results which you anticipate from enterprises undertaken in concert, the plan of which you would communicate, when needful, to a person sent by his Majesty, and possessing his entire confidence. His Majesty answered

me with the greatest praises of your patriotism and of your military talents: he was most satisfied with the confidence you show in him; and he added, 'Our minds are ready for war, and we shall soon be in the field, with all the means at our disposal. When the moment for commencing the campaign is arrived, you will permit me, Signor Conte, to make use of you to concert opportunely with General Pepe. In the mean time, I beg you to offer him my best greetings.' - These are the precise words spoken by his Majesty, whom I thanked, on my own account, for the confidence he had honoured me with; but I represented to him respectfully that it would be more useful to expedite to you an expert and faithful officer, who could comprehend your views better than myself, and refer them to the King.

"I will now answer your last question, whether we are acting here with good sense and good faith. I believe we are, at least as far as the King, the ministry, and the chamber are concerned. But King, ministers, and chamber, who, when they act in concert, should be omnipotent, yet are not so, because

there is something more potent than they; I mean the old aristocracy, who throw their Jesuitical cunning, and their experience in the management of affairs, into the opposite scale, and employ all their power to serve the ends of their incurable egotism. I cannot express the suspicions I feel when I see all these persons, before so openly averse to war, now hastening it on as indispensable. This occasions presentiments which are most sorrowful. I should almost be tempted to believe that they will lead us to new disasters. Take note that the army, which is apparently most flourishing, is far from having recovered from the deep wounds of which I spoke to you at the end of last autumn. As to the King, I believe him to be sincere in following the lofty aim he has in view, whether moved to it by love of glory, or of ambition, or of aggrandisement. Some believe him false; but this is an accusation born and bred in the minds of the aristocracy, who cannot forgive him the wrongs he has done them,-most grievous wrongs, were there no others than the Statuto and the Fusion; and to see them

smile on him with kindly countenances! The King has neither been able to subdue the party which betrays him, nor to reconcile it with the other. This is a great fact. God grant that the consequences be not fatal to him and to Italy.

"Your devoted, &c.

"GHERARDO FRESCHI."

Charles Albert was pleased to send me his general of engineers, Olivaro, accompanied by the deputy Cesare Correnti. The first was an intelligent person, and, what was better, he talked on military affairs with great good sense; Correnti united the most devoted patriotism to great information. I conducted them both round the islands of the Lagoon; I made them examine the fortifications; I reviewed in their presence the militia of the garrison; and it was with much satisfaction that I heard them declare they had not believed it possible to put Venice on the military footing in which they found it.

As the King desired to know my views on the approaching campaign, I sent him, by General Olivaro, two projects along with a letter. As these treated of the salvation or the ruin of Italy, I think it right to transcribe here both the projects and the letter. Of the first project I will only give a succinct idea; the second I give in full.

ABSTRACT OF THE FIRST PROJECT.

"I PROPOSED that the Sardinian forces should be divided into two corps: the first to number about 60,000 men of the best troops; the second to be composed of the remaining troops of the line, augmented by the national and movable guards. The latter would have occupied Alexandria, Genoa, and the positions contiguous to the Alps, where Moreau, in 1799, kept the numerous Austro-Russian army at bay.

"The first corps would have advanced into the Venetian provinces, have made Padua the centre of its operations, and availed itself of the entrenched camp there. I pointed out the manner in which this corps might have reached the Venetian provinces, and assisted the Tyrolese insurrection, which might have extended into Lombardy. I reasoned on the expediency of intercepting the communications between Austria and Radetzky; and should this general advance into the heart of Piedmont, I demonstrated that he would be exposed to complete defeat. I pointed out the advantages the first corps, concentrated at Padua, would derive from the support of the Sardo-Venetian squadron, which was mistress of the Adriatic: and I concluded with these words: 'Sire, your Majesty will not undertake these operations, because they appear arduous, without really being so; and because the human mind is more disposed to adopt half measures than bold ones, or those which are considered so.' I therefore pass to the explanation of my second project."

SECOND PROJECT.

"I. The proposal to divide Lombardy, and place the chosen troops of the army between Padua on the left, and Tyrol on the right, being rejected, I should counsel the sending a division of not fewer than 12,000 men into the Venetian provinces. To these would be added 9000 men from Venice, and between Romans and Tuscans a third more:

in all 30,000 men, independently of the garrison necessary in the Lagoon.

"II. This corps should not amount to less than the number named, in order to be able to act independently, and protect the insurrection in the mountainous Venetian provinces. It should be independent of the Sardinian army, from which it would be separated by more than one river; and it would be protected from the enemy by four strong places. Nevertheless, should the vicis-situdes of the war require it, this corps could join the mass of the Sardinian army, either by the Tyrol, or by Ferrara, or even by Verona, in case the Austrians should have entered Piedmont.

"III. General Pepe, commanding the said division, proposes to execute the following movements: — After making some demonstrations against the enemy in the Venetian provinces, less for the purpose of engaging them, than to mask a more essential movement, he will embark rapidly with 12,000 picked men, in order to occupy Trieste, Pola, Fiume, and other places; in each of which he will remain only as long as may be

necessary in order to send to Venice the prisoners, and the naval and military stores that may be captured. If, in these provinces, the population should show themselves disposed to throw off the Imperial dominion, or if, at Fiume, a correspondence should be opened with Hungary, this expedition might be still further utilised; and the number of the said brigade might be doubled, without endangering the defence of Venice, if chances should present themselves of any grand operation favourable to Italy.

"IV. In the Venetian provinces the same corps might perform many most useful operations. Suppose the enemy coming out of Verona with considerable forces, even as many as 40,000 men, in order to attack the Italian corps in the Venetian territory. This corps might then retreat into Padua, which is surrounded by walls, by two rivers, and a canal; and from thence it would face the Austrians with advantage. It might also disembark considerable detachments at the mouth of the Piave, and of the Tagliamento, in order to attack the enemy in their rear, and cut off their communication with the

Austrian provinces. If the Sardinian army should require succour, either on the side of Mantua, of Verona, or of the Tyrol, the corps stationed in Venice would speedily arrive. In fine, if the King should decide on advancing towards the Austrian frontiers, the same corps would be ready to assist him.

"V. With regard to the operations of the bulk of the Sardinian army in Lombardy, much would depend on the numerical difference between their forces and those of the enemy; on the advantages which the Italico-Venetian corps might have obtained; and on the insurrections going on among the Venetian, Tyrolese, and Brescian mountaineers.

"VI. In every case the Sardinian army, not possessing any fortified place opposite the line of the enemy, should place its strength in compact organisation, and not, as formerly, in the occupation of a long line of country. If it could recover a walled city in the Tyrol, to serve us as an entrenched camp, it might from thence communicate with the corps in the Venetian provinces; and, in that case, its military position would be fatal to the

enemy, who would be deprived of all communication with the empire; since from Venice the troops could act both by sea and land. On the other hand, if the Austrians, in order to open a means of communication, should leave Verona, it is evident that they could probably never return there. These advantages and many others would be obtained by the support of an Italian corps in the Lagoon.

"VII. In opposition to this project it may be observed that the Sardinian army, the Lombard army in the Tyrol, and the Venetian corps, would be separated, and each exposed singly to the assault of all the united Austrian force. But this observation falls to the ground, since the Sardinian army, by retreating towards Genoa or the Alps, would give an opportunity to the Lombard and Venetian divisions of attacking the enemy in the rear; the Lombards would be favoured by strong positions, and supported by the Sardinian and Italico-Venetian corps; and the latter would have a retreat open to Padua and the Lagoon. Moreover, it is demonstrated that it would be easy to unite the three camps."

Both these projects were accompanied by a letter to the King from myself, which I delivered, unsealed, to General Olivaro and Correnti, in order that it might be read by persons of sense and influence; it being understood, that it was to be delivered to his Majesty sealed. The letter was as follows:

" To his Sardinian Majesty.

SIRE "VENICE, 15th February, 1849.

"My conduct towards the five last Neapolitan kings, beginning with Joseph, all of whom were kindly disposed towards me, must prove that the sole motive of all my political acts has ever been the independence and the glory of Italy. This persevering and unchanged love of Italy urges me now to address your Majesty.

"I have never judged human actions by their results, and, therefore, I am impressed only by the noble Italian attitude of Carlo Alberto, when he drew his sword against Austria, and in defence of the audacious Lombards. In the eyes of the inexperienced and the disloyal alone does misfortune become a fault.

"In these last moments, your Majesty must choose either pre-eminent glory, or eternal blame; and decide between the crown of Italy or the humiliation of the rest of your line.

"Let your Majesty, without hesitation, again take up arms: hardly will the war of independence have been proclaimed, than all differences will cease; and that concord will revive which it is sought in vain to disturb by sonorous but insignificant words, dictated by inexperienced enthusiasm, or by the foolish desire to seem foremost in patriotic sentiments. The inhabitants of the Lagoon, more than ever devoted to liberty, will be promptly ready to proclaim the Italian kingdom as soon as they see you again on your battle-horse, and throwing away the scabbard of the sword of your ancestors.

"In every assault and reconnoissance, the enemy has been repulsed at the point of the bayonet by the young volunteers now combating in the Lagoon. How, then, could the Austrians hope to resist the Sardinian army, led on by chiefs devoted to their country? The two projects which I have had the honour to present to your Majesty,

are not dictated by mere enthusiasm, but by experience, which, in warfare, is more valuable than all else.

"I will not dwell on the deeds of the Italian Legion, which, a few days before the battle of Marengo, combated an Austrian division near Darello, and, unassisted, put them to flight. I had then scarcely passed my fifteenth year, and was a simple volunteer. But, in the campaign of 1815, I commanded, as General, Murat's advanced guard; and I had frequent opportunities of examining closely the attitude of the Austrian troops, whom I afterwards combated in the fields of Rieti, having with me then only a few troops of ordnance and a National Guard recently organised, and being secretly betrayed by the prince and his satellites. Hence my knowledge of our adversaries, which has, on my side, been dearly bought.

"Let your Majesty place confidence in the Italian people and in their destiny; thus united to the Peninsula, your dynasty will be saved, and yours alone. I myself, Sire, though by nature averse to princes, shall be the first cordially to salute Carlo Alberto,

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King of Italy, when he has only passed the Isonzo.

"Your Majesty's devoted, &c., &c.,
"Guglielmo Pepe."

As the King had, of his own accord, sent General Olivaro and the Deputy Correnti to me, I flattered myself that their reports, my projects, and my letter, would have brought me such assistance as would have enabled me to avail myself of the magnificent military and political position of Venice. But my hope was vain. The only reply I obtained from Charles Albert was the following letter:

" TURIN, 5th March, 1849.

"ILLUSTRIOUS GENERAL,

His Majesty, my august Sovereign, has received the letter which your Excellency has addressed to him, of the 15th of February, and has charged me to reply to you in his name. I comply most readily with my Sovereign's orders, as His Majesty has desired me to assure you that he appreciates most fully the ideas and observations developed in your letter, as those of an experienced and valiant

general, whose devotion to the Italian cause, and whose sincere love of our common country, are well known, and receive fresh confirmation from the expressions of your letter.

"While obeying the Royal commands, I seize this opportunity of recalling myself to the recollection of your Excellency, and of offering you the sentiments of distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be your Excellency's devoted servant,

" COLLJ."

I cannot express the impression which this letter produced on my mind. It was evident that I could not expect the smallest aid, and that Carlo Alberto, in spite of the promises made to me, and of all he had said so often of the importance of Venice, was, unfortunately for Italy, by no means disposed to derive any advantage from it. It was clear, also, that in spite of the encomiums lavished on me in this last letter, he did not choose to communicate to me his plans for the approaching campaign. Yet he was not ignorant that I commanded in the whole

Lagoon nearly 20,000 men, without reckoning the National Guard, which, in case of extreme need, could have guarded the greater part of the forts; he was not ignorant that among the officers who surrounded him, not one had ever risen to the command of a military corps, or a division, or even a brigade, by regular promotion, but only by favour, which undermines the organisation of an army, instead of giving it solidity, and of bringing forward men able to advise and to act well.

Notwithstanding these mischances, I remained firmly determined never to commit a sin of omission against Italy. On the one hand, I prepared myself at home; and externally, I turned my eyes towards Tuscany and Rome. In Florence, I corresponded with Mandrini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, formerly a captain on my staff; in Rome, with the triumvir Salicetti, whom I had proposed for a minister in Naples. Much that might have been done was not done. Fortune had turned her back on Italy, and, not for the first time, on the most willing and intrepid of her sons.

I dispatched the colonel of my staff, Fab-

brizi, a Modenese, with the following letter and instructions to Rome. I sent the same to Florence.

" To Colonel Fabbrizi.

"COLONEL,

"The military and political position of the Peninsula at this moment is such as to render it the duty of every truly Italian citizen to co-operate for its safety by every means in his power. Commanding in Venice, which is situated between Piedmont and Rome, it is my duty to endeavour to stimulate each of these governments in augmenting the number of their forces, in ameliorating their organisation, and in studying their good direction.

"You are aware of all I wrote to the King of Sardinia, and of what, through General Olivaro and Correnti, I suggested to his government. You also know that I am expecting an answer from Turin.

"In the mean time, and through you, I turn my mind to the Minister of War, and to Salicetti, in Rome; nor could I find a superior officer more capable than yourself of

explaining my views, and putting me in possession of theirs.

"I think that the Roman government should concentrate their forces between Sinigaglia, Ancona, Jeri, Osima, and Macerata, and there give them regularity and instruction.

"The corps thus formed might be employed in offensive and defensive operations, both against the Neapolitan, and the Austrian troops. A defensive position is generally chosen, not on the frontier, but either beyond or within it. I could cite many examples in support of this opinion: among others, Cromwell, with only 10,000 men, subdued Scotland; the Scots, with 40,000 men, trusting to their superior numbers, combated on their frontiers, instead of drawing the enemy into the heart of their country.

"Whether the Roman troops be attacked, or penetrate into the Neapolitan kingdom, I offer myself, in either case, to defend or to attack: the result of the latter operation might prove the salvation of Italy, for, among my contemporaries, not a few would join me; a circumstance which is not unknown to Salicetti.

"In every case, let the Government be

careful of the organisation of the troops; let them purchase arms of a good quality; let them, by means of the patriots, obtain exact notice of the enemy's forces, and of the public spirit of that people.

"If the Austrians should pass the Po, all the Roman and Tuscan forces must again be concentrated in Bologna. In 1815, near Bologna, I contended successfully on the Reno with 7,000 Neapolitans against 18,000 Austrians. Now, with 20,000 Romans and Tuscans, with nearly 10,000 of the National Guard, I promise to defend Bologna, which is the key of the Roman states, against 30,000, or even a greater number, of the enemy. Bologna is a city formed for defence, as I proved in my Italia Militare, published many years ago; and though this city is situated on the frontiers, and not in the interior of the country, yet local circumstances and the energy of its population, make it form an exception to the general rule. The Reno, the mountains, the cultivated and shaded fields which surround it, greatly facilitate its defence. I should esteem myself fortunate to have to defend Bologna.

"I recommend to you, Colonel, the improvement of the fortifications in Ancona. Say that, as soon as Carlo Alberto has decided on recommencing hostilities, the city of Ferrara must be besieged. The siege will be of short duration; I will send there Colonel Ulloa and other distinguished Neapolitan artillery officers.

"For the good of the Italian cause, I have thought it my duty to communicate my thoughts, and to offer my services, to the Roman government. In case Piedmont should act, as I hope it will, in concert with the Venetian troops, I feel certain that the Romans and Tuscans will not abandon us.

"Write to me often. I will let you know the intentions of Carlo Alberto the moment I receive his answer; and you will communicate them to the governments of Rome and Tuscany.

"I have given the President Manin notice of your departure. Accept, &c. &c.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE."

While considering all that might be advantageous outside of the Lagoon, I did not lose sight of our internal affairs. The Roman government desired to recal its battalion of about 1,000 men, for the improvement of which I had taken such pains. I would not allow them to depart, and I wrote on the subject to the President Manin, who answered me thus, on the 10th of March:—

"GENERAL,

"I fully appreciate the considerations contained in your letter of yesterday, regarding the propriety of retaining in Venice the battalion of the Union, sent by the Roman States, and now claimed by the Minister Campello, &c., &c."

One of the considerations contained in my letter of the 8th of March to Manin, to demonstrate the necessity of retaining the said battalion, was the following:—

"At this moment," I said, "it appears that the enemy is preparing to attack our forts on terra firma. The best method of defending these forts is continually to attack the besiegers by frequent sorties, which require numerous troops, and occasion much loss. Massena and Rapp defended Genoa and Dantzic by sorties rather than cannon. For want of these, Antwerp, Saragossa, Gaeta, Terragona, and Mervieda fell. In ancient times Alessia fell, though it contained numerous defenders, but who dared not confront Cæsar's legions. You will see whether the enemy will re-commence their works for the the investment of Malghera, Brondolo, and Treporti; we shall be defended as long as we have men to lose—as long as we can make use of the bayonet as we did in Mestre."

In all Italy, excepting Naples, there existed a serious defect in military institutions, from which even the Sardinian army was not exempt; and this was the mode of promotion of officers of every rank, from the subaltern to the general. I can understand that two, three, or even four steps should be gained by the same individual in a short period of time, provided it be by actual service, by gaining advantages over the enemy, or by giving proofs of valour and intelligence. But advancement accorded without these circumstances is most prejudicial to discipline, and

in a short time degrades the best troops, because, among other reasons, the honour of a military grade becomes a derision, and loses all prestige. As it was proposed that promotion should be given by the Government on the representation of the War Director, I wrote in this sense to Manin, who answered me as follows:—

> "From the Provisional Government of Venice, 14th March, 1849.

"GENERAL,

"I have the pleasure to send you the circular of the 30th January, p.p., in which you will perceive that your legitimate request has been forestalled, and that no advancement can take place among the officers without your approbation. Accept, General, the assurance of my profound esteem.

" MANIN, President."

The information reached us that Carlo Alberto had decided on renewing hostilities on the 20th of the current month of March. Manin, the President, announced this news to the people, and adjourned the National

Assembly for fifteen days, as he had the right to do. It was a joyful day for the inhabitants of Venice, and for the military who composed the garrison; for they believed that the same order, good will, and subordination, existed elsewhere as with us.

I calculated what would be the force necessary for the defence, and I reckoned not a little on the good will of the National Guard. I divided those who could be spared into four brigades; one remained in readiness to throw itself at my orders from Malghera on terra firma, and second my operations; the other three followed me to Chioggia, with a field battery, commanded by the active Major Boldoni, and 120 horsemen led by Captain Dioz, both Neapolitans. These three brigades were commanded by General Rizzardi, and Colonels Belluzzi and Novaro, who had arrived in Venice with the Lombard battalion.

When I embarked with my staff for Chioggia on a small steamboat, the people of Venice, advertised of my movements I know not how, followed me to the shore with shouts of applause which could not have been greater had I returned from some brilliant victory.

I had been promised the assistance of a Roman division as soon as hostilities were commenced; but I counted on them very little, if at all; for not only had they not commenced their march, but they were not even brought together. On the part of the Sardinian King profound silence was observed. Assistance was neither offered nor requested from the left of the Po.

The Estuary was blockaded by eighteen or twenty thousand Austrians. My endeavours could not go beyond obliging the enemy to augment, rather than diminish, the number of their forces round the Lagoon, and at the same time attempting some coup-de-main against the besiegers, encouraged as I was by the moral advantage which my soldiers had gained over the enemy. Though my exploring expeditions and my assaults on the enemy during nearly ten months had been successful, it must not therefore be supposed that I had not encountered difficulties of great moment in my movements.

It should be remembered that in 1815, the French, while they were besieged in Venice, only attempted a single sortie against Cavanella on the Adige. They not only failed in taking it, as happened to myself, through General Ferrari's fault, but they were thrown for a short time on the left of the river. The fields which environ the Lagoon, are all surrounded by stagnant water, and by canals and streams, which are sometimes small, sometimes navigable. Often the banks are so narrow that a few men are sufficient to prevent the approach or the retreat of the enemy, by means of barricades, which can be constructed in a moment. These peculiarities of position sufficiently show the difficulties attending military movements there.

Florestano, who from Naples had his eyes attentively directed towards my operations, wrote to me that I could not be too careful in securing the means of retreating. I wished to advance to Rovigo, and I might perhaps have executed this movement with impunity; but certainly if the enemy had been well furnished with spies, and had decided on attacking me boldly to cut off my retreat, they might have accomplished their purpose, since my column was not sufficiently numerous to allow me to leave echelons on my line of march according

as circumstances might require. Moreover, I could not trust much to chance without endangering the more useful defence of Venice.

However, not to remain with my hands idle, and in the hope that one favourable movement might lead to another, I made a Lombard battalion advance on Conche. It entered beyond the spot I had indicated, constructed a barricade, and established itself regularly in that position. The enemy, advertised of their numbers, advanced with four times their forces, and two field pieces. Our men being without artillery, after making a brave resistance with their muskets, were obliged to sound the retreat. I, who counted much on the moral energy of my troops, said that the valour showed by the Lombards could not efface the fault of retreating before the enemy, and that, therefore, they must retake the position, with the Lombards in the front rank. As I was ignorant of the forces by which the Austrians would be supported, I disposed seven battalions in echelons, with only a small distance between them and the Lombards. It was a gratifying sight for me, on passing in front of them, to observe the excellent spirit with which they were animated. In the midst of the sounds of military music all exclaimed, "Viva l'Italia! Viva il nostro Generale!" One of the battalions added to these shouts the singular exclamation of "Viva pure la morte!"* and I answered in a loud voice, "Yes, dear and valiant sons, 'Viva la morte!' for from that will redound liberty and glory to Italy."

The valour of the Lombards was as usual successful; preceded by two guns, they attacked and took the position they had lost two days before. This column was led by Major Sirtori, and by Virgilio, Captain of Artillery, both belonging to my staff, and both officers of great courage; not only they regained Conche at the point of the bayonet, but they pursued the enemy to the heights of St. Margherita. A Roman detachment of the Union were along with the Lombards, and another detachment of the Euganei.

Other exploring expeditions were made about the same time in the direction of Cavarzere, and all had the desired result.

While from these minor successes I was

^{. &}quot;Long live death itself!"

hoping for others of greater importance, I received a letter from the government, in which it was said that reasons, which would be communicated to me by word of mouth, had determined them to inform me that I must suspend all offensive operations, whether on a small, or on a large scale.

I immediately understood that some disaster which had befallen the Piedmontese army had dictated this dismal letter, which was dated 27th March, 1849.

The misfortunes of the Sardinian army became public before the Venetian government communicated them to me. After giving orders that the troops who had been called to Chioggia should go back to their posts, and join the corps destined to encamp outside the Lagoon, I returned to Venice followed by my staff.

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CHAPTER III.

CHARLES ALBERT'S SECOND CAMPAIGN, MARCH, 1849.

In giving a rapid account of Charles Albert's first campaign, I rendered full justice to his loyal and Italian heart, while I also pointed out the errors he had committed. In the second campaign, of which I now propose to give a short account, the errors were unhappily more numerous and important than in the first.

Instead of acting together, the government, the populace, the higher classes, and the most fervent patriots, without being aware of it, all followed a course which ruined Italian independence. In the opinion of those who were most impartial, and most experienced in military affairs, it was not the soldiers alone who deserved blame; their faults arose from the wrong direction given to them, and should be more justly attributed to their chiefs.

It seems strange that the Italians who have given so many captains to other nations, Pescura, Farnese, Montecucoli, Eugène of Savoy, Massena, and Bonaparte, should not, in this last campaign for independence, have possessed a single general of distinguished merit. It is true that military capacity is acquired in the field, and that we had had a long European peace. This disadvantage might indeed be alleged by both parties, and the incidents of Milan, Brescia, &c. are a proof of its weight. But the enemy's successes in the field may be attributed to the more solid discipline of old troops opposed to new recruits, and to the steadiness usual to those who combat out of their own country. Beyond the Isonzo, Charles Albert's army would not have been urged to disorganisation by a needy aristocracy, by demagogues, and by Jesuits, as was the case on the right of the Ticino.

I will first point out the defects of the administration and organisation of the Sardinian army, adding a few words on its morality; and I will then show the errors of the plan of campaign. It will then appear that the Piedmontese soldiers did not lack that constant valour, with which they have honoured the standard of the Princes of Savoy, as well as that of Napoleon.

It is my firm conviction, that there was no treachery whatever, and that all Italy should be grateful to the Piedmontese army, and still more to Charles Albert and his two sons, who without hesitation exposed their lives and fortunes for the Italian cause, without being discouraged by the misfortunes of the first campaign. Italians! There is no citizen who more than myself has had occasion to show how much more he is devoted to his country, than to kings. From kings I desire nothing; nor could I, without being wanting to myself, accept any personal favour from them. Nevertheless, I repeat that we should all remember Charles Albert with gratitude, as well as his sons, who valiantly followed him to the field of battle, and who could not now ever deviate in Italy from the line of policy embraced by their father, without exposing themselves to dishonour, as well as to the loss of their throne.

The basis of the administration of the

Sardinian army is money; whatever the cause, it is notorious that that system failed. I cannot here discuss their financial measures: I will only say, that instead of 100,000 men, it would have been better to limit the number to 80,000, and to have selected the most eligible in all respects. Quality, rather than numbers, constitutes the strength of an army. In the Sardinian kingdom (as indeed every where) the national guard should be well organised, and it would then furnish 20,000 men, both for internal defence and for garrison service. These 20,000 men would require to be paid only when taken away from their homes. Allow me to recal the fact, that in 1820, by means of telegraphic orders, I made no fewer than eighty battalions of the civic guard march to the frontiers; and that thirty of these fought under my command at Rieti, from dawn until sunset. They were all clothed and armed at their own expense, though only with fowling-pieces. By reducing the Sardinian army to 80,000 men, both the quality of the troops and the administration would have gained. True it is, that with only 80,000 men

there would have been no commands of large and useless detachments to distribute. To the want of money must be added the absence of that regularity in all branches of the service, which can alone insure good results. There was a confusion in the administration of the different corps, which, during seven months, the military superintendents were unable to overcome; and it is well known to all experienced officers that want of discipline is the sure result. At seven-and-twenty years of age I commanded a brigade in Spain, under Marshal Suchet. His troops were the best disciplined, because they were the best administered, of any in the empire.

In the Sardinian army the commissariat was confided to favoured and inexperienced persons. Hence it happened that in the second, as in the first campaign, provisions failed, and the biscuits destined for a last resource were consumed the first day.

The military superintendents had so completely neglected the organisation of the sanitary service of the army, that many of the ambulances only joined the divisions to which they belonged, after the battle of Novara. The service of the baggage trains was not at all in proportion with the wants of the army, which, if it had advanced into Lombardy, would have fallen into great confusion. With regard to their armament, I will only say that they always had the cartridge-box fixed to their girdles, which contained a few cartridges without any wadding to protect them.

We now come to the organic part of the army. The squadrons of the infantry, on which every army depends, were deprived of two classes of soldiers who served in the first campaign, and who had been replaced by two classes of the reserve. At the same time, partial leave of absence had been given to many soldiers, and the regiments found themselves in this manner without their oldest soldiers, who, although fathers of families, had proved brave under fire, and in the pursuit of the Austrians. On the eve of hostilities, these were replaced by young conscripts, newly arrived in the ranks, with the remembrance of recent defeat, and this alone was sufficient to compromise the success of the campaign. Moreover, at the moment when the commencement of hostilities was notified, the formation of a fourth battalion in every regiment was ordered. Thus, in all the squadrons, the officers and subaltern officers were displaced, and found themselves separated from their soldiers and from each other; and by this means was destroyed the reciprocal confidence which can only be acquired by time, and in the field. This displacement was effected between the 11th and 14th of March; but the evil results of it were so striking, that on the 15th, when hostilities were first announced, orders were given to re-establish the squadrons as before. This operation was performed in haste; disorder and confusion followed. Those corps, which from want of time could not reconstruct their squadrons, experienced the fatal effects of conducting young conscripts, who had seen only two months' service, to the enemy's fire. Such was the detriment done to the morals, discipline, and administration of the infantry.

In March 1848, the Piedmontese army which entered Lombardy consisted of an effective force of 70,000 men.

All the troops of the kingdom, including Lombardy, with many battalions of reserve, amounted to 120,000 men: it became necessary, therefore, to enlarge the cadres. New promotions of officers and subaltern officers greatly injured discipline, for they were generally conferred with much partiality, on young men, new to the career, and to the Italian provinces. These inconveniences, with their evil results, extended from the lowest to the highest grades in the army. Almost all the general and superior officers saw their brigades, their regiments, their battalions, for the first time. General Penon, killed on the field of honour, first saw the division which he commanded only three days before the battle of Novara, and was not known to a single regiment. The new rules of promotion had not produced able chiefs, and had irritated the minds of all.

Passing from the organic defects of the army, to the germs of demoralisation which existed in the minds of the soldiers, I will remark, that circumstances were not exactly similar in 1848, and in 1849. The enthusiasm for the sacred war was enfeebled in

the latter year; the sad recollections of the retreat of the Nuncio, and the deplorable events which had occurred in the city of Milan, had left an impression on the minds both of officers and soldiers, which weakened the fraternal ties between the Piedmontese and the Lombards, those two contiguous nations, belonging to the same country. The peasantry of those provinces in which the political measures of Pius IX., during the first months of his government, had been influential, now asked the reason of his change. In every party demagogues exist; those who fawn on power are the most ignoble of all. At the opening of the campaign the warmest patriotism was tinctured with the vices of demagogues. One fault was committed, which, rightly or wrongly, boasted of patriotism; it was that of not shouldering a musket and saying, "If we have been first in speech, we will be first also in deeds." In Greece and Rome, who would have dared to excite the people to arms, without combating or having combated themselves?

We now come to the plan of the campaign, if, indeed, any plan ever existed. In the

12th chapter, Vol. I., we demonstrated the superiority of the position of the Sardinian army over that of Radetzky. If Charles Albert had chosen the city of Padua as an entrenched camp, with all the advantages to be derived from Venice, I pointed out the sorties which might have been made from Padua through the Lagoon, and supported by the Sardo-Venetian squadron, with 20,000 men at a time. I indicated the manner in which the Italians might have invaded Trieste, Fiume, and all the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and destroyed their navy; also how 20,000 men, manœuvring in concert with the King's land forces, might have interrupted all communication between our enemy and their empire. On the opening of the second campaign the King had, some days previously, received my views, and further details which he had asked for, through the medium of General Olivaro and the Deputy Correnti, who were sent to confer with me in Venice. But he acted as if Venice had not been a province devoted to the Italian cause, and ready to sacrifice all to Italy.

Setting aside the operations which might

have been executed on the left of the Adige, the Piedmontese army, if the war had been conducted in those provinces, would have found there neither Jesuits, nor a retrograde party, endeavouring to turn it from the cause of independence, and exciting desertion, in order to ruin that cause. This reflection, alone, should have been sufficient to induce Charles Albert to prefer a war which was distant from his own provinces.

But, since he fatally renounced the scheme of combating the enemy in their weakest positions, that is to say, in their communications with the Empire, and in the city of that Empire, washed by the Adriatic, why, at least, did he not decide whether the war should be offensive or defensive? There were advantages in each system; but offensive warfare was best adapted to the Italian nature; it would have revived the weakened love between the Piedmontese and the Lombards; and, in fine, the latter, supported by 70,000 organised Piedmontese troops, would again have exhibited their former valour in Milan. But nothing was prepared for a war in Lombardy; neither arms nor ammunition were ready for distribution; for Marshal Radetzky had punished, with the utmost rigour, all who had dared to preserve a single offensive weapon. Still less had the Sardinian government thought of organising those numerous light-armed bands, so well adapted to the Italian agility and ardour, as was often proved in the middle ages. Thirteen years ago, I treated of this subject in my "Italia Militare," and, above all, I combated the false idea entertained of the plains of Lombardy in supposing them not adapted to guerilla warfare. In these plains, the highest cultivation exists; the richest lands, rendered swampy from the snow and rain, are easily inundated; and the numerous canals do not permit artillery and cavalry to act, nor even infantry to move regularly. Small bodies of troops can, therefore, combat advantageously alla spicciolata, if they only take care to avoid the more solid plains which are occasionally met with.

Supposing a defensive war to have been decided on, the skirts of the Alps, Genoa, and Alessandria, gave admirable positions for the defence, which might have been converted into offensive movements in the same manner as this was done in Portugal, by Wellington, who had before him no less a general than Massena. It would have been necessary to abandon Turin to the enemy, but this sacrifice would not have been great, and would have ultimately proved of immense advantage; thanks to the wise, vigorous, and prompt strategic movements, which might have taken place. To point these out now would be impossible, depending as they would have done on the positions and forces of the enemy.

Besides the two plans of either attacking Radetzky in Lombardy, or drawing him on towards Genoa and the Alps, there remained a third plan, which was, to form a camp of 70,000 men in Novara, and, according to the movements of the enemy, either to march on Milan, or to transfer the camp to Alessandria, viâ Vercelli. But, in order to be in a position which should leave the choice of these movements, it was indispensable that the Sardinian troops should remain united behind Novara, in case circumstances should compel a battle.

For this plan a large provision of ammunition of all kinds was necessary, as well as campaign fortifications, brought from the city to flank the troops; in fine, then, as ever, a good spy system was quite indispensable. With this the enemy was well provided; while there was absolutely none in the first campaign on our side. The Sardinian army being thus posted behind Novara, it is more than probable that they would have defeated the enemy.

They had the choice either of penetrating into Milan, or of retiring to the many strong positions which Piedmont possesses, beginning with Alessandria and Genoa; or they might have waited for Radetzky in Novara with all their forces. It is an immense advantage for an army to have a city in front of them, and their flanks defended by campaign fortifications. Towers and steeples give great opportunities of examining, with precision, the enemy's forces and movements, while they obstruct his view of his opponent. In a field of battle, it is a piece of good fortune to meet with a village, or even a cottage.

At the battle of Waterloo, the English had

some small buildings in front of them, which it cost the French an immense loss to take. If it may be permitted to compare small things with great, I might add that in 1815, in King Joachim's campaign against Austria, I had to defend the left of the Reno, near Bologna, with 7000 men against 18,000 Austrians. Among the circumstances which enabled me to repel such a numerous enemy from the Reno during the whole day, was the position of some farm-houses, which protected me from the shots of the enemy, and concealed many of my movements, while, from three small buildings, I discovered every operation of my adversary. In Novara, 70,000, or even fewer, Piedmontese might have conquered the enemy.

But the passing and repassing the Ticino with two divisions; hastening breathless to Mortara, and then returning demoralised to Novara; the weakness of occupying a long line from Arone to Sarzane; in fine, keeping the divisions of Marmora and Romarino far from the centre of operations;—all these were dispositions never yet heard of in the annals of war. Marshal Radetzky, though

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occupying a hostile country, in marching against the Piedmontese, left in all Lombardy only 10,000 men, and kept all the rest of his army united under himself. To send out large detachments, forces very superior to those of the enemy are necessary.

It only remains for me to add to this sad chapter, that the Sardinian troops were wanting neither in valour nor in Italian feelings. As long as the people of Northern Italy have an army, they are, and will be, truly Italian.

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CHAPTER IV.*

INSURRECTION IN BRESCIA.

Among the many popular movements which have occurred in Italy during the last two years, the insurrection of Brescia shows, perhaps more evidently than any other, that the nation is ripe for definitive emancipation.

This is proved by the heroic sacrifice which this city made of its best citizens, daring, with a population of only 35,000 inhabitants, to expose itself to the attacks of 20,000 Austrians, who surrounded and besieged it. This fact also proves, that, where valour and resolution are united, a people may attempt everything with a probability of success.

If we rapidly survey the attempts made

^{*} This chapter is from the pen of my friend, Dr. Fossati, a fervent Italian, who has always remained devoted to the common cause.

by the Italians since 1796 to obtain their liberty, it will be seen that their movements were never truly unanimous and popular as in the recent struggle.

In 1796, the French army, led by the republican general Bonaparte, drove the Germans from Lombardy; and though the people spontaneously ran to their aid, yet they were still under a foreign yoke. the same time, the French despoiled them of many objects of art, and of large sums of money. Many thousands of men were compelled to fight, not for the advantage of their country, but for that of a foreign nation; and the final result of so many sacrifices was the total loss of liberty and Italian independence. The only two republics which existed in Italy before the arrival of the French, those of Genoa and Venice, disappeared in the general catastrophe; and these valorous people, like a flock of sheep, were assigned to despotic governments.

Towards the end of 1814, when the Italian army had proved its valour in Spain, in Germany, and Russia, and was still united in Lombardy and Venice, some of its chiefs, with other valiant citizens, dared to project the liberation of Italy; but their daring was punished, before an overt act had been committed, by many years of captivity in the prisons of Mantua and Milan.

The movement at Naples in 1820 was both military and popular; but, being confined to that kingdom, it could neither resist the Austrian arms, nor all Europe leagued against Italian liberty; and the causes of this disaster are well known.

The movement in Piedmont, in 1821, was military, rather than popular or national. Few citizens took part in it; and no resistance was opposed to the invasion of the Austrians.

The insurrections of Modena and Bologna, in 1831, had a popular commencement; but the Italians confided too implicitly in the solemn promises of the French, which were shamefully violated. They were discouraged, abandoned, and vanquished, before they had had time to prepare for the combat.

In the present times, French promises have again failed; and it may be well to recal to the memory of the Italians that true and famous sentence of Salviati, who says of the French: "Frangunt ridendo fidem."

The true National Italian insurrection commenced, then, in 1848, and the daring enterprise of Brescia proves, not only that the Italians have not lost their ancient valour, but that they are resolved to throw off a foreign yoke, and to cancel with their blood all the acts of unjust oppression which they have endured.

We shall endeavour, in a few pages, to recount all the valorous deeds of the Brescians during the days of the late insurrection. The Brescians possess in Italy an ancient reputation for courage, determination, and independence, and history confirms this opinion. Recent facts surpass all that their ancestors recount of them.

After the precipitate and inexplicable retreat of the Piedmontese army from Mincio to the other side of the Ticino, the Brescians did not give up all hope of the liberation of Italy. In the midst of the most atrocious persecutions, and despite the dangers of imprisonment and of the scaffold, they continued to prepare for the combat, for

vengeance, and for liberty. On the 14th of March, the news reached Brescia that the armistice between Austria and Piedmont was broken; on the 20th, that hostilities were commenced, and 100,000 Italian soldiers ready to take the field! On the 19th, the struggle had already begun. Mountain bands, guided by the valiant Caralo di Serle, came and stationed themselves on the suburban hills, and from thence attacked the trains and defences of the Austrian army. On the 20th the people assembled in crowds, demanding that the advocate Saleri, an excellent citizen, should be proclaimed (as he afterwards was) chief of the municipality, instead of Zambelli, who was leagued with the Austrians. On the same day, a quantity of flour was sent into the city by the insurrectionary committee, with instructions from General Chernowski, with a plan of the Lombard insurrection, and with directions to commence the movement on the 21st of March. The city of Brescia was the most suitable centre for the Lombard insurrection, and the inhabitants held themselves prepared.

On the morning of the 23rd, the military commandant, at the invitation of the municipality, who endeavoured to preserve order in the city, promised two hundred swords to the citizens, and proposed that two hundred of them, forming a sort of civic guard, should use these arms, and guard the city by turns. At this moment the Austrians demanded a contribution of 130,000 lire,—an injustice equal to that by which Haynau compelled the city to pay for its own degradation.

The populace assembled on the Piazza, and hearing of this demand, began to exclaim that lead, and not gold, should be sent to their oppressors. This commenced the popular movement. Several cart-loads of provisions and wood, which were stationed at the castle, were seized; the soldiers and gendarmes were put to flight; every Austrian ensign was torn down, and cries of "Viva l'Italia! Death to the barbarians!" were alone heard. While this first movement was in progress, the Commandant of the Piazza and the Chief of the Commissariat reached the municipality to receive the sum demanded; but the people arrived, and invading the municipal saloon,

made them both prisoners. They were with difficulty saved from the popular fury.

The Commandant of the Piazza, now in the hands of the people, was compelled to give his soldiers orders to surrender their guns to the National Guard. Some only obeyed; but at this moment advice arrived that a large supply of ammunition and arms was on the road from Iseo, and that the column of emigrants was moving towards Bergamo; in fine, it was said that the war was begun, and that the Piedmontese divisions had entered Lombardy viâ Alagenta. Inflamed by these hopes, the people unanimously cried, "To arms!"

The Castle of Brescia, recently restored and put in a state of defence by Radetzky, was armed with fourteen large guns, and contained about nine hundred men, under the command of Captain Leshke. The Germans required prompt submission; but the people were not subdued. In the middle of the night, Leshke began to bombard the city. In the midst of this fiery tempest, the people ran boldly to arms; some extinguished the fires, some cleared the streets. The women

and children repaired to the belfries and rang a peal. Already bands of deserters came down to clear the streets and erect barricades.

This nocturnal battle was almost like a festival long desired and promised, so great was the popular fury, and faith in their country's deliverance. On the following day, the 24th, Leshke found means to send some gendarmes out of the castle, two of whom went to Mantua to demand succour. In the meantime the Brescians, wishing to increase and fortify the insurrection, chose for their chiefs the citizens Contratti and Cassola, men of rare devotion to the Italian cause. These made the best possible arrangements both for the defence and the attack. The 150,000 lire, which the city had collected to satisfy Haynau's extortion, were devoted to sustain the contest.

This day was passed between fear and hope in anxious expectation of the succours from Ticino. The Imperialists were also impatiently waiting for news from the camp; and on that day intelligence of the events of Mantua, and of the first flight of the Piedmontese, reached the city.

The 25th passed quietly. Each side held itself ready for the combat: no one could credit the news which arrived from the army on the Ticino.

In the meantime, the Imperialists, under the command of Nugent, came by rapid marches from Mantua towards Brescia. At dawn, on the 26th, a column of 1000 men, with two cannons, appeared at Montechiaro, and from thence proceeded to Rezzatto, to wait for reinforcements from Verona. The most expert company of citizens and deserters were posted at St. Eufemia, a large village two miles from Brescia. Bold marksmen defended them on one side towards the plain, and on the other from the mountains of Cajonvico. A small corps of reserve was placed at St. Franceso di Paulo, half way between Brescia and St. Eufemia.

A little before mid-day, the Austrians opened their fire. They were most numerous on the left of the Brescians, whose courage in this first encounter was almost miraculous. Their numbers were few, and they were unused to arms; but they repulsed the Croats, and would have pursued them with

the bayonet, if Speri, a brave and intelligent youth, who commanded this handful of heroes, had not stopped them. The Italians both fight and die gaily. An Austrian ball first struck a man named Raboldi on the breast: he expired exclaiming, "Happy that I am! I have the honour of dying first on the field of battle!" and he recommended the captain not to forget to write his name first; "And mine second!" cried another, struck by a ball in the stomach. A third refused the assistance of his comrades, saying, "My loss is enough, without making a fourth leave his post." The Brescian rifles disdained to fight from behind trees or hedges, saying, that this was not the Brescian mode of combat. The bravery of these men, scarcely more than a hundred in number, was prodigious: they stood firm for three hours against Nugent's battalions. The committee of defence ordered them to retire in good order, still keeping the enemy in check.

The committee at the same time sent a parley to Marshal Nugent, to know with what intention he came to the city. He replied, that he meant to enter Brescia either freely, or forcibly. The people assembled in the Piazza, and deliberated on their position: they unanimously agreed that Brescia should be defended to the last. It was admirable to see the manly courage with which the women themselves exhorted their husbands and sons not to allow themselves to be moved by words, but to reply haughtily to haughty threats. Everything concurred to inflame the multitude, so that the cry of war alone was heard. This reply was sent to Nugent, and the promptest measures adopted for the defence. Some bands of villagers arrived in the city, and some ammunition was sent to it from Piedmont.

The struggle commenced at two o'clock, p.m., and the inhabitants, running to the barricades and the walls, cried "Viva!" for the war and for Italy; and thus, with heroic though inexperienced valour, they resisted a warlike and well-provided enemy.

The morning of the 27th dawned happily. Mid-day passed, and Nugent had not yet moved; but when the expected reinforcements arrived, Leshke, from the castle, fired on the city with bombs and grenades; while

Nugent attacked our men on all sides. These combated joyfully to shouts of "Viva l'Italia!" nor did the wounded deign to interrupt with lamentations the warlike festival; but all, in one way or another, showed themselves happy to die for the liberty of their country. The populace, seeing that the artillery made more noise than mischief, asked leave to charge the enemy; and soon, at the gates of the city, every one wished to be first to act. About two hundred men ran boldly against the lines of the Imperialists, who were repulsed and forced to retreat. In the meantime deserters descended from their castle, and gave their aid to the common cause. On the approach of night, the chiefs thought it wisest for the citizens to return to safety and repose under the walls, and the bands of the curate Boifava again returned to the summit of the rocks where they were posted.

The citizens, finding they could repulse the Germans, gained fresh courage and confidence in the future. The administration of the municipality promised the citizens to repair the damages of the bombardment. At the dawn of the 28th, the committee of defence posted the most expert fusileers on the declivities of the rocks, and in the Tower del Popolo, to fire down on the sentinels and the gunners placed in the castle. The enemy on the side of St. Eufemia moved slowly, which induced the belief that the Austrians were retiring; but Speri, who had sharp eyes, thought this hesitation only a ruse de guerre, and wished the people to remain at the barricades.

However, the general wish was to go out tumultuously against the enemy's advanced posts, and drive them to St. Francisco. Nugent allowed our men to advance; but when the foremost bands of citizens, though contrary to orders, had gone into the snare, the others would not abandon them. Two squadrons were therefore formed. One, led by Speri, ascended the rocks; the other endeavoured to prevent the Austrians from surrounding the Brescians on the plain.

The fire then commenced along all the line; the citizens rushed upon the Austrians with such impetuosity that their retreat was soon real and not simulated. It is said that Nugent, astonished and indignant, seeing

himself on the point of being driven away from the spot where, only two days before, he had with such harshness received their messenger, giving them four hours to repent and ask for mercy, came forward in person, and encouraged his soldiers; and while he was giving orders to advance a cannon, and point it against the infuriated Brescians, he fell, struck by a ball, which, in a few days, brought him to death's door. Our people feared to throw themselves into St. Eufemia; but the enemy, who surrounded it, left them no time for counsel, and their success was complete. But the Brescians, oppressed by the number of the enemy, endeavoured to regain their streets. Assailed by the Austrians, they fought valiantly. Speri's company, which had all Nugent's forces behind them, were forced to throw themselves off their hills; they then encountered the battalion which Nugent had posted in reserve, and two-thirds of the Brescians were either killed or wounded. The rest were driven back under the hills, where not a tenth arrived. The crowd of the enemy pressed on them; five were taken alive, and shot; the rest died fighting. Out of fifty men who were with Speri, he was almost the only one to escape, having fulfilled the part both of soldier and captain.

The 28th was a cruel but glorious day for Brescia. The indomitable pride of the wounded and the prisoners seems incredible; they never condescended to beg for life, as is usually the case. On this day, the Brescians lost near one hundred men; the loss of the enemy was double. With a handful of men, Brescia resisted forces immeasurably superior, and confided in the destiny of Italy.

The news of the armistice of Novara reached Brescia on the 29th, in the morning, and seemed so monstrous and improbable, that no one could believe it true. Divers messengers arrived with news of Charles Albert's abdication; but some affirmed that Chernowski had engaged and defeated Radetzky.

In the midst of these reports, the Brescians remained armed on the walls and the barricades. Firing recommenced at mid-day, the Imperialists having received succours from Peschiera and Verona. While the combat continued with dubious fortune outside the walls, Leshke bombarded the city with great fury. Many bombs fell on the Civil Hospital, and the committee sent word to the military physician that the enemy must respect the sanitary banners, or expect reprisals. The people suspected that the municipality were treating for the surrender of the city; and if Speri and some others had not sworn that they were only in treaty for the hospitals, which, according to the laws of warfare, are always respected, they could not have calmed the populace. But the Germans took the opportunity of this momentary truce, to penetrate insidiously under the gates, and set fire to many surrounding houses. At this sight, the Brescians became furious; they threw the flag of truce into the dirt, and exclaimed that they would rather bury themselves with their wives and children under the ruins of the city, than suffer such infamy. While the breathless multitude was confusedly consulting how to avenge the insult, a large shell burst on the Piazza; some one took up the largest fragment, and placed it in the midst of the people, who stretched out their hands and VOL. II.

swore, as on the Gospel, to die rather than yield. Such was the noble courage and unanimity inspired by this act, that many knelt down and wept with emotion. In the midst of this excitement the cry was heard of "To the gates!" and nothing could restrain them. The enemy, who had already experienced Brescian fury, retreated to St. Francisco.

On the 30th, firing began early in the morning: the Brescians fought with their usual courage; if they had had only one cannon, they could have prevented the enemy from receiving succours, and the city would never have been taken with the means they then possessed.

On this day, letters arrived from Crema and Lodi, saying that the Austrians had been completely beaten by General Chernowsky. The articles of a new armistice were sent to Brescia, by which Austria was to retire beyond the Adige, and on that condition the lives and properties of the citizens were to be respected.

The Brescians, thus deceived by their own friends, were fed with vain hopes. The enemy, in the meantime, reinforced the garrison of the castle. Haynau arrived with fresh troops: he took the command of the siege, and soon set about the destruction of that city, which a few months before he had so basely insulted.

The morning of the 31st commenced gloomily. At nine o'clock, some soldiers were seen to issue from the castle with a white flag, bearing a dispatch from Haynau. They now began to suspect that all the forces engaged in the Italian war were assembled round the walls of Brescia. The Marshal demanded the surrender of the city without any conditions; and if, by mid-day, a free entry was not given to his troops, he threatened the Brescians with assault, pillage, devastation, and entire ruin. The letter was most insulting, and concluded, ironically saying: "Brescians! you know me—I shall keep my word!"

The municipality and the committee, stifling their indignation, deliberated on sending commissaries to the castle. Five citizens exposed themselves to the peril, aware that Haynau was a very tiger. On being introduced to

him, they narrated the facts which had occurred, and the other reasons which, they conceived, justified the citizens in their enterprise. They produced a copy of the armistice, which they believed to be true, and by which the Austrians were to evacuate Lombardy. Haynau answered, with a perfidious smile, "I know all; I am informed of everything; but I will not speak of these things, -the only question is the surrender of the city, which I have fixed for mid-day." Thus, neither he, nor any of his officers, informed the Brescians of their error regarding the armistice; and it seems that they purposely excited those valiant citizens, for fear they should surrender, and deprive them of the power of revenging themselves by their utter extermination.

When the Marshal's answer was received, no other honourable and reasonable means remained for the Brescians, but to oppose force to force. Saugervagio, in the name of the municipality, explained to the assembled multitude what had taken place. When the proud words of Haynau were related, and the people heard that two hours only were

granted for the surrender of Brescia, supposed to be vanquished by fear, one formidable cry arose: "War, give us war!" the sound of which reached the enemy's camp. The people were silent, and ran to take their arms after placing their women and children in safety in the cellars. These applauded the determination to resist, and showed no fear at the gravity of the danger; they prepared their husbands' arms and their own, cartridges, stones, tiles, boiling water. The citizens, comforting one another, passed two sublime hours, breathing an atmosphere of sacrifice and love, as if it were a preparation for a holy death. At two o'clock, the answer of the Brescians to the ferocious Haynau was the sound of a peal of bells. Shortly after, a sharp firing commenced against the advanced posts of the Austrians, who placed a battery of large mortars against the gate Torrelunga. The troops assembled before all the other gates of the city to make a simultaneous attack, when the artillery from the castle should give the signal.

About three o'clock the firing commenced, and the city was attacked on all sides. The artillery destroyed the external barricades and the Brescians retreated within the gates, but still fighting and repulsing the enemy. In spite of the repeated attacks of the infantry, and the tempest of shells, grenades, and balls, all maintained their posts, and Speri's brigade remained intrepidly guarding that gate, which no professional soldier ever dared to pass. Haynau made his thousands descend towards the streets which led into the centre of the city, but they were thrown back by the frequent and well-aimed shots of the defenders.

The leaders of the Brescians decided on combating the enemy in the very streets of the city! They therefore ordered their men to retire by degrees; and then, after a show of defence, they abandoned the barricade of St. Urbano. The Austrians, thinking this a real retreat, pursued their enemy through the streets which led to the Piazza dell' Albera. There the Brescians waited for them, posted all around in the houses and behind entrenchments. The first company of their fortunate enemy was completely destroyed, and the others, which hastened forwards at the noise of the battle, could neither advance nor

recede. They charged resolutely with their bayonets on the barricades, but such was the slaughter they met with, that no more ventured to the trial. When Haynau saw so much bravery he was said to be moved, and to have exclaimed: "If I had 30,000 of these indomitable Brescians I would march to the gates of Paris!"

The Austrians again ventured to the assault, but the troops were scarcely in movement when Lieutenant-Colonel Milez fell, struck by a ball from a carbine. At this sight the Brescians shouted victory; they sprang from behind their shelter, destroying whatever they encountered. The sword of the dead colonel was given to his destroyer, a brave youth of the people, who by a stratagem had killed several of the enemy's officers. He posted himself on a barricade till a ball struck him on the breast. Haynau sent forward more troops from the eastern bastions towards that part where for two hours the contest had been the hottest between Speri's company and Nugent's brigade, which was commanded that day by Colonel Favencourt, who was afterwards killed. Neither the prayers nor

the commands of their chiefs could persuade the Brescians to retire; and thus many valorous men fell exhausted at their post, the victims of their unconquered valour.

In the meantime, Nugent's brigade penetrated into the city, and breaking through the internal barricades, they reached the Bruttanome. Here the citizens and peasants ran on them from all the surrounding streets; a close contest ensued with bayonets, pistols, and sticks, and the Imperialists were driven to the gates. In this encounter the Brescians had to lament the serious wounds received by the most intrepid of their heroic youths, Oposa, endowed with talents and extraordinary beauty, who, despising death and danger, repaired to where the fighting was the fiercest; all knew how often the eyes of the combatants and the dying sought his angelic figure.

In the evening, the Germans fortified themselves in their posts; but the city was still almost intact. The ferocious Haynau raged with impatience, and while expecting the third corps of the army, together with strong reinforcements of artillery, he attempted to storm the city before their arrival. He set fire to the houses outside the city, so that it appeared enveloped in flames. When the darkness of night was come, the soldiers were ordered to penetrate over the walls and into the houses, to set fire to them everywhere without mercy, and to employ the most diabolical and infamous means. The light of the fire was seen over almost all Lombardy.

It would be impossible to describe the ferocious acts of the Croats on that last night of Lombard liberty; the atrocities committed by the most barbarous people would be mild in comparison.

The Brescians then deliberated on the resolution to be taken, and finding that men and ammunition still remained sufficient for another day's combat, they determined to defend themselves while hope and a single cartridge remained.

On the morning of the 1st of April, the city resounded with one fierce cry of "War," and the Brescians, protected by the barricades, drove the enemy from the posts they had occupied in the night in consequence of the fire; and from the Bruttanome in particular, they drove them with such impetus that the

first lines were thrown back, and they were on the point of taking two of the enemy's cannon. This was the last victory of the Brescians. Fresh artillery and battalions now arrived to Haynau, who made them instantly enter into battle; and with such superiority of forces, and such means of devastation, they penetrated into the houses, destroying everything that came in their way.

The following paragraph, which is literally copied from an authentic pamphlet, I think it due to history to preserve and recommend to the frequent perusal of the Italians, that they may not forget what they owe to Austria:—

"The sight of the horrible deeds committed by the Imperialists, whether in drunkenness, or by command, or in consequence of their stupidly ferocious natures, was such as to overwhelm the mind and freeze the blood in men's veins: they were beyond the limits of imagination or belief. Not only were they ferocious towards women, children, and the sick, but the tortures they inflicted were refined in such a manner as to show how much the cruelty of man exceeds that of the

most ferocious animals. Limbs torn from their victims were flung from the windows and the barricades as food for the dogs. The heads of young children cut from their bodies, women's arms, and fragments of human flesh, were thrown into the midst of the Brescian troops, to whom bombs then seemed merciful. Above all, the Imperial cannibals delighted in the horrible convulsions of those whom they burnt to death; therefore they covered the prisoners with pitch, then set them on fire, and often compelled the women to assist at their husbands' martyrdom. Sometimes, to make game of the noble blood of the Brescians, which boiled with magnanimous wrath, they tightly bound the men, and then, before their eyes, they dishonoured and cut the throats of their wives and children; and sometimes (God forgive us if we remember such a horrid fact) they forced them to swallow the mangled entrails of their nearest friends. Many died of anguish, and many fell fainting with horror."

The populace, whose fury of vengeance was excited to delirium, resolved to be killed on the corpses of their enemies, when some one recalled to their recollection that there were many spies unpunished in the prisons. The most ferocious rushed to the prisons and killed them: these had almost all been already condemned to death by the judges as felons and murderers.

The municipality fearing that the people, blinded by just rage and grief, should become more cruel, consented that their chief should interpose for peace. Accompanied by his brother, and preceded by a certain Marchesini, one of the people, whom the love of his country inspired with the eloquence of a Tribune and the courage of a martyr, the father of the municipality used every effort to obtain a mild answer from the Marshal; but Haynau, silent and implacable, only consented to a suspension of arms during the conference; and this species of truce, only on the part of the Brescians, was more fatal to them than many days of battle, since the enemies' troops ceased not to commit numerous assassinations. Finally, after two hours, the Marshal dismissed the father of the municipality with a written paper, where, in the midst of harsh words, unsuited to such misfortunes and such bravery,

it was stated that the peaceful citizens need fear no hostility. The Brescians resigned themselves to their destiny, expecting to be again treated as enemies and vassals, but not as slaves pardoned, and returned to their yoke.

Almost all the citizens yielded to their cruel fate, except a few who had absolutely determined to die fighting, and the Marshal took on himself the task of breaking their cruel obduracy. But the Imperial soldiers demanded pillage and carnage; already they had robbed the houses nearest the walls. More than twenty battalions, with cavalry and artillery in proportion, were encamped in the Piazza and in the country round. It was necessary to find food for many persons, and the municipality performed miracles in these circumstances, distributing 15,000 rations of bread, wine, and forage.

In the night a ray of hope shone on the desolate Brescians. The valorous and intrepid Camezzi, with near 800 men, had hastened from Bergamo to aid the Brescians. They fought desperately, but being informed that they were surrounded by numerous troops, and considering the fatal armistice of

Novara, these bands were dissolved in the midst of universal grief.

Let the reader imagine the murders, the burning, the pillage, the violence of those frantic soldiers. Neither generals nor officers showed themselves anxious for their honour and humanity. Colonel Jellachich, brother of the celebrated Ban, was an exception. Seeing the Church of St. Affra menaced, where many women had taken refuge, he hastened to guard the entrance, and remained there till his men had departed. Some few officers who had lodged in Brescia endeavoured to preserve the houses of their hosts from pillage. But the ferocious Haynau clearly showed that his mind was turned to vengeance rather than to the government of a brave and unfortunate people. It is believed that more than a hundred among the best and most intrepid of the citizens were in a few hours dragged to the castle, bastinadoed, tortured, and finally shot. A fine of 7,000,000 of livres was imposed on the provinces, and on the city a special charge of 300,000 livres, as a reward for his officers.

The command of the city was given to

Lieut.-General Appel, who speedily demanded with threats, that the heads of the insurrection should be given up to him. Slaughter was now organised. Women and children, the aged and the helpless, were first horribly macerated. We will retail a few facts to illustrate the wickedness of the conquerors. The priest Gabetti, a school-master, trusting in the terms of the surrender, went outside the walls to visit his cottage, which had been set fire to on the preceding night, and in which his mother lived; but scarcely had he gone out, when he was seized and conducted to Haynau in the castle, where on the following day he was shot as a patriot priest.

A more horrible martyrdom closed the life of Pietro Venturini, a member of the legal profession, and popular among the Brescians: weighed down by years and by gout, he was pressed with threats to swear fidelity to the Imperial banners; he boldly threw himself on the bayonets pointed to his heart, and cursing the enemies of Italy, and lovingly saluting his country and liberty, he sought and obtained death.

Some iniquitous Croats laid their hands on

a poor workman, and deliberated on burning him for their amusement; as he was small and deformed, they supposed he could make but little resistance, and would perhaps die in more laughable convulsions. Carlo Zima possessed the strength of a plebeian: when in the flames, he seized on one of his executioners, and held him so firmly that they burned and died together.

Thus fell Brescia, glorious and avenged. The contest lasted ten days, without more than two or three thousand men, without artillery, without any regular soldiers, or an officer of experience to counsel the townspeople; the patriots of the greatest weight, the young men who were bravest and most expert in arms, were absent; yet, notwithstanding, more than fifteen hundred of the enemy were killed: among these, were thirty-seven officers, three captains, a lieutenant-colonel, and General Nugent, who, before he surrendered his soul to God, named the city of Brescia his legatee.

The damage done by war and fire was computed at twelve millions. The conquerors, not content with fines, pillage, the losses by fire, and other war taxes, amounting to seven millions and a half, insulted the municipality by sending them the bills for provisions and powder, demanding that the city should pay these expenses. Moreover, they ordered them to collect money for the erection of a triumphal monument, on the Piazza, to the soldiers who had fallen before Brescia. We shall one day see that all Italy will erect a worthy funeral monument to the memory of Austria.

The high-minded Brescians did not lose courage; they did not break out into discord and calumny; they felt that their dignity was saved; they fell under the superiority of physical force, after the highest proofs of courage and valour.

The people did not reproach their chiefs with the fatal issue of the insurrection, though the destruction of their houses and the death of their companions was before their eyes; at the risk of their lives, they placed the most noted authors of the insurrection in safety out of the city.

Haynau and Appel, however vigilant, had only laid hands on those who had taken no part in leading the revolt. This may perhaps,

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have induced the two Lieutenant-marshals to institute, in July, the infamous process against twelve of the populace; when all Italy was prostrate, and four months had elapsed for the first fury of vengeance to be appeased. They were sentenced to die the death of thieves, and twelve gallows were expressly erected on the bulwarks of the city, where they were executed.

CHAPTER V.

Possibility for the Venetian Government of avoiding the failure of food and ammunition.—Project addressed to the Roman and Tuscan Governments for continuing the War in Italy.—Letter received in reply by the Roman Envoy, Anace.—The manner in which the Author might thrice have contributed to Italian Independence.—Address of the Venetian Government to France and England.—General Haynau hastens to inform the Venetians of the Victory of Novara.—Memorable Decree of the Venetian Government on the 2nd of April.—Contrarieties experienced by the Author.—What kind of Warfare might possibly be continued round the Lagoon.—Letter received by the Head of the Staff from the popular Venetian Circolo.—Strange and ridiculous means employed by the enemy to obtain the surrender of Venice.

There was much discussion in Venice on our military and political position, especially when we were reduced to the last extremities. Among the points of discussion, the most important, after the loss of the battle of Novara, was whether the government might have been able to provide for a long defence in the Estuary. There is no doubt that two steam frigates, added to the sailing and steam vessels we already possessed, with a better

command and organisation of the navy, would have made us masters of the Adriatic, and consequently neither food nor gunpowder would have failed, which were the immediate causes of our surrender. To form an exact opinion on this subject, it would be necessary to show that the government possessed the means required for the purchase of the vessels, as well as of the food and gunpowder, and likewise for the daily pay of the land and sea It is certain that great economy might have been practised in the war and other departments; but this economy, according to my impression, would have been wholly inadequate to meet our numerous wants. From press of time, I did not always preside at the council of defence, in which case, Major Ulloa, the head of my staff, reported to me all that occurred. One day that I was presiding at this council, after the last disasters in Piedmont, the question was agitated what provision should be made for the subsistence of the troops and of the population. It was decided that, besides what there already was, provision for three months more must be got, and I was in favour of that resolution. Not

that I did not desire to procure provisions even for a year; but they made me believe, by a thousand reasons impossible to verify, that it was a most difficult thing to provide for the entire Estuary, even for three months. Immense sums were spent to put the navy in a state for immediate use, without the smallest result; and this was certainly the fault of the government. As for the administrative department, I leave it to men more versed in these matters, to give their opinion. I will conclude by saying, that many members of the commission maintained that there were individuals who had provisions for a year. Time will bring to light many circumstances which, perchance, were concealed during the fifteen months of the siege.

It being now impossible for Piedmont to operate in favour of the Italian cause, its only remaining supports were the governments of Venice, Tuscany, and Rome. Feeble supports, truly! Venice, besieged by land and by sea, had to defend not only the forts on terra firma, but also the islands, particularly those of Lido and Malamoco, exposed to the landing of the enemy. Moreover, the Austrians, being

no longer held in check by the Piedmontese army, might at pleasure increase the forces which besieged the Lagoon; whereas the garrison of the Lagoon was only sufficient for its own defence. As to the governments of Tuscany and Rome, had they even set about raising troops with alacrity, they would never have united a sufficient number in time to combat the Austrians. There was but one bold move, one way of attempting the salvation of Italy,-that which I had proposed to the Romans, through Colonel Fabbrizi, and which I explained in a preceding chapter.* My idea then was, though only hinted at, to march upon Naples, and, in the project which follows, Naples appears a secondary view. But as then, on the 2nd of March, so now, on the 8th of April, the principal, the unique object to me was Naples, and I veiled it in part with other suppositions and other movements. If the Neapolitan government had fallen, the substituted government, created under different auspices, would also have been animated by sentiments more Italian, and would have united their naval division with

[.] Chap. ii. of this volume.

that of Sardinia-8000 Neapolitans would have joined 8000 Sardinians. The two armies, vying with each other, would have dictated peace to Austria. As for the success of this scheme, no Neapolitan out of Venice, with whom I ever conversed on the subject, formed the slightest doubt of it. We should scarcely have passed the Tronto, when the population would have flocked round my banner, or rather round the flag of Italy, as they did in 1820. The army would not now, as then, have instantly declared themselves; but many officers and soldiers would have joined my ranks, sufficient in number, together with the troops following me, to place me in a position to overthrow a government unworthy of Italy and of humanity.

Through the medium of the officers on my staff, I wrote to the Tuscan and Roman governments in the following terms:—

"Venice, 8th April, 1849. Head-quarters.

[&]quot;Some hints which deserve greater development on my new project of an Italian war :— "If the Romans and Tuscans would unite

about 30,000 men in Bologna, I believe that this corps, if well commanded, though composed of new and inexperienced troops, might save Italy.

- "1. The existence of such a corps would probably stimulate the Piedmontese to forget their late disasters, and to organise another corps near Genoa, and among the fine positions which touch the Alps, from whence Moreau, with a handful of men, combated the numerous Austro-Russian troops, in 1799.
- "2. Bologna, surrounded by hills and well cultivated land, might, with 30,000 new soldiers, defend itself against the attack of 30,000 of the enemy, who, not being able to use their artillery or their cavalry, except in the post roads, nor to combat in battalions or in columns, would be compelled to adopt a war of detail, in which the advantages are in favour of enthusiasm over discipline and order.
- "3. Should the Austrians present themselves before Bologna with more than 30,000 men, and succeed in establishing heavy batteries, the Italian corps must then enter the Apennines, where artillery and cavalry would

be mere impediments, and where the infantry could not combat in regular order.

- "4. This corps of middle Italy, and the other of Piedmont and Lombardy (supposing such a one organised) might unite according to circumstances, either at the foot of the Alps, or on the chain of the Apennines, and then concealing their movements, might enter the kingdom of Naples. In this case the fall of the Neapolitan government would be inevitable, and the salvation of Italy would be the consequence.
- "5. Should the troops of King Ferdinand, already occupied with Sicily, seek in conjunction with the Austrians to surround the Italian corps, the latter, profiting by the favourable positions which the Peninsula offers, would fall on one of the columns with the boldness and celerity which patriotic enthusiasm excites, and which effected such prodigies in Milan, in Brescia, and even yet in Venice.
- "6. This war must be carried on after the manner of Spartacus and Sertorius. The first put the glory of Crassus in peril, though he had shut up his adversary in the

last province of Calabria by means of the celebrated ditch, the extremities of which touched the opposite seas of Gonio and Tirreno.

- "7. If at last the Sardinian army should retire under the skirts of the Alps, and overthrow the vain Radetzky in Turin, the discomfiture of this General would be inevitable. Thus, if Murat in 1815, when I, a young General, commanded his vanguard, had had the moral courage to abandon his kingdom to the Austrian forces, and after reaching the Alps had returned into central Italy on the heels of the enemy, their defeat would have been inevitable.
- "8. The Italian army, until it is victorious, should never go far from positions which are inaccessible to cavalry and artillery, since its presence in any part of Italy would always produce a general rising.
- "9. By means of Orders of the Day full of national sentiments, and by means of a paternal severity, the discipline of our troops would be maintained, and they would equal the young soldiers who at Mestre drove their bayonets into the flanks of veterans strong

by their numbers, their artillery, and their barricades.

"Much might be added, and will be added, if the Roman and Tuscan governments have the courage to accept this project, instead of daring only to scribble idle speeches."

It will scarcely be believed that I received no answer either to this project, or to the former one sent on the 2nd of March. I am ignorant of the reasons of a silence so culpable towards Italy. Instead of answering propositions of such moment in a manner suited to the sad condition of the Peninsula, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rome wrote the following letter, on the 12th May, to Salvato Anace, their envoy in Venice:—

"CITIZEN ENVOY,

"I have received your letter of the 5th and 6th instant, and am truly moved to hear of the new wonders of heroic Venice, supported by the mind of Manin, and defended by the valour of the brave Italians who now form its garrison. Tell them that Rome admires with affection the new proofs of devotion given by this her sister in the Lagoon; tell the ardent veteran of Italy, the valorous General Pepe, that Rome is not the last of the cities of Italy to admire and bless him, to prepare for him a wreath of leaves plucked from that tree, of yore the pride of the capitol, which now blooms again. Tell him that the festival he celebrated in Malghera, in the midst of the enemy's bombs, is worthy of his name and of Italian valour. In fine, tell him, tell Manin, tell the soldiers, tell all Venice, that our Triumvirs, our assembly, our people, among the glorious deeds of Italy, have engraved the day of Malghera, &c."

It was thus, that instead of deeds to save Italy, they sent me empty words of praise, dictated, no doubt, by patriotic affection.

From what I have hitherto said it results that, since I set foot in Italy, three times I might have contributed to free it from the Austrian yoke. It would have been free, if King Ferdinand, encouraged by the advantages he obtained on the 15th of May, had not recalled the troops I commanded. It would have been free, if Charles Albert,

before the loss of the battle of Novara, adhering to my second project and to the contents of my letter, had sent me 12,000 Piedmontese. In fine, the Austrians would have been driven beyond the Alps if the Roman government alone, or in conjunction with Tuscany, had placed me in a position to enter the kingdom of Naples.

In the midst of these vicissitudes, the Venetian government was busily occupied in treating with France and England, asking their good offices in favour of Venice, and imploring that it might experience the effects of that sympathy of which we had heard so much, and of that mediation which we had so often been made to hope for.

About this time there were many tempests at sea, which caused more disasters among our small craft than in the enemy's squadron, either when they were entering the Lagoon, or carrying despatches to terra firma. General Haynau, hoping that our population and our garrison would lose courage on hearing of the misfortunes of the Piedmontese, took care that the news should reach us as speedily as possible, being ignorant that

we were already fully informed. He therefore sent us, from Padua, Marshal Radetzky's official bulletin, and added words equivalent to a summons to surrender. But he was not long in finding out, that fortune alone is wanting to the Italians in order to convince the world that they deserve independence better than many, who enjoy it because they have never possessed either a Pope, or the intelligence of our republics of the middle ages, whose very virtues were the occasion of that emulation, afterwards changed into fatal rivalry and disunion; just as Greece Proper, and Magna Græcia, terminated their internal quarrels by inviting the aid of foreign arms.

In proof of the heroic national sentiments with which the Venetians were animated, I will mention, that scarcely were the disasters of Charles Albert known with certainty, and with the same certainty their own increasing perils, than their assembly met, and with unanimous acclamation decided that we must resist at all hazards. Nor was this the decision of the inferior orders, who, having nothing to lose, are improvident; it was that

of the first classes both for intelligence and wealth; who consequently had much to risk, and who fully appreciated the evils to which they exposed themselves. I myself, well used to patriotism and to disregard of life with all the desires for human greatness, admired beyond expression the undaunted minds of these deputy citizens. At the same time, on this 2nd of April, to give greater force to the government, the triumvirate was dissolved, and the whole authority was given to Manin, with the title of President. What most rejoiced me, was to see that the deputies received unequivocal congratulations.

More than once, both before and after the 2nd of April, I had reason to be dissatisfied with the proceedings of the government towards my command-in-chief. Not that they ceased to give me indubitable proofs of their esteem, but they ignorantly prevented me from doing all the good I had in view, and which I had heretofore accomplished with forces no more numerous, and in circumstances no less arduous; I was, therefore, more than once on the point of moving from the Estuary to some other part of Italy: but

officers of high rank and much esteemed, among whom was Colonel Ulloa, afterwards a General, and a citizen of high credit, said to me, "If you go, in two or three days the army will be dissolved, and the population divided." I believe the greatest sacrifice I ever made to Italy, was that of remaining in Venice, with a patience I certainly never exhibited towards the Kings of Naples, during the three periods at which I commanded their armies. But in thinking of that 2nd of April, I often said, "Not only does Italy deserve from me the so celebrated sufferings of Themistocles, but this magnanimous congress of the 2nd of April, and this dear people of Venice, deserve moreover to be remembered by me while life lasts."

In the meantime, I no longer hoped to carry the war beyond the Lagoon, nor even to execute important sorties; I limited myself to small ones, which, besides the loss of life they occasioned, did not fail to fill the hospitals with wounded. I visited all the islands, where I reviewed the garrisons, and assured myself of the well-being of the

soldiers, which served in great measure to maintain discipline.

In all Italy, the popular Circles, or clubs, produced evil results, and the contrary was a rare exception. Being shut up within the Lagoon, I endeavoured to discover the causes of this calamity. These Circles are similar to the French and Italian patriotic clubs, and to the vendite of the Carbonari, who, from 1808 till 1821, had their head-quarters in the kingdom of Naples; but in these there was more order, and they were of more utility to the cause in favour of which they acted. Among other evils produced by the Circles, was the great influence they endeavoured to exercise over the distribution of all places, and especially military posts and grades. I was told that the influence of the Circles induced Charles Albert to name Romarino lieutenant-general, and to give him the command of a division. If this be true, it evinces but little patriotism in the Circles, and great weakness in the King. In Venice, the Circles did rather more good than I recommended some officers of my staff, who formed part of them, to attend to VOL. II.

discipline, and they succeeded admirably. I will transcribe a most trifling letter from the Circolo Popolare in Venice to Col. Ulloa:—

"7th April, 1849.

" COLONEL,

"In the name of the people of Venice, we thank you for what you have done to defend our liberties, and to sanction with the report of your cannon the immortal decree of the 2nd of April. To you, son of Guglielmo Pepe, — but enough! — Spread among your generous brothers this address, which yesterday evening was unanimously decreed by the Circolo Popolare to these valiant soldiers. Italy shall still exist, since God seconds your generous ardour.

" F. CABRI, President."

A little time previous to this period, and before the enemy's troops and artillery had been so greatly increased round the Lagoon, the Austrian generals had employed means hitherto not used in war, to obtain the surrender of the coveted Lagoon. They sent a lady belonging to a noble family of Lombardy

to Venice, with the ostensible charge of persuading the members of the government, that the impossibility in which they were placed of continuing a long resistance was such that a speedy surrender would be most advisable. But the lady had also a secret commission, which was to corrupt as many of the officers as possible, and to bring them over to favour the Austrians. The committee of public safety did not lose sight of this lady, so that she was unable to communicate with any They took from her a letter of recommendation she had received for a young man in Venice, to whom she was not known, and presented her to another, chosen by the committee itself, making her believe that he was the person to whom the letter was directed. This young man played his part so well that he removed all suspicion from the lady's mind. She ended by being really enamoured. All her secrets were told, and reported to the commission; the lady was sent to prison, and, I believe, she remained there till the enemy entered Venice. To this the Austrians added another attempt no less silly, which diverted the Venetians and all

Italy. I allude to their balloons and other aerostatic devices. After talking of these for two or three months, and after numerous experiments made in the Austrian camp near the Adriatic, and in that of Isonzo, they at last carried them into execution. They sent up some fire-balloons from their war-vessels stationed in the Adriatic, and opposite the Island of Lido. These went high enough to pass over that island, and the enemy flattered themselves that they would arrive and burst in the city of Venice; but not one ever reached so far. Under these balloons was a large grenade full of combustible matter. and fastened by a sort of cord, also filled with a composition, which, after a certain given time, was to consume itself. As soon as this happened, the grenade fell, and in its fall burst against the first obstacle which it struck. Of all these balloons that were sent up, one only left its grenade in the fort of St. Andrea del Lido. The others were all extinguished in the waters of the Lagoon, and sometimes sufficiently near the capital to amuse the population more than any other spectacle.

CHAPTER VI.

SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN THE ISLAND OF SICILY.

THE events which took place in Sicily, and which I am about to relate, are taken from the work of a Sicilian who was on the spot; and though I do not agree with him in every thing, and in some of his judgments he does not seem to do sufficient honour to his country, I shall still follow him in these pages without any modification, because I believe the facts he relates to be correct.

I. The special character of the revolution in Sicily, the position of the country, and the causes of its agitation, merit the most serious attention. In the actual situation of Europe, and especially of Italy, all should be prepared for a new struggle. It is necessary that the well-disposed should seriously examine the errors of the first movement, in order to avoid in future the rocks against which the

revolution of 1848 split. The municipality of Sicily has been unjustly accused, and we shall undertake its defence. It would, indeed, be grievous that such an error should gain greater consistency in Italy, since the motives of the Sicilian movements were truly Italian, and will ever be such. Let it not be supposed that this is recrimination. Far from us be the thought of preferring ill-judged accusations at a period so propitious for historical narrative, because pregnant with great, and we might almost say, incredible events. To the intoxication of a first triumph, to the cries of the combatants for a country and for civilisation, has succeeded the stupor of unexpected defeat; the silence into which Europe has now fallen, is interrupted only by the musketshots of a ferocious soldiery, turned against the champions of the liberty of the world. Now then is the time to tell the history of so much misery, in order that men of good will may see the evil, and procure means to avenge it.

From 1815 till 1848, the government of the Bourbons weighed on Sicily with a hand of iron. By a malignant interpretation of the pernicious treaty of Vienna, Sicily was despoiled of her ancient constitution, which, in 1812, had been guaranteed by England, and sanctioned by Ferdinand I.; and the island was subjected to such tyranny as would amaze whoever examined it attentively. Commerce, agriculture, individual liberty, were all oppressed by a short-sighted and ferocious government. The public offices occupied by Neapolitans, public imposts immeasurably augmented, did but increase the discontent of the island from day to day. The year 1820 seemed to threaten the terrible events of 1848, and found the people ready to shake off the yoke. In fact, their efforts then were not small; but these ideas were not generally diffused among the people, and the aversion felt by the chiefs of the revolution in Naples for the independence of the island, produced discord, which made the insurrection fall to the ground. Notwithstanding this, the Neapolitan troops met with a rough reception under the walls of Palermo, and after a useless siege and infinite loss, they only entered the walls by capitulation.

All the Bourbons being secure, by the universal triumphs of kings over the people, their dominion became more cruel over the kingdom of the two Sicilies, which in servitude alone were equals; but the baseness and ferocity of Ferdinand II. stand alone in history.

From 1830 till 1848, Sicily was overrun and wasted by men ready for every infamy, at the command of a man incapable of being stopped by justice and humanity.

The tribunals, public instruction, religion, commerce, the press, all were under the culminating power of the State; the police exercised its dominion with a cruelty which might compare with the reign of Caroline, and the terrors of '99. Neither the asylum of peaceful citizens, nor the altar, was free from its influence; even the latter drew its power from the government. The bishops, the Jesuits in office, performed the part of informers; they kept the country in its ignorance and misery. Theft and assassination alone were protected; and this was the sole basis of government. By exciting the fears of the rich, and the avidity of the poor, they hoped to render a revolution impossible. Municipal hatreds were assiduously fomented; and in this alone the Bourbon excelled, in banishing from these

miserable provinces every generous instinct. The military commissions and the extraordinary tribunals marvellously assisted such a system: like the destructive winds from Africa, it dried up all the resources of an agricultural population; and commerce was always struck with excessive taxes, and iniquitous and vexatious means of exaction.

The monopoly of sulphur was contracted for by a French company, which was afterwards dissolved by the intervention of England; nor was this the last blow to the national prosperity. To such misery was this people reduced, who were habituated to govern themselves by their own laws, and to live under a representative system which had its origin in the manners and customs of the country. Various insurrectionary movements were set on foot, and one among others would have succeeded in 1835, if the cholera had not raged in the island, and in a short space of time carried off 9000 of the inhabitants of the The army then extinguished the partial movements in Syracuse and Catania; exile and assassination were legalised by the military junta; and thus closed that fatal year.

But the liberals did not give up their hopes; aided by a clandestine press, and by the heroic endeavours of the good, they went over the island, and in the name of liberty and national independence they called on all to unite. I will relate a fact which would seem incredible if men and documents were not ready to confirm it.

From 1837 to 1848 Sicily was a vast field of conspiracy, with which all parts of the country, even the most distant from the centre and from Italy, were in correspondence. They had their archives and their diplomacy, without the government having the slightest knowledge of it. This may serve to show, that though men may seem torpid under slavery, yet they never forget liberty. Finally, in 1848, under the auspices of Pius IX., they were aroused: and this name was no more than an involuntary symbol, the watchword of a revolution already morally consummated. The pacific demonstrations and perfidious kindness of their princes seemed at first to content the people of the Peninsula. Sicily followed the same track, because it was moved and agitated by the same impulse. Hence continual demonstrations and smothered agitations warned the governments that the island also was expecting liberty; but they were either ignorant or unconscious of the danger; they spurned it, and shut their ears to the exigencies of the times. But the Sicilian conspiracy, which was interwoven with that of Calabria, by a premature and partial movement convinced the government of its force, and showed the combustible elements of which it was composed. On the 1st of September, 1847, a band of brave men in Messina attacked the garrison, which, after a fruitless sortie from the citadel, was compelled to retire with the loss of seventy men.

This attempt was ill seconded by the people, who were not yet ripe for arms, and who perhaps still trusted in a pacific accommodation: it was extinguished by a few of the leaders being shot.

Things remained in this state till November. On one side, the liberals were in agitation; and on the other, the police were more exasperated. Every thing seemed to foretell a speedy rupture. Pacific demonstrations commenced: cries of "Long live the King!" demands for

representative institutions, and a National Guard, were heard.

So little was then requisite to content Sicily! The Bourbon satisfied the desires of the people by fresh arrests, so that, in a short time, the prisons were filled. The commander of the Piazza and of the garrison of Palermo was one Vial, an obscure adventurer, who, from the very lowest ranks of the army, had risen into favour, and who ruled affairs in Sicily. Insolent from unexpected success in the dark practices of the police, he used to repeat haughtily that a charge of cavalry would suffice to disperse the factious. But as early as the beginning of January, at the corners of the principal streets of the city, papers were placarded, which, in a form of defiance, warned the government to concede to Sicily the institutions to which she had a right, and threatened a recourse to arms if by the 12th of January these desires were not complied with.

Disdain, and the arrest of some illustrious citizens, were the only replies of the government. Men became indignant at such blindness; and on the morning of the 12th of January a handful of citizens attacked the royal troops on divers points. Repulsed with no small loss, the soldiers retired, a part to their quarters, a part into the fortresses and the royal palace.

A revolutionary committee was formed, and with heroic endeavours it provided for the defence. Four days were spent in skirmishing; and this time was most precious for the insurrection, which, strengthened by the addition of the neighbouring districts, became formidable. On the 16th, ten war steamers disembarked on the coast 7000 men, commanded by General Desauget, and commenced a sharp cannonade. Instead of being discouraged, the energy and enthusiasm of the inhabitants redoubled; and they attacked the enemy with success on divers points.

The enemy amounted to 13,000 men, besides cavalry, and an excellent artillery; they had numbers, means of warfare, and the forts on their side. The people had their own irresistible strength, and a just cause. It would appear incredible that a handful of men should have been able to defeat so formidable

a corps, yet so it was. The chiefs who commanded it were deficient both in military science and in courage; they lost their time in vain attempts, and the self-reliance of the soldiers was destroyed. Had a more daring General been at their head, or had he marched directly against the city, perhaps on that day the revolution would have been extinguished, or retarded. The leaders of the movement profited by these errors, and did not cease their attacks; from day to day it became more impossible for the Neapolitans to hold the city. On the night of the 26th January, they abandoned the royal palace in haste, and forming themselves into a column, they began a disorderly retreat, which might almost be called a flight. The manner in which the troops were embarked was equally discreditable: if they had only taken a small battery, which commanded the portion of the coast lying under the protection of the forts, they might have embarked in all security. But by neglecting this, they were obliged to take a difficult route under the mountains which crown Palermo. Two days were lost in intricate roads, and the troops

were conducted to Solanto, where they embarked.

In this timid march stragglers were continually left behind: the artillery, the horses, the whole baggage, and about twenty prisoners, were left in the hands of the Sicilians. The capital being thus disencumbered from the corps of expedition, it was easy for the people to multiply their attacks against the castle and the Finance Palace. The first capitulated, and the other was taken by assault. At the same time in Catania and in Trapani, after a sharp conflict, the Neapolitans were compelled to lay down their arms, so that towards the end of February the citadel of Messina and the forts of Syracuse alone remained in their power.

II. The limits and nature of this work do not allow of any detail in the account of military events, since I am obliged to enter into the particulars of the political negotiations which took place at this period of the revolution, and place them in their true point of view. It has been said that the English squadron, and the furnishers of arms and ammunition, had aided the movement. I can positively

attest, that the mediation employed in the beginning by the commander of the naval station of England, was of a nature perfectly impartial towards the two parties.

The consuls of the different powers resident in Palermo limited themselves to protesting in a body, in order to put a stop to the bombardment which had been going on for several days.

The English mediation in the affairs of Sicily was sought only by the King of Naples; it was at his entreaty that Lord Minto, then in Rome, went to Naples, and thence to Palermo, to effect a reconciliation between two parties which by nature were irreconcileable. I will not say that the English diplomatist was averse to taking part in affairs of that sort, since the nature of his mission is now a mystery to no one. England knew full well the agitation which must soon take place in the Peninsula, and she had no small interest in mixing herself up with it.

On the other hand, the Sicilians would not depart from the constitutional basis of 1812, since it was their right, to recover which they had faced the disasters and the immense sacrifices of a revolution.

In fact, to the various proposals of accommodation the committee in Palermo has always replied, that Sicily would lay down its arms when the general parliament should have assembled and modified the constitution of 1812, by adapting it to the times.

The decree of the 6th of March, which was sent into Sicily as the basis of mediation, did not suit the Sicilians, not only because the constitution of 1812 was almost unrecognised, but still more on account of a capricious article which destroyed all former concessions. The King limited himself to appointing different ministers of foreign affairs, and of war, for the two kingdoms. These two weak elements of government were insufficient. Where was the promised administrative separation? How, and by whom, were these decrees to be guaranteed? This was not told. The Sicilians did not think they followed an imprudent course in refusing this offer completely. They were not ignorant that a treaty without guarantees, resting solely on the faith of the Bourbon, was only

a diplomatic entanglement. They therefore refused to sign it, perceiving the snare it concealed, and leaning upon Italian influence, represented in the person of Charles Albert, who then appeared likely to succeed very differently from what so unfortunately happened afterwards.

If Lord Minto was of good faith in these negotiations, as we endeavour to believe, how did he fall into the web so warily woven by the Bourbon? Setting aside the dignity of his name, and that of the power he represented, the English lord was in fact nothing more than a simple bearer of despatches from the chancery of the Neapolitan ministry.

Time was wanting to the Bourbon to betray the revolution in Naples, and then to fall on Sicily with all his forces. The committee was not ignorant of this, and immediately after its refusal of the decree of the 6th of March, it appointed the 25th of the month for the convocation of the general parliament, already decreed for February. All treaties of accommodation being at an end, and the King refusing to recognise any act of the new assembly, it became necessary to

appoint an executive power, composed of a President and responsible ministers. parliament was inaugurated with immense rejoicings by a people who, for thirty-three years, had not been able to pronounce the name without running the risk of imprisonment and exile. The first act of the chambers was the project of an extended law on the municipality, already impoverished by the inept system of French centralisation, which the late government had introduced. Police, war, and finances, were wisely provided for; and if everything did not reach the end proposed, the fault was in the miserable condition in which the government of Naples had left those branches of the administration. treasury was emptied of the public money. which all went to fill the coffers of Naples. Sicily being without institutions and military records, though remembering too well the infamous system of Bourbon policy, the organisation of the government was no easy The poverty of the treasury was in part repaired by the good will of the contributors, and in the impossibility of organising a police, the National Guard supplied its place. ĸ 2

In this emergency the government was induced to confide a large portion of authority to that body, which served later as a point of reaction. But the most urgent affair was the formation of an army; and unhappily the state of the country was opposed to this, Sicily, exempt from military conscription, had supplied that tribute by money alone. The Sicilian contingent was furnished by the Neapolitan provinces: the Bourbon kept a troop of foreigners in the country, and thus alienated the natives from the career of arms. There were no manufactures of arms, nor military stores, in Sicily, and all this was to be supplied.

True it is, that the enthusiasm of a people is capable of effecting great things, but suddenly to create an army from such negative elements was an impossible work. Messina, which for several weeks had closely besieged the citadel, was obliged to supply the want of all regular means of assault by the courage and enthusiasm of the citizens. But what can courage avail against science and military organisation, which require both time and money? The military achievements at Mes-

sina, though highly honourable, are proofs of the truth of our assertion.

In the meantime, the government perceived the difficulties of the political position of Sicily, not yet recognised by the other powers, with an enemy in front of her who had time to prepare for her attack. In the sitting of the 13th April, the parliament pronounced the downfall of Ferdinand and his family from the throne of Sicily: a bold act, and a wise one if they had immediately proceeded to the election of a new king.

The political position of some of the representatives, who were inimical to a constitutional régime, was by this decree rudely attacked. In order to leave the way open to the probable triumph of republican principles, they urgently demanded the adoption of another paragraph in the act of expulsion: by this it was declared, that another sovereign should be chosen after the statuto was voted. This was unanimously adopted by the chamber, and was one of the first causes which led to the failure of the revolution. We do not therefore mean to attribute the fault to the republican party, for we sym-

pathise with their sentiments, but we deplore those unforeseen errors which in revolutions are committed by deliberative assemblies. They thwart the power of government, when in extraordinary circumstances it is compelled to employ extraordinary means. The Sicilian parliament, forgetting that the enemy was at our gates, conducted itself as if no crisis was weighing upon the country, which was forced to combat at once with arms and diplomacy. Hence oppositions, divisions, a Droite and a Gauche, and that struggle of parties, which in ordinary times is perhaps less useful than is supposed, but which became fatal at such a moment. The government, continually mixed up in these parliamentary struggles, could not give unity and force to their deliberations. From the 13th of April, and during the whole of June, the island was governed in this manner; slow advance being made in the formation of an army, and occasion being given to divisions, which are the inevitable consequences of a revolution abandoned to itself. The commissioners who were deputed to foreign governments, in order to obtain the recognition of Sicily as an independent power, were not

successful in their mission. They could only obtain a promise of recognition after the election of a king. On the other hand, Great Britain, mindful of the obligations she had contracted towards the people of Sicily, in 1812, stimulated the government instantly to choose an Italian prince. Therefore, in July, after a very long sitting, the parliament fixed on the Duke of Genoa, second son of Charles Albert. The English and French vessels of war saluted the Sicilian flag, and a deputation was sent to Turin to offer the crown to that prince. Every thing seemed to promise a happy solution, and the recognition seemed almost certain. But already the Sardinian King, the unhappy chief of a most unfortunate army, had been obliged to capitulate under the walls of Milan, leaving the Italian cause almost lost. This fact exercised a fatal influence on the fate of Sicily. The cabinet of St. James's began, under various pretexts, to vacillate regarding the recognition demanded. France, scarcely escaped from the sanguinary days of June, limited herself to a prudent reserve. The Piedmontese cabinet, embarrassed at home, and

threatened with a German invasion, deferred till better times the acceptance of the crown on behalf of the Sardinian prince. The Bourbon did not miss this opportunity. Already a victor in the sanguinary struggle of the 15th of May in Naples, he now prepared a numerous force for the invasion of Sicily. September, fifteen vessels of war, and many transports, disembarked 15,000 men and a formidable train of artillery in the citadel of Messina. Masters of the citadel, strengthened by a vast territory on the coast opposite Calabria, and possessing great superiority both in the numbers and discipline of their troops, they commenced a sharp cannonade against the city from all the forts. The batteries of the city responded vigorously; and during three days a shower of bombs, and other projectiles, destroyed the houses, and reduced the defenders of this heroic city to The Sicilians, without any military organisation to oppose so much force and science, had scarcely a thousand raw recruits, and several bands of peasants. Under such disadvantages the intrepid citizens struggled bravely against an enemy brutally ferocious.

Pillage, incendiarism, and barbarous destruction marked their passage. Finally, after four days of heroic resistance, Messina, abandoned by her intrepid defenders, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Croats of Naples, not sufficiently repaid by their victory, continued during twenty-four hours to bombard a city void of inhabitants, and reduced to a mass of ruins and corpses:—a fearful contrast with the refined principles of civilisation, which were here sunk in a pool of blood and misery!

The great powers looked on curiously at this revolution of 1848, and honoured with their admiration the miserable people who fell exhausted under the cruel wrath of a ferocious despot. The English and French ships were spectators of so much wickedness; and the two admirals interposed in the name of humanity to put a stop to the slaughter, only when a flourishing and generous city was already imbrued in blood and destroyed by the order of barbarians, who, for our shame, are denominated Italians. A provisional armistice was imposed on each side by the Admirals Parker and Baudin, with the

sanction of the two governments of London and Paris; and a neutral zone was formed round the advanced posts of the Neapolitans, who occupied Messina, Milazzo, and Barcellona, and round the line of the unformed Sicilian army. The misfortunes of Messina were entirely owing to deficiency in the materials of war, and in experienced officers to organise the defence. The people of Sicily desired liberty; and they now perceived that strangers only brought slavery to those who trusted in their promises.

They now saw, that in order to sustain a revolution, and lead it to the point aimed at, an army was necessary, as well as the union of persons used to discipline. They knew that on this account alone the Neapolitan arms had vanquished the Sicilian troops, who were greatly superior to them in courage, and in that generous ardour which constitutes the true soldier. They remembered how, in September, at Messina, they had beat the 11th and 12th Swiss battalions, and forced them to retreat, and this with young recruits, who had no shoes, and who had carried a musket only two months. The good people

of Sicily did not forget all this, and called loudly for an army. The government, finally aware that they must not trust to the promises of other powers, endeavoured to reckon only on themselves, and proceeded with alacrity to the formation of an armed force, capable of defending Sicily from the Bourbons. Unhappily, an army cannot be formed speedily; and therefore the efforts of the revolutionary government were unable to surmount the natural difficulties of such an . undertaking. Superior officers were wanting in Sicily; nor were the subaltern officers sufficiently numerous to form the nucleus of the new army. Artillery was scarce, and there were very few muskets. The ministry did not fail in their duty. They obtained a large supply of muskets from abroad to complete the armament of the battalions, and the national foundries partly supplied the want of artillery. Several foreign officers were engaged in the service of Sicily, and a battalion of Frenchmen who had served in Africa was formed.

Thus, seven months after the taking of Messina, the Sicilians, in the month of March,

had about 10,000 soldiers of the line sufficiently armed and disciplined. But the moral energy of the young troops was singularly affected by want of trust in their captains, who were chiefly strangers in language and habits. In the meantime, negotiations were carried on, and already the bad faith of the French negotiators was revealed, as well as the lukewarm interest felt for us by the representative of Great Britain. It appeared to France an impolitic act to consent to the independence of Sicily, because the advantages of this change would redound to England. This little jealousy was the true cause, from the commencement, of the devotion of the French minister, Reyneval, to the interests of the King of Naples. The English minister, on the other hand, stood in need of the French alliance for the affairs of Upper Italy; step by step he yielded in such a manner, that it was easy to see he was solely intent on making a merit of his concessions to the French alliance. The intentions of these powers did not escape the Sicilian minister, and, in consenting to the mediation, he only aimed at

gaining time to prepare for the defence. The decree of Gaëta, by which the King of Naples conceded the most miserable political institutions to Sicily, was refused. But again the destinies of Italy, and consequently of Sicily, were decided in the camp of Novara. Austria, mistress of Central Italy, dictated the hardest terms to Piedmont, and with the abdication of Charles Albert closed the heroic struggle for Italian independence. On the evening of the 29th of March, all diplomatic relations ceased; on each side the amnesty was broken.

The Sicilian forces round Catania, the centre of operations in this war, amounted to 7600 infantry, 200 cavalry, and six mountain pieces. Roggea Filangieri was commander-in-chief of the Bourbon forces, which numbered 16,000 men, and 48 pieces of artillery. The formidable citadel of Messina was his base of operations; his hospitals and magazines were beyond the Straits, at the distance of half an hour's navigation. The Neapolitan general also disposed of 4000 men, whom at pleasure he could transport from Messina to Catania. These formidable

forces, as they advanced along the coast, were flanked by eighteen vessels, comprising corvettes, steam frigates, sailing frigates, and a number of gun-boats. General Microslawski, who was proposed for the command of the small Sicilian corps, was not ignorant of the immense disproportion between his and the enemy's forces. On two conditions alone could we have hoped for victory; by acting with our whole united forces on a given point; and by avoiding the exposure of our line of battle to the coast, where the enemy's fleet must render them invincible. Unhappily, the indecision of the Polish general gave the victory to the enemy, and occasioned the loss of all Sicily. Everything seemed to forebode that Filangieri would commence the attack along the coast, between Messina and Catania, and that he would have effected a landing at Riposto. Had General Mieroslawski, with his 7000 men, prevented the landing at Riposto, or had he undertaken to cover Catania, the disasters of the campaign would not have been on our side. Unhappily it was just the reverse; our forces never operated together, and our line

of battle was on the coast. This disaster was occasioned by an injudicious plan of campaign conceived by Microslawski. It consisted in taking the offensive above Messina, and attacking the citadel. There was a moment at which this plan was abandoned as too perilous; the General surmised the probability of the enemy's landing at Riposto, and the immense advantages to be drawn from it. But he afterwards returned to his first plan, spoilt the unity of his movements, and dispersed the troops over a line of forty miles, so that small detachments of two or three hundred men had to combat the enemy, who were almost always in columns of 6000 or 7000. Faormina was burnt and destroyed, and the heights which commanded Catania fell into the hands of the enemy. Such were the fatal consequences of so many errors. The Neapolitans, having taken possession of the Casino of Gioeni, which overlooks the city, commenced the cannonade; and the advanced posts of the Sicilian army, after a short resistance, were compelled to evacuate the town. Such was the end of this war. After

the fall of the second city in the island, Syracuse yielded to a shameful capitulation, which the Polish commander was not ashamed Thus, in a short space of time, to sign. three-fourths of the island were in the power of the enemy. Palermo, ever the centre of the greatest resistance, remained; and in spite of the discouragement inevitably following a defeat, the inhabitants were disposed to make an obstinate resistance, if Admiral Baudin had not presented himself, and offered his good offices with the Bourbon at Gaëta. This offer, which had no other object than to divide men's minds, and facilitate Filangieri's march on the capital, was productive of sad The parliament, in spite of the minister's observations, accepted the proposal of Baudin, and those of the government who were for resistance were obliged to resign.

The revolution once fallen, all the enemies it ever had, arose to dispute its remains. Those who regarded it hostilely had taken refuge in the National Guard, which began to exercise an influence fatal in its effects. We cannot understand how, as framers of constitutions, we placed the safety of the state

in the keeping of an armed body, which by its nature is a deliberating one.

Facts are the best evidences of the truth; England and America have no national guards, yet liberty in those countries is the consequence of the just equilibrium of power. As to the National Guard of Palermo, destined to extinguish the last spark of liberty in the country, it derived its force, as we have before said, not alone from the hatred which the people entertained for whatever institutions remained of the Bourbon police, but also from the assistance it had given in mitigating the horrid state in which the Bourbon general had left the island; for on the day that Desauget evacuated it, he had all the prison doors opened, and about 13,000 malefactors were set at liberty; such was the iniquitous rule of the Neapolitan King. To these men Desauget confided the not difficult task of disturbing the new revolutionary society in Sicily, and, in fact, he succeeded in his aim.

The evil brought about by so many culprits let loose, was mitigated by the National Guard. Hence the pride of this body, who in all deliberations expected their influence to prevail.

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They generally endeavoured to obtain their ends by throwing obstacles in the way of the revolution; for the chiefs of this body of armed citizens were without any political antecedents, and they used all their power to stifle generous sentiments. When, in the last days of the expiring revolution, more than human force was necessary to raise us up from the low and reactionary condition into which we were fallen, the old adherents of the ancient system, and many perverse persons acting in a mass, and under the banners of this body, adopted every means of covering the revolution with opprobrium and shame. The ministry having fallen, the parliament being closed, the direction of affairs was in the hands of Riso, the commander of the National Guards, and the head of the municipality. The Marchese of Spanaforno, and the Barons Grasso, and Canalotti, assumed the title of Ministers. On them devolved the charge of covering the last heavings of Sicilian liberty with infamy, and their names are remembered by us as tokens of contempt and anger to all good men.

The Syllan proscriptions, which were to

leave so many families unhappy and destitute after the triumph of Filangieri, had their origin during the short and abominable reign of these vile executioners of Sicily. The remainder of the army, which retired in good order to Castrogiovanni, was by their orders dispersed and annihilated; the fortresses were disarmed; and the most illustrious among the men of the revolution were driven into exile. The people, stupefied by such rapid and deplorable vicissitudes, were daily deceived by perfidious assurances of concessions and benefits. The Neapolitan general, assured of the good offices of the betrayers, advanced rapidly on Palermo. The burning of the small village of Mezzagno, which crowns the mountains near that city, warned the people too late of the trust to be placed in a Bourbon's promise. They sought to repair their error, and, full of enthusiasm, they went out to combat the enemy. But what could a few men without leaders do against so much force and guile? After some skirmishing, the English and French consuls interfered, and on the 18th May a capitulation was signed, by which, eighteen months after the royal

troops had been driven from the city, they entered it once again. In the commencement, promises and caresses reassured the timid; but as soon as the people were disarmed, and the military in possession, the greatest cruelties were inflicted on the country. Exile and military executions rapidly succeeded, and heavy taxes put a finishing stroke to our misery. The Sicilians were condemned to pay 54,000,000 of francs. This sum was employed, with ferocious mockery, in paying the Croats and defraying the expense of the bombs which had reduced to ashes the most flourishing city of the Mediterranean, and destroyed thousands of intrepid citizens.

Fear, the perennial fountain of all tyranny and the basis of the actual Bourbon government, spies, chains, and the axe, are the only means by which, according to them, the happiness of the people is to be hypocritically assured. Vain hope! The smoking masses of the burnt city, the unburied bones of so many brave men, are there to cry out for terrible vengeance. Sicily enraged, silent, but full of hope, united with her Italian brethren, holds herself ready for deliverance. But the heart

is lacerated on thinking of the many chances to be run, and the many tears to be shed for the misery of the nation, which still groans under a yoke of iron.

One smiles bitterly at the pompous title of *civilised*, with which this nineteenth century is qualified by many.

Religion and civilisation were unknown to the barbarians who formerly devastated Europe. These sacred names now serve to cover such wickedness, that posterity will weep over our memory.

CHAPTER VII.

State of the enemy round the Lagoon, and of the besieged.—
Necessity of a military dictatorship.—A decoration and a
medal proposed.—The command of Malghera confided to
Colonel Ulloa,—Reports of the 3rd and 4th of May from the
Commander of Malghera to the Commander-in-Chief.—
Endeavours to obtain information from terra firma.—Letter
from the Commander of Malghera to General Haynau, and
his answer.—Sortie from Malghera on the 9th of May.—
—Order of the Day.—Meeting of the 10th of May, in the
rooms of the War department.—Council of defence on the
13th May presided over by the General-in-Chief.

The enemy besieging Venice had become very powerful. All their land and sea forces, all their immense artillery, both without and within the forts they occupied, were now turned to the destruction of the Lagoon, which they so ardently longed to possess. The Lagoon extended ninety miles in circumference; it contained nearly sixty forts, great and small, and 200,000 inhabitants.

The garrison was inferior in numbers to that of Dantzic and Genoa when those towns sustained their memorable sieges. Venice

paid and fed a navy sufficiently numerous both in sailors and officers; but, wherever the fault might lie, it was of no service for the defence, excepting by the use of small barks in front of the attack on the capital, and by supporting in some measure the sorties from Chioggia. The soldiers for many months had been in a piteous state, and even when their position was at the best, they never enjoyed, either in their clothing or lodging, those comforts which European troops generally have. If to these circumstances are added the epidemic maladies which visited us, our contemporaries and posterity will surely see that both the Venetian volunteers, and those of the several Italian provinces who had repaired to Venice, deserve the warm applause of all who appreciate a disinterested patriotism, which undauntedly defied all the evils of this life.

These dear Italian youths, both the soldiers and their officers, showed a quality which is superior to all other virtues, and which the eloquent Milton himself did not dare to put into the mouth of Lucifer, when he was exciting the courage of the bold rebel angels. I allude to the last months of the siege, when

abandoned by all Europe, wanting bread and powder, and unable to receive any either by land or sea, all were convinced, that even if life remained, whether wounded, mutilated, or still sound, yet to reward their valour, their long and severe sufferings, instead of the independence of Italy, or any advantage to themselves, Italy would remain in servitude, and persecution, misery, and exile would be their individual lot. These latter evils more particularly belonged to the Neapolitans. Yet even to the last, the soldiers aspired to nothing but the honour of exposing their lives to the increasing attacks of the enemy. Young men of all Italy who for the love of Italian independence ran to the defence of Venice, where during fifteen months you combated, alternately stimulated by fraternal and emulous affection, you have for ever belied the foreign calumnies which caused your valour, or the universal wish in favour of our country's unity, to be doubted!

A state, whatever its population, which has a vital war to sustain, must infallibly have recourse to a dictatorship, which should be decreed in due time by the national congress. The Romans adopted this measure even in wars which did not compromise their existence; it was a sufficient reason to this able people that they were arduous. Who does not know, that after the battle of Waterloo, if, instead of two permanent chambers, there had been a dictator in Paris, by placing himself at the head of the forces remaining round the capital, he would have retrieved the lost battle?

In Venice, where we were under the fire of the enemy, there was a congress, a government with its president, and a general-inchief. For some months, instead of a government, there was a triumvirate; all three being quite ignorant of warlike affairs. During other months we were under a president, instead of the triumvirate. Finally, during the last few months, there was a congress, a president, a general-in-chief, and a military commission with distinct powers. True it is that the general-in-chief presided over the commission; but in this manner I was tied down without being able to destroy the inconvenience. In truth, I neither desired, nor would I have accepted, the absolute dictatorship; if I had aspired to this, I should have accepted it when the people offered it to me in the Piazza St. Marco, and when I made them a different proposal, as I have before explained.* But had the assembly conferred on me the sole dictatorship, a true military dictatorship, I could certainly not only have brought the military, the National Guard, and the marines into a better condition, but perhaps at this moment I should be still in Venice defending the city and the entire Lagoon. Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that one mediocre general was worth more than two excellent ones. In Venice, for want of a military dictator, many meddled with military matters. For example, in the reviews which I held of the garrison of the forts, and even without the reviews, I received reports of most valorous actions of the soldiers of every grade. Rarely could I recompense them by promotion; and besides, a soldier who distinguishes himself in presence of the enemy, may deserve a recompense, but not promotion. I therefore proposed to the government that they should create,

^{*} See vol. i., chap. xi.

with the consent of the assembly, a military order. This was promised, but never performed. One day, on returning from Malghera, where many of the military had greatly distinguished themselves, I requested the government to order two hundred gold medals to be coined, with some motto calculated to excite enthusiasm. They told me that they had no gold whatever for the purpose. I told them that I possessed two hundred napoleons, which they might send and take for an object I had so much at heart. They answered that they would employ the gold as I desired; and yet afterwards nothing was done that I proposed. In words, they never said No to me; but in deeds, more than once.

In the meantime the enemy's works advanced visibly. The Commandant of Malghera was odious to the population of Venice and to the military, so much so that I endeavoured in vain by some phrases in an Order of the Day to reinstate him in their good opinion. It was difficult, not only to keep him in Malghera, but to protect him from popular insults; in fact, on laying down his command, he went on board a French war steamer. The posts and

fortresses of the Lagoon were under the immediate orders of the General-in-Chief. For some time I had desired to confer the command of Malghera on Colonel Geronimo Ulloa, the head of my staff; but he being a Neapolitan, I deferred, from motives of delicacy, putting my wish into execution; but the intelligence which arrived of the enemy's preparations was such, that the government spoke to me on the subject, and I gave Colonel Ulloa orders to assume the command of that most important fort.

The Austrian troops around the Lagoon were commanded by General Haynau. On the 3rd of May, Colonel Ulloa wrote to me as follows:—

"GENERAL

"I have scarcely time to write you these hasty lines. From the report which has reached you this morning, you will have learned the works of the day for our own defence, and those of our enemy for the attack.

"The garrison is animated by the best spirit; the artillery is active and intelligent. Will they resist a strong cannonade and bombardment by the enemy? I hope so; and so far as is in my power, I shall keep the garrison as firm and resolute as possible. There is still much to do; for which reason I dedicate all the hours of the day to insure the success of the defence.

"I have written to Milan to obtain what is needful, and to-morrow, if the enemy does not unmask his batteries, I will send Megacapo to Graziani, to get other necessaries from the arsenal. The Minister of War, Graziani, the director of the engineers, and all concerned, proceed with alacrity in providing what is needful for this fort.

"In short, this is what I have asked for :-

- "Two mortars; field-pieces; Boldoni's batteries; wood for ordnance trains.
 - "Sacks of earth.
- "Cloth to cover the tents, of which Graziani has already sent me a good quantity.
 - " Eight for spare gun-carriages.
- "We shall also require a great deal of ammunition, of which immense consumption is made.

"With sentiments of the highest esteem and respect, &c. &c.

"G. ULLOA.

" Malghera, 3rd May, 1848."

The day following (May 4th) I went by the bridge to visit Malghera. At a small distance from that place, I heard and saw a tremendous discharge from the enemy's artillery. On arriving at the bank which leads from the bridge to the fortress, two bombs fell,-one on my right, the other on my left; and the troops of the garrison, on seeing this, in the midst of the bombs, grenades, and balls, began to shout, "Long live our General!" I passed along the front of their line of battle, and after complimenting them on the intrepidity they had shown, I desired Ulloa to make all who were not on duty return to their casemates. The troops had been expecting me in battle-array, before the enemy commenced their fire, and then, with a certain military vanity, they wished to wait for their general in the same order, and without breaking their ranks by retiring before the enemy's fire. These discharges

proceeded from the numerous batteries of the first marked parallel. Without entering into more details on the operations of that day on either side, I will produce the report made to me, after sunset, by Colonel Ulloa:—

"This day, half-an-hour after mid-day, the enemy unmasked their batteries, and sent a shower of bombs, shells, and shots along all our line.

"Our soldiers conducted themselves like veterans: they re-organised themselves promptly, and with repeated shouts of "Viva l'Italia!" prepared for a valiant defence. The artillery were quickly provided, and responded to the enemy's attack. They eagerly repaired to the points most menaced to strengthen them; the engineers, the sappers, all the special corps, ran voluntarily to their posts. And here it becomes my duty to signalise, with peculiar praise, a company of the Sile legion, who, guided by their distinguished Captain Cattabene, at the moment in which we were receiving a shower of the enemy's balls, went, amidst the shouts and acclamations of the garrison, to the distant dwelling of their commander, from whence they brought back their flag in triumph, traversing great part of the fort.

"Almost at the same moment, the Generalin-Chief arrived in Malghera, and an unanimous shout of joy hailed his coming, and showed him that all thought themselves fortunate that the moment of proving their courage, and love of their country, should be witnessed by a captain whom Italy so loved and admired.

"The fire, commenced with so much fury, seemed to be sustained by five principal batteries which surrounded our bastion No. 6, between the lunettes 12 and 13, and by an innumerable quantity of howitzers, so that the whole of the enemy's trenches seemed one line of fire.

"The ardour of our troops did not relax a single instant; and this fiery ordeal lasted at least seven hours, and did not slacken before night. Our artillery, which was well served and skilfully directed, produced great havoc among the enemy. Now, at eight o'clock in the evening, the guns are almost silent, and only an occasional shot denotes

the wish of our tired enemy still to attack us.

"It would be impossible for me to name those who have most distinguished themselves on an occasion in which the whole garrison, according to the words of the Commander-in-Chief, has conducted itself heroically.

"The head and officers of my staff, the commandant of the fort and of the Piazza, the officers of the engineer corps, the sappers, the soldiers of the legion of Sile and of the 4th of the line, the detachment of the National Guard, the artillery by land and by sea, the marines, the trains of the cavalry and of the ambulance, have all deserved well of their country. The legion of the Bandiera and Moro volunteers has especially shown itself worthy of the name which records the first martyrs of Italian liberty.

"The name of the Lombard rifles should not be forgotten among those who, by their activity and courage, merit particular mention.

"I shall not fail to publish to-morrow the names of the dead and wounded, which must be particularly preserved in the annals of this holy war.

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"Among the wounded, I cannot at this moment omit to record Captain Cosenz, of the staff of the General-in-Chief, who, though ill with fever, directed the artillery of the front attack; and though sick and wounded, would not retire.

"We shall take advantage of the night to repair our small disasters and prepare ourselves for the struggle of to-morrow.

"The Commandant-Colonel,
"GIROLAMO ULLOA."

From the 4th of May, till the surrender of Venice, the enemy made more or less use of all their artillery, which exceeded, in number of guns of every calibre, what would have sufficed for the siege of two or three fortified places of the first order; our artillery-men were all youths of education and intelligence; they had, therefore, learnt in a short time to serve their guns better than many of the enemy's; and, what was more, they served with affectionate ardour. I will record a trait to show that the atmosphere of Venice was full of Italian vitality. One of the

batteries of Malghera, of which I do not now remember the name, was served by the immortal Bandiera company of artillery. One of those valorous volunteers, while intent on pointing his piece, was stretched on the ground by a ball of the enemy; a second takes his place, and is struck by another ball; a third presents himself, and the same fate awaits him; this did not prevent a fourth from intrepidly defying the well-directed shots of the enemy. The valiant Major Cosenz tried to dissuade him, saying that we must abstain for a time from making use of a piece which was aimed at so surely; but he persisted, and succeeded in aiming several shots very well.

We were in the meantime in a total and cruel want of all positive intelligence, and we were obliged to supply the want by means of occasional boats which we received, not without danger, at the entry of the Lagoon, where many of the spies paid for the exercise of their trade with their lives. The consuls obtained from the Austrian squadron what they do not always concede, and viâ Trieste, they often received intelligence of

what was passing in Europe. It was important to us to hear of the war in Hungary, and the end of the strange hostilities between France and Rome.

On the 5th of May, the Commandant of Malghera wrote to General Haynau, who soon after was superseded in the command of the enemy's troops round the Lagoon by Count Thurn. Haynau answered. The two letters follow:—

"The Colonel Commandant of the Fortress of Malghera.

"The letter of Marshal Radetzky, which you sent this morning, was directed to the President of the Venetian Government.

"Without the express orders of the said government, I do not think myself authorised to suspend hostilities. I must therefore continue firing, and so much the more because you openly show a desire to take unfair advantage of the truce which you propose, by continuing your works, which is quite contrary to the usages of war.

"It is also contrary to those usages to send open letters to the commander of a besieged fortress, as you have lately done. I have, therefore, the honour to warn you that my advanced posts have received positive orders to consider the bearer of any open letter as a spy, and to treat him accordingly.

"G. ULLOA.

" To the General Haynau, &c., &c."

"L. T. R., Commanding the Second Corps.

"The Commander of the Fort of Malghera is informed that hostilities were suspended by the besieging Imperial troops in order to send the summons, of which the copy is here joined, of Marshal Radetzky to the inhabitants of Venice.

"HAYNAU, &c., &c.

" To the Commandant of the Fort of Malghera."

If the forces in the Lagoon had been sufficiently numerous, I should have made more use of the bayonet, than of the artillery; but sickness, which had rendered the numerical inferiority of the garrison more evident, obliged me to limit myself to the defensive.

Notwithstanding this, on the 8th of May, I repaired to Malghera, and having consulted the opinion of Colonel Ulloa, who had always an eye on the movements of the enemy, I determined to make a reconnoissance on the second parallel of the enemy in the manner he judged most suitable. This is related in detail in the Order of the Day which follows.

" VENICE, 9th May, 1849.

"This morning, Colonel Ulloa, commandant of the district and of the fortress of Malghera, selected the most opportune moment to execute a reconnoissance planned by him with his usual intelligence. The General-in-Chief here transcribes the circumstantial report of the colonel.

"The population of the glorious Lagoon will be able from these experiments, more or less limited or extended, to know what confidence they may place in the valour of their defenders, in whose ranks it is impossible to discover any difference between new and old soldiers; since all are equal in patriotism, and in the desire to conquer." "The Inspector of the first District of Defence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops.

" MALGHERA, 9th May, 1849.

"THE works of the enemy, which had advanced with alacrity since the 4th, were suddenly suspended at the new parallel which was completed yesterday morning. To ascertain whether the enemy had really retired behind the first entrenchment, or whether, having sufficiently consolidated the new parapets, they were intent on planting other batteries, the inspecting colonel ordered a vigorous sortie this morning. Two columns, of about 500 men in all, pushed forward at half-past eight, a.m., from the two lunettes 12 and 13, towards the enemy's lines. The first was conducted along the railroad by Majors Cosenz and Sirtori; the second advanced under Major Rosaroll on both sides of the canal of Mestre. Both columns charged boldly at a quick step, and repeatedly drove back the enemy from the head of the parallel behind the principal line of trench, and though they found behind this a numerous reserve, supported by many mortars and

howitzers, yet for a long time they fought hand to hand, and maintained the disputed ground. The principal object of ascertaining the enemy's forces and the forwardness of the works being attained, after an hour's fire a retreat was commanded, which was executed in the greatest order, under cover of the guns of the fort. The conduct of the officers and of the troops of every corps, during the entire action, was beyond all praise. After a more minute inquiry, I will mention the names of those who have deserved the greatest encomiums. The high courage of our soldiers, eager to measure their strength hand to hand with the enemy, unhappily made a retreat to the fort difficult, and exposed them to much slaughter. Our loss amounts to four killed and thirty wounded; among the latter are five officers. We have every reason to believe the enemy's loss much greater. They were the mark of our artillery, whose shots, in the opinion of those who were observers, rarely missed their aim.

"The troops were returned at half-past five; but the fire of artillery continued, principally from the enemy's works. "The observations since made show no progress during the night; the inactivity of the enemy in the new trenches may be principally attributed to the quantity of water, which, in consequence of the late rains, has filled their trenches and rendered it impossible for them to work.

"G. ULLOA.
"G. PEPE."

The numerous guns and works round Malghera, exceeding what are usually seen even before a place of the first order, clearly showed that it must inevitably surrender in about two weeks more. The bridge which traversed the Lagoon, and extended from Venice to terra firma, had cost the Venetians an enormous sum, and the railroad leading to Verona was on it. It always was a matter of surprise to me that the Austrian masters of Venice should have permitted the construction of this bridge, without forming in it, at the same time, and at certain distances, long drawbridges. To leave this bridge entire would be fatal to the defence of the city; to break a number of its arches would cause great regret in many citizens.

Without my knowledge, and against all military rule, the government held a council in the rooms of the War-office, at which many superior officers of the department were present; among these was Colonel Milani, a most intelligent and active officer, who served laboriously till the last hour of the defence. In this council it was decided that, if the arches were undermined, there would always be time to blow them up. I complained that this council was held without my knowledge; and they sent me the minutes of their deliberations, which I preserve, and which went to prove that the blowing up of the arches, which was indispensable for the defence, might always be accomplished in a few hours. But, as I shall soon show, experience demonstrates that arches, not well undermined, are not speedily blown up, as they affirmed; and their fragments, on account of the insufficient depth of water in the Lagoon under the bridge, served as stepping stones for the enemy to advance on.

While Colonel Ulloa was defending Malghera with intelligence and valour, I received a letter from him, full of complaints against the war department, and other agents of the government.

Among other things, he informed me that, without any reference to himself, the committee of safety in Venice had established a sub-committee in Malghera for the internal regulation of the fort. He also informed me that the editors of the Official Gazette narrated according to their pleasure the operations which took place in the fort and in the sorties, praising their favourites in preference to those who had really signalized themselves. Such complaints were well founded, and not calumnious.

I took measures to put a stop to these not inconsiderable disorders. Above all, I authorised Colonel Ulloa instantly to dismiss the sub-committee, whose presence in the fort was an unprecedented scandal. At the same time, I complained to the government, myself, of the editors of their Official Gazette. I endeavoured to console the colonel by my own example; for he was not ignorant that, through love of Italy, I had practised more patience in Venice, than under five Neapolitan kings.

That those who take interest in military matters may understand the order in which I proceeded with the army in Venice, in the council of defence, I will roduce one protocol at the end of this chapter.

"Venice. In the quarters of Lieut.-General Baron Pepe, Con ander-in-Chief of the Italian troops in the Venetian State.

" Sunday, 13th May, 1849.

" PROTOCOL OF THE COUNCIL.

- "After being separately invited yesterday by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, we are this day assembled in a council of war.
- "1. The General-in-Chief, Baron Guglielmo Pere, President.
- "2. The head of the Marine Department, Vice-Admiral Graziani.
- "3. The ..ead of the War Department, General CAVADELIS
- "4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Civic Guard, Vice-Admiral Marsiely.
- "5. The Commodore-General of the Navy, Vice-Admiral MILANOPULO.
- "6. The Commander of the Garrison, General of Division, Solera.

- "7. The Director of Artillery and Engineers, General of Division, Armandi.
- "8. Member of the Council of Defence, and Vice-Admiral, General Bera.
- "9. Commander of the Land Artillery, General PAULUCCI.
- "10. Member of the Council of Defence, Colonel MILANI.
- "11. Director of the Infantry at Cavallina, Colonel FONTANA.
- "12. Adjutant-in-Chief of the Land Army, Colonel Marcello.
- "13. Inspector of the Fifth District of Defence, Captain RAFFAELLI, of the Navy.
- "14. Commandant of Division, &c., Captain F10220 (Navy).
- "15. Commandant of the Corps of Engineers and Sappers, Lieut.-Colonel Ranzelli.
- "16. Commandant of the Marine Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel Marchesi.
- "17. Member of the Council of Defence, Lieut. Mainardi (Navy).

"The General-in-Chief opened the conference by referring to the progress of the operations of attack on the fort of Malghera, on the part of the enemy, and by discussing the defence, which, for several days, has been energetically sustained by our troops. He said that the fort would capitulate only in an extreme case, and after a long, vigorous, and laborious resistance. That, nevertheless, as it was necessary to be prepared even for sinister events, he desired that measures might be taken in time for the regular evacuation of the fort, when it became necessary to abandon it: he added, that he desired to ascertain the orders which ought to be given on the occurrence of this event.

"General Cavadelis, head of the war department, expressed, that it was necessary in the first place to examine and agree as to the point, whether the defence of Malghera could be maintained, and in what circumstances it would be necessary to cede or abandon it, and to withdraw the troops from the successive positions: he remarked that, this point being attained, the moral impression which the cession of the fort would produce, as well as other political views, rendered it necessary that it should be discussed and resolved on in concert with the government, and not treated as a mere military operation.

"After other discussions, it was agreed

that the question should be proposed at another time, and in concert with the government.

"General Armandi, taking occasion from the subject of this conference to refer to the actual state of the armament of the fort, observed that it would be well, in the meantime, to prepare and effect the transport of some of the artillery, and to exchange some of the pieces of heavy artillery for others of smaller calibre; that this measure would tend to disencumber the fort of what was superfluous; and that such successive removals would render the complete evacuation more easy, in case we could no longer keep the fort.

"On these observations of General Armandi, it was decided that there should be another conference between the same General, Colonel Milani, Lieutenant-Colonel Ranzelli, and the Commander-in-Chief, as president. On the General-in-Chief's returning to the question proposed, of the case in which we must lose the fort of Malghera, and abandon it, he addressed his interpellations to Vice-Admiral Graziani, chief of the war department, to

know the means of defence by sea, supposing that, after the cession of the fort of Malghera, the war had to be carried on in the Lagoon, and in the fortified islands.

"Vice-Admiral Graziani answered this interpellation by indicating the maritime forces prepared to defend that part of the Lagoon between the railroad at Malghera, and the contiguous shore on the side near Campalto.

"Interpellations were successively made as to the means which the navy could dispose of to prevent a landing from the enemy's squadron, and to repel them where this should have taken place from the coast either of Lido, Malamocco, Palestrina, or other points of the Estuary; to which it was answered, that the navy could prevent nothing by sea, but that it could concur in the defence of the Lagoon.

"On inquiring what means of defence the navy could furnish for the succour of the fort of Brondolo, Vice-Admiral Graziani gave his opinion, that it could not speedily furnish any other succour than that of the existing vessels already known, and stationed in the part of the Lagoon between Chioggia and Brondolo; that the navy had neither here, nor elsewhere, any other means to add.

"The General-in-Chief having then made known the necessity that the navy should prepare to attack the vessels of the enemy, he was answered, that the greatest force the Venetian navy could furnish, could do no more than protect the commerce of the coast.

"After this discussion the conference was dissolved."

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CHAPTER VIII.*

NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN TUSCANY.

THE movement in Tuscany commenced in the beginning of 1846.

The first acts of liberal resistance consisted in signed protestations, and small pamphlets clandestinely published.

On the 28th February, 1846, Pisa protested in a direct petition to the Governor Serristori, against the foundation of an institution of the Sacré Cœur, the authorisation of which had already been obtained from government.

The professors who signed this were admonished, but in spite of the admonition they made a second protest. The government revoked the authorisation. To the Sisters of the Sacré Cœur, Jesuitism was attached, which Tuscany was determined not to admit.

^{*} This chapter was contributed by the illustrious Montanelli.

The clandestine pamphlets were very moderate, and limited themselves to desiring some civil and administrative reforms.

On the elevation of Pius IX. to the Popedom, and the publication of the amnesty, a subscription was opened in Pisa, and all the other parts of Tuscany, in favour of the indigent who had been pardoned, with the intention of giving practical proofs of national unity. The government would not permit the subscription lists to be printed, and they were circulated in manuscript.

The liberal agitation, feeling strengthened by the name of Pius IX., redoubled its activity in the winter of 1847, and obtained the law of the 6th of May on the press, which permitted a respectful criticism of the acts of the government.

Popular demonstrations commenced; political journals were founded. At Florence, the principal were the *Alba* and the *Patria*; Pisa had *l'Italia*; Sienna, the *Popolo*; Leghorn, the *Corriere Livornese*.

Though the preventive censorship remained, the law was not enforced, and in Tuscany they wrote as freely as in the most liberal countries. A civic guard was demanded by the journals, by the municipality, and by the people in the streets. The government would not concede this; menaces were not spared to prevent popular demonstrations, but they were ineffectual on account of the fraternal feeling between the military and the people.

The first place where any acclamations were added to the usual cry of "Viva Pio Nono," was Pisa, where in popular demonstrations they added "Viva l'Italia! Viva the reforming princes! Viva the Union! and Viva Gioberti!"

The civic guard was conceded in a Motu Proprio of the 4th September. This institution was celebrated with federal festivities. The first took place in Pisa on the 6th of September, where the people of Leghorn and Lucca met together; the second was at Leghorn on the 8th, and the third at Florence on the 12th. Representatives from all the communes in Tuscany met in Florence. The pretext of this meeting was a thanksgiving to the Grand Duke; in reality, they wished to protest against the foreign oppression in Lombardy, and express their desire

for the Italian league. The tri-coloured flag was displayed in these federal festivals.

Towards the end of September the Marchese Ridolfi and the Conte Serristori, who were of liberal opinions, entered the ministry. The first act of the new ministry was the suppression of the presidency of the Buon Governo.

By the abdication of the Duke of Lucca, which took place in October, 1847, the union of Lucca with Tuscany was anticipated; according to the treaties of 1815, Triviziano and Pontremoli were to be added to Modena and Parma.

The union of Lucca with Tuscany, in spite of the loss of political name, was as agreeable to the people as that of Triviziano was displeasing.

An ardent liberal party declared itself in Leghorn, and took occasion, on the occupation of Triviziano, to make a menacing demonstration on the evening of the 6th of January. A popular deputation was named in the Piazza, at the head of which was the advocate Francisco Guerrazzi. The minister Ridolfi dissolved the deputation; Guerrazzi

and the other chiefs of the exiled party were placed under arrest.

On the 13th February, in imitation of Naples and Piedmont, a constitution was given.

On the 22nd of May the news of the insurrection in Milan had scarcely arrived, when from one end of Tuscany to the other, the young men rose to hasten towards Lombardy. Companies of volunteers were immediately formed; the government was carried along by the popular impetus; they sent about 5000 men in regular troops and volunteers.

The command of the Tuscan corps was given first to General Ferrari, and afterwards to General de Laugier.

The Tuscans encamped under Mantua, at Cartalone, at Montanara, and at Grazie. They performed various feats of arms, and all with honour. They were attacked on the 5th, the 13th, and the 29th of May. On the 29th of May, more than 4000 men, posted between Cartalone and Montanara, were engaged during eight hours with the enemy, who had 30,000 men and many pieces of artillery. The university guard took part in the combat. The

losses of the Tuscans were great, but fruitful for the Piedmontese army, as the glorious achievement of Goito was the result.

The Tuscan troops united to those of Piedmont also took part in the unfortunate combats of Custoja, of Villa Franca, and of Luglio.

The conduct of the minister Ridolfi during the war of independence excited so warm an opposition against him, that he was compelled to retire. The advocate Salvagnoli, editor of the *Patria*, and Guerrazzi (now freed from prison), the editor of the *Corriere Livornese*, both of them deputies, were the chiefs of the opposition. The Ridolfi ministry was succeeded by a ministry under the presidency of Capponi.

Leghorn rose on the 5th of September, and the people remained masters of the city and the forts.

The government treated with the insurgents, who demanded the dissolution of the ministry and the call of Guerrazzi to the government.

Professor Montanelli was sent to Leghorn as governor, and in his programme of the 8th of October, he proposed an Italian Costituente. The Capponi ministry gave in its resignation, and Montanelli was called upon to compose a new one. He accepted the trust, and among the ministers he named Guerrazzi; in the ministerial programme he proclaimed the Costituente.

D'Ajola, Minister of War, undertook an organic reform in the army. The chambers were dissolved; the Grand Duke opened the assembly the 9th of January, 1849, and in the speech from the throne the proclamation of the Costituente was omitted.

One of the first laws proposed by the ministry was the election of thirty-seven deputies for the Italian Costituente; both in the council and the senate the law was voted unanimously. During the discussion concerning the Costituente, the Grand Duke went to Sienna, where he passed the winter with his family. On the 7th of February he fled, and in a letter written to the President of the Ministry, he alleged some futile pretexts to justify his flight.

At Florence the people and the assembly proclaimed a triumvirate, consisting of Guerrazzi, Montanelli, and Manzini. They dissolved the assembly, and convoked a Constituent Assembly.

General Laugier with the garrison of Mazza, which he commanded, gave the signal for reaction. Guerrazzi, with General D'Apice, set out from Florence with 4000 men. On approaching the troops of General Laugier they fraternised with those of the provisional government. At the same time, in the night of the 21st of February, the reaction broke out in the environs of Florence and Pietro, but without success.

The Constituent Assembly met on the 25th of March. The triumviri resigned their powers into the hands of the representatives of the people. When the news of the battle of Novara arrived, Guerrazzi was named chief of the executive, with dictatorial powers.

On the 11th of April, there was a conflict in Florence between the Florentines and some volunteers of Leghorn. The partisans of the Grand Duke took advantage of this occurrence, and on the 12th of April the restoration of the prince and of the constitution was proclaimed.

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Fifty resolute men would have been sufficient to oppose this reaction. The representatives of the executive power took no measures for this purpose. It is, therefore, believed by many, that, after the unfortunate battle of Novara, the restoration of the Grand Duke was meant to be allowed.

CHAPTER IX.

Details on the operations of the enemy round Malghera.—Their effects on the place.—The Author's visits to Malghera.—His Parisian valet-de-chambre.—Decree of the 22nd May, for the evacuation of Malghera.—The possibility of prolonging its defence.—Bad effects of not having blown up the arches of the bridge in time.—Promotion of Colonels Ulloa and Cosenz.—Answers of the French and English Governments to that of Venice.—Order of the Day after the evacuation of Malghera.

THE forces and the artillery which the enemy employed in the siege of Malghera, and its obstinate defence, deserve that I should enter into some details.

On the 4th of May, the batteries of the first parallel were completed by the enemy, and on the night of the 23rd those of the second parallel were terminated,—that is to say, they employed nineteen days in cannonading, in spite of the enormous forces they had brought into operation. On the 25th, the parapets were all thrown down, and the sacks of earth which replaced them

were exhausted. Even the platforms were all in a burning state; and the powdermagazine threatened ruin, its side-walls being much injured. The palisades round the covered way were completely destroyed; many guns were dismounted; many of the casemates were so untenable, that on the morning of the said 25th, in No. 1, where the head-quarters were established, the enemy's grenades killed two men and wounded eleven. The fort being thus no longer capable of defence, the enemy might have actively assaulted it, protected by the embankments of the railroad, which ran along the fortress at a short distance. In effect, our spies brought word that the assault would take place on the morning of the 27th. It is to be observed that Malghera has no buildings surrounding it. The water of the ditches is often very low,-a circumstance which is mentioned in General Thurn's report to Radetzky.

The third parallel was epened by the enemy on the 25th, and continued its fire till the night of the 26th, when the defence ceased.

Though I had entire confidence in the zeal and intelligence of Colonel Ulloa, yet I went frequently to Malghera, to comfort the garrison with kind words, and thank them in the name of all Italy for the intrepidity and resignation which they exhibited on every occasion. They read on my countenance an unfeigned affection, so much so that they would not tell me their grievances when I questioned them, for fear of giving me pain.

When I arrived on the place, the enemy's fire, if it had been suspended for a moment, immediately recommenced; and this was attributed to the white plume on my hat, which was visible even in the plains of Mestre.

I had a valet-de-chambre named Theodore, who had never before left Paris, nor seen the sea. He showed the greatest courage in all my vicissitudes, and complained that I would not let him follow me when I approached the enemy's fire, and earnestly begged to be allowed to accompany me everywhere. I was surprised at an intrepidity in the midst of balls, bombs, and grenades, which might have done honour to an old soldier of the Imperial Guard. He diverted himself with

picking up the projectiles, assisted by some of the soldiers, and bringing them to my gondola. When I went to Colonel Ulloa's quarters, or to a place where the shots were unusually thick, I told him not to follow me, because he was already sufficiently exposed to peril, without seeking what was needless, and that his loss would be a serious evil to me, for I could not replace him without injury to the public service.

Among other articles published by Vari, a man of intelligent and truly Italian mind, I read that, on returning one evening from the fort, I said to him, "If Tasso had come to Malghera, he would readily find the originals of his heroes." In fact, I had given Lieut.-Col. Rosaroll the name of "Argante of the Lagoon."

I am averse to exaggeration, and I do not exceed the bounds of truth when I affirm, that the wounded of Malghera, while their arms and legs were being amputated, continued to exclaim "Viva l' Italia." A Lombard engineer, wounded in the foot by the splinter of a bomb, himself encouraged his companion who assisted in the amputation. In the

lunette, No. 13, the enemy's artillery threw down the Italian flag: Lieut.-Colonel Rosaroll went to replace it, but an artillery man envied him the danger, and ran to the mound where it was fixed, saying, "Do not touch it." An old patrician, a cavalry soldier of Napoleon's, went to Malghera to visit his sons who were in one of the valiant companies of Bandiera and Moro: a shell struck him dead; the son fell on his father to save him, and the shell burst leaving both corpses entwined. I left to some officers the charge of collecting the isolated facts which happened in Malghera, and along the batteries in front of Venice, exposed to the enemy's balls, which facts might show how much patriotism there is in the minds of the Italian youths. I am ignorant whether these desires were accomplished. I remember that I have contracted a debt towards the heroic companies of Bandiera and Moro, a debt which I have not been, and never shall be, able to pay. In one of my many reviews, I was so satisfied with their conduct, that I promised to have printed a statement of their names, of the native communes of each, of the days on

which their entire corps had combated, and of the particular facts by which they had had the glory to distinguish themselves. But the enemy gave us so much to do, that there was no time to execute the promised work.

In the meantime, the government and myself, united in council, came to the following decision:—

"The Provisional Government of Venice, considering that Malghera is an artificial and not impregnable fortress, especially in presence of a determined enemy who have numerous forces and abundant materials of war at their disposal;

"Considering that the exigences of military honour are fully satisfied by the signal proofs of talent, courage, and perseverance, which the garrison and their excellent commander have displayed in repulsing the enemy's repeated and furious assaults, and in occasioning them severe loss;

"Considering that strategic reasons, and especially the necessity of economising our ammunition and money, in order to prolong the resistance, demand that the defence of Venice should be reduced within its natural limits which are really impregnable;

"The General-in-Chief and the heads of the Government departments of War and Marine decree,

- "1. The Fort of Malghera shall be evacuated.
- "2. Colonel Girolamo Ulloa, Commandant of the said Fort, is charged with the execution of this decree. "Manin, President.

" VENICE, 26th May, 1849."

In general, the garrison of a place suffering so much fatigue and so many losses, is rejoiced when surrender or evacuation is announced; but in Malghera they bade a sorrowful adieu to their cannons, and embraced them with tears in their eyes.

The retreat into Venice was accomplished with so much order and secrecy, that the besiegers were not at first aware of it. Half an hour before midnight the garrison had entered Venice, carrying with them the wounded, the dead, and even their woollen coverings. The enemy were so accustomed to see themselves assaulted, or repulsed with vol. 11.

vigour, that, in spite of the unaccustomed silence of the batteries of the fort, they did not venture on an exploration, but continued their fire till half-past five in the morning of the 27th, and then, with much precaution, they issued from their trenches and occupied the fort.

The losses which the garrison of Malghera had suffered in killed and wounded were about five hundred men. The nearer the enemy advanced, the more their shells increased. The number of their killed and wounded appeared greater than ours in the daily reports, but when the third parallel was opened, the daily loss became exorbitant for their numbers. Had Malghera been an independent place, like Antwerp, we might, for the honour of our arms, have waited for an assault, supposing the loss not to have been such as to compromise the defence. But in Malghera not only had there been more honour earned than was necessary, but its garrison had become essential to the defence of all the Lagoon. Between the killed, the wounded, and the sick, our numbers were alarmingly diminished. Those of the victorious enemy, on the contrary, were always

increasing; and it is for this reason that it would have been more useful for the defence to have remained even a shorter time in Malghera than we actually did.

After the evacuation of Malghera, the bad effects of not having in right time blown up the requisite number of arches of the great bridge appeared more plainly. In fact, the mines under the arches were badly charged, because this had to be done in haste, and under the fire of the enemy, who were now in possession of Malghera: and, moreover, these mines were beyond the reach of our cannons in the place. The blowing-up of these, with the ruins of the bridge, formed a sort of breach in which the enemy lodged themselves. From thence, in answer to our direct fire (for our battery on the Piazzale had only seven cannons), they attacked us with their parabolic lines.

At the same time, and in spite of my repeated orders, the commander of artillery and engineers had neglected the indispensable defences of St. Secondo and the works which were ordered at St. Giuliano.

The above-named accidents might have

been fatal; that they were not so, was owing, on one side, to the slowness of the enemy, and on the other to the great activity and intelligence of Ulloa and Cosenz. As both had distinguished themselves most highly in the defence of Malghera, I proposed Ulloa for the rank of General of Brigade, and Cosenz for that of Lieutenant-Colonel, and I obtained the two brevets. I gave Ulloa the command of all the front of the defence, and I left Cosenz under his orders, with the Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, Mezzacapo, and Rosaroll, and Majors Virgilio, and Carrano, who all conducted themselves admirably. They all belonged to my staff, which was composed of officers of several provinces in Italy. Major Pegozzi, a Bolognese, was in bed with a musket-ball in his thigh. Major Cattabene was in Rome, being a deputy there. Fabbrizi was also in Rome, sent there by me. Antonio Mordini was in Florence, Minister of Foreign Affairs. I had known intimately the staffs of Massena in Calabria, and of Suchet in Spain. I had been twice in the squadron, in which were those of Cesar Berthier and Dongolet at Corfu.

My staff in Venice did not yield to either of these, either in intelligence, valour, or activity. And truly, without this activity and intelligence, the errors and neglects I have pointed out could not have been repaired. Thanks to the works which General Ulloa executed on the bridge, and in St. Secondo, the valour of the troops, of the artillery and of the officers of the navy, on light boats, maintained our uninterrupted superiority under the enemy's fire, till the surrender. This fire was continued without interruption day or night, for the space of nearly three months, without forcing us to a surrender, which was obtained only from want of bread, and saltpetre for gunpowder.

In order that Venice and its garrison might be informed of the evacuation of Malghera, I published the following Order of the Day:—

"Commander-in-Chief of the Troops in the Venetian States. Order of the Day.

"The garrison of Malghera, which Colonel Ulloa commanded, has merited the admiration of the Venetian government, and of the General-in-Chief, and will obtain the applause of all Italy, when the history of this siege, sustained against such immense superiority of numbers both in troops and artillery on the part of the enemy, is known.

" If, for the duration of the defence, I had consulted only the daring, the patriotism, the invincible valour, which feared nothing, which braved all fatigue, and with which the defenders of the place were animated, it might have been sustained some days longer, and our men would have repulsed more than one assault. But the Government, the Generalin-Chief, the Council of Defence, all decided on its evacuation, reflecting that the loss of Malghera would not compromise the security of the Lagoon; that the 150 cannons of the enemy would have diminished our means of defence; that, in fine, we must preserve these intrepid defenders for our city and for the Estuary. Malghera was, therefore, abandoned in the course of last night, and the retreat was effected with the greatest order.

"If we have many irreparable losses to deplore, the number of the enemy's leaves them no cause for rejoicing. Of our entire garrison of 2500 men, 400 are hors de combat. The people of Venice and of Italy must be aware, that there is no place on terra firma which must not yield to a regular siege, and that the enemy employed against Malghera more than sufficient means for the reduction of a place of the first order, while it was at most one of the third order.

"The enemy will bear testimony to the deplorable state to which Malghera was reduced. The powder magazines, although shell-proof and covered with sacks of earth, were greatly damaged and rendered unserviceable; the casemates were insecure; the platforms and parapets were destroyed; in fine, many guns were rendered useless. Nevertheless, order was so well maintained, that posterity may well say, that the Italians were deficient in nothing, not even in discipline.

" G. PEPE."

The menacing activity, and incessant fire which the enemy employed against the capital, did not prevent me from showing the Austrians that their numerical superiority in men and artillery was far from making us despond. I therefore gave Rizzardi, a General of Division who commanded the district of Chioggia, the necessary *matériel* for a sortie, which I authorised him to make.

My object was to maintain the vivid conviction of their own valour in the minds of the soldiers, and also to obtain as many provisions as possible for the Estuary. The sortie was executed by General Rizzardi. The particulars of it will be found in the following Order of the Day, with the report sent me by the said General.

Order of the Day.

" VENICE, 23rd May, 1849.

"In order that the military of Venice, who for a whole year have defended the Estuary with glory and perseverance, may know that their companions in arms of the 3rd district, commanded by the General of Division Rizzardi, conduct themselves on all occasions with zeal and valour, the General-in-Chief transcribes faithfully the report he has received from the said General, with a view to the welfare of the military service.

"G. PEPE,
"Commander-in-Chief."

Report of the Expedition from Brondolo.

" The 22nd May, 1849.

"The object of the sorties hitherto executed by me was to reconnoitre the forces and movements of the enemy, and not to obtain provisions. I now feared to recal the enemy in greater force on this side, lest they should rigorously intercept the arrival of provisions, which hitherto had come in daily; I had not sufficient forces, after the occupation of the extended line of defence from the Brenta to the sea, to open the passages blockaded by the enemy.

"Having discovered that the Austrians intended to make a requisition in the country round us, in order to take away the resources of Venice, I immediately determined to forestal them; and with great secresy I prepared the expedition already announced, and with my previous number, of which I will give a detailed account in this report.

"The scope of this was to levy a simultaneous requisition of cattle of all kinds, in the whole territory of which Brondolo forms the centre, and which extends from Piove to the Adige and the sea; and thus not to give the enemy time to oppose in future my operations on those tracts of land which I had not explored. For this purpose I divided my forces into three partial columns, of which the first and the strongest was commanded by the brave Colonel Morandi, who on so many occasions had proved his worth; this was composed of four companies of the Euganeo legion, and 100 men of the 2nd regiment; 570 in all, who had orders to penetrate along the Bacchiglione, on the right of Brondolo, beyond Casa Bianca, towards Civi, Treporti, and Correzuolo.

"The second column, commanded by Major Matterazzo, composed of two companies of the Euganeo legion, and 160 men of the Alpine legion, in all 360 men, was to explore all the ground in the centre, that is, on the right and left bank of the Canal of Vale, composed within the Adige, the Cavanella, and the Gorzone.

"In fine, the third column, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Calvi, and composed of 140 men of his legion, was to beat the ground on the left, that is between Basiola, the sea, and the Adige. "These dispositions being made, I ordered the ships of war and the Commander of Engineers, Major Chiavacci, to effect the passage of the said troops from the Brenta; a difficult passage, as we are deprived of the bridges and boats suitable for it.

"At dawn of day, on the 22nd, all the troops were in motion beyond the Brenta; from Brondolo I overlooked all their movements, ready to give the directions which circumstances might require.

"The expedition everywhere encountered the enemy, and everywhere repulsed them with loss, showing plainly in this encounter the valour and courage of our troops, and of the officers commanding them.

"The first column encountered the enemy opposite Civi; they were kept at bay by our vanguard, and by a sharp and constant fire from their muskets. The principal corps of the column then pushed on before Treporti, in order to levy their demands in all the neighbouring territory, and with favourable results; after which the column returned in military order towards Brondolo, sustaining with imperturbable coolness the redoubled

attacks of the enemy, who, with reinforcements and a field-battery, in vain endeavoured to stop them.

"The second column met the enemy at Cavanella, on the right of the Adige. They first began the fire, but without doing us any damage, as we were protected by the parapets of the fort; the enemy had a sentinel killed. In the meantime the requisitions were duly made, and the return was effected in good order, under a sharp fire from the enemy, who descended with a force of more than 350 men, and a piece of artillery which they had not time to use.

"The column of Lieut.-Colonel Calvi, having passed the Adige, and effected the requisitions ordered, returned back upon the Porto Caleri, and took prisoners the entire Austrian corps stationed there, who, however, made a brisk but useless resistance. The same column arrested a man named Vincenzo Belluzzo, a perverse character, and an abettor of the Austrians, who came in the first instance from them.

"The result of the expedition was the bringing in of three hundred oxen, four hogs, twelve horses of various ages, and a great provision of wine, eggs, poultry, &c., all which, profiting by the opportunity, entered safely into Chioggia. Besides this, there were eight prisoners, among whom a corporal, an under-corporal, and two scouts, who being dexterous at the oar, are destined to conduct the Austrian patrols along the rivers and canals. Moreover, the enemy must have suffered no small loss both in killed and wounded.

"On our side, we have only to deplore the loss of one man of the 2nd regiment, Pietro Doni, struck by a ball in the chest in the encounter of Civi.

"In general I have great reason to praise the discipline and valour of all the troops, as well as the ability, zeal, and intrepidity of the staff, especially of Colonel Morandi, and of Major Matterazzo, and Lieut.-Colonel Calvi, commanding the columns; also of the Major of Engineers, Chiavacci, who made a hasty bridge on the Brentono, and there, with pirogues and armed boats, guarded this important point of retreat. Majors Gandini, Stucchi, Capitani, Maiset, Mataigne, and Lieutenant Matticola, all effectively contri-

buted to the success of the expedition. In fine, Major Gheltof and Captain Sugana made the most laudable efforts in expediting the reinforcements and the reserve. Praise is also due to Basilisco, captain of a frigate; to Lieutenant Rossi, and in general to the whole navy, for their promptitude in preparing the maritime forces necessary for the operation, and their efficacious assistance in saving the cattle from the waves.

"Captain Oliveri also, of the Alpine legion, deserves special mention for his vigorous assistance in taking the Austrian prisoners at Caleri; and I should also recommend for a proper recompense Sergeants Boscurolo and Candiani, and Cuman, a soldier of the Euganeo legion; the former of these killed two of the enemy; the second, a subaltern officer; and all united in effecting the requisition under the enemy's fire. In fine, I recommend Illich, a marine of the 2nd class, who swam several times beyond the Brenta to aid the passage of the cattle.

" RIZZARDI,

" Inspector-General.

"CHIOGGIA, 22nd May, 1849."

About this time arrived the answers made by the cabinets of London and Paris to the prayer which had been addressed to them, in the name of Venice, at the beginning of the Ware, writing on Venice, thus exmonth. presses himself :- "These answers were evidently framed in concert; they agreed in counselling peace with Austria, and prompt efforts to obtain concessions from that power, in whatever shape. The two despatches differed only in form: that of Lord Palmerston spoke of the Treaty of Vienna, to which Great Britain was a contracting party, and by which Venice was made a part of the Austrian Empire; that of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys was not less unjust; it lamented the irreparable errors committed by Italy; it expressed compassion for Venice, which must necessarily submit to the consequences, without deserving reproach; and hinted that a general war, which would be terrible to all, could alone have impeded the triumph of Austria. Thus wrote the French minister, expressing sympathy for the cause of Italian liberty on the 27th of April, that is, only three days before the French army set out to combat that same liberty under the walls of Rome, and in conjunction with Austria."

Venice was now deprived of every hope of aid, either by arms or mediation. In the whole Lagoon we combated for the glory of the Italian arms; we combated to show the world that our misfortunes were not merited, and, therefore, that although the wisdom and justice of Providence had permitted them, it would never allow them to be of long duration.

After the evacuation of Malghera, I dictated the following Order of the Day:—

" VENICE, 30th May.

"SOLDIERS OF VENICE,

"A year has passed since the eyes of Europe have been fixed on you; and the cause which with such alacrity, such valour, and such disinterestedness, you have undertaken to defend, is now confessed to be sacred.

"It is not unknown, that the months of last summer were passed by you alternately between sickness, privations, and arduous reconnoissances round the Lagoon. The results of the day of Mestre made Italian hearts rejoice; and the same will be the case when the defence of Malghera is known, which fort, in a mere strategic point of view, you evacuated with an order worthy of the most expert soldiers. The defence of Brondolo, of Treporti, and of classical Venice will not be less applauded.

"But in the midst of all the virtues you have given proof of, and which we yet further expect from you, I still inculcate the preservation of that rigid discipline which I admired in your ranks, while you sustained, unmoved, the innumerable shots of which Malghera was the mark. Your retreat from that place equalled a high feat of arms, since no fortress on terra firma is impregnable; and Malghera is a place of the third order.

"Continue worthy of your ancestors, and remember that perseverance is the crowning virtue of a soldier. Your glorious antecedents will be forgotten, if discipline is not maintained among you; by that alone, you can accomplish your firm purpose of conquering at all costs. The more fierce the struggle, the greater the necessity of increasing you. II.

order; thus alone your courage, and that of your leaders, will give you the right to say, with pride, during the rest of your life, 'I was one of the defenders of immortal Venice.'

"Guglielmo Pepe,
"Lieut.-General Commander-in-Chief."

I shall conclude this chapter by transcribing the following particulars from the Gazette of Augsburg, on the evacuation of Malghera.

"At midnight of the 26th, the fire of the fort ceased; but our batteries continued to bombard till dawn; then the fort was discovered to be abandoned, and was occupied by our troops. But our joy at the taking of Malghera was soon diminished. Some of the officers went with their men to take possession of the fort of St. Giuliano, and were blown into the air by a mine. Four officers were killed, and one wounded. Many soldiers perished—(hitherto we have found but thirty-five bodies)—and many were wounded. Another mine was discovered, but we were in time to take away the match before it exploded. At half-past eleven, I entered the

fort of Malghera. In every street, on the right and the left, were to be seen horrible traces of the bombardment; and as I advanced, the scene became still more appalling. It is impossible to form an idea of the state of destruction to which this fort is reduced. It is impossible to walk a step without falling into holes made by the bombs; the ground is strewed with fragments; there is not a building, not a cottage, which is not reduced to a heap of ruins. None of the guns can serve again.

"To honour, praise should be given. The garrison of Malghera behaved most valiantly, and here every one acknowledges that no troops could have resisted longer."

CHAPTER X.

Rapid sketch of offensive and defensive preparations in the second period of the siege of the Lagoon.—Letter of Tomaseo on the Dalmatian Company, and answer.—Report of Gen. Rizzardi, from Chioggia, on the enemy's squadron.—The Author called to the Presidence of the Military Commission, with other powers.—Order of the day.—Enrolment for the Navy service. Correspondence with Hungary.—Negotiation with De Bruck.—Letter from the Cardinal Patriarch.—Answer.—Death of Rosaroll.—Order of the day.

While Malghera and its vicinity were exposed to the constant fire of the enemy, and wounds, mutilation, and death, were the daily fate of so many noble volunteers, my mind was in a state of constant anguish, which was increased by the idea that the population of Venice, and of Chioggia, would soon be exposed to the same misfortunes. Chioggia is a city of 30,000 inhabitants; and now that the Austrians have no other enemy in Italy to combat, they may probably besiege that place.

Among the troops then in Venice were many distinguished Neapolitan artillery officers. My own experience made me know how far the enemy could injure the capital, in spite of all the valorous efforts and the intelligence with which these officers endeavoured to neutralise in part the effect of the vast preparations made by the enemy in front of their attack. In 1810 I was with King Murat, when, with a French army of 30,000 men, he threatened to invade Sicily; his tent was erected in the camp of Piale, and we, who belonged to his military establishment, had our tents around his.

The English, who defended the island, gave their cannons of large calibre an elevation of forty-five degrees, and they sent the balls from their batteries constructed on the Sicilian shore, not only to our tents, but far beyond them. They continued their fire, night and day, for four or five months; and at night the bombs and grenades had the appearance of stars describing a parabola, and formed a beautiful spectacle.

In this second period of the defence of the Estuary, that is, after the evacuation of Malghera, the Austrians prepared for the attack of Venice and Chioggia. To become masters of the latter city they were obliged to besiege the fort of Brondolo. For this purpose they began to construct batteries on the right bank of the Brenta, in order to pass that river, and then attack the entrenched camp adjoining the fort. We shall soon see why their operations were fruitless in that part of the Lagoon, which was distant from Venice twenty miles by water, and forty by land. But, though they did not succeed in making themselves masters of that town, it was certainly much damaged by their attacks.

They established batteries, opposite those which we had on the bridge, in the Island of St. Giuliano, from whence they did us the most injury. They had other batteries on terra firma towards Campalto and Fusino. The enemy's batteries in St. Giuliano were rather more than 3,000 yards distant from the capital.

Our means of defence consisted in the batteries on the bridge, and those of San Secondo, besides many pirogues and other armed boats, all of which took up positions very near the enemy's batteries.

The first battery on the bridge, called the

Piazzale, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz, Colonel Rosaroll, Captain Martini, and two other Captains. All five, alternately, took the command. Two of these were killed by cannon balls, and two were wounded. This battery was almost totally destroyed three or four times, and each time it was rapidly reconstructed. About forty of the mountings, which were struck and broken by the enemy's projectiles, had to be replaced. One day a grenade blew up the powder magazine; thirteen artillerymen were either killed or wounded; but, nevertheless, the others continued their work as if no disaster had happened. Colonel Rosaroll himself commanded the fire of the guns.

San Secondo had also more than one commander. Among them were Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, and Major Virgilio. It would not be easy to describe their activity in creating all the requisites for defence. On taking the command, Sirtori found that everything was to be done; there were few pieces in the batteries, few parapets, neither casements nor blindaggi. All these were made under the fire of the enemy. Seeing

Sirtori under a cloth tent, instead of a blindaggio, I wrote and spoke to Vice-Admiral Graziani to have one speedily constructed, in order to protect the officers of the garrison from the bombs and grenades of the enemy, when their duties did not call them to the batteries.

The line of defence was commanded by General Ulloa; but, when he became a member of the military commission, Colonel Cosenz took the command. I had no occasion in my inspections to recommend activity and energy. But the operation of clearing the waters of the Lagoon under the bridge, filled as they were with ruins of the arches which had been more or less effectively blown up, proved a very arduous one; and the number of killed and wounded, among the workmen who were in the boats, was very considerable.

Tomaseo, a man of thoroughly Italian sentiments, as all knew, is a native of Dalmatia. Of the strangers who came to defend Venice, the numbers were reduced to one hundred and fifty in all, who formed three companies; one Swiss, one Dalmatian, and another Hungarian. For some fault committed, the Dalmatian company was dissolved: and Tomaseo wrote to me as follows:—

The Dalmatians, to his Excellency General Guglielmo Pepe.

"You, learned in the arts of war, who have seen so much of the history of Europe pass before your eyes, and have borne a part in it,-you, General, better than myself, know the estimation in which Napoleon held the Dalmatians, and how the Venetian Republic owed them her last victories; you know in what manner the Dalmatian soldiers united sincerity with firmness, and firmness with impetuosity. Had it depended on you, you would certainly not have permitted that a company of a few soldiers, of divers countries, should take the title of Dalmatians; because truth, even in trifling things, should reign among the free, and a name is not a trifling thing. The company was composed of fewer than fifty men, and the Dalmatians among them did not number ten. It being desired that these should be incorporated in a Swiss company,

they complained at having to leave off their native cap, and at being mixed with those whose language was German, and with soldiers who were not their own countrymen. spite of this, they remained for some time united with the Swiss, and combated one night in their company. They had been for forty hours, not in guard of the lunette, but simply in reserve, when Lieutenant Carava, the descendant of honourable soldiers, a man who fortunately served eight years in the maritime militia without a stain, seeing the rain falling, ordered his company to place themselves under cover, that their arms might remain dry and ready for use, and they obeyed. Carava, by not giving notice to his captain, certainly sinned against discipline,-ever a great fault, but especially in these times, and in Italy, where military discipline, almost unknown, needs to be vigorously enforced. But Carava did not refuse to affront danger; there was no danger to affront. At the first alarm he could, with his men, resume his post; and when, soon after, they went in search of his company, the men were all found under arms. This act, in

short, might be called a caprice, but there was not a shadow of cowardice. At all events, the fault was in him who commanded. and not in the company which obeyed, and which, as I said, was not composed of Dalmatians. The Lieutenant having been placed under arrest, they asked, not tumultuously, but respectfully, for his liberation, because they loved him; and this sentiment was honourable to both parties, although, in a besieged fort, it was not the manner in which to manifest affection. They were therefore disarmed; the company was dissolved; and the men dispersed among other troops. Two only were brought to trial; and the other soldiers, hearing they had left their post, and believing it was from fear, condemned them too severely.

"To you, illustrious warrior, to whom honour is as precious as discipline, it will be a satisfaction to know that these few, called to defend a sacred banner, have not shown themselves unworthy, and that they may soon repair the fault of insubordination by noble examples. Accept, I pray, my cordial thanks, and those of many others, for all that

you and your worthy fellow-countrymen have done and suffered for Venice and Italy.

"Your affect.,

" N. TOMASEO.

" VENICE, 3rd June, 1849."

This letter shows, in the same person, an intense love for his native, and for his adopted, country. I answered as follows:—

"My mind is deeply moved by the tenderness you show towards the Dalmatians, whose virtues I have long admired. If, during the past months, the Sardinian Vice-Admiral had condescended, with the squadron commanded by him, to support the expedition I proposed to make in Dalmatia with the Venetian troops, it certainly would have been very advantageous to Italy. Instead of a few Dalmatians in the company bearing their name, an entire legion would have arrived, and have been most useful in the defence of the Estuary.

"Thanks to the perseverance of immortal Venice, and to so many proofs of heroic valour which the Italians have given in the Lagoon, in Milan, Brescia, Bologna, and Rome, our cause is not lost. In the midst of the vicissitudes of this war of independence, it is possible that the brave Dalmatians may still appear with glory in the Italian ranks, and may make the world speak of them again, as it did in the war which the Venetian Republic sustained, when her name resounded amid the regions of the East.

"Yours, &c.,

"G. PEPE.

" VENICE, 7th June, 1849."

To give some idea of the situation of the Lagoon, I will transcribe two reports sent to me from the opposite quarters of General Rizzardi, in Chioggia, and General Ulloa, on the railroad.

"To the Commander of the Troops in Venice.

"CHIOGGIA, 6th June, 1849.

"SINCE dawn yesterday morning, the enemy's fleet had been anchored four miles from our coast. This day their frigate hoisted sail, and, towed by two steam-boats, took the direction of the Levant; the other vessels followed this example, and went off to the right and left, while the steamers have gone out towards Caorle. At the hour I am writing, one corvette and one brigantine alone remain in these parts.

"Both yesterday and to-day, the fort of Brondolo, as well as the line of the Brenta, discharged a few guns against the enemy's works, and especially against those which are situated near the Ghiacciaja; they were effectively aided by the fort St. Michael, and compelled the enemy to abandon the position and take to flight. Ca' Lino, also, and the new fort, fired several discharges against the enemy's steamers, which endeavoured to approach: they were obliged to put out to sea, and get near Ca' Leri, out of the reach of our guns. There was said to have been some brisk firing at Ca' Lino, last night, with the enemy's patrols and picquets. We had three men wounded.

"INSPECTOR-GENERAL RIZZARDI."

From the railroad, on the 8th of June, General Ulloa wrote to the Commander-in-Chief as follows:— "The useful and zealous service of our batteries and armed boats, still retards considerably the progress of the enemy's works. Thus, yesterday, about mid-day, a bomb, aimed with singular precision from the battery on the middle bridge, blew up a deposit of powder in St. Giuliano, causing the enemy a considerable loss of time and men.

"Besides the usual reconnoissances from the right wing, two pirogues of the left accomplished, during the night, another bold expedition, under the orders of Major Rudelli, against a work of the enemy which had been observed at the mouth of the canal Botterrighi. They approached the point stealthily. While the two pirogues occupied the adversary with a continual fire, fifty brave men of the corps of marine infantry and of the crews of that division, led by Captain Luigi Talento, landed on the opposite shore, and compelled the enemy, after a long and sharp combat, to suspend their fire and give up the position. This affair cost us only four men wounded.

"On the same shores were discovered this morning some fresh pieces, placed there probably with the intention of taking our left division in flank.

"From the enemy's eagerness to concentrate on this point all the means of attack they could dispose of, it was evident how much they feared for the safety of their position; and this was a fresh reason to praise the intrepidity of our men, who, in front of a fire every day more severe, and from which we have already experienced many losses, yet remain immovably and perseveringly at their post of honour.

"GENERAL ULLOA."

What most annoyed me and the artillery officers was the scarcity of gunpowder. To injure the enemy's batteries, and make them, from time to time, suspend or diminish their fire, it was necessary not to spare our own shots, which were sufficiently well directed by our young artillery-men, whose patriotism, and warm desire to injure the enemy, supplied their want of experience. An entire battalion of Neapolitan volunteers was transferred to the artillery service, and, after short instruction, they served the pieces with a

precision of which I should not have thought them capable if I had not witnessed it. The enemy's artillery found it necessary to repair the damage they had received oftener than we did. But these advantages over the Austrians would cease when we were compelled to economise our powder, of which we wanted, using it largely, not less than ten measures a day.

These circumstances, and the many errors in the management of the naval division, and in the various branches of the administration, induced the assembly to nominate a military commission both for land and sea affairs, with ample powers, independent of the President of the government. It was composed of General Ulloa, Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, and Baldiserotti, an officer of the navy. Though the commission was to exercise that part of the military power which had belonged to the government, independently of the Commanderin-Chief, still, as I had told them that, in the state of siege in which we were placed, the Commander-in-Chief was continually paralysed by what was called the Ministry or Direction of War, both the government and

the military commission named me President; and the assembly, at its first meeting, issued the following decree:—

"The Assembly of Representatives of the States of Venice, in the name of God and the people, decree their sanction of the appointment of the illustrious General Pepe, by the government and the military commission, to be President of the said commission.

"GIOVANNI MINOTTO, President.
G. PASINI,
G. B. BUFFINI,
A. SOMNIA,
P. VALASSI,

Secretaries.

"VENICE, 30th June, 1849."

My first Order of the Day in my new capacity of General-in-Chief and President of the commission was as follows:—

"Soldiers of every grade, on land and at sea, defenders of Italian independence in Venice!

"Called to the presidence of the military commission instituted by the National Assembly with new powers, it is my duty to tell you that in these supreme moments, when the enemy's attacks are on the Lagoon itself, we are more than ever called on to show invincible valour, and to surpass even Mestre and Malghera.

"Strength is ever based on discipline, and that on blind obedience. The higher the grade, the more essential it is, since the example of the first is ever the best. I shall be inexorable in punishing all failures. Whoever in these important circumstances does not justify the faith which the country has placed in him — whoever should entertain, under whatever pretext, the thought of abandoning his post, which has become more arduous in our present condition — will be considered by the country as guilty of the crime of high treason.

"But you, instead of punishment, will know how to merit rewards, which you will receive both from me and your contemporaries; and these will be more truly appreciated by you, for they will go down to posterity.

"Europe, Italy, have their eyes on you.

The wonderful deeds which for fourteen centuries honoured Venice will receive new lustre from your present virtue.

"Let us prove ourselves worthy of the difficulties in which the destinies of this classical land have placed us. Let us so act, that, even beyond the Alps, men of intrepid hearts may say, 'Why was not I too among the difficulties and dangers with which Venice, the bravely defended, was environed?'

G. PEPE.

"General-in-Chief, President of the Military Commission, &c. &c.

"VENICE, 18th June, 1849."

Though I knew nothing of naval affairs, yet, if alone, or as president of a commission with other powers, I had, on my arrival in Venice, been entrusted with the organisation of such a naval division as should be capable of combating the Austrians with advantage, I should certainly have succeeded. Public opinion and profound examination would have enabled me to establish a worthy council for sea affairs; and by employing these means with vigour and a determined will, I should have accomplished my purpose.

But the evil was done; it was irreparable; and the remedy came too late.

Neither of the three Vice-Admirals persevered in keeping the command of the division; and neither enjoyed the confidence of their subordinates. In the space of a year, by giving difficult missions to chosen officers against the Austrians in the Adriatic, some among them would have acquired sufficient fame to deserve the command of the active naval forces. Besides this, with great authority and determination, two steam frigates might have been purchased. The Venetian sailors and naval officers were acknowledged, both by the French and English, to be better than the Austrian; it was, therefore, necessary only to be superior also in sailing and steam vessels.

After I was named President of the commission, all hope of augmenting the feeble number of our vessels being gone, I told the council of defence that we must perform, if not desperate, at least very daring acts, and I pointed out Napier's deeds on the Portuguese coast. But desperate deeds emanate from the minds of those who do them, and cannot be commanded. The defence of Thermopylæ, the bold manœuvre of Nelson against the Danish fleet, the blowing up of Vigliena, near Naples, were deeds which were performed, but not commanded. Sometimes I thought of placing some of the commanders of war vessels between the alternative of acquiring military fame, or eternal dishonour by degradation in the public piazza. But the members of the commission and of the government said to me, "Too late! too late!" Nevertheless, my fatal genius, which never despaired, led me on board some of the ships of war, where I endeavoured, by encouraging words, to raise the minds of the officers, the gunners, and mariners. Some time after I reviewed the entire naval division; and after the review I published the following Order of the Day :-

" VENICE, 3rd July, 1849.

"YESTERDAY, the General-in-Chief and President of the Military Commission reviewed the naval division commanded by Bucchia, captain of a corvette. The General's first object was to be assured of the spirit which

animates the officers and sailors of the navv. Though it be difficult to read the thoughts of individuals, those of a multitude, when we are in the habit of studying them, are more easily divined. The sailors, and gunners of the marine artillery, showed themselves satisfied with the care of their young and valiant officers. But above all they manifested great impatience to prove by deeds to their contemporaries, that they know how to vie with the land troops in valour and in all patriotic actions. The General then told them that if the military of the Estuary had rendered themselves formidable by the use of the bayonet, the mariners, to follow the same object, must hasten to board ships; that in this manner Admiral Napier, with a feeble frigate, had taken a vessel of the line from Don Miguel near Lisbon.

"The General was rejoiced to observe that the sailors needed no spur, and they seemed to say, 'The praises which the valorous soldiers in Mestre and Malghera have so justly earned on the batteries which face Venice, seem to take away all honour from us.'

"Among other unequivocal proofs of the

eager desire to combat, one was given by Lieut. Galandrea, of the Marine Artillery. He belonged to the brigantine S. Marco, and being promoted from a sergeant to an officer, he begged his superiors to let him continue to serve as sergeant, on condition that he should remain on the vessel honoured by such a classical name, and that they should soon encounter the enemy.

"The General-in-Chief can assure the people of Venice, that the naval division, though weak in numbers, will always do honour to the ancient Queen of the seas.

" G. PEPE."

A few days before I reviewed the naval division in the hope of obtaining some advantage from it, the commission which I presided over published the following:—

"THE Commission of War and Marine, having full powers; considering that the glory of Venice was always on the sea; considering that by nature and in history she was always declared the Queen of the Adriatic; considering that her collective

forces should be on a par with her history and her elevated destiny;

" DECREES,

- "1, That an appeal shall be made to all the young men of the Venetian states for a voluntary enrolment in the service of the navy.
- "2. The enrolment shall be binding for the duration of the present war of independence.
- "3. For the city of Venice and the districts of defence, this enrolment shall take place at the commission instituted for this purpose in St. Biaggio, and in the third district at the military transport office, under the superintendence of the local war commission, always with the intervention of a naval officer.
- "4. The departments of War and Marine are charged with the execution of that part of the present decree which regards them.

"GUGLIELMO PEPE, President.
GIROLAMO ULLOA,
GIUSEPPE SIRTORI,
FRANCESCO BALDISEROTTI."

[&]quot;VENICE, 20th June, 1849."

The want of powder being as great a calamity as the want of bread, the war commission decreed that all the powder possessed by private persons should be given up. We hastened to fabricate as much as could be made from the raw materials existing in the Estuary, and I often sent to the commander of the batteries to slacken his fire as much as that of the enemy would permit. Admiral Graziani showed the greatest activity and good will in assisting the commanders of our batteries with all the matériel he could draw from the arsenal.

At that time the Venetian government was informed of the nomination of Louis Kossuth as President-Governor of the Hungarian republic, and a letter was also received from his diplomatic chargé d'affaires, engaging Venice to resist for two months, and requesting that some one might be sent to treat of arrangement with them: this letter was dated the 19th of May. By means of a French gun-boat, citizen Lodovico Parini, Vice-President of the Assembly, was dispatched. He concluded a convention with the Hungarian envoy, by which the govern-

ment of Debreczin engaged to assist Venice with a sum of money, to expedite two frigates purchased in England, and then (as they hoped) to make a powerful diversion in Italy against the Austrian troops as speedily as possible. Splendid promises, which might have changed the face of affairs, if that generous nation had been in a position to accomplish them. But the communications, intercepted by Austria, were become so difficult, that the Hungarian envoy, to give notice to his government of the urgent peril in which Venice was placed, found no other safe means of sending his despatches from Ancona to Debreczin than by Constantinople. Our hopes on that side, therefore, were sufficiently distant; and yet we reckoned on them much! A few days after, the envoy was obliged to fly from Ancona, which was besieged by the Austrians, though at Venice we knew nothing of it.

Parini had not returned from his conference with the agent of Kossuth, and the termination of his agreement was not yet known, when a despatch reached the Venetian government from Signor De Bruck, Minister

of Commerce at Vienna, who was at that moment in Italy to negotiate the peace with Piedmont. Referring to the expressions which Manin had used in his answer to Marshal Radetzky as to the direct attempts at negotiation which might be commenced with the Imperial cabinet, it declared that De Bruck was authorised to receive any communication made from the head-quarters of Mestre. This letter was brought to the assembly by Manin on the same day on which the treaty with Hungary, above related, became known.

It was not without astonishment that the letter of Signor De Bruck was discussed. Austria was now the first to open a negotiation which, fifteen days before, she had so uncourteously repulsed, even refusing a safe conduct to the French ambassador; and that part of Manin's letter which Radetzky, in his sharp reply, had not deigned to notice, now appeared so important, that the Imperial minister made a journey on purpose that the treaty might be set on foot. Whatever were the motives of this change in the politics of Austria towards Venice, it was observed that the

conference could not be refused, and the assembly made a decree authorising the government to continue the negotiation diplomatically commenced, subject of course to the ratification of the representatives of the people.

Throughout the discussions on this subject, the assembly did not fail to recommend that the basis of this negotiation should be consonant with the instructions given to Signor Valentino Pasini, to guide him in the overtures he had been sent to make at Paris. These instructions permitted him, in the present bad position which prevented any better terms, to admit the scheme of a Lombardo-Venetian constitutional kingdom, but separated from Austria. On the same occasion, and in the same degree which authorised this negotiation, the assembly declared that the land and sea forces by their valour, and the people by their sacrifices, had deserved highly of their country; and, persisting in the deliberations of the 2nd of April, it expressed its confidence in the bravery of the troops and the perseverance of the people. This was agreed on almost unanimously, and by secret ballot. It was an opportune answer given by

the assembly to certain Austrian journals, which had dared to treat the unanimous vote of the 2nd of April as an act obtained by surprise.

Manin designated two persons of talent, Signori Giuseppe Calaci and Giorgio Foscolo, to confer with De Bruck. They had a conference with the Austrian minister, and afterwards a correspondence with him, frequently asking an explanation of ambiguous proposals, and obtaining replies not more explicit on the same propositions. In substance it was already seen that De Bruck's mission was to allure Venice, after the manner of Austria, into following the fate of a Lombardo-Venetian constitutional kingdom.

The special relations which this kingdom would have with the Imperial Crown were discussed; but it was clearly seen that Austria did not intend to recede from the idea that these provinces should form an integral part of the monarchy, as was said in the famous constitution of the 4th of March by the Emperor Francis Joseph, to which every letter of De Bruck referred.

All this correspondence was laid before the

assembly by the government on the 15th of June. According to custom, the assembly named a committee of reference among its members. As those who were charged with providing provisions and ammunition were in bad odour with the public, it was decided that the commission should at the same time examine the whole state of the country, and thus it was that the military commission was proposed to the assembly. The formation of that commission followed the conferences with De Bruck, although I have been induced to explain it first, while I was on the topic of our means of defence.

That all might proceed with order in Venice, whenever any question arose between the clergy and military, I always endeavoured to satisfy the demands of the Cardinal Patriarch; and when he knew that I was named President of the military commission, &c., he wrote me the following letter:—

"EXCELLENCY,

"The decree of the provisional government and of the military commission, confirmed yesterday by the assembly of the representatives of the state, by which the presidency of the said military commission is given to your Excellency, inspires me with firm confidence that ecclesiastical persons and things, as well as civil, will, in case of need, find in your Excellency a firm and generous patronage, which I now invoke, while at the same time I sign myself, with the highest esteem and consideration,

"Your Excellency's devoted servant,

"J. CARDINAL PATRIARCH.

"VENICE, 1st July, 1849."

I answered on the same day:-

"In reply to your Eminence's letter, I beg to assure you, that, though I am intimately convinced that it is my duty to defend the Estuary till the last extremity, yet this does not exclude the duty of making the defence weigh as lightly as possible on the citizens, and especially on the clergy. To my sympathy for them is added my reverence for their head, who, during this year, has inspired me with the highest respect and admiration.

"Your Eminence's devoted, &c.

" G. PEPE."

The month of June terminated sadly for me. The Argante of the Lagoon, the magnanimous Rosaroll, who a few months before had been wounded in Carlo Alberto's army, at length, while he was directing the fire of that battery on the bridge which I called his "god-daughter," met the death he sought for, as I have explained in the following Order of the day:—

" 28th June, 1849.

"The war we are now waging is certainly most afflicting. On a day of battle, to lose a number of combatants, drawn into the ranks either by force or by hope of advantage, is very different from seeing our ranks thinned by the loss of young men who, renouncing the ease and affluence of their families, have run to arms, stimulated by the love of liberty and Italian independence. To read the names of such men among the wounded, the mutilated, or the dead, plunges the mind of the least sensitive leader in grief. Yet some alleviation is imparted to your General's affliction, when he hears of the high-toned feelings with which life is abandoned, and sufferings are

endured, by our companions in arms. The acts of heroism which we observed on many of the most fatal days of Malghera, are now continually repeated in the first battery on the railway bridge. There, dexterity and coolness vie with one another; and thanks to these qualities, the artillery of the enemy, though superior in number, are not so in results: there is manifested the fierce determination never to yield or withdraw.

"The valiant Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz, already wounded three times while commanding the 1st district facing the Austrians, in his daily reports refers to actions in that same battery, which would do honour to the most glorious pages of Greece and Rome. Why cannot the foreigners beyond the Alps, who, by a tendency to material interests and low-minded thoughts, call Italian valour in question, why can they not witness Venetian valour?

"Yesterday, Lieutenant-Colonel Rosaroll, though suffering severely from an attack of fever, would not stay away from the first battery of the bridge. At three o'clock a bomb from the enemy burst a powder deposit; Rosaroll immediately repaired the damage, continuing all the time the fire from our guns. Five hours later, while from a parapet he was observing the Austrians, a fatal ball struck his right shoulder and he fell. 'To your guns, to your guns!' he imperiously cried to the artillerymen who ran to assist him. The General-in-Chief went to him, and found him gasping for breath; he pressed his hand and spoke words of consolation. But the noble warrior, recalling all his strength, said, 'Not I, expiring, but our Italy, should be the object of your care;' and a few minutes later his valiant soul had taken its flight to the regions of immortality.

"Soldiers of every grade, if hitherto the names of all the brave, and their deeds, have not been given to publicity by means of the Press, this has arisen from their being in such numbers, that it was necessary, in order to avoid partiality, to take more accurate information respecting the acts which, when they are made known, will honour those who performed them, and all Italy. The world will then see that, though abandoned by men, and placed by Providence in the most trying

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position, the soldiers of the Lagoon have proved themselves worthy of the glory which crowned Venice during fourteen centuries, and of our beloved Italy, which, though alternately sovereign and oppressed, is still ever unrivalled.

" GUGLIELMO PEPE.

" Lieutenant-General, &c., &c."

CHAPTER XI.

Fresh conferences with De Bruck,—Fall of Rome,—The battery on the great bridge surprised.—The number of the garrison diminishes.—Decree that 1000 of the National Guard be placed on active service.—Want of provisions.—Preparations of the Austrians to besiege Brondolo; their retreat to the right of the Brenta.—Letter from Count Marcello.—The enemy open their fire.—Vague rumours of the Austrians' doings.—Last Order of the day.

At this period new conferences were opened with De Bruck, and this time he explained more clearly the intentions of the Austrian cabinet with regard to the government of Lombardy and Venice. The two Venetian commissioners made a special report, in which they demonstrated that these intentions did not respect the dignity of the Italian nation, nor correspond with the moral wants of the time and of the country, and could not restore peace.

This report was read to the Assembly in a meeting of the 30th of June, and afterwards a letter from De Bruck was read, treating

more particularly of the conditions respecting the city of Venice, which would be agreed to when the city, by accepting them, should submit. The paper money of the Commune was to be reduced to one half, that of the Patriotica to one third of its value; permission to depart was conceded to forty persons who had been excluded from the amnesty; in short, the whole letter was in the style of a conquering barbarian, and the conditions were such as might be imposed by force, but that a people cannot voluntarily accept, while any self-respect remains. The Assembly, in entire accord with the Government, would not take these proposals into consideration. It replied to the insulting offers of Austria by passing to the order of the day at an immense majority, and in a manner which obliged the government to publish all diplomatic papers, in order that Europe might be the judge of what had passed between Austria and Venice. This was the position of unfortunate, but ever valiant, Venice, when the news arrived of the fall of Rome. This bitter event, although foreseen, did not the less afflict the population and the troops, yet

without discouraging them. Not only was the Lagoon left alone in Italy to defend itself against the attacks of a most powerful empire, but that excellent nation by whose arms we had hoped to see the imperial forces, if not vanquished, at least kept in check, the warlike Hungary, appeared likely to fall on the arrival of the Russians, and through her own internal discords. Yet Venice seemed to derive, even from her accumulated adversities, fresh courage, and a firm will to endure the most painful sacrifices for the noble cause which raises mortals to immortality.

I will retail one among the many valorous deeds which brightened the scene at the commencement of July. Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz wrote from the railroad, 7th of July, 1849.

"During last night the enemy who, during the last three days of unusual firing, perceived they had not been able to subdue the constancy of the defenders of our batteries, tried to obtain by surprise what they had failed in by force. At about one o'clock, after midnight, a fire-boat of the enemy exploded, between the third and fourth of our parapets on the bridge, without causing us any damage. Half an hour later they sent up rockets in the air, from the side of Campalto, and almost at the same time two other fire-boats were seen descending the canal from the right; while our fire and our attention were directed to these, a detachment of the enemy succeeded in secretly approaching St. Antonio, under our batteries, and in unexpectedly scaling the parapet.

"In a few instants the superior reserve, under the command of the Captain of the Piazza, Mastroviela, and composed of Gendarmes, of the Chasseurs of Sile, and of the 1st of the line, ran upon the assailers with irresistible impetus, and after a short but desperate resistance drove them back from the battery.

"While this was going on, the pirogue Brillante, commanded by Privato, pushed boldly forward, and caught the flying enemy on one side, while S. Secondo aimed at them on the other, so that but few of those who had so desperately thrown themselves into the water avoided being killed. One of the enemy's fire-boats is in our hands, uninjured. The courage and presence of mind with which our officers and soldiers met the attack of the enemy, deserve the highest praise,

"ENRICO COSENZ,
"Lieutenant-Colonel in Command."

To this report I will only add, that Colonel Cosenz, as modest as he was brave, does not tell that he himself led the assault; and, fighting hand to hand with an Austrian officer, received a sabre cut on the face; and this was the fourth time he had been wounded within about two months.

The Venetian army diminished visibly, not only by means of the enemy's fire, but by fever, which rendered a great number unfit for service. These daily losses, one after another, of young men, belonging to good families, whose names were known to us all, grieved me to the soul. I was also much afflicted to see the hospitals and barracks filled with the wounded and the invalids, whose greatest agony was that they were unable to fight by the side of their companions.

I began to be alarmed, on seeing how few were in a state to perform the daily service of the vast Lagoon, with nearly sixty forts, great and small, and, at the same time, to furnish the reserve indispensable for the threatened assaults of Venice and Chioggia. To increase the number of the combatants, the assembly decreed that 1000 of the citizens, on whose intrepidity they could reckon, should be enrolled: of these, 100 a day were sent for the defence of Malghera, before it surrendered; they returned, the following day, usually with ten killed or wounded, but not a murmur escaped.

Both the troops and the people bore, with constant resignation, the scarcity and bad quality of the bread, and other eatables, which at the same time were extremely dear. I sent four carriage horses myself to the butcher. In the midst of these events, it was essential not to forget Brondolo, the loss of which would have been followed by that of Chioggia.

The enemy had established several batteries on the right of the Brenta, with the intention of passing it, assaulting the entrenched camp,

and then commencing the siege of Brondolo, the resistance of which place could not have been long, on account of the Austrian's numerous artillery. I sent Major Boldoni into the district of Chioggia; he was a Neapolitan officer, highly instructed, valiant, and of indefatigable activity. I charged him to ameliorate the fortifications of Brondolo, and to construct, on the left of the Brenta, the field works necessary to prevent the passage of the river. Boldoni pushed on the works day and night; he did all I had desired, and exceeded my hopes, as I convinced myself by visiting all the district. The accomplishment of these works, the exactitude of the service, and, perhaps also, illness among the enemy, made them retire from the right bank, and so hastily, as to leave behind them a quantity of balls, shells, and grenades. I never knew the exact cause of this precipitate retreat, which had the appearance of a flight. It completely calmed my anxiety for Chioggia, whose inhabitants I had much affection for, besides that its fall would have been a great blow to the Estuary.

I desired the glory and prosperity of Venice,

as I did that of all Italy, and the reception given me by the affectionate population of the Lagoon inspired me with gratitude. I therefore endeavoured, as far as depended on me, to contribute to the esteem and affection for the Government, by telling those who complained of its faults, that they were faults common to all governments. Conte Marcello, who had reason to think himself a descendant of the great Marcellus of Rome, was Intendant-General of the army. His excellent qualities, and his patriotism, inspired me with esteem and friendship. He one day wrote me the following letter:—

" EXCELLENCY,

"To the most excellent man, to the best of patriots, I send a copy of the document by which I intend to give up all interference in the affairs of the Government, since they are carried on in such a manner that I can have no confidence that the Government is acting for what, according to my poor ideas, is the good of the State. In privately communicating this document to General Pepe, I wish to give him a proof of

the high esteem in which he is held by me, and by all good men; and in proof of the particular devotion I have for him, and of the gratitude I feel for the great kindness he has always evinced for me, I beg him, at the same time, ever to consider me his devoted, &c., &c., &c.

"A. MARCELLO.

"7th July,1849."

After reading this letter, I begged the Count to favour me with an interview, and I obtained from him, for the sake of heroic Venice, to continue to hold his post in the army.

Towards the end of July, our disasters accumulated, though without weakening our high Italian sentiments. The Austrians, who could dispose of all the artillery in Verona, Peschiera, Mantua, Trieste, and other places near the latter, brought together a great number of guns of large calibre, and missiles of all sorts. They gave them towards the mouth an elevation of forty-five degrees, and by loading them with an immense charge of powder, their balls, both red-hot and cold,

were made to carry very far, often near the Piazza di St. Marco. The distance which these projectiles were sent was equal to that attained by the English artillery in Sicily in 1810, to which I have already referred.

In the night succeeding the 28th of July, all the guns of which the enemy could dispose (and they were not a few) discharged a storm of balls, bombs, and grenades. If hitherto these projectiles had chiefly fallen in the waters round the batteries on the bridge and at S. Secondo, now that they were directed over a vast capital, all were exposed to danger. The bombs and grenades reached over half of Venice, and the balls over two-thirds.

The attitude of all classes of the population (and at this moment famine and cholera were added to the list of their sufferings) was such as to do honour, not only to the Lagoon, not only to Italy, but to the human race. Providence, in permitting that a people so noble, so energetic, should fall into servitude, seems to tempt our limited understandings to doubt its intervention. The grief of bidding adieu to house and home, the certainty of meeting

with diasters and privations without end, the inevitable sufferings of so many tender youths, never drew from a single mouth the desire of a treaty for peace. When the people saw me in my gondola visiting our batteries, they were the first to bless me. If the enemy's guns were silent for an hour, in order to repair their damages, the whole population were alarmed, and the reader will scarcely believe that it was for fear we should be treating of an armistice.

From the night in which the enemy brought all their pieces to bear against the city, emigration began in every quarter which was exposed to their fire. The inhabitants of those parts which were out of the reach of the bombs, hospitably opened their houses, even to persons whom they did not know. The government, the municipality, and the wealthy citizens multiplied the lodgings in the public establishments for those who wanted them. Yet at first, the piazza, the streets, the gondolas on the canal were filled with families belonging to the poorer classes. Many families of the better classes were compelled to sleep all in one room, inasmuch as the greater part of

their dwellings were crowded with strangers. All this suffering was increased by the hottest season of the year, by the worst food, which even often failed, and lastly, by the cholera, of which I shall say something in the next chapter.

In the midst of these internal disasters, my most anxious thoughts were necessarily turned towards the defence, and I addressed the following letter to Manin:—

" Venice, 30th July, 1849.

"SIGNOR PRESIDENTE,

"The Government has sanctioned those defensive measures, in case of urgency, which the Council of Defence, presided over by the General-in-Chief, should decree. These require to be much modified since the occupation of the borders of the Lagoon by the enemy; their attacks against the city may be instantaneous, and, I may say, unforeseen; since at this moment the Austrians seem decided to make every sacrifice in order to gain possession of the bridge, on the defence of which depends that of this incomparable city.

"The military commission is seriously

occupied with that defence; and the measures taken are such as to guarantee it from any attack either by land or sea, if the Venetian garrison act in concert under a single commander.

"According to these first instructions and arrangements, at a signal agreed on, the troops of every arm, in agreement with the Civic Guard, receive their orders from the General-in-Chief, who alone assumes the command; but, as alarms may frequently be given during the night, the order for calling out the troops cannot be transmitted otherwise than by military authority, which alone watches over the defence of the city against all external assaults.

"I therefore repeat that for the safety of the city, and that its defence may be secured, the Civic Guard, in case of alarm, and without any preventive orders, should be at the command of the General-in-Chief.

"The original regulations for the defence of the city, in case of internal disorders, remain as before determined on; those only are modified which regard an assault from the enemy. "The troop of ordnance and the disposable land artillery are all stationed in the forts, and at the batteries of the 1st district, and will be distributed according to the movements of the enemy.

"Out of the four battalions of the two civic legions of Cannareggio and S. Polo, individuals should be chosen to form two corps, called *mobile*, who, under the command of one or two chiefs of the legion, should take a position at the third line of defence, and encamp in order of battle behind the third entrenchment, which includes the three forts of Carlo Alberto, Pio Nono, and S. Marco.

"The civic guard will double the posts of the garrison, comprehending those guarded by the troops of the line; half a battalion will take a position at the bridge of the Rialto, and the remaining force will be placed in battalion, in close ranks, their heads turned towards the column of the piazzetta.

"The gendarmes will be placed according to the existing instructions. The boatmen and boats, which, by the 24th Article of the aforesaid instructions, were to be stationed in their quarters, should now be placed on the railroad. "The military forces of the city are thus divided, and occupy two points; that of the borders of the Lagoon, which includes the first *Circondario*; and one half of the city. These two points of defence communicate by means of the bridge of Rialto. The command of the first division is confided to a general,—that of the second to the commandant of the civic guard; but both under the orders of the General-in-chief.

"The present regulations being approved, the commandant of the civic guard should make a list of the individuals composing the two battalions which are to serve in the first Circondario, and of the colonel who commands them. I invoke the patriotism of the commander of the civic guard in making choice of the officers, subaltern officers, and simple National Guards, who are to compose the two battalions called mobile.

"All the arrangements, not contemplated in the present project, remain unchanged.

"Accept, Signor Presidente, the assurance of my high esteem.

" G. PEPE,
" General-in-Chief."

To the military and political condition in which we were placed, it must be added that we had scarcely sufficient bread remaining to last us a month, or gunpowder enough for a fortnight, if we wished to respond to the enemy with sufficient vigour to force them to diminish their fire.

Many citizens and officers, who were well acquainted with the circumstances I have detailed, in order to make a show of greater patriotism than their neighbours, went about repeating that Venice would never surrender: that if the people would voluntarily arm themselves, and thus augment the columns of the National Guard and of the troops, we might execute a vigorous sortie, and obtain provisions, and saltpetre to fabricate powder. The Committee of Public Safety assured us that this excitement was the work of the enemy, in order to trouble the admirable order which reigned among the people, and the so much lauded discipline of the corps of the garrison. As a first remedy, I published the following Order of the day, which, by many, was considered apt to reinvigorate discipline, and destroy illusions now become

useless, since France, as well as Austria, was hostile to Italy, and Hungarian liberty had already fallen.

" Order of the Day.

" VENICE, 31st July, 1849.

"Officers, subaltern officers and soldiers, in order to make a trial of the capabilities of Italians in the career of arms, fortune has placed you in the midst of the most difficult trials which our profession can ever encounter,—privations of every sort, sickness, a long blockade, a siege in which the enemy has availed himself of every means which the best artillery of our times can furnish. To these calamities, others still more grievous are added.

"We are abandoned by all the world, and menaced with famine. To so much danger, to such long and bitter suffering, you have opposed contempt of life, unparalleled perseverance, and, above all, that calm which is so rare in young soldiers, and which has perhaps been infused into your minds by the holiness of the cause for which you are fighting; a cause which has inspired the Venetian people with an attitude so sublime, that in all the vicissitudes of my life, I have never seen its like before: I speak of the manner in which they receive, unmoved, the numerous and fatal shots launched by the enemy against this admired city.

"Soldiers, you have tempted me into pride! I am indeed proud to command an army of Italian youths thus pre-eminent in military and civic virtues.

"It remains for me to tell you, that the glory you have so dearly bought, must remain pure from the beginning to the end of your career. It must be like a day in which the horizon, from break of dawn till its decline, is not obscured by a single cloud.

"Your General-in-Chief assures you, that the chamber and the government will have at heart till the last moment, as much as the firmness and patriotism of upright citizens will permit, the honour of the Italian name, and your welfare. Continue to act as you have done and are now doing; and be assured that, whatever evil days may still await us, you will awaken in the minds of all men, even of your enemies, envy, and not compassion.

"G. PEPE,
"Commander-in-Chief, &c."

This was the last of my many Orders of the day which I made use of for the space of a year and a half as a means of exciting Italian sentiments, contempt of life, and love of discipline, and of showing the various people of the Peninsula the conduct of the small army of the Lagoon, abandoned by men and by heaven to the barbarous attacks of a great empire.

CHAPTER XII.*

Political events in the States of Rome from 1831 till 1849, when the French entered Rome.

When the Bourbons were driven from France in the revolution of 1830, the era of universal liberty seemed to be announced to the nations of Europe. Romagna rose in February, 1831, and declared the temporal power of the Pope at an end. But Austria took armed possession of the legations, and restored the papal power. The new rights of the people which France had proclaimed, she did not also defend. Austria interfered in Romagna in spite of the law of non-intervention; and the learned orators of France demonstrated in Parliament that the disapproval of intervention did not imply the necessity of combating it; parliament approved this loyal interpretation.

[•] I owe this chapter to the patriotism of Lisabe Buffoni, a deputy of the Roman congress, and a man of truly Italian sentiments.

Abandoned to clerical vengeance, the tyranny which the Legations endured became more cruel. The sect of the San-Fedisti was organised by the government; concealed hatred became more fierce and intense. The people waited; the insurrection of 1843, and the timid white flag in 1845, were vain efforts for liberty.

The prisons were daily more crowded when Gregory XVI. died. The people were now ready to break out; the assembled Cardinals felt the earth tremble beneath them; they considered with fear the perils of a revolution, and the expense of an Austrian occupation. They therefore desired that the new Pope should be one who could appease the irritation of men's minds, and concede something, without shaking the ancient fabric. With these intentions they elected, in 1846, to the pontifical throne, Maria Mastai Ferretti; he took the name of Pius IX.

The history of this pontificate is marked by the Italian revolutions of this epoch; revolutions generated by the mental powers of our ancient stock, as well as by the agency of the whole human race. The populace impute revolutions to men and time; but time does nothing, and men are but animated instruments of Providence and of the age—nothing more.

Pius IX. was the instrument, not the cause; he hastened, but he did not create events. Having assumed the Papacy, he perceived that Austrian arms, and much bloodshed and slaughter, would be necessary to repress the existing state of discontent. He believed a middle course to be possible; to pacify the people by gentle measures, yet still hold them bridled.

Unhappily he had forgotten history. Had he been the pattern of goodness itself, his position would have changed him. Gregory VII. and Innocent XIII. saw the dangers which, in their days, menaced the church; they exterminated these dangers with the sword. Leo X. slept over them; he did not foresee the signs of the German reform; he was vanquished, and lost a fine portion of Europe.

Pius IX. adopted conciliatory measures, and published an amnesty; the prisons were opened to the prisoners of state, and their banishment was revoked. Then commenced that immense burst of exultation which diffused itself more every day, dragging along with it both people and princes.

The city resounded with applause of the Pontiff, with vivas and songs; people and Pontiff blessed each other, and for the last time. The Pope pardoned the state criminals; and some of these, the most benignant in council, together with others, first elicited a hope that a revolution might be conceded. This hope invaded men's minds, that liberty might be granted by a Pontiff, and that insurrections are perhaps not necessary.

This hope became deep and universal: the people were prepared for liberty; yet it seemed necessary to dip their swords in some drops of blood. The Pontiff shed the expected drops. A law on the press was promulgated; soon the municipality was constituted on a wider basis; then, the laity were admitted to the supreme magistrature, and a council of ministers was created, all of whom were laymen, except the ministers of foreign affairs and of public instruction; a Consulta was also formed.

Enthusiasm had now reached its highest point, and the people met together as they had not done for five centuries. "Our Pontiff," cried the people, "will prove the father of liberty. He does not yet concede everything, because he fears the enemies of liberty, the universal enemies. Let us then show our power."

The people were inebriated; the papal throne was surrounded by a garland of three millions of men, united, moved, and demanding liberty. The movement spread from the Roman provinces to the farthest points of Italy. In every city, on the roads, and in the country, immense multitudes of people congregated, demanding liberty with songs and prayers. Every where the governments yielded, except in Naples, where the tyrant responded with armed resistance. Calabria and magnanimous Sicily took up arms: Messina and Palermo were covered with barricades, and were the first camps of sanguinary revolution; the cowardly Bourbon trembled, bargained, and promulgated a constitution.

At this announcement the impetus of the

people of Rome could no longer be restrained. "The Pope, our divine Pius IX., cannot refuse us what the Bourbon has granted;"—and the multitude again broke forth in rejoicings on the piazza, more ardent and excited than ever. The supreme hour had come for the revival of a people which Heaven seemed to have raised out of the tomb. The cry of liberty now became menacing: Pius IX., though timidly, breaks the sacerdotal seals, and on the last page of the papal volume inscribes the Statuto, the fundamental statute of the temporal government of the States of the Holy Church.

But the civil movements of Rome in 1846 became Italian in the following year, and European after the revolution in France. In 1848 the Italians of the two Sicilies were the first to revolt; and, last in Europe, fell Rome and Venice.

Paris had overthrown its monarchy, and from France the first republican cry came forth. At this cry Berlin was commoved, and threatened her King: Vienna was in ebullition, and the terrified Cæsar was brought to a reckoning with his people.

But, before the rising of the people in France and Germany, the generous Lombards had caught the infection from Rome and Sicily, and were inflamed with the new Italian spirit. Milan, the second Rome of Italy, rose and denied the rights of the Austrian Cæsar, as the other Rome had dictated laws to the Papal power. Milan gave a new shock to the yoke; after five days' battle with the citizens, the Austrian army was driven from the city, and the tricoloured flag floated over the ancient Duomo.

The people are the true founders of enduring monuments. While Pope and Princes timidly granted constitutions and statutes, the Lombards were occupied with far other decrees. They drove out the Croats; they erected barricades; they promulgated from thence the independence of nations.

All Lombardy rose, and no vestige of foreign dominion remained on this side the Alps.

But in Rome there was a Pope. How could the successor of St. Peter make war on the heir of Cæsar? Could a Pope sanctify insurrection? The readers of history alleged the example of Alexander III.; but feudal times were past. To humble the Imperial power, and the lofty dominion of Cæsar, the supreme rights of the Pontiff over all temporal possessions must be revived. Cæsar alone is supreme over temporals, say the Ghibellines. The Guelphs reply: The Pope alone holds the place of God on earth.

In these days, it is the people who declare themselves sovereign; they ask for the investiture of their rights neither from Cæsar nor the Pontiff, but derive them from themselves and the barricades.

The rights of revolutions could not therefore be consecrated by a Pope; by blessing the Lombard insurrection he would have blessed all present and future rebellions, and the Vicar of Christ would have become a revolutionist, a denier of absolute authority, which pretends to derive its eternal rights from Heaven.

If then Pius IX., in the first ardour of enthusiasm in Rome, on hearing of the events in Lombardy, did not dare to oppose, in his own states, a levy of men against the Austrian empire; if in a few days an army of 20,000 men was ordered to march to the Po; yet, as soon as he was aroused from his first stupor, he openly declared on the 29th of April 1848, in full consistory, that his mind was against all offensive war with Austria. Thus the people again fell into the old and abhorred state; the Pope separated himself from them by refusing to ratify the decree of war against the barbarians, which the Lombards had dictated with their expiring breath.

The people now began to be undeceived: their Pontiff did not believe in the sanctity of the Italian right of independence; therefore it could not be holy, and they could no longer love it. And thus the first fervour of love yielded to as deep and concealed a hatred as ever entered the human heart.

The people became tumultuous, and the Ministry resigned. Pius IX. was terrified, and began to waver: he wrote an autograph letter to the Emperor, to exhort him amicably to cede his dominion in Italy, and to counsel the Germans to recognise the Italian nation as a sister, "Each reducing its dominion within their natural limits with honourable compacts and the blessing of Heaven." But if

this was so, why not make war? If it was unjust, why exhort the Emperor to feeble concessions? If nations have natural limits, it is consequently a natural right to defend them; and those who overstep them offend Nature and God. To have recourse to advice, rather than to arms, was both short-sighted and perfidious. Could the Emperor be moved by words, rather than the power of arms, to abandon Italy?

But the more the Pope was averse to war, the more fatal it became for him to leave a free course to events. Yet he called to the government only the men who were universally popular. Among the new ministers was Terenzio Mamiani, a terse versifier, a studious metaphysician, a man of subtle mind, both prudent and clever: he placed the summit of wisdom in ever pursuing half measures, and balancing all extreme parties by temporisation. The president of the ministry was Cardinal Soglia, who, two months previously, had sent a letter written in cypher to the pontifical Nunzio then residing at Inspruck; this letter was intercepted and published in Milan in the journal Dell' Italia del Popolo.

The treachery was veiled in mystery, yet an indication was given in a subjoined postscript, which recommended the Nunzio to persuade the Emperor that the proposals of the Holy Father differed widely from those of his ministers.

Let the world imagine how there could be any compromise between the party which secretly conspired with the house of Austria, and those who wished to combat it; and how a national militia could agree with treacherous prelates.

The ministers endeavoured to form a league among the Italian princes, who were already suspected on account of the increasing power of Charles Albert, and still more suspected by increasing liberty; they also determined on the continuation of the war.

On the 5th of June, 1848, the assembly of legislators was convoked in Rome; they approved the acts, and the expressed intentions of ministers; they strengthened their authority, and kept the capricious people in check.

In the meantime, the people were rejoiced and consoled by the glorious deeds of the Roman soldiers who were combating in the Venetian provinces, and memorable were the enthusiasm and the boldness they showed in defending Vicenza. While Charles Albert was besieging Peschiera, the passage of the Alps was left open to the Austrian army. Radetzky increased his army to more than 18,000 men, some of whom arrived before Vicenza, and endeavoured to take it. Vicenza, guarded by 2000 volunteers from the Romagna, and some hundred Lombards, fiercely repulsed the assault.

General Durando, with 5000 men, hastened to the relief of the menaced city; the obstinate Radetzky did not change his purpose; he again sent his battalions to the assault, and again they were repulsed by Italian valour.

But no sooner were the Austrian arms vanquished at Goito, than Marshal Radetzky passed the Adige with 30,000 men, and seventy cannons; and on the 10th of June, by way of Montaguane, he appeared before Vicenza. It was then garrisoned with an army of 10,000 men, commanded by General Durando. The bulk of the Roman militia

was there, with volunteers from all the states engaged in the Italian war. Through want of ammunition, and after a ferocious combat of sixteen hours, Vicenza capitulated to a very superior force. The Roman militia of Vicenza went out with their arms, baggage, and colours flying, to the beat of the drum, but under an engagement to abstain from combating the Austrians during three months. They were soon after followed by the troops which garrisoned Treviso; and thus 15,000 men returned into our state.

New disasters soon followed. The Imperial arms overcame Charles Albert, whose fortune failed him, rather than his courage. Vanquished on the Adige, and pursued by Radetzky, he did not defend the banks of the Adda, but fell back on Milan, promising to bury himself under its ruins rather than yield the heroic city without a struggle: then, despairing of the enterprise, he departed, leaving the capital of Lombardy a prey and a victim to Austrian vengeance. True it is, that Radetzky had promised the vanquished, in that secret capitulation, that the city should be uninjured; but Austrian

faith could preserve the stones of the city, and strike the citizens.

The Roman state, which had sent its soldiers to attack the Austrians, was in turn attacked. General Welden, with 8000 men, passed the Po, entered Ferrara, and then appeared before Bologna. Cesare Bianchetti was then prolegate of Bologna. The senator Zucchini convoked in council the military and civil commanders, and Count Carlo Pepoli, both a commissary and a magistrate, not in order to organise a terrible and bloody defence, as the people desired, and as the duty of patriotism, and the misfortunes of Lombardy, and the necessity of the war demanded, but in order to learn from the senators, from the commanders, from the commissaries, if it were possible to defend the city. It was declared in council by Latour, a Swiss general, by Zucchesi, a colonel, and by others, that, as the greatest part of the troops had come from Vicenza and Treviso, under an engagement not to make war for three months against the Austrians, and as the other forces were insufficient for the defence, it would therefore be better to retire into the Cattolica, and there wait for the enemy.

We do not understand how troops who had capitulated could combat the Austrians in the Cattolica, and not in Bologna. It is the duty of every one to keep faith; but to interpret treaties, and to prevent them from becoming snares, is a common right. The treaty not to make war against the Austrians certainly forbade all attack; but could it forbid selfdefence against a sudden assault, made by stealth in the night? and if those who were at the head of affairs in Bologna made it a point of conscience not to violate their word. they were not forbidden to defend themselves. The troops having gone out, the barricades remained; and they had then to cry to the assembled people, from the balconies, "Let the Croats sound their trumpets, and we will ring our bells."

On the night of the 4th of August, the Roman troops went out of Bologna, and there only remained to defend it some carabineers, some finance guards, and an ardent populace ready to rise. Signor Bianchetti selected a few citizens, and sent them to General Welden, to protest against the violation of the territory. The Austrian General tore up the protest, dismissed the deputies, and on the morning of the 7th entered Bologna with a part of his troops: he had a short conversation with Bianchetti, and then commanded his Croats to march out by the gate of St. Felix.

But on the first entry of the Austrians the people became furious. They began by jeering and provoking the Croats; from angry words they soon came to blows and bloodshed. Many soldiers were struck, and one officer was killed. General Welden then ordered his 5000 men to commence the assault.

The people, undaunted, rose with fury crying, "To arms!" Immediately the city was barricaded and blocked up on all sides; the bells were rung, and the armed citizens placed themselves to defend the barricades. The combat commenced on the morning of the 8th. The Austrians cannonaded the city from the gate of St. Felix; then, ascending the hill from the gate Galline, they placed their artillery there, and fired on the city without any obstacle intervening.

The people could no longer contain them-

selves behind the barricades; they furiously charged the Austrian soldiers, and sustained the trampling of the cavalry, and the continual fire of the artillery. Along with the brave citizens fought the remaining carabineers and Finance Guards. All boldly met the danger, and succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the hill. After four hours of fierce contest, the enemy's infantry and cavalry, who endeavoured to open a passage into the city, were repulsed; they were driven from all the posts they occupied, and completely routed. Welden fled, leaving several hundred prisoners. The loss on our side was severe, but that of the enemy was much greater.

This was a battle of the people. Sensible, prudent, and temperate politicians, were in despair; they judged it absurd to make any resistance; the foolish populace confided in themselves; senseless and furious, they rushed to the defence and conquered. The people do not possess the rare virtues of wise politicians; nevertheless, when they will they can do everything, and, like gods, they can build up or destroy. Wise statesmen protest

with their pens, which does not prevent the people from taking arms and fighting. They defend what the others abandon; they count not their enemies, and, when they strike, they expend blood and life; in a few hours of strife they accomplish and seal the slow and meditated progress of ages; they are the executors of the decrees of civilisation, and initiate new social movements.

The popular victory of Bologna, the sudden war, the defeat of Charles Albert, and the intentions of the King of Naples, while all Europe seemed returning to darkness, moved to opposite feelings all the cities of the Roman states. Their hatred to Austria seemed to increase, as well as their suspicions of the papal wiles, their desire to combat, and their hope of victory. No sooner did the late event become known, than the troops which were proceeding towards the Cattolica marched back to Bologna: volunteers came in from all sides, and the whole state was in agitation. General Welden repassed the Po, and the Pope protested. But how did he protest? In Rome, agitation had reached its climax. The eternal city felt the stroke which overthrew Milan, and wished to labour for her rescue. The ministers, Mamiani and Campello, proposed from the tribune preparations and ordinances for war, which were immediately approved; but Pius IX., who had just protested, would not ratify these measures. Count Mamiani, a prudent and most temperate man, could not vanquish the papal determination; he could not weigh and balance theocracy and democracy, and he resigned his seat in the ministry.

The people were then undeceived. Pius IX. was neither an Alexander III., nor a Julius II.; he would not drive out the barbarians; he was a Clement IX., he was Austrian, but before resuscitating the dead, he wished to bury the living.

Rome was enraged, and the Pontiff chose new ministers. Doctor Pellegrino Rossi, General Zucchi, the Duke of Rignano, and Professor Montanari, succeeded Mamiani and his colleagues. Grave-diggers, and not ministers, they supported the bier of the defunct papacy.

Rossi wished to give a new direction to the state, to divert men's minds from the Italian war, to make a league with the Bourbon of Naples, and to join the European reaction: in the meantime, to create a code of laws, to reform the civil ordinances, and introduce better rules of administration. In the government journal, some opinions were expressed against the house of Savoy; and the defeat of Piedmont and of the King was spoken of.

The people believed themselves betrayed. For them, all reform consisted in driving out the barbarians, and in national liberty; and before creating codes, they wished to erect the national power. Lombard blood from the banks of the Po cried out to them, "Arms and Vengeance!" and they hated all who were deaf to this cry. And why speak of the Piedmontese defeat? Why not rather forget errors and misfortunes, and speak only of a rescue from Rome?

The people believed themselves betrayed; they were tumultuous, and so full of rage, that the cup already overflowed.

On the 15th of November, parliament was convoked. A crowd was assembled round the doors of the palace where the deputies sat. Rossi appeared, and with a disdainful countenance he passed through the midst of the vociferating crowd. Hearing some jest aimed against him, he raised his eyes, and looked contemptuously. One of the populace then threw himself behind him, and with a knife struck him in the throat, and disappeared.

This act was the spark which lighted the fire. All that day, and the following night, the city was in silent fermentation; but on the following morning arose one of those fearful and wonderful popular tempests, which overwhelms in its passage whatever it encounters. In the streets and in the piazze were multitudes of armed men. Soldiers and citizens mingled, and organised themselves. The usual flag was displayed; songs of liberty, and imprecations against their betrayers were uttered; and the assembled masses moved on in grand array toward the Quirinal. When they arrived before the Pontifical Palace, two cannons, which the populace had dragged along with them, were placed against the door, and with terrible cries and fierce threats, they demanded that a new ministry should be chosen, of men selected by the people.

On this day the revolution was accomplished. From the 16th of November a new epoch commenced—the new life of the Roman people. On that day, the people destroyed with their own hands what they had for so many ages adored, and adored what they heretofore destroyed. They believed that a Pope—the partisan of Austria, the enemy of Italian liberty—had forfeited all right to temporal dominion, and they placed catholic authority under the due command of the nation. From a flock they became a people, and broke the crook of their pastor.

The Pontiff was astonished and confused. He found himself abandoned; the prelates, the cardinals, and all those who are now sustained by foreign arms, concealed themselves, and dared not speak. Yet some determination was necessary to appease the city, and arrest the tumult. A promise was given that the wishes of the people should be complied with.

The author of this chapter was told that, in the night, the Pontiff shut himself up with some persons of authority and counsel. His countenance was pale with compressed indignation. He inquired to whom he could confide the government. One of the prelates named two of Rossi's predecessors; but the Pontiff interrupted him, exclaiming, "I wonder that any one dares to defile my ears with such names!" Silence ensued. The Pope then asked a military commandant if his troops were to be relied on. The honest soldier replied, "If your Holiness wishes them to act against the people, I cannot answer for them;" and Pius IX., striking the table with his closed hand, exclaimed, "Then I have no other resource left but to invoke the thunder-bolts of God against the rebels:" and he went out, leaving his counsellors astonished.

While Mamiani, recalled to Rome by the fury of the party who desired to have him as minister, assumed the office, and undertook, for the third time, to balance papacy and democracy; the Pope, in the dead of night, on the 24th of November, secretly left Rome. A carriage, with foreign arms, conveyed the disguised Pontiff to Gaeta, and the Contessa Spaur followed him.

Twice the parliament deputed some of its most distinguished members to supplicate the Pope to return to Rome. Their prayers were vain. Twice, also, the Pope elected a council to govern the state; but the office was refused. There was therefore no government in Rome. The parliament chose a provisional giunta, and then dissolved itself. For two months this giunta ruled the state. But the pontifical authority having fallen, the authorities constituted by the Pope also fell; and, by a decree of the revolution in Rome, an appeal was to be made to all the people of the state.

By order of the giunta, the people assembled in committees to elect, by direct and universal suffrage, a constituent assembly. Out of a population of 2,800,000 souls, 343,000 citizens voted in the committees. On the 6th of February, the representatives of the people met in Rome; and on the 9th, after about fifteen hours of solemn discussion, the fall of the papal power in the Roman states was decreed, and the republic was proclaimed from the Capitol, in the midst of the immense applause of the people. The government was confided to an executive committee.

But while new-born liberty was thus being organised in Rome, both in Rome and in all Italy it received the last blow by the defeat of the Piedmontese army at Novara. Charles Albert abdicated; his son and successor acknowledged himself vanquished, and the war was terminated by an armistice. Magnanimous Brescia rose in the rear of the victorious Radetzky; it returned to the yoke after horrid butchery. In vain did Genoa protest and refuse to submit to the armistice, still crying "War against Austria."

About the same time a multitude of armed peasants, incited and paid by the partisans of the fugitive Duke, broke into Florence, and another government succeeded to that of Guerrazzi.

When the news of these events reached Rome, the Triumvirs, Giuseppe Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini, who had already been elected by the assembly, and invested with absolute power, found themselves surrounded by enemies, and abandoned to themselves; yet they did not despair, and on the 14th of April they published a declaration, that they would never yield or treat.

Instead of being extinguished, the republican ardour seemed to gain new force. The

government applied itself to reorganising the dispersed soldiers; they made the exiled General Avezzana, who had returned from Genoa, Minister of War. They expected the arrival of 8000 Lombards; arms were provided; a foundry was instituted; expert officers commenced organising the artillery, and in the course of a month the republic had 40,000 men to defend it.

General Guglielmo Pepe proposed to the Triumvirate, from Venice, that 10,000 men should be assembled on the Neapolitan frontier, of whom the greater part had combated under him in the Lagoon, in order to establish a new government in that country devoted to the Italian cause.

The government of Rome proposed to commence a third Italian war, with better fortune (no longer a regal, but a popular war,) and to enter Lombardy.

But while the almost unarmed republic was preparing the necessary ammunitions for so much warfare, its territory was occupied, not by the Austrians, not by the royalists of Naples, but by the republicans of France, who on the 24th of April reached the shores of Civita-

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Vecchia. Thus was every future enterprise stifled at its birth. General Oudinot, representing the French people, commanded the expedition which was sent neither to defend, nor to overthrow, our government. They would not interfere in political matters; they came purely to counterbalance the power of the Austrian arms; the people were to be interrogated regarding their form of government, and the army would pay in ready money all goods and services. The tree of liberty was planted, surmounted by the French and Italian banners conjoined. Certain Frenchmen made great parade of liberty and fraternity, and of the great benefit Heaven conferred on us by sending to the help of our endangered state the powerful assistance of French alliance.

But neither the people nor the government were allured by these false pretences. The Roman assembly protested in the name of God and the people against this sudden violation of territory, not preceded by any announcement, as barbarous and piratical. They admonished the French general to respect the sovereignty of the Roman people, who had deliberately chosen their supreme magistrates, and their new political ordinances; and to respect the constitution of his own country, which declared that the French nation did not make war on the liberties of other nations. They added their firm determination to resist.

The assembly and the triumvirate sent two deputies to the French general; and the general, in his turn, sent deputies to the government; but an ambuscade was laid, on the discovery of which all negotiation proved fruitless. To General Oudinot's deputies the Romans and Triumvirs answered, that the French army must either be friendly, hostile, or neuter; that if neuter, they could not understand for what reason they occupied their neighbours' houses; that if they were not enemies, they must be friends come to defend the state, and in that case they requested them to return to the frontiers, and remain in Civita-Vecchia. Rome was not in need of their assistance. Oudinot's deputies replied, that it was the will of their government that they should occupy Rome: and having said this they advanced.

On the 26th of April the Triumvirs made

known to the assembly the intentions of the French general. The assembly deliberated, and made the following short and memorable decree:—

"The Assembly, after the announcement made to it by the Triumvirs, commits to them the salvation of the State, and charges them to repel force with force."

The people in the surrounding tribunes applauded vociferously; the deputy Cernuschi, pale and agitated, mounted the tribune; he exhorted the people to accomplish the decree of the assembly, and ratify it with their blood. Then, taking from his breast the band which he wore as representative, he displayed it, exclaiming, "Your legislators, O people! will fulfil their duty; and you, when to-morrow you are called to battle, will fulfil yours: girded with these ensigns we will lead you to the fight, and either conquer or die with you." And the people rushed out exclaiming, "To arms! To the barricades!"

The dispersed troops, which could be assembled in Rome, amounted to 7000 armed men.

They were divided into four brigades. The

first, commanded by General Garibaldi, defended the environs of Porta Portese, as far as the Porta St. Pancrazio. The Villa Corsini, which is situated on the hill in front of that gate, and commands the walls of the city, was guarded by the first company, and their banners extended to the Villa Pamfili. The second brigade joined the left wing of the first, and defended the environs as far as the Porte Angelica. The fourth was stationed in the Piazza Cesarea, and in the Chiesa Nuova, ready to act as a reserve. The cavalry of the third brigade were drawn up in the Piazza Navona.

It was the last day of April. At nine in the morning the first French battalion appeared in the estate of Brevetta, in front of Garibaldi's brigade; there the vanguard stationed itself. The enemy approached on the left hand, then turning towards the cupola of St. Peter, and directing their course on that side, they vigorously assaulted the Porta Angelica and the Porta Cavaleggieri, defended by the second brigade. Garibaldi then pushed forward and attacked the French in flank. They, to turn him, executed a counter-movement towards the Villa Pamfili. Garibaldi was

obliged then to rally his men, and to fall back on Villa Corsini. Finally the bastions of the Vatican were assaulted. The reserve squadron then moved; the carabiniers hastened to reinforce the bastions; the fourth brigade boldly marched to the succour of the first, and the battle became general. Our troops retook the positions they had lost; they drove back the enemy from the Porta St. Pancrazio, and the French placed themselves steadily before the Vatican. The first and fourth brigade advanced impetuously and simultaneously. The enemy then precipitately sounded a retreat, leaving 300 soldiers and seven officers, among whom was a major, prisoners in our hands. The French assembled again in Brevetta, three miles from the city, whence, after a short halt, they fell back to the castle of Guido. While the French artillery was thundering round Rome, the armed populace and the civic militia defended the bastions and guarded the barricades, at each of which were seen the representatives of the people armed with their decorations, and exhorting the combatants.

The people behaved like a disciplined army:

they obeyed the orders of their magistrates, and ran wherever the danger was greatest.

In the meantime, events crowded on. Royal Europe had decreed the fall of our republic. The royalists of Naples, the Spaniards, the Austrians, followed the example of France. The Bourbon arms occupied Velletri and Albone; the Spaniards appeared before Fiumicino, and the Imperialists attacked Bologna.

Garibaldi was sent to drive back the Neapolitans. He arrived at Palestrina, where he halted. The Neapolitans sent a column to attack him; but after a long resistance, they were repulsed.

At this period, valiant Bologna fell, after being assaulted twelve days; vanquished at last by superior forces, after emulating the daring of Brescia, after several times refusing to treat, after the most energetic efforts, it fell like a hunted lion, and fell gloriously.

The Imperialists then turned their arms against Ancona. All around we were encircled with armies and hostile governments, and no ray of hope appeared to lighten the darkness of reactionary Europe.

The assault of Rome created much agitation

in the assembly at Paris. The intentions of those who had proposed the expedition were now clear, and the government was invited. in a public declaration, no longer to turn it from its true object. Lesseps was despatched to Rome. A truce was concluded with France. One treaty of peace was refused: another was proposed by the assembly, and accepted by the two parties. But in France the Legislative Assembly succeeded to the Constituent. The government of France, certainly with the consent of the new legislature, then ordered General Oudinot to recommence the attack; and Oudinot refused to ratify the treaty that Lesseps had signed in his name.

The armistice was declared at an end; but at the same time a promise was made to defer the assault till the 4th of June. This was on the night of the 2nd. The troops had been left in their barracks, not to tire them uselessly: only the advanced posts were on watch. The estate of Villa Pamfili, which backs the city, includes on the left hand a pleasure garden, and on the right a wood. It was guarded by only four hundred soldiers; and on the 3rd

of June it was attacked early in the morning by two brigades,-one commanded by General Molière, and the other by General Jean Levaillant. They advanced together,-the first towards the garden, the other towards the wood. Two other brigades supported these. A large detachment of infantry effected a breach, and entered the villa. Our vanguard, which was stationed in the garden, assembled at the Casino Corsini and at the church of St. Pancrazio; but those who defended the wood found their road intercepted by the enemy's troops, which had entered the villa by the middle gate, and they were taken prisoners. But the others, who had retreated to the church St. Pancrazio and the Casino Corsini, kept up a constant fire of musketry against the enemy, and resisted the attack of at least 8000 French. Vanquished by numbers, they retired to a large house called Vascello, and rallying there, they again advanced against the Casino Corsini, and got possession of it.

At the rumour of this battle, the city was roused, and at five in the morning the division commanded by Garibaldi rushed impetuously out of the city, and met the enemy's troops.

The combat lasted sixteen hours. The Villa Corsini and the Villa Valentini,—both positions necessary to the French to commence the siege,—were retaken by them; they were again regained, and again retaken. The Roman combatants were not military men; their commanders were inexperienced in the science of war, but patriotic love supplied all deficiencies.

Twice the French troops turned back, and twice the battle was renewed by the accession of new forces.

Italian valour was at last vanquished by superior numbers, and by treachery; the enemy remained masters of Villa Pamfili, Villa Corsini, and Villa Valentini. If the battle had been loyal, if Oudinot had kept his word, and not commenced the siege on the eve of the day he fixed, we should have conquered, and a second victory would have proved to our proud invaders that we are still apt for warfare.

In the night, the enemy began their parallels, and the siege commenced. At the same time the Austrian army surrounded and attacked Ancona, while the French artillery thundered against Rome. But Rome resisted till the last extremity; the whole universe was against her; but she protested, while combating and profusely shedding her blood.

The government did not capitulate. The assembly heard the opinion of General Garibaldi, who, after weighing all the chances of war, declared that it would not be possible to resist longer than the 1st of July, and he remained at his post. The French army entered Rome the following day, the 3rd of July, and while the enemy's battalions were encamped on the piazza of the Capitol, the legislators of Rome proclaimed the constitution in the midst of the acclamations of an immense multitude, which remained at the Capitol till French bayonets drove them from that sacred asylum.

But as the grandeur of pagan Rome was transmitted to the minds of catholic Rome, so from the ruins of papacy will arise one day the power of the Roman people, and the third epoch of Italian civilisation.

CHAPTER XIII.

Venetian navy.—Sortie from Brondolo.—Cholera in the capital.

—The Patriarch menaced.—Letter to the Committee of Public Safety.—Attempts at disorder provoked by the enemy.—A battalion in the island of Lido on the point of setting a bad example.—Severity towards a General of the army.—Expedient used to cure the imaginations heated by the erroneous idea of a general sortie.—The author elected a representative of the Assembly.—Declaration which arrived from the General of the National Guard.

I EXPLAINED, in a former chapter, the discontent felt by the government, by the military commission, the entire population, the patriotic circles, and the press, with the Venetian navy. Many officers in small vessels did pretty good service, attacking the enemy, and watching their minutest movements. But when an attack on the squadron outside the Lagoon was discussed, no attempt of any importance could ever be obtained from them. Instead of an energetic law, condemning to infamy those who should prove backward in encountering dangers and

difficulties, the congress, animated by ill-founded hopes, decreed a levy to supply the losses in men which the navy had suffered. This levy, on account of various opposing circumstances, never took place; and it ended in our placing no confidence in the naval division, which was, in fact, our only remaining hope for the prolongation of the defence: since if that division, by a desperate attack, had either destroyed or forced the enemy to retreat from the waters of the Adriatic, we could have obtained bread, and materials for the fabrication of powder, which would have enabled us to return shot for shot.

Towards the end of July, I had obtained in the district of Chioggia the object of my wishes, which was, the retreat of the enemy from the left of the Brenta. Instead of attempting to pass that river, they were obliged to go to a distance, after completing many temporary works, and making vast preparations for the passage. But in warfare we must ever play the part of the wolf, and not of the lamb; that is, we must always threaten, even when we scarcely have the

means of defence; I therefore gave orders to Colonel Novara, who commanded that district, to make small but continual sallies. in order to keep up a menacing attitude. afterwards authorised him to extend the numbers of his column in a sortie to 1000 men, in case the spies brought favourable accounts of the enemy's movements. Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, who was ever anxious to distinguish himself, was then in Chioggia. Colonel Novara confided to him a column of 1000 men. Pushing forward on the side of Conche, he dislodged the enemy from their strong positions, took a flag belonging to the 18th regiment, and brought back near 200 oxen. with wine and corn. If I am not mistaken, this was the only Austrian flag which fell into our hands during the war for independence.

The enemy always contrived to procure useful spies, and to spread reports of all kinds to alarm the population and the garrison. Thus, when the first account of cholera having appeared at Chioggia reached me, I attributed it to these false and alarming rumours; but it was only too true.

Neither I, nor others, failed to foresee how fatal this malady must prove in Venice, where the population was crowded into one quarter of the city. The houses in that inhabited quarter were so full, that whole families were obliged to sleep in one room; the season was even unusually hot, and the provisions were bad. All these circumstances hastened the progress of the contagion, which, when once arrived in the capital, daily struck a multitude of individuals, and especially those who were obliged to sleep either in the streets, or in boats of all sizes. In fact, about a week after the malady first appeared. nearly 150 persons died daily, and even more, according to some of the medical reports. A suitable sanitary commission being established, the government hastened with much zeal, and at no small expense, to provide the poor with all that was needful; and especially to enforce the observance of that separation, which experience has shown to be necessary. One of the obstacles to the cure of the malady was the want of the necessary medicaments. The fires which the bombs occasioned in the uninhabited quarters, created

alarm and confusion; for the proprietors of the burning houses, braving the danger, went to ascertain their losses.

While Venice was thus labouring in the midst of calamities, the combat on her frontiers was carried on with redoubled vigour. and the enemy's endeavours only succeeded in exciting one unaccomplished act of disorder, which, being unique, could not serve as an example. I speak of a tumult directed against the Patriarch, who sympathising, as is ever the case with ecclesiastics, with that power which best and most constantly favoured him, was more attached to the Austrian, than to the republican government of Venice. The exceptions to this are rare: how often is a Capecelatro found at Tarento in the kingdom of Naples; or a Sibour, Archbishop of Paris? This sympathy, this affection, induced the Patriarch to sign an irritating letter to the government. Two or three citizens of ill fame, wishing to pass for exalted patriots, availed themselves of the Cardinal Patriarch's folly to excite a tumult, and had him followed to his house to arrest him. But instead of his apartment, they entered one next to it, which

belonged to the Conte Quirino, and during this time the Patriarch escaped elsewhere. The tumult lasted a very short time; for, on the appearance of some officers and some patriots, and among them Tomaseo, it subsided. A few of the military, either seduced by the civilians, or ignorant of the affair, were among the rioters. Though no trace remained of the tumult, yet to prevent its recurrence, I had the military arrested with the intention of bringing them to judgment. But the civilians, who were the prime authors of the disorder, passed with impunity in the public streets. On this, I wrote the following letter to the Safety Committee, for I saw with grief that the noble and heroic conduct of the population of the Estuary was likely to be sullied.

"To the Committee of Public Safety.

" 4th August.

"On perusing your letter, I must remark that the event which took place at the Patriarchal palace yesterday has caused me much sorrow; for I see honest citizens exposed to the insolence of immorality, and the magnanimous conduct of the inhabitants of the Estuary, during the space of sixteen months, a conduct which has led to immense sacrifices of blood and treasure, is now likely to be tarnished in the eyes of all Italy.

"Already four soldiers (two of whom belong to the corps of Bandiera and Moro, which I so highly esteem) have been brought to judgment; others will be so; and many of the least culpable will be punished by me; while officers, not in active service, who by their discourses in the Piazza of Venice incite to disorder, will be sent to another place of residence.

"But as the real instigators of the infamous pillage yesterday in the house of citizen Count Quirino Stampalia were the civilians, it is indispensable that they should be severely punished; and the least culpable banished from the city of Venice. It will not be difficult to learn the names of these perturbators, for they have already been pointed out to me. If they are not speedily punished, it is impossible to foresee the new shame to which we may be exposed.

"Though my task is only to defend Venice

and the Lagoon from external enemies, yet, as an Italian, I am so humiliated by the disorders of yesterday, that, if the citizens who were the first instigators to the fault in question are not punished, I shall feel myself obliged speedily to resign the command-inchief.

"G. Pepe,

" Commander-in-Chief."

After the elements of the above-mentioned tumult, the origin of which was the Cardinal's imprudence, had been completely destroyed, there arose in the army one of those plots, which, if not repressed in time, entirely destroy discipline.

Some superior officers, of small merit and great presumption, who complained of not having obtained the advancement in rank which they deserved, endeavoured to persuade some of the younger officers, that thousands and thousands of the populace might have been armed, and that, accompanied by a column of soldiers, they might make a vigorous sortie, and return with a vast quantity of provisions, cattle, and saltpetre for gunpowder, or even bring into Venice the

powder itself which was fabricated on terra firma. In consequence of these absurd and evil suggestions, many officers, belonging to the whole army, but among the least esteemed. met to deliberate on the measures to be taken. and on a memorial to be addressed to me. relative to what they termed the grand sortie. I gave orders that evening that the chiefs of corps, and the most ardent members of the commission, should come to me. After showing them the absurdity of their demand, I added that, being in presence of the enemy. all meetings for the purpose of deliberation were a capital crime; that I should pardon it this first time, but that in future I should cause all who met to deliberate on any subject whatever to be arrested and decimated. At the same time I commanded all the superior officers, and particularly the heads of corps, to repair to me every morning at eight o'clock, a.m., with a verbal report of all that concerned discipline and the welfare of their subordinates.

These measures put a stop to all further disorders in the garrison of the city and district of Venice.

But in the neighbouring island of Lido, a battalion of which, for the sake of its valour and the services it had rendered, I will not mention the name, refused to embark for Treporti in order to garrison that fort. Without losing an instant, I charged General Cavadelis to repair immediately to Lido, to form the battalion into a square, and to tell these soldiers that their disobedience had obliterated the remembrance of their own former valorous deeds, and those of their companions in arms. He was to add, that if they did not obey, I should myself go and have them fired on by the two campaign batteries which were there. The battalion obeyed without hesitation.

A general who commanded in an island not far from the capital, forgetting my rigorous orders, which obliged the officers of every grade not to leave their posts, came daily to Venice. I warned him of the fault, which in presence of the enemy became a crime, and I did this in vigorous language. The general wrote me a letter which was injurious to subordination. Among other things he threatened to have recourse to the government to obtain

justice for my sharp proceedings against him. I immediately sent to tell him, through General Cavadelis, that, if he did not write to ask my pardon for the contents of his first letter, I should expedite a detachment of gendarmes to arrest him, and a council of war should on the following day decide his fate. The letter I desired was not long waited for. By these prompt acts of rigour, the most distant indications of insubordination disappeared. In truth, they had very rarely showed themselves in the ranks of the Italian army which defended Venice, and which amounted to nearly 30,000 men, including the three battalions of Charles Albert, the four Roman legions, and the Morandi and Zambeccari battalions, of whom part were recalled, and part remained in their provinces.

I was not contented with having prevented the officers by rigorous means from deliberating on a general sortie; I wished to convince them of the bad faith and ignorance of those who had propagated the idea. I sent the most meddling of them, who was a colonel, to an island near Treporti, and I there wrote to him officially, that I had in mind to accomplish a strong sortie, and to give him the command of it, in case I could not take it myself; that the first object was great booty for the provision of Venice. The colonel was much confused on receiving this letter; he endeavoured to demonstrate to me the immense difficulties of such a sortie, and the impossibility of collecting victuals or saltpetre round that part of the Lagoon, where the country was most unsuited to such attempts. Many copies of this reply were circulated, and exposed him to complete derision.

At that time the population of Venice wished to give me a proof of their esteem by naming me deputy. I knew nothing of this nomination when I received the following decree:—

[&]quot;THE Provisional Government of Venice.

[&]quot;The officer of the 14th Electoral circondario informs H. E. General G. Pepe that, by the votes of that circondario, he is elected a representative in the new assembly convoked by the decree of the 17th July of the present assembly.

"Gassmy, President.

[&]quot; VENICE, 12th August, 1849."

Had Venice remained free, I should not have accepted the honour of being a deputy. Except in certain cases, I should always refuse to serve my country in the quality of deputy in a national assembly.

The cholera, and the increasing fierceness of the enemy's fire, obliged the citizens to abandon their habitations, and take refuge in others not yet touched by the Austrians, or in other islands of the Lagoon. At the same time the ranks of my soldiers were thinned by death, wounds, and above all by sickness, whether cholera, or the annual contagion which visits the islands of the Lagoon, and the marshy lands round Brondolo and the Brenta.

We endeavoured to change the men who mounted guard every twenty-four hours. I applied to the general of the civic guard to give me three hundred of his men during the day, whom I should send to the places least exposed. The general pointed to the causes I have named, and told me with grief how few men he could give in the circumstances in which we were placed, circumstances truly distressing.

CHAPTER XIV.

Admirable conduct of the Venetians.—Meeting of the Assembly and its decree.—The total want of powder and bread forces the Government to treat with the enemy.—The Author's irrevocable determination if the enemy had not granted an honourable capitulation.—Wants of the military provided for.—The Author quits Venice.—Letter from the Municipality, and answer.—Address to the Neapolitan soldiers on the Lagoon.—Conclusion, on the events of the Peninsula.—The Author's address to his countrymen.

The month of August was advancing, and the Venetians gave examples, new to history, of unbounded patriotism. Without wandering among the pages which tell of ancient prowess, we may admire the vigour of Masaniello's fellow citizens; then that of the people of Genoa; and afterwards the Neapolitans, when, outside the walls of the capital and in open campaign, they combated the French army commanded by Championet. Lastly, we have heard with wonder of the deeds done in Milan, Bologna, Brescia. But the desperate valour of the people of Naples, Genoa, Milan, &c.,

we admire and understand: they returned shot for shot. But the people of Venice, surrounded by a Lagoon, and by internal canals, could not fight their assailers; they were compelled to endure patiently bombs, grenades, balls cold and hot, cholera, and famine; and they did indeed fearlessly await and support all these scourges with a resignation I never before either saw or heard of. When in my gondola I went to inspect the batteries in front of the enemy, even women, and persons of every age, down to children, applauded me with their lips and their hands, calling for a long defence; that is to say, for a prolongation of suffering for them all. Among the other disasters which fell on the rich as well as the poor, was the duty of receiving those who had abandoned their homes when within reach of the enemy's fire. Both hosts and guests were straitened for room in that hot summer. To these sufferings, want of food was added; but the courage of the Venetians failed not, and their desire of liberty remained invincible.

On the 6th of August, the assembly met to deliberate on their country's fate. The

deputy Vara thus writes :- "No one wished to precipitate matters; but it had become necessary that some one should have authority to provide, in a prompt and extraordinary manner, for urgent events. Some wished to defer, because the exact condition of the powder magazines was not known, nor that of the public provisions (to continue on alive three weeks longer, the bread was obliged to be deteriorated by mixing rye-flour); others wished to defer, because they still hoped in the navy; some feared that a change in the form of government might be regarded as a signal of approaching death, and as such, disturb the order of the troops, and promote turbulence in the city."

These objections did not prevail. The assembly centred all the powers of government in the President Manin, reserving to itself the ratification of any decision on its political state.

A last effort was made to induce the naval divisions to fulfil the expectations of the people; and at the same time some intercourse was attempted to be renewed with the Austrian authorities, but all in vain. The complete want of bread and gunpowder decided the final fate of these magnanimous forces. The President declared the impending necessity of acts in which neither the representatives of the people, nor any power derived from them, could take part. He abstained from the government, and left the affairs in the hands of the municipality.

If in Venice there had been no assembly; if its surrender, or the prolongation of its defence, had depended on me; if there had been bread and powder for two or four months, or even longer, I should have resisted even at the price of still greater sacrifices to the population and the garrison; because greater glory would have redounded to the Italian name from our defence, when Europe saw us resisting a great empire so long.

But, as we were unable to hold out two more months, or even one, I should have preferred surrendering the Estuary eight days before it was actually surrendered; since those eight days added nothing to our glory, and, in the meantime, many victims fell, and great suffering was occasioned by the fire of the enemy, by the cholera, by the worst food, and the agglomeration of people in confined quarters.

As soon as I knew, in a manner which admitted of no doubt, the small quantity of powder and provisions remaining, being certain, at the same time, that the enemy was not ignorant of our situation, I could not believe that we should obtain an honourable capitulation. I then thought that it could never be fitting for me to say to so many valiant soldiers, among whom were many officers of high merit: "You have done honour to the Italian name, you have suffered immensely; I feel myself compelled, notwithstanding, to leave you at the mercy of the enemy, and myself to embark on a French steamboat, in order to spend some pleasant days in Paris," I had determined, on the contrary, to say to them, "The enemy, abusing our miserable position, has placed us between death and dishonour; you have shown so much virtue that I cannot doubt your choice. Follow me, therefore, to terra firma, where we will, at least, die not unavenged."

Fortunately, we were not compelled to such

a duel of death: for we could not have obtained a more honourable capitulation, if we had had remaining to us gunpowder and provisions enough for one year, instead of for one day.

The government did not forget to provide the soldiers with the necessaries for their journey, and with subsistence for some time. The communal council co-operated in this first measure.

The Commission of War, &c., of which I was President, had, some days before, freighted and provisioned a considerable number of vessels, which were destined to transport to Greece, and, if I mistake not, also to Smyrna, more than 1000 officers, subaltern officers, and people in military employments who preferred leaving the Lagoon by sea.

Thus fell Venice, not vanquished by a great empire, but because she had neither bread nor powder. She fell after sustaining a thousand misfortunes, and after sacrifices on the part of the population which are almost incredible.

I did not interfere in the treaty of surrender, and on the 25th of August, as soon as I was assured that the military in all the Estuary had maintained strict discipline, I embarked on a French war-steamer, with four officers of my staff,—General Ulloa, Colonel Cosenz, Lieutenant-Colonel Assanti, and Major Currano. A moment before I embarked, I received from the municipality the following letter, which proves that those noble minds were heedless of pleasing an enemy expected so speedily to lord it over those illustrious provinces, which had so well deserved, not thraldom, but liberty.

"To his Excellency the illustrious General and eminent Citizen, Guglielmo Pepe.

"EXCELLENCY,

"Venice has had you for the companion of her sacrifices and the sharer of her privations. Your noble deeds have ever equalled the warm interest you have expressed in her fate. Venice must ever regard you as a brother and a friend.

"You have consoled her with that affection which can only be felt for a beloved country. You have been to her generous beyond all example. She must ever entertain for you the most true and heartfelt gratitude.

"In these last moments, when the heart seeks some alleviation by expressing its feelings, deign, Excellency, to permit the civic representatives of Venice, the faithful interpreters of the wishes of the whole city, to express to you their affection, and, while bidding you farewell, to wish you the happiness you deserve.

"GIOVANNI CORRER, Podestá. FRANCESCO DONOR, Assessor. MUZIO ZORZI, Secretary.

" From the Municipality of Venice, Aug. 23rd, 1849."

Answer to the preceding letter :-

"Signori of the Municipality, and its worthy Chief.

"Since my earliest youth, I have ever admired Venice, and fancied that her deeds might worthily compare with those of Greece and Rome. When, after a lapse of many years, I was at the head of an army, and knew that the city of my admiration was in danger, I crossed the Po to hasten to her

assistance; but followed by those alone who, inspired by true glory, dared to defy exile and misfortune.

"During the fifteen months that it has been my fate to defend the Estuary, I have perceived that, in spite of their cruel fortune, the character of the Venetians is unchanged.

"In fact, they have yielded, not to the overwhelming force of a great empire, not to the artillery which has destroyed two-thirds of their city, not to the destructive pestilence of cholera, but solely to the failure of gunpowder and food.

"Such an heroic resistance is due, not alone to the desperate valour of the garrison, but also to the sacrifices and perseverance of this admirable city.

"To so many virtues in the Venetians is constantly added a rare amiability; and of this your letter of to-day, Signori, is a proof which does me great honour, while at the same time it excites my deep emotion.

"Be assured I shall ever feel towards every Venetian the sentiments of a friend and brother.

"To men of generous natures like your vol. 11.

own, my constant ill fortune will not make you appreciate less my sincere affection.

"G. PEPE."

I thought it, at the same time, indispensable to bid adieu to the Neapolitans, who, for the love of Italy, had followed me over the Po, and had combated with such valour and intelligence as to have honoured the Italian as well as the Neapolitan name. I said to them:—

"Officers and soldiers of Naples, who followed your General-in-Chief over the Po for the defence of Venice, as soldiers you have shown yourselves firmly devoted to discipline, and as citizens you have proved yourselves to possess sentiments truly Italian.

"During fifteen months in Venice, you have been the example of every virtue. You have defied mortal maladies, want, the balls of the enemy, and daily mutilation more severe than death.

"In every reconnoissance, the number of the slain which covered the field was larger, in proportion, from your corps than from any other.

"Malghera was commanded by a Neapolitan when it became a mass of ruins.

"The most exposed batteries, the defences on the bridge, and those of St. Secondo which sheltered Venice, the threatened batteries on the Brenta, were all commanded by Neapolitans.

"The Argante of the entire garrison was Rosaroll of Naples, who died gloriously as he had lived in defending the battery of St. Antonio, which he had commanded. In the sortic of Mestre, worthy of long remembrance, Alessandro Poerio, also of Naples, met death while advancing with desperate valour.

"Most brave were all the soldiers who so admirably upheld Venice, and you were bravest among the brave. During these last days, when not the destruction of two-thirds of the illustrious capital, not the cholera which thinned your ranks even more than the artillery of the enemy, but the want of gunpowder and food alone made surrender imperative, you to the last fearlessly maintained discipline inviolate, and won the admiration of the Venetians, who will never forget you.

"Not your General only (who for the third time is going into exile) thanks you for your unparalleled magnanimity, but all Italy, and especially your countrymen, thank you: even the Sicilian King, whatever may be his policy towards you, must still from the bottom of his heart admire you.

"I shall ever be proud of having led you to glory, which will endure while the history of Italian misfortunes continues to be read."

My task is finished. I have been careful in these pages that the reader should meet neither with exaggerated facts nor want of accuracy.

From what I have advanced it must be clear, that we Italians, though not free, are as capable of independence and liberty as other nations who are in possession of those highest blessings; that we might have acquired them without foreign aid, if evil fortune had not been adverse to us in the most important moments. Yet foreigners will still continue to say, "The

Italians are not ripe for liberty;" "The Italians are not yet in a state to act alone." These are not the phrases of conviction, but of that jealousy to which the human race is condemned, like him who voted for the ostracism of Aristides. The superiority of the Italians, which is read of in history from the earliest ages, becomes wearisome; it is annoying to see them sometimes exalted, sometimes oppressed by Fortune, but ever favoured by Nature, ever chafing and unsubdued.

I confess that in myself patriotism is stronger than philanthropy; and that if I were not an Italian, I too should be annoyed at hearing the palm, sometimes for one thing, sometimes for another, always given to the Peninsula. When the Etruscan greatness ceased, that of Magna Græcia and Sicily commenced, and was often superior to the fame of Greece itself. When Tarento, Sibari, Reggio, Cotrone, Metaponto, Agrigento, and Syracuse, declined, behold Rome embracing the known world by the power of mind and arms. The great empire fell, not without leaving immortal traditions, and there arose Venice, Florence,

Genoa. The whole of their population would scarcely equal a quarter of London, yet the fame of these cities filled the world; and even at this day, history is full of this people. of their power, their deeds, their civilisation. That the conquerors of the world, that Rome should have produced the greatest captains, was to be expected; but that the same Peninsula, without land or sea armaments, should have produced a Doria, a Columbus, a Montecucoli, Eugene of Savoy, Massena, Bonaparte, seems miraculous. Again, foreigners, when they visit Italy in order to know what is most beautiful and admirable in art, seem to pay a forced tribute. But what more than anything else disquiets the Ultramontanes, is to see this people of enslaved Italy, corrupted by their own and by foreign despots, enfeebled by the fine arts and by every refinement, still from time to time taking up their arms, and using them better than the most warlike nations. Though the Italians have not burnt another Moscow to expel their invaders, yet a brawl in Palermo expelled the House of Anjou from Sicily; and a fisherman in Naples drove out the

Spaniards, who were supported by a fleet and by three castles. The Genoese did the same by the Austrians shut within their walls. Half a century ago the Neapolitans abandoned their city, and met the French army under Championet in open campaign. The Milanese latterly, after five days' combat, vanquished and drove out the Austrian army, who were supported by a strong citadel; and the valour of Milan was soon after renewed in Brescia. But neither these facts, nor the destruction of 20,000 Austrians round Venice, will prevent it from being said, "The Italians do not fight."

When the valour which was displayed in the defence of Rome cannot be denied, the deputies of a generous people exclaim, "It is true they fought in the defence of Rome, but the combatants were foreigners." These foreigners were from the Roman provinces and Rome itself, assisted by Lombards, Bolognese, Neapolitans, Sicilians.

Is it not evident that, beyond the Alps, the constant superiority of Italy, in every enterprise, cannot be pardoned? It is to you, Italians, that are now addressed these last words of your fellow-countryman, of your brother, the veteran in the field, and in the internal movements of the last fifty years, with the hope that my counsels may still be of some use to you. I will here write down my act of faith, which may be collected from every action of my life, but which I will shortly recapitulate.

The republic is in my heart, and has been there since I first lisped the pages of ancient story.

In my fifteenth year I shed my blood for the Parthenopean republic. The heroes of these provinces, dear to nature, who had renounced riches and social honours to fraternise with the people, so exalted my young imagination, that chains and privations seemed to me jests, and I even envied the martyrs who suffered on the scaffold.

When, after being driven into exile, I crossed the great St. Bernard with the republican army of Marengo, amid which I fought, my thoughts were continually transported to Rome, Sparta, and Athens. After

passing alternately through camps and prisons, I arrived at the highest military grade, and found myself in an abject court, which never dazzled me. My illusions had vanished with my early youth, but the love of liberty never left my breast.

In 1819, at the risk of losing my rank and liberty, I sent away from my head-quarters at Avellino the Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetti, because he had been one of the judges who had condemned to death Murat, their late King. But whilst this same Murat reigned, I, his general, conspired three times in order to oblige him to give a constitution to my enslaved country.

Man is weak by nature, and in servitude he becomes low and despicable; liberty alone, by exalting him, cancels in great part his natural defects. These reflections never abandoned me. I, who in my political vicissitudes had never once the misfortune to cause blood to be shed, yet highly admired Sylla. I saw the most honoured courtiers, at the approach of misfortune, betray their King and country; but the exile Sylla, not to abase

the glory of Rome, then ruled by his rival Marius, proudly refused the assistance of Mithridates.

The year 1820 approached, and I was on the point of obtaining a guarantee of high independence for Italy; when sad destiny prevented me from making the Emperor Francis, Ferdinand I., Metternich, and Medici my captives. Not long after, at the head of 40,000 men I entered Naples, and while demanding wide institutions from my King, I sent a man who cried "Viva la Repubblica" to the castle of St. Elmo; and I did this because I loved my country better than a republic, and in the condition of Europe at that moment I asked not what I most desired, but what was most useful.

In May 1848 I commanded the Neapolitan army which was to combat the Austrians; instead of obeying the order for their recal I consulted the interests of Italy, passed the Po, and hastened to defend the Venetian republic. Yet I was afterwards a partisan of the fusion with Sardinia. "How," I heard it said, "do you like a King?"

Certainly I am for him, since he has compromised himself in the cause of independence, since he can dispose of nearly 100,000 men, and form by the fusion a kingdom of 11,000,000 of Italians, including Genoa and Venice. During the short period of the fusion a citizen of note, who had belonged to the last government, presented himself to me and said, "There are reports current, that Charles Albert is sending a large body of troops into Venice with evil views; what will you do if this is verified?"—I should oppose their entrance into the Lagoon, since their mission should be, not to encumber it, but to combat the Austrians.

A month later, before the disasters of Novara, I wrote to the Sardinian King, that, though by character averse to kings, I should be the first to proclaim his Majesty King of all Italy, as soon as he passed the Isonzo. Thus, in the midst of apparent contradictions, my aim has ever been Italian independence.


In reference to past events I blame those who, instead of encouraging Charles Albert, deserted him on inopportune pretexts. I blame the patriots in Naples, who ran to





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time.

Please return promptly.

Dur HAFFT W?

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